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Abstract

This study investigates the dramatic nature of William Blake’s multimedia art (poetry,
painting, engraving) and the resulting implications for identity. Although he wrote little
conventional drama, his illuminated works resonate with theatre and performance. The
recent surge of Romantic scholarship devoted to theatricality and dramatic stagings offers
new perspectives for understanding Blake’s art form and his conception of identity and
identity-formation. The initial chapters of this project explore the way the dynamism
between word and image in his works not only creates a distinctly dramatic genre but
also encourages a specifically theatrical audience, one which is called on to act. Chapter
one situates Blake in the theatre discourses of his time and interprets the illuminated
works as a dramatic form that unsettles the binaries of mind/body, interior/exterior,
reading/performance. The second chapter examines the opposing tendencies toward
immersion and distancing in his works by drawing on contemporary media theory,
Brecht’s alienation-effect, and medieval presence; Blake provokes a twofold process of
alienation that leads to a self-conscious entrance into his works. Subsequent chapters
examine individual and communal identity in light of Blake’s dramatic elements and
contemporary theories of performativity, subjectivity, and identity-construction. Chapter
three rereads The Book ofUrizen as a melodrama—a major dramatic form in the
Romantic period—that locates the source of the fall in a kind of Althusserian
interpellation, wherein individuals misrecognize themselves and are misrecognized as
independent and isolated identities rather than as interrelated and dependent ones. The
final chapter explores Milton and its depiction of inspiration and self-annihilation and the
emerging tension between essentialist and constructivist notions of identity through the
lens of theories of performativity, action, and performance. By viewing the illuminated
works as dramatic performances and by analyzing them in relation to theatre and
performativity, this study shows how Blake fits an alternative view of Romanticism, one
that foregrounds vision, exteriority, and community. Moreover, it argues that Blake’s
works uphold a model of identity based on action and an integration of mind and body,
the imagination and the senses, and singularity and multiplicity.
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Introduction

Drama and identity form the two intersecting lines of inquiry into the illuminated works
of William Blake. My use of the term drama encompasses its multi-faceted nature:
dramatic composition, theatre, performance, performativity, theatricality, the stage,
acting, embodiment, exteriority, the body, the senses, spectacle, and visuality. I argue that
situating Blake’s works within the discussions of theatre and performance of his day
provides an alternative understanding of his composite art—one that leads to viewing
these works as part of the dramatic genre. In addition, the aspects of performance and
performativity that this context raises show that his conception of identity is relevant to
our current attempts to think through identity.
While Blake’s obviously dramatic pieces, such as the unfinished (or barely begun)
history plays of Poetical Sketches'— King Edward the Third? Prologue to King Edward
the Fourth, and Prologue to King John—may appear to be more likely texts for an
exploration of Blake and drama, I argue that Blake’s illuminated works provide a much
more layered and significant contribution to discussions of drama and theatre. These
early compositions have garnered some attention, but, in most cases, critics tend to mark
these youthful forays into the dramatic as separate from his later works: “Otherwise
Blake seems to have had no direct interest either in drama or in the theatre” (Webb 13).
Thus, these dramatic fragments are viewed merely as early experiments in the dramatic
form, clearly isolated from his later works, rather than as the beginning of a larger body
of works that are, in fact, dramatic performances. For critics, Blake remains very much
on the periphery of these issues. However, rethinking the image-text relationship of
Blake’s engravings in terms of the dramatic and its associations provides a space to

1 F. R. Leavis suggests that this whole work, not just the few dramatic pieces, have a dramatic
quality. Specifically, he refers to poems entitled “Song” and argues that they adapt and allude to
Shakespeare’s plays in tone and topic (73-76).
2 Despite its incompleteness, this work encouraged John Egerton to list Poetical Sketches, Blake’s
early poetry and only work to be published by conventional channels, in the 1788 volume o f Egerton’s
“chronicle o f the drama” (Bentley, Blake Records 49).
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revision his relationship to his cultural moment as well as new insights into his composite
art and his conception of identity and identity-formation.
“Dramatic” and “performance” are not particularly strange terms to use when
describing Blake’s illuminated works—critics have long employed them. More than half
a century ago, Northrop Frye, in Fearful Symmetry: A Study o f William Blake (1947), saw
Blake in relation to drama. Tracing the evolution of Blake’s artistic output with respect to
form, Frye explains that, after writing epics, Blake still had time for “a crowning period
of dramatic art” (405). Frye implies that turning to drama would have been the natural
end of Blake’s career. But Blake did not write dramas; rather, he turned toward fresco
painting. Addressing this fact, Frye asserts:
drama proper demands a public support of a kind Blake was not very
likely to receive [...] the stage and he could never have been friends, and
in any case the silent unity of vision in painting makes painting at least
equally good as a dramatic medium, and a medium that Blake had already
mastered. And of all forms of painting, fresco-painting on walls of public
buildings is the most obviously dramatic. (405-06)
Although Frye explains that Blake’s lack of an audience impeded the natural progression
of his career toward drama, it is significant that Frye sees Blake in relation to both drama
and performance, even if only in his frescoes.
Scholars also apply the terms dramatic and performance to Blake in terms of
content. W. J. T. Mitchell says of the figures in Blake’s designs, “His characters [...] are
[...] busy acting out a visionary dumb show in a realm of sensuous [...] immediacy”
(Blake’s Composite Art 29), thus granting the designs a theatrical dynamism. Regarding
Blake’s grand vision of humanity at the end of his last epic, Tristanne Connolly argues,
Eternal communication in Jerusalem has its own special medium: the
‘Visionary forms dramatic’ [...] are akin to Blake’s illuminated works, yet
they go further. For one thing, they are dramatic. Blake’s graphic and
poetic bodies come as close to movement as is possible in their static
medium, through the energy of the figures. [...] Visionary forms dramatic
overcome the restrictions on movement imposed by two-dimensional
prints. (208)
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Connolly acknowledges the explicit dramatic quality of Blake’s visions and draws a
parallel between them and his composite art, though she ultimately denies the illuminated
works the kind of theatricality present in “Eternal communication” because, as she says,
they exist in a “static medium”; Eternity’s dramatic forms escape this limitation by
“[surpassing the limitations of earthly media.”
Nelson Hilton refers to “Blake’s plates and pages as a theater of text where he
staged his multimedia ‘Visionary forms dramatic’” (“[Blake] & the Play o f ‘Textuality’”
86). Here, theatre is employed at the service of the word; textuality, not dramatic
performance, is Hilton’s concern. His discussion centres on the problem of transcribing
into print the words Blake etched on his plates. However, focusing on the medium of
Blake’s composite art, G. E. Bentley, Jr. and, later, John H. Jones claim that the
illuminated works and their various copies are each one a performance. Nevertheless,
while Blake scholars occasionally refer to the dramatic quality of his works, or categorize
his works as performances, rarely do these references or categorizations go further to
assess how the performative quality of Blake’s works influences the audience’s
experience of them or how the works relate to actual dramatic performance—something I
do in this study.
Despite the hinted parallels between the illuminated works and drama, Blake,
unlike many other major Romantic poets, is still excluded from most analyses of
Romantic drama and performance. This is somewhat surprising considering that criticism
of Romantic drama has steadily progressed over the past two decades, moving from
analyses that attended strictly to textual dimensions of plays by many of the so-called
“major” Romantic writers to analyses that broaden their scope to include performative
and theatrical aspects of canonical as well as non-canonical writers and dramatists of the
period. In addition, much of the scholarship has been concerned with how issues of
identity are shaped and constructed by theatre and performance, as well as social
theatricality in general. For instance, David Worrall’s recent book Theatric Revolution:
Drama, Censorship and Romantic Period Subcultures 1773-1832 (2006) goes beyond the
specifics of play-texts, addressing the marginal spaces of performance and spotlighting
the pervasiveness of the theatrical in Romantic society: “Theatricality was a mode of
public being, a representation of self which was not confined to dramas performed in the
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playhouses” (2). Where once critics avoided Romantic theatre culture, except for
examining the so-called closet drama of the major Romantic poets, now many
wholeheartedly embrace Romantic performances of all kinds.
Facing a far different critical climate more than two decades ago, Jeffrey Cox
challenged critics who had been “hedged in their evaluation of [Romantic drama]” (xi)
and dramatists. In his book In the Shadows o f Romance: Romantic Tragic Drama in
Germany, England, and France (1987), Cox explored what many viewed as the
Romantic “failure” to produce tragedy as compared to Elizabethan success. He dispels
the notion of “failure,” showing how Romantic literature attempted to revive tragedy and
produced some important works. Cox concludes, “[R]omantic tragic drama was a
doomed attempt to preserve a vision that life no longer supports,” thereby locating the
root of the problem not in Romantic writers but in historical circumstances and in the loss
of faith in an ultimately ordered and heroic world (254). By focusing on history, Cox
provides a positive analysis of Romantic drama. In part, Alan Richardson follows this
positive attitude, providing a strong argument for reading closet drama—so-called
unstageable drama or drama intended to be read rather than performed—as “the invention
of a fundamentally new poetic form,” rather than as the evidence of a poet’s “‘retreat’
from the theater” (3). Richardson discusses the drama of the period in terms of success or
failure under his own criteria: a successful drama offers “a dynamic conception of
character as inherently unstable, changing, formed and reformed through dramatic
confrontation” (5). Julie A. Carlson, while appreciating Richardson’s efforts to re
evaluate Romantic drama, rightly criticizes him for “[doing] so at the expense of theatre”
(14), as he embraces only the act of private reading, thereby subordinating and excluding
performance. Aligning myself with critics such as Carlson, I hope to show how Blake’s
connection to drama undermines the hierarchy of text over performance.
Like Carlson, Catherine B. Burroughs pays particular attention to the gendered
politics of theatre and performance. She explores Joanna Baillie’s particular role in
theatre history and identity-formation in Closet Stages: Joanna Baillie and the Theater
Theory o f British Romantic Women Writers (1997). Burroughs broadens the definition of
the closet to include private spaces of performance such as the home—a domestic space
traditionally in the power of women—and she considers it as a theatrical space in which
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people, often the upper-class, produced plays for private entertainment. By opening the
category of closet theatre to more than just private reading, Burroughs destabilizes
conventional assumptions about the closet and the stage, assumptions I examine more
closely. Burroughs argues that these kinds of performances have the effect of
“encouraging a serious self-consciousness about the performative features of social
acting” (144) and identity. This specifically dramatic and performance-based notion of a
flexible identity, of room to change one’s place in the social system, is significant to how
I see Blake’s dramatic characterizations correlating to Romantic drama.
Unlike J. L. Austin’s use of the term performative, Burroughs’s use of the term
relates primarily to acting and performance, both onstage and in actual life. Austin
initially outlined the performative in his speech-act theory in a series of lectures
published as How to Do Things with Words (1962). In opposition to fictional texts, he
focuses on the effects of language and how an utterance does what it says it does—how it
makes itself happen. For example, the words “I now pronounce you husband and wife” in
a marriage ceremony actualize the state of matrimony but only when spoken by someone
invested with the proper authority (a minister for instance). Despite the fact that he
excluded the realm of art and literature from his discussions of the performative, critics
have fruitfully used the Austinian performative for analyzing fiction, including Blake’s
works.
Centralizing Austin’s discussion of the (perlocutionary) effects of the
performative on literature, Leopold Damrosch Jr. refers to the relation between Blake and
the performative in Symbol and Truth in Blake’s Myth (1980). Damrosch builds on Frye’s
work by focusing on the symbol as Blake’s central creative force and by emphasizing
Frye’s point that “there can be no ‘key’ and no open-sesame formula and no patented
system of translation” (7) by which to interpret Blake (though Frye proceeds to provide a
cohesive way to engage with Blake’s complicated symbology). Damrosch argues,
“[Blake’s] symbols are mental constructs which create, rather than mirror, the reality they
claim to represent” (11); they are dynamic tools that explore imaginative territories and
spaces, not “simple, univalent counters chosen arbitrarily to illustrate predetermined
truth” (95). Damrosch concludes his study by linking Blake’s use of language to the
Austinian performative, arguing that Blake’s works “exemplify Austin’s perlocutionary
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acts [...] they invade the reader’s mind and attempt to transform his world” (358). His
brief engagement with the performative ends by defining Blake’s works “not [as] printed
documents but [as] living acts” (363). The creative and transformative aspects that
Damrosch articulates raise the issue not only of Blake’s expectations of his audience but
also his views on the nature of identity—issues I will address.
The performative is also the basis for Angela Esterhammer’s Creating States:
Studies in the Performative Language o f John Milton and William Blake (1994). She
explores the performative in Blake more extensively than Damrosch does, establishing
the relationship between prophetic language in poetry and the performative. Esterhammer
makes the useful distinction between sociopolitical performatives, which relate to
institutional power, and phenomenological performatives, which relate to linguistic
power. She analyzes the ways in which Milton and Blake approach visionary language,
subjectivity, and authority through these kinds of performative speech acts. Her
investigation of “the effectiveness of [Blake’s] words” (163) and the performative’s
relationship to “the act of creating states,” such as “the name of a city, a community of
people, an individual [...] a state of consciousness, and a poem” (177), all in a social and
political context, provides a valuable point of reference for my engagement with Blake
and performativity. Esterhammer illuminates the way Blake constitutes himself as
prophet and how he uses language to create states of being. Her arguments prompt my
engagement with issues of identity and performance in terms of the capability of Blake’s
works to effect changes—visionary and socio-political—in his characters and audience.
While Austin’s performative theory is rooted in linguistic analysis, theatrical
performativity encompasses acting, physical action, artificiality, spatial relations, and
spectatorship and offers insights into past and current conceptions of identity and
identity-formation. Like Burroughs, many drama and theatre critics, both implicitly and
explicitly, take up this notion of the performative with respect to identity. For instance,
Jonas Barish and Erika Fischer-Lichte more generally raise issues of identity in relation
to drama as a form. Barish provides a comprehensive history of antitheatrical sentiment
in the Western world in The Antitheatrical Prejudice (1981). He traces the various
reasons for the negative response to theatre and dramatic performance over the centuries,
but the one reason that appears repeatedly is the anxiety provoked by the actor’s self and
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the ability of the actor to take up different roles or identities. He links the actor to
Proteus, the shape-shifting god of the sea,3 an image that resonates in almost every
chapter and epoch. Barish’s central protean metaphor is especially useful in linking Blake
with drama because his characters and works are continually exhibiting mutability. His
characterizations undermine all certainty, such as those that arise in Milton where the
Bard, Milton, Los, Albion, Blake, and his brother Robert all share and merge identities.
Barish’s protean image of actors establishes Blake’s connection to acting and to
performance, a key focus of my final chapter.
Fischer-Lichte’s History o f European Drama and Theatre (2002) has interesting
parallels to and resonances with Barish’s study. She makes the formation of identity the
cornerstone of Western drama and attempts to “write a history of European theatre as a
history of identity” (4). Fischer-Lichte begins with Rousseau’s condemnation of an actor,
which stems from the fact that he “has no identity of his own” (1) and then proceeds to
show the ways in which various plays have shaped (and continue to shape) social
identities in their given historical periods. She argues, “[Tjheatre creates highly unusual
situations for the spectators which allow them to experience wholly new things. If the
spectators are able to adopt these experiences consciously [...] the performance can lead
them to shed the old identity, and take on a new one” (69). This interchange between
performance and audience, and between imaginative realms and socio-political ones,
constitutes one of my central interests in Blake and his conception of identity.
Romantic theatre scholarship has used the relationship between theatrical
performance and identity productively. While Burroughs and Carlson investigate
Romantic theatre’s potential as an imaginative space where identity can be transferred
and then translated into social and political spaces, Judith Pascoe focuses on the way
theatrical performance confuses “actual” identity. In Romantic Theatricality: Gender,
Poetry, and Spectatorship (1997), she highlights the central role that women have played
in the Romantic world of drama, both literary and theatrical. Pascoe argues that the
notion of the sincere, authentic, and original (and often male) Romantic writer is a false
construct given “the performative aspects of early romantic literary culture as a whole”
(1). Even the courts, she recounts, were not exempt from these aspects. In the 1794
3 See chapter four, “Puritans and Proteans,” in particular (80-131).
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treason trials in particular, lawyers’ “performances were pitched to ensure wide public
support,” showing how lawyers treated the courtroom as a theatre and the audience as
spectators (57). Their performances changed to suit a female or male audience. In
addition, Pascoe claims that Wordsworth, like many of the writers of the time, performed
a role that the literary marketplace created by way of celebrity and even that he
consciously played up this persona. For instance, there are several depictions of
Wordsworth reading to Dorothy, as Milton had done with his daughters, a representation
of Wordsworth that suggests “he was fashioning himself as a poet at a time when the art
world was enamored of Milton that highlighted his relationship to a female audience”
(202). Celebrity, then, creates an ambiguous relationship between people’s “authentic”
identities and their audience/media-generated ones. But where is the line? Pascoe’s
argument challenges stable notions of identity and suggests the absurdity of absolute
labeling or classifications. These explorations of identity and performance in the
Romantic period offer new ways to examine Blake’s conception of identity, provoking
questions about its nature and the implications for a larger social context.
Romantic scholarship has re-evaluated Romantic-period drama and theatricality
not only by recovering forgotten or ignored works and dramatists but also by placing a
greater emphasis on Romantic performances. However, in large part, these dialogues
have remained silent about Blake’s relation to drama and the stage. This reticence has not
prevented Blake from appearing on the modem stage. People have been staging Blake’s
works since the 1920s. Sir Geoffrey Keynes, a major proponent of reigniting interest in
the poet-painter in the twentieth century, conceived of a Job Ballet based on Blake’s
illustrations for the Book of Job. After some failed attempts to get it staged, Keynes
finally succeeded in 1931, when it was performed in London under the title Job: A
Masque for Dancing, with the score composed by Ralph Vaughan Williams, the set
design by Gwen Raverat, and the scenario by Keynes. In an interview, Keynes explained
his motivation for the project: “it seemed to be that the pictures were asking for the
chance to be put into motion. In all the engravings, Blake’s attitude was so characteristic
and so striking; they seemed to want to move from the page and on to the stage” (Ries
19). Keynes spots an energy in Blake’s designs, one that seems suited for enactment.
With Job, the focus is on Blake’s images rather than his text.
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More recently, Blake scholar Joseph Viscomi adapted An Island in the Moon, one
of Blake’s own texts, for the stage in 1983 at Cornell University, a production which
included original music and added songs from other works by Blake. This text lends itself
to dramatic performance thanks to the inclusion of dialogue among characters and a
number of songs. There have also been productions that put Blake the man on stage, such
as in Adrian Mitchell’s Tyger (1982) and Thomas Kilroy’s Blake (completed in 2001, but
unpublished), focusing on the relationship between Blake and his wife, Catherine. As the
tradition of staging Blake and his work continues into the new millennium, some
contemporary productions turn to Blake’s illuminated works. Richard Ramsbotham’s
company Amador, based in the UK, produced a one-man performance called “William
Blake’s ‘Milton’” (Swansea and London 2007 and 2008). Ramsbotham adapts Blake’s
Milton, turning the epic into a theatrical experience by performing solo as he interacts
with large-scale projections of Blake’s engravings, mostly from the epic, that appear on
the back wall of the stage while a live orchestra accompanies the spectacle.
By contrast, the Theatre of Eternal Values (TEV), a production company founded
in 1996 in Gent, staged a large ensemble piece called William Blake’s Divine Humanity:
A Dramatisation o f the Visionary Artist’s Life and Work for the Blake250 Festival in
London in 2007. As their website states, “Visual images of Blake’s work and the stories
of Job and Jerusalem interweave with the unfolding drama of Blake’s life to enact the
inner drama within Blake’s soul.” Their online video clip shows them acting out
illustrations and poems such as “Infant Joy.” The performance also includes dance and
music and large ensemble pieces, as they make Blake the star of his own works. TEV’s
most recent Blake project is Eternity in an Hour (first performed in 2008 in Helsinki and
currently lined up for New York in August 2010). The show “interweaves scenes from
William Blake’s life with his poems, paintings and imagery, incorporating live music,
physical theatre and contemporary dance” (2-3). Focusing primarily on the Songs, Milton,
and Jerusalem and eyewitness accounts found in Alexander Gilchrist’s biography of
Blake, it delineates Blake’s life from childhood to adulthood, where he becomes “a
revolutionary hero, rousing up the artistic youth of London” (6-7).
One significant offshoot of this theatrical enterprise is the accompanying
workshop that the group offers, primarily to students. The purpose of the workshop is
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“exploring the vast world of Blake and his major themes through one’s own body, music
and poetry. The aim is to enhance the participants’ knowledge of William Blake (artist,
engraver and visionary poet) through direct experience, led by a theatrical process” (40
41). Drawing on reason, imagination, emotion, and the body—the four Blakean Zoas—as
well as some of Blake’s poetry, members of the theatre company take the participants
through exercises of bodily movement and improvisation (42-43). The composition and
goals of this workshop most explicitly show how modem theatre can productively
combine Blake’s works and the theatre. Thus, contemporary theatrical productions show
the suitability of translating the illuminated works to the stage.
The contemporary examples of stage performances of Blake suggest that there is
something about his works that people find theatrical and appropriate for the stage. But
what were Blake’s thoughts about drama and performance? It is revealing that his works
include a number of performances and dramatic moments. In many of his designs,
characters are often in the middle of an action, whether it is walking, playing, dancing,
falling, flying, or crawling, not to mention those whose arms are thrusting apart or whose
bodies are gripped in the throes of pain. Besides a work such as Songs, in which the
performance aspect is stressed by virtue of being named songs and by being a metrical
arrangement that invites public performances in the form of reading or singing out loud,
Blake’s other more satiric or prophetic books maintain the performance aspect, albeit
without the mellifluous metrical arrangement in many cases. For example, in the pastiche
form of The Marriage o f Heaven and Hell, Blake incorporates sections entitled “The
Voice of the Devil,” “A Song of Liberty,” and the “Chorus,” all of which put an emphasis
on the dramatic (as opposed to the sections entitled “The Argument,” the “Proverbs of
Hell” and the “Memorable Fancies”). In addition, Blake chooses dramatic scenes to
delineate, where an ensemble performs, rather than using the lyrical method to convey his
ideas. The majority of his works centre on the interactions and dialogues of several
characters. Rather than employing a narrator to speak for the characters, Blake allows
them to express themselves directly in the text and designs. In fact, unlike lyrical poetry,
his own position in the works is often that of character—not a conventional speaker—so
that the audience remains excluded from his (and the other characters’) interiority. Thus,
the form and content of his illuminated works suggest performance.
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Furthermore, in the 1780s, Blake attended the literary salon of Mrs. Mathew,
where he is said to have sung his poetry in front of the gathered guests (Bentley, Blake
Records 120). John Thomas Smith states, “Blake wrote many [...] songs, to which he
[...] composed tunes. These he would occasionally sing to his friends; and [...] his ear
was so good, that his tunes were sometimes most singularly beautiful, and were noted
down by musical professors” (500). The fact that he sung his works out loud and in front
of an audience suggests that he was open to performance and did not see his works as
part of only the mental sphere (as I will discuss in chapter one). Perhaps the most famous
performance Blake gave was the private one he gave with his wife, when the two of them
read Milton’s Paradise Lost out loud to each other as they sat naked in their garden. This
anecdote has been discredited in light of refutations by Thomas Butts’s grandson, John
Linnell, and Samuel Palmer. Bentley adds, “There is no contemporary evidence to
support the story” (xxvi-xxvii). Despite its dubious authenticity, the anecdote does fit
nicely with an image of Blake who was not confined to his intellectual life, as well as
with the performance aspects so central to the illuminated works. His performance of
Paradise Lost resonates with his earlier performances of his own poems as well as with
his tendency toward dramatic expression in his art.
Blake’s references to and experiences with the theatre world of London are few
and far between, but even these few examples suggest that he was not completely severed
from it. He does offer comments pertaining directly to stage performance. In his
Descriptive Catalogue (1809), he considers the difference between the page and the
stage. Blake offers his rationale for the way he depicts various literary and dramatic
characters with the example of what, by his estimation, is a mistaken interpretation of the
witches in Macbeth. He argues, “Those who dress them for the stage, consider them as
wretched old women, and not as Shakespeare intended” (E 535). In this case, Blake
implies that some performances get the text wrong, but, more significantly, his criticism
shows his familiarity with stagings of Shakespeare, whose plays Blake illustrated.4

4

For instance, he illustrated scenes from Macbeth, Henry IV, and As You Like It, as well as

engraving a plate after John Opie’s painting o f a scene from Romeo and Juliet for the Boydell Shakespeare
Gallery (Burwick, “Introduction: Gallery, Artists, and Engravers” 19).
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Another comment about the theatre negates a general dismissal of performance. In
an 1805 letter to his patron William Hayley, Blake dabbles in a bit of mainstream gossip
and celebrity, offering his two cents on the current rage in London for a boy actor: “The
Town is Mad Young Roscius like all Prodigies is the talk of Every Body I have not seen
him & perhaps never may. I have no Curiosity to see him as I well know what is within
the compass of a boy of 14. & as to Real Acting it is Like Historical Painting No Boys
Work” (E 764). The boy in question was William Henry West Betty, known as Master
Betty or Young Roscius. He performed at Covent Garden Theatre for a short time in the
early nineteenth century. Blake does not preclude the possibility of seeing the boy
perform and does not express disdain for the stage itself. Rather, the boy’s youthfulness
and inexperience form the foundation of Blake’s criticism. Moreover, Blake’s comment
implies respect for the profession of acting as an art form, equating it with painting,
thereby elevating theatrical performance. According to him, it takes someone properly
trained and skilled in the profession of acting or painting in order to produce something
of true value. This one brief digression in the letter indicates that Blake was acquainted
enough with the acting of his day to feel himself a fair judge of a boy he had not seen
perform, and he implies that the theatre is not an unusual place for him to visit.
Alongside textual references to the theatre, Blake also makes pictorial ones.
Specifically, he depicts a performance space in one of his most well-known paintings: in
The Ghost o f a Flea (c. 1819-20), Blake chooses a stage-like setting with wooden
floorboards and half-drawn curtains for a grotesque-looking creature—a flea,
representing men who were in their human lives blood-thirsty conquerors. According to
John Varley, Blake based this work on one of his visions. In an article about The Flea in
The Guardian, Jonathan Jones says, “Blake’s flea is evil, gothic, grotesque, stalking
through a starry realm between stage curtains—walking the boards, in fact, as if the artist
had ensnared this creature to appear in a spectacle at Drury Lane Theatre.” Jones talks of
Blake making a spectacle of the flea and envisions a performance at one of the Theatres
Royal. Caught in mid stride, the flea holds his bowl for the blood of the victims he drinks,
making a spectacle of himself and performing for an audience, the spectators who sit in
front of the curtain in a darkened auditorium.
The only evidence that Bentley offers for Blake’s actual visits to the theatre
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comes late in Blake’s life. John Linnell, an artist and friend of Blake in his later years,
often took Blake out. And Aileen Ward notes, Linnell, John Constable, and Blake
“attended exhibitions and occasionally the theater and opera” (32). Bentley describes at
least one of these theatrical outings: “Besides artistic exhibitions, Linnell took Blake to
see plays, which Blake is not known to have done much previously. ‘Tuesday 27 [March]
[...] to the Theatre Drury Lane with Mr Blake’ to see Sheridan’s Pizarro [...]” (Blake
Records 377). Here, Bentley quotes from Linnell’s journal entry from 1821, a mere six
years before Blake’s death. Another entry suggests that Linnell took Blake to see John
Dryden’s Oedipus in November of the same year and they “were much entertained”
(380). Although historical records of his play-going days pertain only to the late stages of
his life, this does not preclude the possibility of his attending the theatre earlier or of the
theatre’s impact on his ideas of art, acting, and identity. Indeed, Blake’s response to the
boy actor at the beginning of the nineteenth century—around the time he was working on
Milton and Jerusalem—suggests otherwise. His later documented excursions to
playhouses, then, just reaffirm that he was no stranger to being a spectator, nor did he shy
away from the theatre.
More general associations or possible associations with theatre people include a
potential meeting with playwright Thomas Holcroft sometime in the 1780s when Blake
was very near publisher Joseph Johnson’s circle (which also included Fuseli—with
whom Blake was friends—Godwin, Wollstonecraft, and Paine) (Bentley, Blake Records
55); a confrontation (in Lambeth, where Blake lived for a time) with Philip Astley, who
built and ran Astley’s Theatre, known for large-scale productions (Tatham 507); a
possible connection to well-known scene designer and painter Philippe de Loutherbourg5
through Mrs. Mathew who patronized his assistant as well as Blake (Bentley 30); and a
link to Sarah Siddons, who—at the end of the eighteenth century—lived near Blake’s
friend and patron Thomas Butts, while Blake himself lived a short distance away from
them (90). Recently, Worrall has made the case that Blake and his wife were inevitably
influenced by their theatrical and radical environment when they lived at 3 Fountain
5

As Peter Thomson explains, de Loutherbourg was known for his “innovatory lighting

techniques” and as “an inventive machinist” for grand spectacles and special effects, and “he had a vision
to translate landscape from canvas to stage” (155).
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Court, Strand in 1821, near the end of Blake’s life: “far from entering a London area
suitable for a quiet semi-retirement, they found themselves relocated to the very centre of
the capital’s theatreland and radical press industries” (“Blake in Theatreland” 26).
Worrall argues that popular culture as it manifested itself in the theatres and the presses
near Blake’s final home made an impression on and elicited responses from Blake that
can be traced in his engravings of that time, specifically the illustrations for the Book of
Job. As Worrall suggests, the Blakes could not ignore the “networks of a commercially
oriented sociability” (28) and “the intricate continuities [...] between Fountain Court,
Regency pressmen, the acting profession and a vigorous local popular culture” (31).
What all these possible encounters and references to theatre reveal is that Blake certainly
was not isolated from the theatre of his day.
This historical contextualizing of Blake finds its initial articulation in Blake:
Prophet Against Empire (1954) by David V. Erdman, who analyzes his works in light of
the political struggles and events taking place at the time. Erdman describes Blake’s
understanding of the world as tied to “the flux of current history” (294) and argues that
for Blake “prophecy and history” are inextricably linked (431). David Worrall and Jon
Mee continue this kind of scholarship, specifically positioning much of Blake’s thinking
in the radicalism of the end of the eighteenth century. For instance, Mee argues that
Blake’s rhetorical strategies and the texts he produced in this period “are profoundly
involved with the ideas and images of the culture of the 1790s” (Dangerous Enthusiasm
18). Although my project will be less concerned with the “historical minutiae” that
Erdman locates in Blake’s texts (473) to clarify certain allusions by situating them in the
concrete details of the past, this historicizing process shows that he was a poet engaged
not with the arcane but with the socio-political.
Yet, nearly half a century after Erdman’s study, Saree Makdisi, in William Blake
and the Impossible History o f the 1790s (2003), contends,
Too often in Blake scholarship, issues and questions of Blake’s work that
seem, according to modem political idiom, not to be readily identifiable as
political in nature—his understanding of being, his views of art, his sense
of love, his conception of the imagination—are assumed to mark a
departure into some other realm: the mythic, the cosmic, the universal, the
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spiritual—all of which are assumed to be somehow opposed to or
irreconcilable with the historical, the political, and the real. (2)
Makdisi’s analysis suggests that much of Blake’s thinking, not just that which is
obviously connected to current affairs, is heavily invested in and consciously part of the
political and economic goings-on of his day. Placing Blake and his art in a direct
relationship with his time is, therefore, crucial to understanding the meaning of his works
and his participation in his cultural moment.
In this study, I will show how dramatic performance offers new ways of
understanding Blake’s chosen medium and the role of his audience that lead to new
interpretations of his notions of individual identity and larger communal relations, as well
as the relationship between the imagination and the physical body. Similar to Makdisi,
Mee, and Worrall, I position Blake directly in his historical moment by examining the
theatre world as well as the debates involving mind and body, identity and action, stage
and reading of his time. Furthermore, in order to show Blake’s relevance for the present, I
also explore his work in relation to contemporary theories of theatrical performance,
media, performativity, and identity-construction. My interpretations of Blake’s thinking
and his works follow a more holistic view, much as Frye’s, which argued for the
“consistency of Blake’s mind” (178) throughout his life and artistic production. I do not
argue for an evolution of ideas from the first work to the last one, as do critics such as
Anne K. Mellor who states, “I believe that Blake’s thought and symbols changed,
developed, and even contradicted themselves in the course of his sixty-nine years”
(Blake’s Human Form Divine xix)—though such approaches are insightful. However, I
do acknowledge the contradictions and paradoxes that arise (often within the same work)
but without the aim of resolving them even if only for a particular moment in time. In
fact, this dissertation engages directly with many of the paradoxes without attempting to
solidify a final solution. I have found that living with the contradictions has proven much
more fruitful.
In chapter one, 1 examine the relevance of the media Blake chose for his
illuminated works within the context of Romantic-period discussions of performance. 1
explore how Blake’s composite art implicitly participates in the theoretical debates
surrounding Romantic drama and theatre, debates between interior and exterior, spectacle
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and contemplation, embodiment and idealization, performable and unperformable, and
stage and page. Moreover, I address the way that he combines textual and pictorial space
to create a dramatic space and a spectatorship rather than a simple readership or
viewership. In doing so, he challenges conventional notions of a reading audience, the
form of drama, and even what it means to be performable, questioning the relationship
between the mind and embodiment. Focusing on America: A Prophecy, I argue that
Blake’s illuminated works not only demonstrate a movement toward staging, toward
spectacle, and toward embodiment but also function as dramatic performances,
suggesting that he has a place in current discussions of Romantic drama and performance.
In the second chapter, I build on the dramatic quality of the illuminated works by
exploring issues of representation and the specific demands placed on the audience in
relation to Brechtian theatre theory, medieval spectacle, and contemporary media theory.
Through the use of (metatheatrical) self-reflexive techniques, Blake challenges
conventional notions of human identity and our relationship to imaginative spaces. He
also prompts two seemingly contradictory experiences: alienation and immediacy. I claim
that the tension between the distancing and immersive effects creates a specifically
Blakean spectatorship that is provoked to both stand apart from the world of the
imagination and enter into it—as he asks us to do in A Vision o f the Last Judgment—both
of which are necessary in order to see the interpenetration of the physical world and the
eternal one.
Having established Blake’s relationship to theatre and performance, I turn to two
particular works that explicitly address issues of identity and identity-formation in the
context of theatre and performance. Chapter three explores Blake’s revision of Genesis in
The Book o f Urizen, which turns the creation and the fall into the primordial scene of
identity-formation. This revision makes use of the melodramatic form, emphasizing the
visual, the body, sensory perception, affect, excess, and the external. Furthermore, Blake
locates the origin of the fall in a kind of Althusserian interpellation, wherein Urizen and
the rest of the Eternals misrecognize the true nature of identity by perceiving themselves
to be independent and isolated selves rather than a community of interrelated ones.
Reading Blake in light of Romantic melodramatic tendencies and Althusser’s theory
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places him and his work in an alternative vision of Romanticism that celebrates
community, the physical body, the senses, and the visual image.
Finally, turning to Blake’s epic poem Milton, the fourth chapter ties the various
threads of the dissertation together: stage performance, exteriority, visuality, entrances,
audience engagement, community, and identity. Focusing on the repeated moment of
inspiration in the context of Judith Butler’s performative theory of identity-construction, I
explore the relationship between doer and deed and the implications for Blake’s depiction
of identity in the poem. As characters inspire one another, they open up unconventional
and nontraditional possibilities for inspiration, suggesting that the power and authority to
inspire is available not to a chosen few but to everyone. Moreover, the merging of
various identities and the seemingly contradictory action of self-annihilation provide a
vision of identity that upholds both individuality and interdependence, one that exists
somewhere between essentialism and constructionism—a vision that offers an alternative
to the either/or of the identity-formation debate.
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“Visionary forms dramatic”: Blake’s Illuminated Works

William Blake demonstrates his uniqueness as an artist in two important ways: his mode
of production and his mixing of media. He uses a special means of reaching his audience,
resisting the conventional print modes and methods of commercial print publication by
completely circumventing them. Blake’s distinct process gave him total control over the
production phase of his artistic creations. With few exceptions,1 his works were not
published conventionally, nor did they come in the form of a conventional medium.
The medium Blake chooses for his artistic expression and his method of uniting art forms
such as poetry, painting, and engraving make him unlike any of the artists (literary and
pictorial) of his day. Although combining texts (poems and narratives) and images
(paintings and engravings) was not new—one has only to consider the commissioning of
illustrated literary text or the proliferation of prints of satirical caricatures—nothing quite
like Blake’s illuminated works was produced.12 The works, which Blake called
“Illuminated Books,” employing several media (engraving, painting, and poetry) using a
process he called “Illuminated Printing” (Prospectus of 1793, E 693). Blake’s name for
these works directly points to the illuminated manuscripts of the Middle Ages, in which
written texts were adorned with decorations and illustrations.3 Blake constructs works
that make use of both the literary and the visual, integrating words with pictures in order
to articulate his particular vision.
Since their initial production, Blake’s illuminated works have raised critical
questions for readers/viewers: How do we define them? Clearly, they relate to the
medium of visual art as well as literature, so how do we take both into account? The
1 His youthful collection o f poems Poetical Sketches (1783) was printed thanks to fellow artist
John Flaxman and the Mathews, who had a salon that Blake sometimes visited early in his career. Also, the
first part o f Blake’s poem The French Revolution made it to the proof stage, but the poem does not seem to
have been completed, nor was it ever published. In all other cases, Blake chose his method o f illuminated
printing.
2 Also, there was the even older tradition o f emblems and, near the end o f Blake’s life, the
circulation o f the annual (e.g., the 1820s publication The Keepsake, in which texts were solicited for pre
existing graphic art).
3 See, for instance, Hagstrum 30-33 for conjectures on direct sources o f influence.

19

question may not have been a central one in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries;
however, for contemporary academic scholars, defining the illuminated book as a genre
has generated varied responses. What precisely is an illuminated work? What is its
generic identity? How are we to engage with it? As an art form, how is it relevant to
Blake’s historical period? What is at stake in these questions is a more precise
understanding of the composite nature of illuminated works, one of Blake’s primary
modes of artistic production, as well as a revisioning of Blake’s relationship to his time.
These are questions I will explore in relation to his era, to audience response, and to the
word-image dynamic in his works within the context of theatrical performance. The
recent surge of interest in and corresponding research on Romantic-era theatre4—
unexpectedly—generates new insights into Blake’s multimedia form by making this a
viable context for analyzing his works. The current rediscovery of Romantic theatricality
makes it possible to view his illuminated works—in the specific tension between the
linguistic and visual realms—as producing a particular experience of them: as dynamic
dramatic performances. By reexamining Blake’s works in light of the dominant
discourses of drama and the theatre of his day, namely the theatrical and antitheatrical
debate, a new understanding of these works emerges.
Critics interested in Blake’s designs, as well as his writings, have asked the
questions about genre I pose above. In William Blake: Poet and Painter (1964), an early
study of Blake’s use of text and design, Jean Hagstrum states, “Blake can be regarded as
the classical embodiment of those venerable conventions of Western art, pictorial poetry
and poetic painting—in fact, of the entire tradition that for centuries had united the visual

4

For an extended discussion o f recent scholarship on Romantic-period drama and culture that

focuses on the theatrical aspects o f both, see the introduction. A few examples o f the prevalence o f
theatricality in current Romantic-period research are as follows: Jeffrey N. Cox’s In the Shadows o f

Romance: Romantic Tragic Drama in Germany, England, and France (1987); Julie A. Carlson’s In the
Theater o f Romanticism: Coleridge, Nationalism, Women (1994); Catherine B. Burroughs’s Closet Stages:
Joanna Baillie and the Theater Theory o f British Romantic Women Writers (1997); Judith Pascoe’s
Romantic Theatricality: Gender, Poetry, and Spectatorship (1997); Jane Moody’s Illegitimate Theatre in
London, 1170-1840 (2000); David Worrall’s Theatric Revolution: Drama, Censorship and Romantic
Period Subcultures 1773-1832 (2006); and Celestine Woo’s Romantic Actors and Bardolatry: Performing
Shakespeare from Garrick to Kean (2008).
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and verbal arts” (8). Blake’s unification of the sister arts, “the long tradition of ut pictura
poesis (as is painting, so is poetry),” aligns the two modes of representation, showing
that, “despite their different media, painting and poetry are assumed to be mimetic arts,
similar in that they both aim to represent nature, whether visible or ideal” (Otto, “Blake’s
Composite Art” 43). However, W. J. T. Mitchell counters Hagstrum’s view in Blake’s
Composite Art: A Study o f the Illuminated Poetry (1978)—a title that highlights
Mitchell’s response to Hagstrum, who first applies the term “composite art” to Blake’s
illuminated works (10). In taking up Hagstrum’s term but revising its application,
Mitchell stresses the distinct natures of writing and pictorial art. Nevertheless, Mitchell
does not dismiss the unity implicit in Hagstrum’s argument. Mitchell says, “Almost
everyone would now agree with Northrop Frye’s remark that Blake perfected a ‘radical
form of mixed art,’ a ‘composite art’ which must be read as a unity. It is not superfluous,
however, to ask in what precise sense Blake’s poems ‘need’ their illustrations, and vice
versa” (3).
What Mitchell takes issue with in the ut pictura poesis view is the relationship
between the forms of expression: “In general, however, neither the graphic nor the poetic
aspect of Blake’s composite art assumes consistent predominance: their relationship is
more like an energetic rivalry, a dialogue or dialectic between vigorously independent
modes of expression” (4). Mitchell resists relegating the images to mere translations of
the text (and vice versa). He states, “In the absence of explicit textual associations we are
forced [...] to concentrate on the picture as a picture in the world o f pictures, rather than
seeing it as a visual translation of matters already dealt with in words” (5). For him, what
follows from Hagstrum’s interpretation of Blake’s works as a combination of the sister
arts is a subjection of one art form to the other.5 Blake’s designs do not function merely
5

Otto’s “Blake’s Composite Art” succinctly summarizes the varying attitudes toward Blake’s

illuminated texts, using the Hagstrum-Mitchell debate as the major point o f departure for the attitudes that
have followed. Also, see Mitchell’s “Poetic and Pictorial Imagination.” In reference to Hagstrum’s reading
o f Blake’s illuminated works, Mitchell states, “The most thorough investigation o f the relationship between
Blake’s poetry and painting places his ‘composite art’ in the tradition and context o f ut pictura poesis, the
system o f analogies between the ‘sister arts’ which was dogmatized by many early eighteenth-century
critics, and debunked by Lessing in the second half o f the century” (337). Since the crucial debate between
Hagstrum and Mitchell, scholars have paid attention to the materiality o f Blake’s engravings and his
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as illustrations or translations of the text. His illuminated works “are not texts-withillustrations” (Behrendt, ‘“ Something in My Eye”’ 80). In an early volume of Blake
Studies, John E. Grant takes Clyde R. Taylor to task for reading Blake’s designs solely
through the text and submitting them finally to the authority of the word (194).
Admittedly, I find analyzing Blake’s texts in light of the designs and vice versa extremely
fruitful, and Grant does not foreclose this possibility. Rather, he warns us not to see the
two modes as mere reflections of one another because the interrelations between the two
provoke us to go further than simply focusing on the way the designs illustrate the
narrative of the text.
It is in this vein that I will engage with the questions I put forward in my
introduction and examine the dynamic of Blake’s composite art. He does not prioritize
his poetry, and, in fact, some argue that only once he engraved and illuminated his poetic
works did he consider them complete and published in the same way conventional poets
might have considered their works complete once printed by a press. As early as
Northrop Frye, critics aligned the illuminated works with Blake’s categorization of
particular works as finished or published or distinct: “And when these poems were once
engraved Blake seldom altered anything more fundamental than the color-scheme [...].
The inference is clear: the engraved poems were intended to form an exclusive and
definitive canon” (6). While I disagree with Frye’s dismissal of the importance of
changes from copy to copy (from colour scheme to additions to deletions to order), the
point is still significant: the form of the illuminated works plays a large role in our
understanding of them, and so does the fact that this form necessarily includes the
designs. As a result, the designs deserve attention.
Despite the progress scholars have made in illuminating the significance of the
pictorial element of Blake’s works, Stephen C. Behrendt finds that a “logocentric bias”
lurks behind some definitions still in use to describe the illuminated works (‘“ Something
in My Eye’” 80). In reference to the phrase “combining text and design,” he states,

production methods (see the scholarship o f Essick and Viscomi), which yield unique artifacts despite the
repetition o f a work into ‘copies’, thereby criticizing mass reproduction, or commodification o f art (see
Makdisi), and the hierarchy between original and copy (see Carr).
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this dichotomous and apparently mutually exclusive terminology recurs
with surprising frequency in much of recent poststructuralist commentary
on Blake’s work. Language of this sort implies that only a literary text can
be a real ‘text’ and that the visual text is at best the weak and subservient
sister art whose function is not textually significant and whose nature as
art is only minimally and marginally important in the generation of
meaning. (79)
Finding a term that satisfies the many points of view involved in this discussion may be
next to impossible. However, Behrendt makes a valid point. How can we discuss Blake’s
medium, or even genre, in a way that does not reduce the poetry or the pictorial art? This
problem inevitably leads to questions of what the nature of the illuminated works is and
how we respond to and engage with them—after all, what a thing is suggests how one
can use it. Such questions highlight the crucial role of the audience in an understanding of
the form. As Behrendt points out, “the crux of the matter lies [...] in what the responding
mind is asked to do in dealing with the two arts” (83).
While I do not pretend to have definitive answers to the aforementioned
questions, I do put forward the thesis that the illuminated works occupy a space in the
realm of the dramatic, the performative, and the theatrical without appearing to be drama,
performance, or theatre per se. They do so by exhibiting performative aspects in their
multimedia form, their content, and in the audience interaction that they encourage. In
calling Blake’s works performative (or defining them as such), I suggest something about
them as an artistic form and also about how one can and might work with them. Blake’s
relation to dramatic performances has been overlooked to a large extent, other than to say
that his works are dramatic or that each copy is a performance.6 As noted in the
introduction to this study, both Frye and Mitchell (Blake’s Composite Art) make passing
references to Blake’s works and various forms of drama. G. E. Bentley, Jr. claims,
“Blake’s coloured works in Illuminated Printing are all performances” (“Blake’s Works

6

In Blake’s time, the word “performance” regularly referred to creative productions, such as

poems and paintings, as well as theatrical performances— a meaning that, though not common today, had a
history as far back as 1665 according to the OED. In his letters, Blake uses the term to refer to his own and
other artists’ paintings (see, for example, E 745, 748, and 759).
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as Performances” 334); however, Bentley’s use of the word “performance” stresses the
“uniqueness” rather than the theatricality of each copy of a given work (335). Similarly,
John H. Jones talks of the multiple performances that result from the variations arising
from copy to copy versus “a single performance through exact copies” of the same work
(“Printed Performance” 88). And Jerome McGann calls Jerusalem “a public
performance” (“William Blake Illuminates the Truth” 9), but his argument centres on the
way Blake highlights “the limits of knowledge” and “the limits of his work” (36) in “the
mutilated plate 3 of Jerusalem" (37); it does not contextualize the comparison within a
theatrical frame. As these kinds of critical descriptions of them suggest, Blake’s
illuminated works have an undeniable theatrical or performative energy both in their
content and in the way an audience responds to them. I aim to broaden these observations
into a more sustained analysis of the implication of such labeling of and engagement with
Blake’s work. My focus will be to examine Blake’s medium in relation to the dramatic
and pictorial criticism of the mid-to-late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
Approaching Blake’s illuminated works through the lens of drama and dramatic
performance results in a new understanding of the genre of Blake’s art, the interplay
between words and designs, and his relation to his time.
Any discussion of the relation between the word and image, particularly one that
involves questions of genre and genre borders, inevitably leads to Gotthold Ephraim
Lessing’s Laocoon, or The Limits o f Painting and Poetry (1766)—a foundational
eighteenth-century work comparing (and contrasting) the two modes of expression.
Lessing’s essay stresses the adherence to strict generic boundaries, in which, as Mitchell
describes, “the borders are closed and a separate peace is declared” (Iconology 43). In the
essay, Lessing hypothesizes that Virgil’s recounting of the myth of Laocoon and his sons
was the first that showed the group being killed and devoured by the serpent-creature, not
the sculpture by Hagesandrus, Polydorus, and Athenodorus of Rhodes (The Visual Arts
203-04), as was formerly believed. This revision of origins (i.e, who was the first to
depict the group) already betrays Lessing’s bias. His argument about these two renditions
leads him to posit many “truisms” regarding poetry and visual art. At times, Lessing
seems to give a balanced account of the nature of the art forms; however, in many cases,
he ultimately allows poetry a greater scope, ability, and overall effect, arguing, at one
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point, that “poetry is the more comprehensive art, that beauties are at her command which
painting can never attain” (36). As Mitchell rightly observes, “The aim of Lessing’s laws
of genre, then, is clearly not to make the spatial and temporal arts separate but equal, but
to segregate them in what he regards as their natural inequality” (107).
Lessing’s initial argument centres on the fact that, while Laocoon screams and is
able to vent his extreme emotions in Virgil’s poem, in the sculpture, Laocoon is depicted
with a mouth opened only slightly as he is crushed in the serpent’s painful grasp (6).
Lessing states that because “with the ancients beauty was the supreme law of the plastic
arts” (11), the sculpture’s emotional range is limited in a way the poetic representation is
not. Although he says that this law is no longer in effect with the modems, he does imply
a certain disdain for modem art, which does not heed these laws, thereby placing a
greater value on ancient art (14) and its clear border divisions between art forms.
According to Lessing, poetry has fewer limitations than sculpture, which, though
beautiful, falls short because it does not (and cannot, given the medium) depict the full
range and temporal process of Laocoon’s pain. Whereas Virgil’s version does not suffer
distortion in its use of the extreme shriek, any attempt to depict that level of pain in a
sculpture would render it ugly. Lessing’s assessment here suggests that the physical and
visual extemalization of this moment cannot compete with language, which depends
upon the imagination for the envisioning process and is, therefore, not limited by what
the artist has created. According to Lessing, extreme and violent emotion would only
“disfigure the face in an unpleasing manner [...]. The mere wide opening of the mouth
[...] is a blot in painting and a fault in sculpture” (13).
His claims regarding visual art’s limitations stem primarily from visual art as a
static form. Poetry, on the other hand, has characters that “live and act” (38). More
precisely, the fundamental difference lies in the fact that the “plastic arts” are spatial
while literary modes are temporal. In comparing epic and dramatic poetry to sculpture
and painting, Lessing argues that the former has the ability, due to the nature of its
medium, to depict “continuous action” (54) and works within time, while the latter can
depict only a static moment and works within space (55). The problem, according to
Lessing, is the “unintermitting aspect in the material imitations of Art” (15). In the visual
arts, the moment is frozen and the extreme emotional state remains permanent. In nature
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and poetry, eventually this state subsides and vanishes. Ironically, the affective qualities
of the sculpture or painting are diminished because of its fixed nature in spite of being
#

immediate to the sense of sight.

n

Mitchell critiques Lessing’s distinction between the arts on the basis of space and
time, and he suggests that the use of space and time in this way merely serves to create a
hierarchical relation between literature and the visual arts. He asserts that “the whole
notion of ‘spatial’ and ‘temporal’ arts is misconceived insofar as it is employed to sustain
an essential differentiation of or within the arts”; “the categories of space and time are
never innocent, [...] they always carry an ideological freight, and never more so than in
that great source of wisdom on this issue, Lessing’s Laocoori' {Iconology 98). For
Mitchell, all art (linguistic or otherwise) exists within space and time and cannot be
divided absolutely from one or the other. He discusses the definitions and broader
ramifications of the divide between the graphic art and the written word, or image and
text, explaining that these terms are by no means self-evident or free from contradictions
and ambiguity. He explores the following questions at length: “What is an image? What
is the difference between images and words? [...] Why does it matter what an image is?
What is at stake in marking off or erasing the differences between images and words?”
(1) Taking into account ideology and cultural impositions and biases, Mitchell shows
how complex the relationship between pictures and words is and argues that there is no
essential difference between them: “there is no essential difference between poetry and
painting, no difference, that is, that is given for all time by the inherent natures of the
media, the objects they represent, or the laws of the human mind” (49). I find his
argument persuasive and important to keep in mind as one attempts to engage with
Blake’s composite art, but I also find that, even if we understand the constructed nature
of the terms poetry and painting, we as an audience still relate and respond differently to7
7

Contemporary critics, such as Mitchell and Frederick Burwick, have noted that there is no

inherent problem with the “plastic arts” that nullifies the possibility o f showing the passing o f time. Rather,
the problem lies in ideology and the way we come to perceive and shape notions about various art forms:
“The aesthetic judgment, endorsed and upheld by Lessing, is more obedient to tradition and cultural
conventions than to any deficiency in temporal dynamism which he seeks to grant to language and deny to
art” (Burwick, “Ekphrasis and the Mimetic Crisis o f Romanticism” 88).
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the forms (as Mitchell seems to concede throughout the book). As a result, I maintain the
difference in my chapter.
Lessing clearly does see an “essential difference” between the two media, but,
more significantly, he imbues one with greater capabilities, thereby privileging one over
the other. His implicit hierarchical distinction between what he calls “the plastic arts” and
poetic writing functions by way of the imagination. First, he assigns to the individual
imagination of the audience a greater ability to envision a scene than the sculptor or
painter is capable of producing materially. Then he suggests that poetry
permits the imagination to enlarge the stage [figuratively speaking], and
leaves it free play to conceive [for instance] the persons of the gods and
their actions as great, and elevated as far above common humanity as ever
it pleases. But painting must assume a visible stage the various necessary
parts of which become the scale for the persons acting on it, a scale which
the eye has immediately before it. (47-48)
In other words, poetry more effectively provokes the imagination to think beyond
material constraints and to envision giant and superhuman gods alongside humans. In our
mind’s eye, seeing the difference in stature and power is possible, but the visual or
material artist, who appeals more to our physical eye, is bound to the confines of his art—
namely, the size of the canvas or the block of marble. The limits of the painter’s “stage”
inhibit the power of the visual work to provoke our imagination beyond what we
physically see. The problem with painting or sculpture, then, is that the relational size
between god and human must be concretely demonstrated to the eye and all aspects of the
image pinned down; the power of the gods must be shown clearly, rather than hinted at
using the figurative techniques of the poet. As a result, what the painter or sculptor
creates inhibits the imagination’s powers to create. More than this, Lessing’s argument,
with its implications regarding the image and the word, uses similar rhetoric as the
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century supporters of closet drama, who championed private
experiences with a text over performances on the stage. Thus, his attitude toward the
word and the image suggests a kind of closet thinking.
In fact, talking of Sophocles’ Philoctetes, Lessing briefly assesses drama, a
textual genre meant to be enacted physically on stage. Lessing says,
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Can the dramatic poet be included with him in this justification? It is a
different impression which is made by the narration of any man’s cries
from that which is made by the cries themselves. The drama, which is
intended for the living artistry of the actor, might on this very ground be
held more strictly to the laws of material painting. In him we do not
merely suppose that we see and hear a shrieking Philoctetes; we hear and
see him actually shriek. The closer the actor comes to Nature in this, the
more sensibly must our eyes and ears be offended [...]. Besides, physical
pain does not generally excite that degree of sympathy which other evils
awaken [...]. They will appear to us spectators comparatively cold. (17
18)
Here Lessing aligns performed drama with sculpture and painting through the sensory
element present in reception. Elsewhere, he assesses drama as a written form and seems
to align it with epic poetry, suggesting a relation between Philoctetes’ suffering and cries
and those of Virgil’s Laocoon. However, as a form that is intended for performance
rather than private reading, drama suffers from similar limitations as the other “visual”
arts. What Lessing focuses on is the “seeing” aspect of drama. By seeing the actor in the
throes of extreme emotion, Lessing argues that an audience would recoil at its reality, or,
as in the above case, an audience would not even be moved one way or the other by the
actor’s expression of pain. This implies that poetry (and the activity of reading) has the
ability to successfully relay these kinds of moments because they are enacted only in the
mind’s eye: the private and individual imagination can better represent scenes than the
physical arts can. “[T]he boundless field of our imagination” (30), as Lessing calls it,
inevitably weakens the power and scope of visual and performance art. This attitude
privileges the word above all other modes of expression and even insinuates that the
imagination is constrained by all other modes. Lessing’s essay houses many sentiments
that the antitheatricalists would later use; in fact, Coleridge, Hazlitt and Lamb would
continue this line of thinking far into the Romantic period (as I will explore further).
In relating Blake to Lessing’s ideas, Yvonne M. Carothers states, “Blake could
not accept an aesthetic, typified in Lessing’s Laocoon, which assigns to painting and
poetry distinct provinces on the basis of their affinities with empirical space and time. He
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then formulated a new aesthetic [...]” (116). With his illuminated works, Blake breaks
Lessing’s rules of aestheticism (at least how he idealizes them and envisions them
working in the ancient world) and provides a counterpoint to this closeted mentality.
Mitchell uses Blake as an example of an artist “who set[s] out deliberately to violate
those laws, [...] [and] insist[s] on blurring the genres in a mixed art of poetry and
painting” (112). I would argue that he does not just mix genres—he creates a new one.
Blake creates a genre that blatantly stands in two modes of expression at once:
written word and visual art. For example, both Blake and Lessing consider the Laocoon
as a visual and poetic work. However, where Blake reconceptualizes it as a word-image
art form, Lessing uses it to assert the power of the word over the image. Blake’s Laocoon
takes a sculpture, turns it into an engraving—a graphic image—and includes written text,
thereby crossing and adapting three genres of art (fig. 1). This work can be reproduced
simply as a text, but as soon as one tries to remove the image from the words to allow the
words to take priority, the question of how to arrange them arises. The phrases and words
are scattered along the work, horizontally, vertically, diagonally; some seem connected to
others, while others appear to have no connections. David V. Erdman chooses to arrange
the textual components of the work thematically. Finding a connection between certain
words, Erdman takes the free-floating phrases and arranges them in typescript for his
edition. This is a compromise at best. In the end, how to read or represent Blake’s
Laocoon poses a challenge that has no easy answers. Erdman’s answer is one of many,
but none seems quite right.
Putting aside the editorial problems that go along with any of Blake’s works (if
one takes into account the number of copies of each work, variants of certain plates, the
cost of reproducing colour designs, what is lost in the reproduction of art, etc.), there are
a number of challenges that arise with the Laocoon specifically. Where does one begin
with this work? Which direction does one take to navigate the text? In which direction
should the eye move, given that it cannot move in a consistent direction because Blake
uses Hebrew (read from right to left) and English (read from left to right)? How does one
connect the image with the text, which consists of numerous statements that range from
maxims about art to intertextual references? How does one link each item of text with
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Fig. 1. Laocoon, copy B, c. 1826-27, Collection of Robert N. Essick. © 2010 the William
Blake Archive. Used with permission. This project is supported in part by a William
Blake Archive Reproduction Grant for Graduate Students.
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another? And how does the image of the ancient sculpture affect the way one reads each
textual item?
This work raises questions that apply to all of Blake’s illuminated works. By
refusing to play by generic rules, Blake’s composite art creates fissures in the supposed
walls between them. His mythic figures are not confined to the realms of an interior and
mental space; rather, they are visually represented, suggesting a bridge between the inner
and the outer. For a poet that invests so much in “imagination” as a visionary force, it
seems odd that he would base his work in part on physical vision and the extemalization
of his characters and their circumstances. Yet, he does precisely this, reinforcing the idea
that perhaps there is more to visionary experience for Blake than the interior spaces of the
mind. With Blake’s works, our own imagination is not allowed complete “free play,” as
Lessing puts it. We do have moments that remain closeted in the sphere of the written
word and private reading, yet Blake also offers us moments that step into the sphere of
visual art and external representation visible to the physical eye, thus allowing his art
form to take on a performative identity.
As several scholars have noted (e.g., Mitchell, Behrendt, and Morris Eaves) when
one picks up a work by William Blake, one does not simply “read” the work. Eaves
emphasizes that the term “‘reader’ is a grossly inadequate term for Blake’s audience”
(“Introduction: To Paradise” 2). In fact, the question of audience is as thorny as the
question of genre. In The Making o f English Reading Audiences, 1790-1832, Jon
Klancher argues that we cannot simply dismiss the way various authors and media target
and construct a particular kind of audience. Although he suggests that “audience-making”
is a product of periodicals because they were (and still are) geared toward particular
audiences (4), the idea of audience-making is also relevant to Blake: the way he creates
his art suggests a specific kind of “audience-making,” one that necessarily involves both
reading and looking—and something more. For example, Bentley emphasizes the
“seeing” aspect of Blake’s works, not just the “reading” aspect (“Blake’s Works as
Performances” 321). Seeing, and not only the vision of the imagination, plays an
important role in Blake’s works. The designs are not components that can be ignored if
one is to fully engage with Blake’s texts; they do not simply illustrate the action defined
in the poem. They both support and destabilize the narrative; they both tell the story with
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the poem and tell their own story at the same time. As a result, they cannot (as Grant and
Mitchell point out) be relegated to a subordinate position in the interpretive act.
Given the complex process involved in engaging with one of Blake’s illuminated
works, what kind of audience is suggested by his chosen medium? Hagstrum assesses this
multimedia form as one geared to multiple senses, particularly “ear and eye” (139). He
states,
Blake wanted his message to attack the whole man—all at once. He must
have thought it served his purpose as a prophet to invade man’s soul by
the venues of more than one sense, and he makes his psychological assault
frontal, the better to accomplish his purpose. If under Urizen man’s senses
have been starved, the art that fed more than one was likelier than poetry
alone to bring nourishment to the soul and to arouse the dormant faculties.
(139)
Poetry alone does not accomplish what poetry and painting (and engraving) do together,
primarily because separately each one does not offer as expansive a mode of engagement
as they do in combination. On the one hand, as readers, we read the linguistic signifiers
and focus on the narrative, diction, figurative language, and literary conventions. On the
other hand, as viewers, we look at the pictorial depictions and focus on colour, size,
composition, and visual art conventions. Surely though these are not two completely
separate and mutually exclusive processes we force together to form an interpretation.
Mitchell argues that “text and design in Blake’s books do not have univocal functions
regulated by the predictable binary oppositions we associate with visual and verbal
communication” (“Image and Text in Songs''144). With Blake, we cannot clearly separate
the linguistic level from the pictorial level because he presents the two at once. The
words themselves are woven into the designs and vice versa. Behrendt asserts that a
“meta-text [...] emerges from Blake’s illuminated pages” (‘“ Something in My Eye’” 94).
He explains:
Blake’s illuminated poems generate what is essentially a ‘third text’, a
meta-text that partakes of both the verbal and the visual texts, but that is
neither the sum of, nor identical with either of, those two texts. The verbal
and visual texts stimulate different varieties of aesthetic, intellectual and
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affective responses which are firmly grounded in the disciplinary natures
of the two media and in the tradition and ‘vocabulary’ (or referencesystems) particular to each. (81)
Behrendt makes a persuasive argument. He does not set up an opposition between the
two media. Rather, he acknowledges the different responses that each medium can and
does elicit from an audience, while stating that somehow these various responses overlap.
1 dislike Behrendt’s use of the terms “meta-text” and “third text” because they betray a
kind of logocentrism; however, 1 agree that Blake’s illuminated works do achieve this
third, or extra, level, while maintaining literary and pictorial levels. My response to
Behrendt’s “meta-text” is to envision a dramatic space that the literary and pictorial
elements work together to produce.

o

Indeed, Blake’s illuminated works not only exhibit a performative or theatrical
energy, but they also function as kinds of dramatic performances, particularly in the way
they present word and image together rather than clearly separating them. Throughout
this chapter, I will use America: A Prophecy89 as my main example for analysis as I
progress through my points. This work has a balanced design-to-text ratio, having no fullpage text plates (as we find in many of the other works) and no full-page design plates

8 Makdisi offers an alternative definition o f Blake’s illuminated works. He states, “It may be
useful to think o f the illuminated books not as finite texts, contained within a closed circuit o f interpretation
as defined by some cage o f mutually illustrative (and hence reinforcing) words and images, but rather as

virtual texts, constituted by, even suspended in, the indefinite and expansive gap between words and
images - a gap kept resolutely alive by the open nature o f Blake’s work” (“The Political Aesthetic o f
Blake’s Images” 111). Makdisi’s aim is to keep interpretation flowing and unlimited, to keep it from being
a way to assert absolute claims about Blake’s art. The “gap” allows us to constantly renegotiate our views
and ideas about the illuminated works, foreclosing the possibility o f ossification. However, like Behrendt,
Makdisi too uses a term, “virtual text,” that emphasizes the linguistic over the pictorial.

9 There are more than a dozen copies o f America, first printed in 1793, followed by further
printings in 1795, 1807, and 1821 (and perhaps even a final posthumous printing). Some copies are richly
coloured as is the case with copy A (part o f the second printing o f the work in 1795), while others remain
uncoloured as is the case with copy E (from the first printing).
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(except for the frontispiece).10America makes a fitting case study because it has all the
elements 1 highlight in this chapter. At the level of textual content, it includes a number
of dramatic or spectacular moments and a number of performing bodies, such the
description of “the fierce rushing of th’inhabitants together” who “all rush together in the
night in wrath and raging fire” (14.12, 19, E 56). In terms of the spectacle of the designs,
Blake depicts many amazing scenes: a dragon chasing an old man through the air (pi. 4),
Ore emerging from flames (pi. 10; fig. 2), a young man riding an enormous bird in flight,
while children ride a huge serpent below (pi. 11), a woman amidst the waves having her
liver eaten by an eagle, while beneath her lies a chained man about to be devoured by
various aquatic creatures (pi. 13; fig. 3). Furthermore, the pictorial art in America depicts
a number of bodies in motion (though Lessing would disagree about the ability of visual
art to show moving bodies) in addition to bodies at rest. For example, plate 5 depicts
contorted bodies wrestling with serpents, bodies hunched over in pain, and bodies
dancing through the air (fig. 4). These bodies display an energy that is not surprising
given Ore’s display of revolutionary energy throughout the poetry and designs. In the text
of two copies of America, Blake also includes a Bard whom he identifies as a singer and
musician—a performer—at the end of the Preludium. Typically equated with a poet, the
Bard here does not use writing as his medium of choice; instead, he employs the auraloral one of song and music.
In addition to these performing bodies and spectacles, the plates integrate word
and design to an almost seamless degree, particularly those from copy A thanks to the
vivid colouring. The words become part of the image and the image becomes part of the
words. In most cases, the strong and deep colours of the plates cover the whole plate, not
just the design areas (as opposed to the text spaces), further uniting word and image.
There is, thus, no visual or implied division between word and design in the majority of
the plates of America (e.g., title page, pi. 3-5, 7-15). For instance, on plate 8, Urizen sits

10

Where I see a more equal relation between word and image, D. W. Dorrbecker finds a more

hierarchical relation: “In general, the text on the America plates has been compositionally subordinated to
the pictorial elements, which here regulate the entire layout o f the pages”; for the most part, “the figures
tend visually to dominate the text, so that the poet-artist’s description o f the book as a series o f ‘designs’
does not seem too far o ff the mark” (74).
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Collection, Library of Congress. © 2010 the William Blake Archive. Used with
permission. This project is supported in part by a William Blake Archive Reproduction
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Fig. 3. America a Prophecy, copy E, plate 13, object 15, 1793, Lessing J. Rosenwald
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above the words on a cloud and they in turn press upon the waves so that the use of blue
throughout unites the words to sky and sea; on plate 13, the text occupies the underwater
space in between the woman above who is having her liver pecked out and the man
below who is being consumed by various sea creatures; and plates 10 and 15 show flames
rising through the text.
Besides many of the usual swirls and squiggles that Blake adds to some of the
letters, he depicts words and images transitioning into one another. The Preludium
depicts a number of integrations of word and image (mostly of the garden variety) (pi. 1
2; figs. 5 & 6). On plate 3, which begins with large letters spelling^ Prophecy, the “‘A’
begins in a lily [...] and ends in ripe wheat” (Erdman, The Illuminated Blake 141), and
the letters of “Prophecy” sprout or twist into lilies as well as vines and bud-like objects,
as if the words have the power to generate nature and as if, conversely, the natural images
have the power to generate language (fig. 7). The words and images also act on one
another in other ways. For example, on plates 2 and 9, a ray of light shines onto the
words, highlighting certain parts of the text while leaving other parts in shadow. On plate
16, Urizen’s hair blends with his tears to form a waterfall, which cascades over the text
(fig. 8). He sits upon the text bent over in a supplicant position as the water pours forth
from him and runs over and along the words—as if the words form a barrier like rock
through which the graphic streams of water cannot penetrate. All of these examples serve
to show the various ways that Blake forces us to see word and image together, acting on
one another, rather than as separate spheres of engagement.
Besides the spectacles, the bodies in motion, and the lack of clear separation
between word and image in America, the element of unrepeatability also connect the
work (and all the illuminated works) to performance, especially theatrical performance.
Saree Makdisi states,
the illuminated books can perhaps be thought of, even heuristically, as a
performance to be repeatedly recreated without the intervention of a
controlling principle designed to guarantee its outcome or meaning—or at
least without absolute principles, since what we encounter in Blake’s work
is not really sheer dissemination but rather a series of repetitions through
preexisting channels of reiteration. ( William Blake 175)
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Makdisi not only emphasizes the experiential, or in-the-momentness, of the interaction
one has with Blake’s art, but he also emphasizes the element of repetition with a
difference, which can be applied to the existence of various copies of a work as well as to
each encounter with the same copy. Makdisi implies that performance here relates to the
variability in interpretation that occurs with each engagement of a work. However, it is
not just that our interpretation can alter each time we pick up one of Blake’s works; the
way we navigate the text and designs inevitably will alter from viewing to viewing.
While it is true that our interpretations of all works of art can and do change with
each reading or viewing, the actual experience of reading or viewing the work changes
only in terms of context—the particular edition (with its presentation of a particular
version) in which we choose to read a work or the venue in which the art is exhibited.
This is not to dismiss variant editions of certain works, such as those by Shakespeare, or
even revisions of works, such as Wordsworth’s Prelude. They too share a degree of
alterity. However, variant editions often arise out of a lack of agreement on the final
“published” or authorized copy. With Blake, the story differs. As his own publisher and
editor, he purposefully decided to create a variety of copies of his works, copies which
contain both minor and major changes. As Robert N. Essick argues, “We lose our sense
of the individual copy as an unchanging and completely authoritative icon as it is
recontextualized back into its material and temporal origins and seen as one of many
versions” (“Teaching the Variations in Songs" 93). John H. Jones reasserts Blake’s
subversion: “Blake’s bookmaking process removes the stasis and fixity of the book by
eliminating exact duplication from the mechanical reproduction of a text, thereby
disrupting the authorial power that exact duplication fosters” (“Printed Performance” 79).
This disruption leads to the empowerment of the reader, “shifting] authority away from
authorial position and returning] emphasis to the performance itself and to the moment
of its reception” (88) by forcing “readers [to] negotiate the variations and
inconsistencies” and giving “readers [...] the ability to create the story as they interpret
it” (74).
While agreeing with the central claims of these scholars—specifically the
experiential moment of reception—I reposition Blake away from the context of print
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culture toward the theatrical culture of the time. As Susan Bennett points out in her
analysis of theatre audiences,
The literary, as well as the filmic, text is a fixed and finished product
which cannot be directly affected by its audiences. [...] In the theatre
every reader is involved in the making of the play. Indeed, the audience of
even the most ‘culinary’ theatre is involved in a reciprocal relationship
which can change the quality and success of a performance. No two
theatrical performances can ever be the same precisely because of this
audience involvement. (20-21)
With Blake’s illuminated works, a comparable kind of audience interaction occurs. As
Tristanne Connolly recognizes, “[T]he rearrangements of the texts, and subtle changes
such as colour from copy to copy, provide a kind of movement, parallel to the variations
which accompany repeated, live dramatic performances” (208). She takes Bentley’s and
Jones’s applications of performance to Blake’s copies further by placing the experience
of them squarely in a theatrical context. These changes from performance to performance
(or copy to copy) also help to create a multi-layered idea of what the particular work is.
Each copy calls attention to every other copy and every change Blake made to it, perhaps
as the sum of performances in a show’s run creates the idea of the show itself.
Moreover, performance has the following qualities: it is unique, evanescent,
experiential, and unrepeatable. These qualities also describe an interaction with Blake’s
works. An audience member can attend all the performances of a play staged by a
particular theatre-company, and each of those performances can even involve the same
actors for the whole run, but each and every performance will be different due to the
response of the audience at any given moment, the delivery of lines and the execution of
the action, and the way the audience focuses and refocuses its attention as the show
unfolds before them. Similarly, with Blake’s illuminated works, each encounter changes,
depending not only on which copy we happen to hold but also on the way in which we set
the design-text interplay in motion. On the one hand, like Connolly, we can consider
copies—with all their differences and changes—as separate performances of the same
work, like the various performances that make up a show’s run. On the other hand, we
can also consider each and every engagement with the same copy as separate
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performances because Blake forces us to navigate a more fluid pictorial and linguistic
space, each time tracing a trajectory that cannot be repeated from experience to
experience.
Inevitably, our eyes do not make the same journey over the text and designs with
each encounter. We look and read in different combinations and with a different degree
of overlap. Even with plates that seem to draw fairly distinct divisions between graphic
and verbal spaces, our eyes still go back and forth between text and image differently
each time. Our focus can change from time to time, and we can correlate or contrast or
juxtapose the text and designs in any number of ways. Referring to Blake’s illuminated
books, Mitchell asks, “How do we get from Blake’s images to his texts? What are the
routes [...] of references between visual and verbal signs?” (“Image and Text in Songs’’’
43). There are no simple answers to these questions.
The navigation becomes particularly complex when Blake includes several
graphic images on various parts of a plate, creating a fundamentally experiential mode of
reception for his works, one akin to theatrical spectatorship. They raise (as with the
Laocoon engraving) a critical question: Where do I begin? For instance, the Preludium
can be viewed in parts, as one single plate followed by a second separate plate or as a
diptych (figs. 5 & 6). The design, which boxes in three sides of the text (in the shape of a
“C”) on the first plate, depicts a number of moments that may or may not be connected to
each other or to the text. When we look at this plate, we must choose which direction we
allow our eyes to travel around the image. Do we begin with the worm at the bottom,
leading to a hunched over male figure, then to what appear to be body parts morphing
into the roots of the tree along the side of the plate, then to a prostrate and chained figure
at the top, and finally to a couple who seem to flee in sadness and terror? Or do we begin
with the fleeing couple and make our way down to the worm? Are these different scenes
sequential or simultaneous? If we take in the two plates at once, do we associate the
figure emerging from the ground on the second plate with any of the figures on plate 1, or
is he separate and isolated?
Furthermore, the visual images that Blake grafts to the words place different
degrees of emphasis on certain words and also lead our eyes in different directions,
confounding them by leading them up and down as well as left and right. For instance, on
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the second plate, the words “I know thee,” which begin the shadowy daughter’s speech,
have a prominent vine swooping around the “I” that leads downwards to the final line of
the speech: “This is eternal death [...]” (2.7, 2.17, E 52). However, the vine also
implicitly leads us down toward the image of a young man emerging from the ground,
suggesting a juxtaposition between eternal death and resurrection to eternal life.
Because of the nature of the illustrated works, we do not merely read the lines on
the page from left to right; rather, we skip ahead and go back, depending on which way
the words and images push and pull us. Building on Bentley’s view of each copy of
Blake’s works as unique, 1 argue that each encounter with, for example, America leads to
a unique experience, wherein what we experience is a different performance every time, a
performance in the sense of staged dramatic performance. As an art, theatre gives the
audience the greatest degree of visual choice. When you look at the mise en scène, you
can direct your attention toward any one of its elements at a given moment: lighting,
setting/props, costume/make-up, or the actors’ performances on stage. Which character
do you focus on—the one speaking or the one reacting? Do you zoom in (metaphorically)
on an expression of a particular actor? Or, do you take in the larger interaction of all the
characters at once? These decisions will not only be different for each member of the
audience, but also for each time that member watches a performance. No one viewing
experience can mimic another. Similarly, each encounter with America will provide a
different experience than the time before, unlike reading a conventional text. In this
respect, our relation to the work is constantly shifting, mirroring a theatre audience’s
engagement with the spectacle on the stage.
This performative unrepeatability also applies to the characters’ dialogue, another
important aspect of the illuminated works that functions in a performative manner in the
context of pictorial space. For example, plate 8 of America is particularly dramatic (fig.
9). It graphically depicts Urizen among the clouds on the top half of the plate, while the
bottom half of it verbally depicts Ore’s speech in which he first identifies himself. The
plate’s design suggests an “ironic juxtaposition” of these two characters (K. Easson 44).
Urizen, with arms wide open, appears to unfold Ore’s speech in the space below,
confusing the dynamic between the two characters. Not only does the plate succeed in
creating ambiguity concerning the distinct identities of two antithetical characters—
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Urizen and Ore, reason and energy—it also succeeds in showing us the dramatic side of
Blake. In seeing an image of Urizen and “hearing” Ore’s voice simultaneously, we can
take the next imaginative or visionary leap: just as the two characters engage in the poem,
we engage image and text in a performative reading. In some sense, we enact the drama’s
tension of opposites as we try to reconcile text and image. That Blake uses text and image
to play out a drama of opposites is especially probable when we consider the
complementary plate 10 (fig. 2), where Ore emerges from flames in a pose that echoes
Urizen’s emerging from the clouds, implying rival forces challenging each other.
Dialogue and its related idea of exchange also create further disjunctions and
tensions, and performative resonances. For example, the previous speech (pi. 7), which
provokes Ore’s response, belongs not to Urizen but to Albion’s Angel; the design of Ore
emerging from the flames (pi. 10) occurs two plates after the Urizen plate (pi. 8) where
Ore speaks; and plate 10 verbally describes Albion’s Angel who has just spoken on the
previous plate (pi. 9). The textual speaker and the character graphically depicted do not
correspond in these cases. These odd juxtapositions and tensions not only show the
dynamic energy of the plates, but they also suggest that the performance of the scene that
we construct can take several shapes—with varying meanings produced as a result of
image and text interaction. This kind of dialogue reinforces Jon Mee’s assessment of
Blake’s attitude toward the exchange of ideas. Mee finds that Blake offers a “more
conflictual model of conversation” (‘“A Little Less Conversation’” 139), which
encompasses “the utopian possibilities of conversation, and its capacities to facilitate
‘contraries’ that could be productive of progress” (135). Mee adds,“[T]here may not
always be the sympathetic answering call imagined by the sentimentalized discourse of
conversation. Blake’s sense of conversation as a bumpy ride is predicated on the idea of
risk organized around the pause between utterances out of which may emerge
contradiction or even silence” (138). Urizen and Ore participate in a verbal and visual
exchange, in which they push each other and their ideas, continuously evolving but not
submitting. The vigorous energy that emerges from Blake’s illuminated works, thanks in
part to the exertion of the audience with each engagement, provokes difference and
change, not sameness and stasis.
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In their articles in Unnam 'dForms: Blake and Textuality, Robert N. Essick and
Stephen Carr assess the relationship between the various copies of one of Blake’s works.
Essick counters Carr’s claims that in Blake “each ‘copy’ of a work differs from all others.
This radical variability is embedded in the material processes of producing illuminated
prints, and thus always enters into the verbal-visual exchanges generated within each
page” (182). Carr’s point is that an interpretation of Blake’s work often cannot reside in
an overall and consistent reading, as he states much criticism attempts to do. Essick
counters the idea of “radical variability” in Blake’s process; he explains that Blake’s
method is not quite as unique in terms of the variation produced as Carr makes it out to
be. Conventional printing methods also yield important variations. Rather, he explains,
“Our attention should focus on neither identity nor difference alone, nor on them as
absolute opposites, but on their unfolding relationship in the production and perception of
images” (“How Blake’s Body Means” 205).
While Essick does provide a convincing counter-argument to Carr's point, I
disagree with a related point that Essick makes in trying to show that differences do not
necessarily force the kind of changes of meaning that some of us want to invest in them.
He argues,
Blake’s hand and eye (or his wife’s) directed each stroke of pen or brush,
but individual differences between one copy and another, coloured and
sold years before, cannot be attributed to the artist’s intentions unless we
invent a ‘Blake’ whose art is based on memory. All we can say is that
Blake selected a mode of production and handled it in a way that allowed
differences among finished impressions to be invented, executed, and
proliferated by the medium itself. (207-08)
Here, I disagree with Essick; of course Blake would not necessarily remember every
detail of a work, nor would he be able to recreate an exact replica given his hand-painting
technique, but there are many changes, even in colour, that alter the tone and mood of a
work (not to mention the more obvious changes of order and of deletion or addition
regarding plates or parts of plates). Significantly, Blake chose a mode of production that
would inevitably result in change, and the fact that he did not produce a template for all
his works as a kind of original to follow every time seems to suggest that the changes
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from copy to copy are important and part of his overall project. The result is that Blake
intentionally broadens the range of possible interpretations through his method of
producing his art.
Because colour impacts the tone of a plate, and even the work as a whole, while
also having a bearing on interpretation, changes in colour from copy to copy cannot be
ignored as secondary or unimportant, and it too functions to produce a varied experience
of the works. Some copies remain uncoloured, while others are thoroughly saturated with
colour. The addition of colour incorporates another level of meaning that is not present in
the sepia copies. One can trace moods and character associations based solely on colour.
For instance, some plates in copies of Songs o f Innocence and o f Experience include
bright sunny colours (see, for instance, copies B, C, and R), while others are coloured
using a rather dark and ominous palette (see, for instance, copies L, Z, and AA).
Beginning the section of Songs o f Innocence with colours that elicit happiness and
warmth versus fear and coldness is, in my opinion, a big change. In fact, this kind of
change provokes a shift in the meaning the work produces or in how the audience
performs the works. Likewise, in the title page to America, Blake makes similar palette
changes. The title page shifts from being dominated by blues in copy M to mostly red and
pink and yellow hues in copy O (fig. 10) to a mixture of the two in copy A. Because
Blake associates Urizen with the sky and sea and Ore with fire, blue would seem to
represent Urizen and his repressive elements, while red (and yellow to some degree)
would seem to represent Ore and his revolutionary elements (as pi. 8 and 10 clearly
suggest in copy A). If this is the case, then copy M offers an America that seems to have
Urizen as its ruling principle, while copy O offers one that has Ore as its ruling
principle—and copy A offers a combination of the two. Each copy shapes our initial
encounter with the work in a different way, changing the lens through which we view the
remaining pages. By means of colour and texture, the designs take on a complex affective
quality, while at the same time attaching symbolic meaning to plates by way of character
association.
The relationship between design and audience interaction also emerges in terms
of additions and deletions between copies. In America, the most significant change
textually speaking concerns the four lines about the Bard. In all but two copies of
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Fig. 10. America a Prophecy, copy O, title page, object 2, 1821, Fitzwilliam Museum.
Reproduction by permission of the Syndics of The Fitzwilliam Museum, Cambridge.
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America, the short scene between Ore and the shadowy daughter ends the Preludium;
however, in copies A (1795) and O (1821), it ends with a curious moment of meta
narrative and self-reflexivity:
The stem Bard ceas’d, asham’d of his own song; engraged he swung
His harp aloft sounding, then dash’d its shining frame against
A min’d pillar in glittering fragments; silent he turn’d away,
And wanderd down the vales of Kent in sick & drear lamentings. (2.18-21,
E 52)
The framing of the Bard’s outburst seems to suggest that he has just been singing of Ore
and the shadowy daughter, so it is this story that shames and enrages him. If this is the
case, though, then what are we to make of all that follows his self-exile from the work?
Does the prophecy that follows belong to him, or does it belong to yet another narrative
voice? How many layers of storytelling are there? The poem depicts revolutionary forces
and the freeing of Ore: Why would this lead to the Bard’s shame and rage? Does it imply
an overall failure of the Urizen-Orc cycle, the cycle of tyrant-oppressor in which the
oppressor fights back and overturns the tyrant only to become one himself, oppressing
others in his turn? Moreover, Blake engraves these four lines beneath the young male
figure pulling himself up from the ground. As he rises from the ground, he looks up to the
section of the Preludium that relates Ore’s breaking free from his prison, his seizing of
the shadowy daughter, and her subsequent epiphany. When the four lines remain visible,
it appears as if the young man pulls himself from the Bard’s words. Are the Bard and this
man (potentially Ore) one and the same? How do we reconcile the young man’s apparent
freedom and the Bard’s destruction of his harp? All of these questions add a number of
possible dimensions and complications to the work. In the remaining copies of America,
the Bard’s lines are masked or deleted, nullifying this element of dissatisfaction and
rejection.
Blake makes significant changes to the graphic space as well. On the second page
of the Preludium, which depicts the man rising from the ground, Blake alters the position
of the sun. In copy A, the sun rises and offers its rays on the right side of the page along
its borders and just behind the rocky ground from which Ore emerges (here, the lines of
the Bard are present). In copy M, the sun sits just behind Ore’s head as he pulls himself
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up, and it offers no beaming rays (the lines of the Bard are masked). And in copy O, the
sun, composed of clear and firm strokes, rises just behind Ore, creating a halo around his
head, just as he emerges from grassy ground (the Bard’s lines are visible) (fig. 11). The
addition of a halo-like sun behind Ore here is especially interesting given the fact that, in
the same copy, Urizen also has an obvious halo around his head on plate 10. What does
Blake suggest about the symbolism of the halo by applying it equally to Ore and Urizen?
What does this equation suggest about the two characters, and how we are to view them?
Blake makes changes to the expression of his characters as well. Copy O presents
us with an Ore who appears resolute and almost defiant as he looks up toward the sky
(presumably where Urizen resides). His eyebrows curve in half moons, while his eyes
narrow somewhat. However, copy M depicts Ore with a somewhat more fearful
expression: his eyebrows are straighter, with a slight bend in the middle, and he does not
squint. His eyes are open and appear to express a sort of plea—certainly a much less
combative and less dominant expression than the one in Copy O.
My final example of a variation from copy to copy pertains to the final plate of
the work (fig. 8), and, like the preceding examples, it highlights the experiential basis of
audience engagement at the heart of the illuminated works. The image of a serpent, a
creature that signifies Ore, entwined in a bunch of vines runs along the bottom of the
page. The text above the serpent heralds the coming of Ore and the fires of revolution to
Europe after a twelve-year repression by Urizen (the time between the American and
French Revolutions). In copy E, F, and A, the word “FINIS” is imprinted on the serpent,
signaling the end of the work. However, in copies O and M, no such signal appears on the
serpent. In the other three copies, the declaration of the end could signify the end of the
Urizen-Orc (tyrant-oppressor) struggle, with Ore emerging as the clear victor. In this
case, the work may be heralding the French Revolution as an event that not only ends this
historical moment, but also begins a completely new story or order of things. In the other
two copies, however, the missing declaration suggests a more open-ended reading in
which the cycle may very well continue: here, the French Revolution signals an uncertain
future. In either case, the inclusion or exclusion of this one little word generates a
significant change in the way we view the impact of the prophecy and points to its
performativity.
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Fig. 11. America a Prophecy, copy 0 , plate 2, object 4, 1821, Fitzwilliam Museum.
Reproduction by permission of the Syndics of The Fitzwilliam Museum, Cambridge.
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Demonstrating the variation of Blake’s illuminated works shows how they
construct a spectatorship like that of the theatre, which has a significantly different
engagement with a performance from night to night, rather than readers of print or
viewers of painting. Omissions and additions also sometimes relate to sequence, the order
of the plates in the work. Many copies of America, including all of those on The William
Blake Archive, do not include changes of this nature; however, many other works do. For
instance, The First Book ofUrizen, as John H. Jones explains, consists of “eight copies
[...], yet none of the copies are identical. Not only are the full-page illustrations placed in
different orders in the different copies, but the plates of text also appear in different
positions in all but two copies” (“Printed Performance” 79). Examining the sequence of
plates in copy A and copy D, one notices many differences. Limiting examples to those
that relate first and foremost to sequence (rather than deletions or additions), but keeping
in mind that changes of colour and specific design inevitably arise, I focus on three
examples. In copy A, the title page and Preludium are followed by two full-page designs
(with no text), while in copy D the textual narrative commences right after the Preludium.
In copy A, the audience is faced with an image ofUrizen that differs significantly from
his depiction on the title page, where he is writing or drawing or transcribing. On the
third plate of the work, he sits facing us with his knees up and hands hanging down by his
feet in chains (pi. 22, obj. 3). At this point, Blake gives us very little verbal or visual
information for deciphering this plate. However, he inserts the same image much later in
the work in copy D (obj. 20), where it comes after Los has attempted to bind Urizen. By
placing the image well before the audience has even heard of Los’s actions, copy A gives
the audience more freedom in creating meaning for this specific plate. Forestalling the
narrative with two full-page designs has the effect of giving these plates, as well as the
visual field, added emphasis, as if they function as a key to what follows.
The second of these shifting plates depicts the birth of Urizen’s four children, who
emerge from the elements (pi. 24). In copy A, the audience has no text to draw on to help
create meaning (obj. 4). As in a kind of pantomime or dumb show, we must make do
without words. In copy D, however, Blake places this plate (obj. 22) after the textual
description of the birth, making a direct connection between verbal and visual realms
(albeit the design lacks two of the four figures in this copy, creating some confusion). In
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copy A, we are encouraged to connect the chained Urizen image to the four figures
emerging from land, sea, sky and flames/sun through juxtaposition, but without a sense of
how these figures relate. Likewise, the end of the work also significantly alters between
these copies, but this time the sequence differs only very slightly: the final two plates are
reversed. In copy D, the final plate includes both text and design. The narrative ends with
Urizen’s children abandoning the world, and we see Urizen trapped in a net. In copy A,
this plate is the penultimate plate, while the final plate is a full-page design of Urizen,
whose back is to us as he looks in the opposite direction with his hands by his head. He
does not find himself trapped; rather, he is free as he moves away from us, indicating that
somehow liberation is possible, even in a text that has been all about the binding and
restricting of others (though his turn away from the audience does complicate an absolute
reading). In copy D, Urizen ends the work caught in a net, facing us, suggesting a
hopeless situation.
I argue that copy A emphasizes the visual realm by deferring the narrative with
two full-page designs that have little or no immediate textual context and by concluding
the work with a full-page design. The visual guides the audience’s initial and final
engagement with the work in copy A, unlike copy D, where the verbal does. Jones rightly
states, “Rather than one book in eight copies, there seem to be, rather, eight different
books of Urizen, each with its own, somewhat different version of the Urizen story” (79).
Experiencing each copy of the book parallels the theatrical experience of both an
adaptation of a known text and a staging that changes either by choice or by chance from
performance to performance, resulting in a different entity each time. The theatrical or
performance-based elements of the illuminated works position Blake not only in the
context of the stage more generally, but also within his own historical moment more
specifically. I argue that Blake’s designs externalize the private and interior space that
opens up during a reading of his texts. They give shape to the characters and events, and
rather than restricting, they help us go beyond what we imagine. In the end, we (the
audience) alone are not responsible for envisioning these elements.
Blake’s brand of generic formulation—intertwining word and image—utilizes
both the interior sphere of the reading imagination and the exterior sphere of
materialization and sight. As Erdman says of the illuminated work or the “poem-picture,”
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“The artifact only opens the sensory doors to the mental theater” (“America: New
Expanses” 93). He does not expound on the relevance of this performative quality except
to refer to the “visualizable drama” (95) of the designs. His analysis of the illuminated
works does not concern itself with the nature of their dramatic performance, but rather
with the “new expanses” (111) or apocalyptic vision that the interplay of text and design
yields. Nevertheless, this single brief reference to the opening up of the mental theater to
the senses encapsulates well the way the interior space is transformed into the exterior
and suggests an implicit connection to debates of reading versus performance in the
Romantic period. With respect to Blake’s illuminated works, on the one hand, we
envision the spaces of the text, and, on the other, we are presented with a vision of the
text. In the designs, we behold Urizen, Los, Enitharmon, and Ore and see them with our
physical eye, not just our mind’s eye. In this respect, Blake differs from other poets,
whose work is restricted to language and the written text (excluding those editions that
are illustrated by other people), and from other visual artists, whose work is restricted to
the pictorial image. He unites the two spheres in one medium—the illuminated works.
1 argue that this distinctively Blakean genre finds itself between reading and the
stage in a time—late eighteenth and early nineteenth century—when the value of
performance versus reading was hotly debated. Drama, very much at the heart of the
debate between the closet and the stage, at first sight seems alien to the Blakean method
mainly because Blake did not write much that can be classified technically as drama and
because his designs seem less dynamic than actors on a stage (given the fundamental
differences between the painted image and the performing body). However, his images
gesture toward performance (a combination of the corporeal/material and the aural and
oral) by over-stepping the boundary enclosing silent reading. His images sometimes
perform parts of the text and sometimes things not contained in the text, suggesting a
connection not only to such performance-based media as tableaux, mime, and attitudes,
but also to staged drama. This connection situates Blake in a dialogue from which he is
generally thought to be far removed. He breaks down the opposition between
reading/interiority and performance/exteriority by embedding his work in both.
Morris Eaves takes up this question of interiority-exteriority and frames it in the
context of the imagination (mental activity) and engraving (physical activity). Basing his
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claims on what Blake has written in his treatises, Eaves interrogates the terms
“conception” and “execution” to argue that Blake, despite his material productions, was
first and foremost concerned with the powers of the mind. With regard to “the correlation
of the mental and material phases of production” (The Counter-Arts Conspiracy 177),
Eaves argues, “Blake’s value system is strongly at work orienting the items in the series
toward conception and away from execution, toward the ‘Mental’ and away from the
‘Corporeal’ [...]. His investment in the bifurcation of mind from nature is simply too
powerful to allow mental invention to be made interchangeable with physical expression”
(179). Eaves views Blake as an artist who values interior processes much more than
exterior manifestations. Eaves explicitly positions himself in opposition to Robert Essick
and Joseph Viscomi, who, to varying degrees, find Blake's views about mental concepts
and material artistic production more equivalent than hierarchical. Eaves counters, “As
attractive as these transactional models of creativity are to [...] the romantic spirit, they
risk sentimentality and anachronism. They tend to sentimentalize ‘the medium’ [...]”
(184).
Essick questions how Eaves’s perspective measures up against the pictorial
element of Blake’s works:
But what about pictures? Do they begin as mental concepts, images ‘o f
something else, or do they evolve only within material acts? Viscomi opts
for the latter - what he calls ‘an idea of invention grounded in execution’
[ ...] - and refers to Blake’s practices more than his writings for
authorization. That practice typically takes the form of ‘drawing’ - either
on paper or on a copper plate - in which, as Viscomi puts it, ‘invention
and execution are organically intertwined’ [...]. From this perspective,
‘form and meaning evolve from the continual interactive relationship
between ... invention and execution’ [ ...] - an interaction that finally
takes on a ‘sense of oneness between subject and object’ [...]. (“Blake and
the Production of Meaning” 8-9)
Implicitly aligning himself with Viscomi, Essick suggests that one cannot so easily align
Blake with the mental over the material as Eaves does, particularly with respect to the
graphic image. While it is true that many of Blake’s written statements seem to suggest a
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preference for the interior space of the mind and spirit, I find Essick’s and Viscomi’s
viewpoints much more compelling when considering the illuminated works and Blake’s
artistic productions. For Viscomi, execution (or material production) occupies an equal
role in the creation of Blake’s mythology as the thoughts housed in his imagination. The
fact that Blake painstakingly engraved, painted, and provided graphic images for many of
his texts indicates that he was highly invested in the material production and
visualization, not just the expression and dissemination, of his ideas. Moreover, Makdisi
goes a step further to argue that Blake is engaging with the material and industrial culture
of his time.
The visual representation of characters such as Ore and Urizen provides Blake’s
audience with a concrete way of engaging with these esoteric mythological figures,
however obscure the intricacies of allusion and signification, thereby placing these
figures in a less arcane realm. The move is similar to a director expressing his/her vision
of a play-text on stage. Like a director, Blake visually renders his vision of his characters;
he shows us as well as tells us, rarely leaving it wholly up to a reader’s mental
imaginings. Blake’s designs seem to help better situate the audience as he or she
encounters unfamiliar names. It may seem odd to say this about Blake. After all, this is
the same man who, in one of his letters, said, “That which can be made Explicit to the
Idiot is not worth my care” (E 702). However, it is important to note that Blake’s claim
that only those who can understand the implicit are of concern to him is in large part due
to his frustration with friends and critics who dismissed his work. Also, Blake articulated
a strong desire for the consumption and acceptance of his work. In the “Public Address,”
he calls on his contemporary audience to defend him against the critics of his day: “I call
for Public protection against these Villains” (E 582)." However, he also calls out to
posterity because he wants his work to endure and because he does not completely trust1
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Blake aims the “Public Address” at the “Chalcographie Society” (E 571 ), chalcographers being

“engravers on copper” as Erdman explains (E 882). This document functions as a defence provoked by
attacks such as that o f Robert Hunt in The Examiner. Blake also expresses his faith in the English to
distinguish true art and true artists from false ones that proliferate “[i]n a Commercial Nation,” and he
defends the English public against opinions that suggest otherwise.
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that he will be appreciated in his own day, as his experience proved. His use of the
word “Public”—a general term—suggests that he appears quite open as to who will form
his audience. His effort to write public addresses, including his reiteration of the phrase
“Mark well my words” in Milton (e.g., 2.25, E 96), the addresses attached to each chapter
•

1 "5

of Jerusalem, and his reference to the Parable of the Talents in the letters, reaffirm his
desire to reach people with his calling, even if the attempt failed. These examples indicate
that he wanted to be given the benefit of the doubt and have people engage with his work;
he did not want his work dismissed as “a Madman’s Scrawls” (E 528). In his “Exhibition
of Paintings in Fresco, Poetical and Historical Inventions,” he remarks, “if Genius and
Inspiration are the great Origin and Bond of Society, the distinction my Works have
obtained from those who best understand such things, calls for my Exhibition as the
greatest of Duties to my Country” (E 528). Both of these examples clearly demonstrate
that reaching other people, forming relations with others—the “Bond of Society”—
through his art was something he wanted, despite the small audience for his works that he
had during his lifetime.
Blake’s inclusion of designs embodies his visions; it makes the audience’s
interaction with the work less mental, less like a closet reading and more like a
performance. Blake’s visions do not merely exist in our minds as we read; we can see
them—we can put faces to the names. Thus, he creates a kind of spectatorship, in
addition to a readership. Blake’s art creates an audience that is closer to a theatrical
audience than most traditional literary texts or visual art. The images ensure a certain
sense of community and bond because we all think of, for example, the same Urizen—an
old man with long white hair and beard. Of course, words alone can describe the look of
Urizen, but only the visual image ensures that we think of the same Urizen. Mitchell
questions the validity of the possibility of this shared experience in the context of graphic123

12 Referring to his future audience, Blake says, “the Public will know & Posterity will know”;
“Posterity will judge by our Works” (E 572, 573).
13 Blake alludes to the Parable o f the Talents when he reveals his anger at his patron William
Hayley for attempting to divert Blake away from following his calling, that o f prophet-bard, and towards
becoming a commercial engraver who reproduces the works o f other original talents (E 724, 728). See
chapter four o f my dissertation for an extended analysis o f this allusion and its role in Blake’s art.
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images. He says, “contrary to common belief, images ‘proper’ are not stable, static, or
permanent in any metaphysical sense; they are not perceived in the same way by viewers
any more than are dream images [...]” (Iconology 13-14). I agree with his assessment
regarding the fixity of images; we should not oversimplify the process of how we respond
to visual images or what each of us sees when we look at them. However, I also cannot
dismiss the fact that there seems to be an indisputable difference between what we
conjure in our minds when we read about a character versus what we experience when
we see a character performed, whether in pictorial space or on the stage. While I would
not go so far as to say that each of our engagements with a pictorial representation of
Urizen corresponds precisely to all others, there do seem to be more points of similarity
and intersection in seeing Urizen than we could possibly expect from reading about
Urizen. Imagining what a character looks like based on words, 1 believe, produces fewer
overlapping features than seeing a visual depiction of a character. By taking his
characters and representing them graphically, Blake places them in, to borrow a phrase
from Mitchell, a “publicly shareable space” (13), something which words alone cannot
accomplish to the same degree. This is comparable to a Romantic audience (or any
dramatic or visual audience for that matter) who can all recall the same image of, for
instance, Sarah Siddons as Lady Macbeth or Edmund Kean as Richard III. Here we see
particular incarnations of Shakespeare’s characters, specific to Siddons’s and Kean’s
bodily and visual performance of them. By recalling shared images of this nature, a
dramatic community of a specific performance or production is formed. Blake creates
various copies of the same plate, but, in the end, we still picture Blake’s Urizen and not
our own, creating a similar kind of communal experience through spectatorship.14

14

Critics have commented on the way the illuminated works seem to construct a particular kind o f

audience. For instance, Essick argues, “The author and his readers ideally meet and converse together in
and through a text which thereby becomes the motivation for a hermeneutic community whose members
share a common language” ( William Blake and the Language o f Adam 223; see also Behrendt, ‘“ Something
in My Eye’” 85). My own point picks up on the way a community forms based on “shar[ing] a common
language,” albeit one o f visual, not linguistic signifiers. Essick focuses on reader and text, where the
community is based on “linguistic activity” (224) and the interpretation o f “Adamic sign[s]” (223).
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In light of the closet-stage debate of the eighteenth and nineteenth century,
Blake’s works take on an intriguing significance. His production of an art form that is
dramatic on more than one level—particularly its emphasis on vision and embodiment—
places him on the side of the theatricalists rather than the antitheatricalists. Drama itself
was an important literary form of the period, making the dramatic nature of Blake’s
composite art all the more relevant given his cultural context. Many viewed drama as
directly related to society’s level of greatness. More broadly, Blake associated a “Poor
state of the Arts” with a “Poor state of Politics” (“Public Address” E 580), indicating that
art can directly affect and be affected by its social-historical-political environment. Also,
he commands, “let it no more be said that Empires Encourage Arts for it is Arts that
Encourage Empires” (E 577). As far as Blake is concerned, art is the driving force behind
the advance of civilizations, not the other way around. Whereas Blake credits art in
general for the progress of society, other writers of the period make similar claims for
drama specifically. For instance, both P. B. Shelley and Joanna Baillie, in separate
decades and for different reasons, name drama—performed rather than closet drama—as
a key marker of advanced civilizations. My point is not to mount an argument for valuing
one literary form over another; rather, it is to show the place drama held in the thinking of
Romantic-era writers. In A Defence o f Poetry>,Shelley argues, “[T]he highest perfection
of human society has ever corresponded with the highest dramatic excellence” (492),
linking the capacity of humanity with their dramatic output. In her “Introductory
Discourse,” Baillie, too, takes a similar attitude when she says, if drama did not already
exist, “[t]he progress of society would soon have brought it forth” (Plays on the Passions
83), implying that drama as a form is inevitable given the evolution of society.
In particular, writers on the side of the theatricalists valued embodied
performance for the effect it could have on an audience, an effect not possible in reading
the play. As Peter Duthie points out, the “new collision of word and image” occurring in
the late eighteenth to the early nineteenth centuries (42) gave rise to Baillie’s main point
in her “Introductory Discourse”: “in examining others we know ourselves” (74). An
“exhibition of passion” (102) on the stage provides us with the chance to “observe the
behaviour of others” (90), the implication being that the act of looking allows for critical
analysis in a way that reading the same passage in a play-text does not. Similarly, Shelley
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claims that “drama [...] teaches [...] self-knowledge” (491). He also says, “The tragedies
of the Athenian poets are as mirrors in which the spectator beholds himself’ (490). Given
Shelley’s application of the word “spectator” rather than “reader,” the quotation implies
that seeing our likeness in actors on the stage, not the reading of drama, produces “self
knowledge.” Dramatic performance allows this kind of illumination.
For Baillie, the physical construction of a theatre was also important to drama’s
special ability to elicit self-knowledge. In her dramatic theory, she raises concerns over
the enlargement of theatre houses in her day. According to Baillie, the larger size of the
house made it quite difficult for audience members to see the facial expressions of the
actors (Duthie 43). For her, a crucial component of performing a play is the relationship
between actor and audience; the self-knowledge she hoped her audience would take away
from her plays rested on the ability of the audience to see the actors as they expressed
emotions and words and performed actions. Like Shelley and Baillie, Elizabeth Inchbald
found a potential in the stage that the mind alone could not always match (though she
does not necessarily choose one over the other). In her Remarks to A Winter’s Tale, she
argues that the statue scene is “far more grand in exhibition than the reader will possibly
behold in idea” (6)—seeing it unfold onstage surpasses the mental construction, contrary
to Lessing’s viewpoint. Moreover, as Jane Moody points out, the period was filled with
writings on topics of chironomia (the study of gesture), physiognomy, and the passions
(83), indicating a preoccupation with vision, with the internal becoming external, and
with seeing.15 Blake’s designs, which focus predominantly on human beings, and many
of which depict an emotional state, create a kind of tableau vivant, suggesting that his
works participate in the period’s fascination with visual and dramatic manifestations of
human character.
Blake’s outing of his symbolic and mythological characters from a private mental
space (or closet) into the external space of the visual image is reminiscent of dramatists
who championed the value of embodiment over private and individual textual readings.
Donald H. Reiman and Sharon B. Powers explain in their edition of Shelley’s Poetry and
Prose that Shelley first attempted to have The Cenci staged. In fact, he waited until it was
clear that there would be no performance before he published the play:
151 more fully explore this aspect o f Blake’s relationship to his historical moment in chapter three.
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Shelley had mailed to Thomas Love Peacock a single printed copy [...]
with which he was to submit the play anonymously to the Theatre Royal,
Covent Garden—where Beatrice would be played, Shelley hoped, by Eliza
O’Neill [...], the leading female tragedian of the day. [...] Thomas
Harris—who had managed Covent Garden since 1774 and was not noted
for his theatrical innovations—refused even to consider producing the play
because of its emphasis on incest. His opinion was echoed by theatrical
censors in Britain through the nineteenth century [...] When it became
clear to Shelley that the play would not be staged, he secured its
publication [...]. (236-37)
With even a leading lady in mind, Shelley clearly wished to have this particular play
staged, a wish that the play’s taboo topic thwarted. Due to censorship, then, not to
Shelley’s intentions, this play became a closet drama, one only for the reading public.
Nevertheless, his Preface to the play references potential stagings, repeatedly discussing
future “exhibitions” of the play and giving directions for the enactments. One such
directive was to ensure that “nothing [was] attempted to make the exhibition subservient
to what is vulgarly termed a moral purpose”; for Shelley, “drama” was not a “fit place for
the enforcement” of “dogmas” (240). Here, Shelley implicitly assigns a power to the
staging of dramas by suggesting that these embodiments can affect the way an audience
receives, for better or worse, the scripted words of the playwright, and that such
performances can offer something that a mere reading cannot.
Baillie also clearly expressed her intention to have her plays performed, but,
unlike Shelley, she wanted her entire collection of plays staged, not just an individual
text: “It may, perhaps, be supposed from my publishing these plays, that 1 have written
them for the closet rather than the stage. If upon perusing them with attention, the reader
is disposed to think they are better calculated for the first than the last, let him impute it
to want of skill in the authour [sic], and not to any previous design” (108-09). Baillie’s
plays share with Blake’s chosen mode of expression an appeal to the visual, an implicit
indication that there is something different (and useful) about the audience seeing and not
just reading a work. That Blake uses designs even in aphoristic, non-character and non
action based works such as All Religions are One and There is No Natural Religion
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(thereby making philosophical and spiritual principles and maxims less abstract by
including images of human figures) indicates that the image expresses something more
than words and that a (pictorial or live) performance of ideas or words with bodies does
something that language or reading alone cannot. For example, in Baillie’s De Monfort
from Plays on the Passions, consider the end of Act 4, scene 3 when De Monfort is alone
with the corpse of Rezenvelt, the man he has just murdered. De Monfort’s monologue of
about a page is emotionally intense, but the intensity of performance is only hinted at by
a number of stage cues, including De Monfort “Runfning] to the corps [sic] and
tearfing] o ff the cloth in despair" and "Shrinking] back in horrour [sic]." The visual
effect cannot be underestimated. Reading a stage cue lasts a few seconds at best, but on
stage the performer can add to the space of the scene what a stage cue can only ever gloss
over. Performance more fully realizes and creates the action, dialogue and emotion in a
text by giving flesh to the characters who drive these three elements. The result is that
these elements are externalized from the play-text (and our minds) right before our eyes.
Another significant example of the power of stage performance over closeted
reading is that of the death, or suicide, of De Monfort, particularly as compared with that
of Byron’s Manfred. The final act of rebellion each hero enacts is his own death. Both
make an attempt at suicide before their passion finally destroys their physical beings. The
phantom of Astarte tells Manfred that “To-morrow ends [his] earthly ills” (Manfred
2.4.152), but his death is not caused by any obvious external phenomenon. Instead, it is
as if Manfred himself, through the intensity of his passions, causes his own end. Before
the appearance of Astarte’s ghost, Manfred is doomed to live a tortured life, but it is as if
once her apparition visits him he takes hold of his own destiny and controls the flow of
his life, no longer finding it necessary to resort to a physical means of suicide. He tells
the Abbot as he "expires," “Old man! ’tis not so difficult to die” (3.4.151), implying that
he has had the power all along. Marjean Purinton asserts, “Liberation occurs only when
the mental chains holding humankind to institutions perpetuating that enslaving ideology
are broken [...] In the end, it is not so difficult for Manfred to die, because his mind is no
longer held in bondage” (91-92). It is only when he allows himself to break free of social
constraint completely that he is successful in releasing himself from torment.
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Where Manfred’s death functions more on the level of the mental sphere, both in
the way he causes his death and in the way his death is delineated, De Monfort’s
attempted suicide, due to the overwhelming nature of his passions, takes on a more
external and spectacular form. He says, “Come, madness! come unto me senseless death!
/ 1 cannot suffer this! Here, rocky wall, / Scatter these brains, or dull them”; this
exclamation is followed by the stage directions: “Runs furiously, and, dashing his head
against the wall, falls upon the floor” (5.3.89-91). While his actual death is attributed to
an overflow of his passions rather than directly to his actions, in all likelihood, smashing
his head against a wall sealed his fate. Father Bernard describes the scene of De
Monfort’s death as unlike one he has ever seen:
many a bed of death,
With all its pangs and horrour 1 have seen,
But never ought like this [...]
[...] death is dealing with him.
From violent agitation of the mind,
Some stream of life within his breast has burst. (5.3.20-25)
Despite focusing on the passions gripping his soul in his final moments (which occur off
stage), we are not denied the spectacle of De Monfort bashing his brains. In Manfred, we
have no such sight—we have only an abstract expiration, not a spectacular death. The
main difference is that Manfred’s death is not caused by any obvious external or physical
phenomenon—indeed, such early attempts fail. Instead, it is as if Manfred himself,
through the overwhelming intensity of his passions and will, causes his own end. Baillie
creates a scene begging for performance, while Byron constructs a scene that seems to be
meant for the closet, which aligns with his own description of the play as “mental
theatre,” or closet drama.
The spectacle of the body went hand-in-hand with mechanical spectacles in
Romantic-period theatre, which was highly indebted to theatre crews for staging
elaborate special effects that thrilled audiences. In the advertisement to The Lady o f the
Rock (1805), Thomas Holcroft thanks a theatre crew member for enabling so fantastically
the storm sequence at the heart of his play: “Enough can scarcely be said in praise of Mr.
Johnston, the Machinist of Drury-Lane Theatre, by whose invention such apparent reality

66

and distress are given to the Rock Scene” (vi). And William Moncrieff thanks the
spectacles themselves for the play’s lure in the Cataract o f the Ganges! (1823): “To the
Cataract, itself, for the effective manner in which it has contributed to cause an overflow,
and create a long run to the Piece. To the horses, for the powerful way in which they have
combined [to enhance the play] during its career, the Author’s best thanks are also due,
and are gratefully offered” (Advertisement iv). Both Holcroft and Moncrieff
acknowledge their debt to the aspects of their texts that can come to their full fruition
only on the stage, not in the private reading space. The thrill of the live performance of
the storm, cataract, or army of horses satisfies the audience in a way that reading a
dramatic text cannot. Consider the impressive coiled serpent that reappears throughout
Blake’s corpus, including America. I can imagine the thrill and anxiety of theatre
personnel trying to construct a giant mechanical serpent—if explosions, falling bridges,
and cataracts have been done, why not a huge snake? Often, dramas, melodramas in
particular, relied heavily on mime or gesture for effect, thereby suggesting that
performance was not secondary to the written word. The elaborate stage directions cannot
possibly replace the sight of these spectacles on stage. In the absence of the stage, Blake
gives us his designs, emphasizing the role of seeing in an engagement with his works.
Baillie uses the term “sympathetick [sic] curiosity” in her “Introductory
Discourse” to describe the desire to look and the pleasure of seeing (Plays on the
Passions 69). Her use of the word “sympathetick” is not quite the same as that of Adam
Smith, who defines sympathy as “our fellow-feeling with any passion” (10), arguing that
upon seeing “our brother [...] upon the rack,” “[b]y the imagination we place ourselves in
his situation, we conceive ourselves enduring all the same torments” (9). For Baillie,
sympathetic curiosity does not correspond to feeling what another feels; rather, the
emphasis is more on curiosity than sympathy. The sympathetic aspect seems to lie in the
fact that as humans we are all capable of passions, but not specifically in feeling what
another feels. She emphasizes the desire to watch, “mak[ing] us press forward to behold
[even] what we shrink from” (69). Using the example of the public execution, she
explains that most look on in spite of a competing desire to turn away. It is as if we
become lost or seduced by the visual image of someone under the sway of emotions.
Baillie states, “Every person [...] is more or less occupied in tracing, amongst the
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individuals he converses with, the varieties of understanding and temper which constitute
the characters of men; and receives great pleasure from every stroke of nature that points
out to him those varieties” (68). If “in examining others we know ourselves,” then our
interest in viewing the manifestation of the passions allows for a certain degree of self
analysis and future prevention. In Blake’s illuminated works, sight also plays a
significant role, much as it does in Baillie’s “Introductory Discourse,” where seeing an
actor perform the part of a character significantly affects the ability of the audience to
gain self-awareness.
Baillie’s drive to show and delineate character, especially onstage, is similar to
Blake’s attempt to show the correlation between past and present events in order to shape
the future. For Blake, prophecy does not entail being able to see flashes of an
unavoidable or predetermined future. In his Annotations to An Apology’for the Bible by
Bishop Watson, Blake explains, “Prophets in the modem sense of the word have never
existed [...] Every honest man is a Prophet he utters his opinion both of private & public
matters Thus If you go on So the result is So He never says such a thing shall happen let
you do what you will. A Prophet is a Seer not an Arbitrary Dictator” (E 617). By “Seer”
Blake means an astute interpreter of history and not a prognosticator. For instance, in
America: A Prophecy, he shows the connection between the American and French
Revolutions and hints at possible consequences for the future. Mary Lynn Johnson and
John E. Grant explain,
As the first of Blake’s works to be subtitled ‘A Prophecy’ (the other is
Europe), America proclaims itself the utterance of a prophet, but its
subject is recent history, not the future. Prophecy of this sort makes
connections between past and present, provides insights into underlying
motives, raises alarms about likely consequences, and envisions fresh
possibilities, but it does not predict an inevitable future. (Introduction to
America 83)
Prophecy entails the ability to analyze—to see what is right before one (the current state
of affairs) and what is behind one (prior events) and assess them, piecing together the
probable outcome of a particular course of action.
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The title page of America (fig. 10) includes two people, a man and a woman,
sitting below the word “America” and above the word “Prophecy”; they appear to be
reading what may, in fact, be the work that we hold in our very hands. Both figures are
flanked by children. However, the male figure is flanked by two children who try to get
his attention away from the book before him; they point toward different directions,
trying to get the reading figure to lift his eyes and look to where they point. The
implication is that reading is not enough. The figure must also see what these children are
trying to show him. The Preludium continues this emphasis on seeing. An imprisoned
Ore, who speaks first, expresses his frustration at not being able to see “the shadowy
daughter of Urthona,” the daughter of his captor. At the end of his speech, he admits,
“when thou bringest food / 1 howl my joy: and my red eyes seek to behold thy face / In
vain! These clouds roll to & fro, & hide thee from my sight” (1.18-20, E 51).
Immediately following this admission, Ore breaks free of his chains and “siez[es]” her,
beginning the (violent) act that sets the rest of the events of the poem in motion. His need
to see her finally forces or enables him to destroy his own shackles. Until now, “the
shadowy daughter of Urthona” has been silent, unable or unwilling to speak. However,
the sight of Ore finally breaks the spell, and she speaks for the first time: “Soon as she
saw the terrible boy then burst the virgin cry” (2.6, E 52). In the speech that follows, she
articulates her understanding of who Ore is, a kind of saviour figure, but also of the pain
and violence that will accompany his coming. Seeing Ore directly precipitates her
revelation or (self-)knowledge of Ore, herself, and the revolutionary events of the world.
This scene of self-knowledge and the role of sight are reminiscent of Baillie’s argument
that an audience gains this kind of awareness by seeing performers on a stage.
In the same cultural moment when seeing and performance were seen as
significant, there were also those opposed to them, either in part or in whole. The result
was a debate between the relative merits of the closet and the stage.16 Many Romantic

16 Catherine B. Burroughs reminds us that there is a “tendency to associate the closet with reading
only, to oppose it to theatricality, and to forget that, during the early nineteenth century, not only did the
phrase serve as a metaphor for privacy and intense intellectual engagement, but it also identified a literal
space in which a variety o f theatrical activities— many particular to women— took place” (8). The literal
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writers, such as Charles Lamb, William Hazlitt, Samuel Taylor Coleridge and Leigh
Hunt, preferred the mental theatre to staged theatre, particularly when it came to
Shakespeare, the national poet. These writers felt that the stage denigrated in some way
the nobility of his characters. As Lamb says, “The greatness of Lear is not in the corporal
dimension, but in the intellectual” (qtd. in Hazlitt 4: 271; also qtd. in Burroughs 9);
Hazlitt states, “[T]he reader of the plays of Shakespear [sic] is almost always
disappointed in seeing them acted; and, for our own parts, we should never go to see
them acted, if we could help it” (5: 222); Coleridge is reported in the Bristol Gazette as
saying that “he never saw any of Shakespear’s plays performed, but with a degree of
pain, disgust, and indignation” and that Shakespeare should be “drive[n] [...] from the
stage, to find his proper place, in the heart and in the closet” (5, 1: 563); and Hunt
nostalgically looks back at the moment of original performance and explains that the
nature of the theatre has altered too much for Lear to be acted without repelling the
audience:
In Shakespeare’s time, the scenery, dresses, &c. were so unlike any thing
real, and the public came so much more to hear the writing of the thing
than to see the acting of it, that it was comparatively another matter; but
now that the real bodily old man is before us, with his white beard, and the
storm howling about him, we ought not to be able to endure the sight, any
more than that of a mad old father in the public street. (251)
Hunt’s comment suggests a contradiction in that stagecraft and acting have become
almost too good; now, audiences cannot help but be absorbed in the reality of the
performance, rather than keeping a distance, which he claims was possible in earlier
centuries. In addition, Hunt's assertion is that, in Shakespeare’s day, people went to the
theatre to hear the words of the playwright, thereby subordinating the spectacle and
embodiment to the text.
The exaggerated acting style, due to the cavernous size of the theatres, as well as
the emphasis on spectacle were at the heart of much of this abuse according to Timothy
Webb, who has compiled many of these kinds of theatrically antagonistic remarks from
space o f the closet that Burroughs mentions was often in the domestic setting o f the home, such as a
drawing-room.
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Coleridge, Lamb, Hazlitt and Hunt (35-39). However, Celestine Woo makes a good case
for shades of grey when it comes to classifying these critics as antitheatricalists. On the
one hand, some critics and writers, such as Lamb, were uncomfortable with seeing
emotion expressed because “the more comprehensive and overtly visual embodiment of
the affective character” led, they believed, to “audience passivity” (56). In other words,
“being given all the details visually by the players” made the audience less active in the
interpretive process. On the other hand, “seemingly antitheatricalist critics” displayed an
“evident relishing of the productions and actors they witnessed” in their dramatic
criticism (63).17 For instance, “despite his notorious rantings about preferring to read
Shakespeare rather than see him acted, when it came to actual Shakespeare performances,
Lamb wanted the actor to act emotively.” Even Byron, who coined the term “mental
theatre” (Byron's Letters and Journals 8: 186-87) and appeared to completely reject the
idea of staging his dramas, sat on the selection committee at Drury Lane and tried
vigorously to get Baillie’s plays staged. His own reluctance to stage his plays seems to
have had little to do with issues of performability and the value of the stage:
1 cannot conceive any man of irritable feeling putting himself at the
mercies of an audience:—the sneering reader, and the loud critic, and the
tart review, are scattered and distant calamities; but the trampling of an
intelligent or of an ignorant audience on a production which, be it good or

17 Antitheatricalism encompasses more than just issues o f the closet and the stage. Since the Early
Modem period, actors and playhouses have been consistently associated with the seedier elements o f
society. In Shakespeare’s day, the theatres were located near taverns and brothels, making connections
among the three inevitable. The stigma o f immoral conduct dogged the theatre world into the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries. Society often viewed “players” as having “suspiciously immoral identities”
(Hadley 21). While John Philip Kemble and Sarah Siddons subverted the typical view o f their profession
by projecting ideals o f domestic virtue, “theatrical respectability [and] social mores” (Woo 138), Edmund
Kean’s “dissolute lifestyle” (133) reinforced the conventional attitude toward the theatre. For an account o f
the history o f antitheatricalism from ancient Greece to modern times, see Barish’s The Antitheatrical

Prejudice. Barish consistently identifies an anxiety o f role-playing, or acting, as a recurrent rationale for
opposing theatrical productions. Many found the deception, or pretending, and the fluidity o f identity that
marked performance threatening. I explore this aspect o f antitheatricalism in more detail in chapter four.
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bad, has been a mental labour to the writer, is a palpable and immediate
grievance [...]. (Preface, Marino Faliero 305)
Knowing his own temperament and ego, Byron rejected the stage out of fear of being
rejected by the audience, a rejection far worse than written attacks or private criticisms of
his plays and poems.
The value of seeing something is the crux of the debate between the closet and the
stage, where the closet involves the private, individual reading of a text and the stage
involves a communal experience of seeing a text physically manifested based on
someone else’s interpretation or vision of a text that does not generally equate with that
of the audience members. The former entails a personal and ideal vision and the latter the
externalized vision of another. Antitheatrical comments, such as Lamb’s infamous
criticism of seeing an old Lear doddering about the stage versus the noble image he had
conjured in his mind while reading the play, function to elevate the status of mental
renderings while deriding the potential of the theatre. A large part of their antitheatrical
sentiment has to do with the extreme veneration of Shakespeare as the nation’s poet and
the sense that the written text was sacred and should not be translated into other media.18
Ironically, the instability of Shakespeare’s written texts, as well as his own involvement
in the theatre, does not dissuade these kinds of critics. Neither does the simple fact that,
even in reading a text, we personalize it; in effect, we stage the events of the text in our
minds as we envision characters and interpret speeches and actions. Writers such as
Lamb, Hazlitt, and Coleridge all strongly contested an equivalent value between mental
constructions and physical embodiment, placing the word above the image in many cases.
Performance is not the only victim of these critics. They also heaped disdain on
representations of Shakespeare in the medium of visual art for similar reasons. Hazlitt,
though he labels performances of Shakespeare as the worst, ranks paintings of scenes
from Shakespeare—such as those in Boydell’s gallery—a close second. He says, “Even

1HAs Woo observes, “Dramatic criticism in the latc-Romantic era weighed deeply the question o f
whether these increasingly prominent theatrical stars overshadowed the text: evidence o f the shift in ethos
to privilege the playwright and his work, in contrast to the eighteenth century when the author and
playscript were rarely mentioned or analyzed” (156).
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those daubs of pictures, formerly exhibited under the title of the Shakespear Gallery, had
a less evident tendency to disturb and distort all the previous notions we had imbibed
from reading Shakespear” (5: 234). The Boydell Shakespeare Gallery’s “overall effect
was to shift attention from the word to the picture,” at least in the eyes of the
aforementioned critics (Webb 36). Blake himself engraved a plate of John Opie’s
painting Romeo and Juliet for the gallery (Burwick, “Introduction: Gallery, Artists, and
Engravers” 19). To argue, the way antitheatricalists do, that the performance of a play
closes down or limits the possible interpretations of the text creates a hierarchy between
performance and text, similar to the one that exists between the visual image and the
word. Mitchell suggests that the idolatry of the imagination on the part of many Romantic
writers stands behind this hierarchy:
Under the aegis of ‘imagination,’ in other words, the notion of imagery is
split in two, and a distinction is made between the pictorial or graphic
image which is a lower form—external, mechanical, dead, and often
associated with the empiricist model of perception—and a ‘higher’ image
which is internal, organic, and living. (Iconology 25)
This idea that the powers of the mind are superior to the powers of material pictorial
space extends to the view that the powers of corporeal theatrical stagings are also
inferior. However, performance opens up interpretation in many ways, most notably by
showing us a reading that we may never have envisioned. With respect to design and text
in Blake, those who argue that the image closes down our numerous possible mental
interpretations align themselves with those who see pictorial space at the service of the
word. Cannot the same be said of the word, though: that it closes down how we interpret
or respond to a design? Blake does not shy away from creating designs for his own
words, nor does he for those of the most revered poets of the time—Shakespeare, Milton,
and Dante. For Blake, then, visual representation offers interpretive potential that does
not take away from the mental image; nor does it limit the text. In fact, in many cases, it
augments it.
Through the dramatic performance of the illuminated works, Blake provides a
counterpoint to a closeted mentality generally and to antitheatricality specifically. His
marriage of words and visual images, treating them as equal partners in his art, distances
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him from the antitheatricalists. Although the idealization of private, inner worlds of
reflection and imagination in the Romantic period functioned in opposition to the public,
outer world of action and performance, Blake’s verbal-visual art form, a genre that
exhibits a theatrical identity, outs the text from the closet. Indeed, his composite art
makes a significant contribution to the image and word dialectic of his time, destabilizing
conventional notions of genre as well as toward exploding the boundary between the
inner world of the mind and the outer world of the body. While we can enact Urizen’s
story in our minds as we read the text, the designs necessarily externalize that mental
activity by presenting us with a visual representation that interacts with our private vision
of Urizen; thus, the inner is bridged to the outer. The images give the characters a voice,
so to speak, in spite of being mute, the way that actors on a stage give characters in a text
a voice that does not come from the reader’s own mind. The characters are not bound to
mental idealizations. In Blake, the characters are stretched beyond our own individual
limits. Thus, even in private, in our “closet,” the theatrical nature of Blake’s illuminated
works emerges.
In freeing his work from the strict confines of the reading closet and from generic
conventions, Blake indirectly offers his voice to the discourses of Romantic drama and
performance. The theatricality of the illuminated works suggests a challenge not only to
conventional notions of the reading audience and the form of drama but also to notions
about what it means to be performable and unperformable. Analyzing Blake’s works as
dramatic performances offers a different historical and generic context and it offers a new
way of understanding the interplay between text and design central to his art, providing
one answer to the generic identity of his art, to his “Visionary forms dramatic”
{Jerusalem 98.28, E 257).

74

“Enter into these Images”: Journey to the Centre of the Illuminated Works

In the previous chapter, I argued that Blake’s illuminated works function as dramatic
performances, creating an audience more akin to a theatrical audience than a
conventional reading or viewing one (i.e., of books or paintings). 1 will build on these
theatrical identifications—particularly with respect to audience engagement—by
examining Blake’s conception of art, imagination, perception, identity, and, of course, his
own illuminated works. Significantly, Blake signals the audience repeatedly throughout
his works, both in visual and textual spaces. Even though his visionary poetry conveys a
concern for the welfare of humanity, focalized as it is through the voice of a prophet
figure, Blake’s relationship with his audience goes further than simply revealing human
ills and sketching out possible solutions. In fact, he creates an art form that makes direct
demands on the audience, constructing a specifically Blakean spectatorship.
Blake articulates his most radical idea about the nature of the illuminated books,
about the relation between his artistic media and his audience, in A Vision o f the Last
Judgment (1810), his prose remarks on his large-scale painting by the same name. This
commentary from his Notebook explores vision, reality, perception, artistic
representation, and mediation. Blake writes, “If the Spectator could Enter into these
Images in his Imagination approaching them on the Fiery Chariot of his Contemplative
Thought [...] then would he meet the Lord in the Air & then he would be happy” (E 560).
For Blake, visionary art is a transformative medium, but the transformation is sensory
and physical as much as it is mental. His use of the verb “enter” to describe the
audience’s interaction with his work suggests not only an intellectual participation in his
universe, but also, as I will show, a literal step into that world. Although he situates this
particular (indirect) call to the audience to “Enter into these Images” in the context of his
painting, I argue that this statement, in fact, applies more aptly to his multimedia
illuminated works. As a combination of engraving, poetry and painting, they provide a
fuller and more immediate experience of Blake’s world of the imagination than any
medium could provide alone. In this chapter, I will analyze the spectator’s activity of
entering Blake’s works not as a metaphor for art appreciation, but as an imaginative and
physical experience of his “composite art” (W. J. T. Mitchell).
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Stephen C. Behrendt asserts, “Blake continually emphasizes the mediatorial
function of art, which serves as catalyst in a transformation of mental state[s]” (Reading
William Blake 22). Using A Vision o f the Last Judgment as a theoretical reflection on
mediation, 1 will examine how Blake manipulates the tension between alienation and
immersion in order to provoke a transformative experience in his spectator, leading to an
altered perception of one’s potential and the nature of the world and to a specifically
Blakean spectatorship. With the illuminated works, which tend toward theatrical
performance in content and presentation style, Blake constructs two seemingly
contradictory experiences of spectatorship by exploiting this tension: one, a Brechtian
alienation that jars us out of our complacency—our uncritical acceptance of the supposed
relationship between art and reality—and two, a kind of immediate “medieval experience
of spectacle” in which we perceive the representation as an actual “presence” (Egginton
43). Blake does not seek erasure of the medium or of mediation. Rather, he emphasizes
the illuminated works as a medium through various self-reflexive techniques, such as
references to his process of artistic creation, depictions of characters entering doorways,
and direct addresses to the audience. For Blake, creating a sense of distancing is
necessary in order for the audience to consciously answer his call to enter into the works
by altering their perception of reality to the level of presence. Such an alteration offers a
fundamental re-conceptualization of the way we understand reality, spectatorship, and the
visionary medium. By paying close attention to his self-reflexive strategies, which I align
with metatheatricality, and to his language of “spectatorship” and “entering” in
conjunction with theories of media and mediation, I argue that Blake uses the opposing
effects of distance and immediacy in his works in order to catalyze a self-conscious
participation in the audience and a recognition of the interrelated nature of reality and the
imagination.
Much critical attention has been paid to the way media function in the world as
well as to the relationship we have to media. Lisa Gitelman asks, “If media are sites for
experiences of meaning—critics have pondered—to what degree are meaning and its
experience determined or circumscribed by technological conditions?” (8). The answer is
significant in terms of the degree to which human will participates in the creation of
meaning in the world. Gitelman states, “At stake are two different versions of agency.
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Either media audiences lack agency or they possess it. Hardly anyone would say the truth
can’t lie somewhere in between these two extremely reductive positions [...]” (9). This
middle position regarding media and human agency seems to be encapsulated by John
Bunyan’s address to his readers in “The Author’s Apology for His Book” in Pilgrim’s
Progress'.
This Book will make a Traveller of thee,
If by its Counsel thou wilt ruled be;
It will direct thee to the Holy Land,
If thou wilt its Directions understand[.] (p. 6)
The Book, it would seem, acts on the reader, and the reader of the work seems to take on
an active role by becoming a “Traveller” journeying to “the Holy Land.” However, this
dual agency is negated through Bunyan’s language of control and domination. It
undermines the agency of the reader because he/she does not choose to become a
traveller; rather, the book will “make a Traveller of [him/her].” The agency lies with
Bunyan’s text, then, and not the reader. Pilgrim’s Progress, according to the author,
offers “Counsel” and “directions,” but the reader must submit and be “ruled” by the
words on the page. Arguably, there is a certain agency in the choice to be “ruled,” but one
that hinges on passivity. In contrast, Blake, though also figuring his audience as a kind of
traveller, does not assign agency to the medium while denying agency to the audience.
Instead, Blake emphasizes the agency of his audience; he does not use passive language
or the language of control, as Bunyan does. Blake’s spectator is not ruled by the work,
but, on the contrary, he/she actively “approaches]” it and then “meet[s] the Lord in the
Air” ( VLJ E 560)—as does the spectator who enters Blake’s painting of the last
judgment—thus affirming the spectator’s agency and power in the reception process.
Although he gives his spectator agency, the power of the work itself does not diminish
because the art object helps to instigate an epiphanic moment by materializing
imagination. For Blake, the construction of meaning depends on a specific kind of
interaction between the media and the audience, one in which an audience’s active
participation necessarily creates meaning.
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This view of artistic reception coincides with reader-response theory, which
refigures readers of texts as active producers of meaning rather than as passive receivers
of authorial textual productions:
Thanks to the work of theorists like Wolfgang Iser, Stanley Fish, and
Michael Riffaterre, readers are no longer considered passive recipients of
textual meaning but active contributors to the aesthetic process, working
with the text to decode signs and then to create meaning. [...] for them, all
readers are engaged in the active making of textual meaning. (Hutcheon
134, original emphasis)
For instance, Iser foregrounds the role of the reader in “causing] the text to reveal its
potential multiplicity of connections” (“The Reading Process” 1222), as the reader
participates in “the process of anticipation and retrospection” (1223) and fills in “the gaps
left by the text.” The reader actively creates meaning through these kinds of activities,
unveiling the connections within the text, connections which “are the product of the
reader’s mind working on the raw material of the text” (1222). Fish advances the view
that literary criticism should focus more energy on the experience of reading rather than
on the text as the ultimate source of meaning: “the reader’s response is not to the
meaning; it is the meaning, or at least the medium in which what I wanted to call the
meaning comes into being” (3; original emphasis). Fish undermines the authority of the
text as a stable object that houses meaning and that cannot be altered by external forces:
“The objectivity of the text is an illusion and, moreover, a dangerous illusion, because it
is so physically convincing. The illusion is one of self-sufficiency and completeness”
(43). Similarly, Blake’s implicit plea for his spectator to go into his art suggests that his
works are not complete or sufficient; they are dependent on an audience.
Giving the audience of visual media the same power to create meaning, Linda
Hutcheon argues that seeing visual images, whether on a canvas, onstage or on a screen,
entails as much activity on the part of the audience as reading words on a page does:
“both are imaginatively, cognitively, and emotionally active” (23). By demanding an
active audience who must navigate verbal and visual spaces at once and create meaning
from an arcane mythological universe, Blake’s work functions as an ideal object of
reader-response criticism, as Behrendt suggests when he discusses Blake in relation to
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Iser (Reading William Blake 30). Critics often discuss the way Blake provokes his
audience into a kind of co-creation of his work, a co-creation that is even more explicit
and active than in Iser’s theory. For instance, Roger R. Easson says specifically of
Jerusalem, “[I]t is a poem that enjoins the reader to participate with its writer in the
creative process” (311). Tilottama Rajan argues, “As ‘visionary forms dramatic,’ to use
Blake’s own phrase, the prophecies seem to require the participation and faith of the
reader if vision is to be dramatized, made empirical and concrete” (“The Supplement of
Reading” 574). She continues, “The point is not that the elements of a completed
meaning are absent from the text, but that the reader must participate in the process of
actualizing them” (581).' For Rajan, the reader faces gaps, or “aporias,” in the text and
must set about an “imaginative participation” in order to realize meaning. Behrendt
shares a similar viewpoint: “for Blake demands that his readers serve as co-creators [...]
participating fully in this shared activity of making. The reader is expected to respond to
implied queries and challenges, to embedded puzzles and enigmas, and to an often
daunting array of apparent inconsistencies” (1). Blake “brings the audience into the
drama as participant, obligated to get involved, to perceive and to judge” (9). Nelson
Hilton’s assessment of The Book ofUrizen's relation to its audience also aligns the
audience and Blake as co-artists. Hilton states, “Urizen helps us, finally, to appreciate the
power and will of an Original Poetic Genius that went into its creation and that goes into
our creating of it” (“Blakean Zen” 197). Similarly, Morris Eaves says that Blake’s (and
Wordsworth’s) ideal audience “is someone with a fully developed mind and heart whose
powers of intellect and passion are equal to those of the poet. The reader is not a passive
receptacle or an impassive judge [...]. To judge a poem, the reader must enter into an
intimate relationship with it” ( William Blake's Theory o f Art 191). For all these critics,
Blake (either as a unique figure or as part of a larger spirit of the age) forces those who
engage with his works to take on an active role and share in the creative process.1

1 Rajan makes a more wide-ranging argument by applying this idea o f co-creation to Romantic
poets in general: “What we witness in Romanticism is the development o f a literature in which the text is a
heuristic stimulus rather than a finished product” (587).
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While I agree with those scholars who argue that Blake demands a higher level of
engagement and a higher level of creation through interpretation than most other writers
and artists, I also make the case that the implications of what Blake demands from his
audience go even further and are even more radical. We are expected to do more than
help resolve or grapple with inconsistencies and gaps in the text, to do more than
negotiate between verbal and visual levels of depiction, and to do more than participate
actively in the production of textual and visual meaning. All of these actions hold great
importance, but Blake urges us beyond intellectual activity. His call to have us “enter” his
work not only functions on the figurative level, comparing mental engagement to walking
into a work, but also reflects the literal level: we enter his imaginative space in mind and
body through altered perception. Being a member of Blakean spectatorship is about
reading, viewing, receiving, creating and participating in alternative spaces and worlds all
at once. An ideal Blakean spectator has the will and the ability to shift his/her ordinary
perception about the nature of art and of human identity—its potential and limitation. For
Blake, his art is more than entertaining an audience or making them flex critical and
interpretive muscles; entering his works leads to the Eternal, to other modes of thinking
and being, to expanded perception, and to an actual immersion in the imagination.
Alongside figuring audience interaction with his work as an entrance, Blake sets
out some important first principles in A Vision o f the Last Judgment. In a series of
digressions, he articulates his understanding of the nature of vision, representation, art,
reality, and perception. He begins by juxtaposing generic modes or media of artistic
expression: “The Last Judgment is not Fable or Allegory but Vision Fable or Allegory are
a totally distinct & inferior kind of Poetry” (E 554). Here, Blake subordinates “fable” or
“allegory” to “vision” or “imagination,” a term he equates with “vision,” sometimes
using them interchangeably. His reasons for doing so lie in the association he makes
between fable or allegory and memory on the one hand and between vision and
inspiration on the other. This opposition between memory and inspiration appears
repeatedly throughout his works, for instance, in Milton (pi. 1 and 2), where negative
connotations are heaped on memory.
For Blake, the problem with memory is that it functions in a static manner;
inspiration, however, functions dynamically and creatively. The former can only repeat,
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but the latter can produce new things. Rooted in memory, fable or allegory can offer only
copies or reflections of things—not things in themselves. Blake explains that while
“Fable or Allegory is Seldom without some Vision [for instance] Pilgrims Progress is full
of it” (E 554), fable or allegory still differs from the visionary mode because the former
offers only a distanced experience, while the latter ultimately offers an immediate one.
Fable or allegory is a genre that uses one thing to stand for or point to another thing; it is
a kind of fiction that does not itself embody a truth or reality. Vision, then, surpasses
fable or allegory because it “is a Representation of what Eternally Exists. Really &
Unchangeably,” implying that what fable or allegory represents is impermanent and false
because it does not “Really” exist. Vision’s foundation in inspiration, however, leads to
the production of the Eternal, of the truth, and of what “Really” or actually exists.
As productive of reality, vision or imagination does not function only on an
intellectual or spiritual level. Blake also adds a sensory quality to imagination by
referring to it as the “Imaginative Eye” that sees, an addition that builds on his statements
in All Religions are One and The Marriage o f Heaven and Hell that mind and body are
not divided. Blake’s understanding of vision and imagination and the engagement with
artistic objects go against a more conventional understanding in which the reality seen or
created can only ever be virtual, not concrete or real like the physical world. Iser asserts,
The literary text activates our own faculties, enabling us to recreate the
world it presents. The product of this creative activity is what we might
call the virtual dimension of the text, which endows it with its reality. This
virtual dimension is not the text itself, nor is it the imagination of the
reader: it is the coming together of text and imagination. (“The Reading
Process” 1222)
Despite using words such as “recreate” and “reality,” Iser’s notion of the way a reader
interacts with a text remains at the level of mental play. Tellingly, he uses the phrase
“virtual dimension” to denote what “endows” the text with “its reality”—virtual, of
course, is opposed to actual (virtual reality, after all, is not quite reality) and connotes
simulation, artificiality, and imitation. For Blake, however, vision and the imagination do
not produce virtual or make-believe things, and they do not produce a mere version of the
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real; instead, vision and the imagination lead to an actual recreation of the world the text
presents—one that really, and not virtually, exists.
At first, the language Blake employs to talk about works of imagination seems to
cause complications and even undermine this aspect of the actual. In fact, he seems to
subvert his own hierarchy between vision and fable or allegory by aligning vision with
the very thing that makes fable or allegory inferior. When Blake states, “Vision or
Imagination is a Representation of what Eternally Exists. Really & Unchangeably” (E
554, my emphasis), the word “representation” gives one pause. If Blake intended the
meaning of the word in the conventional way, then how does vision differ from fable or
allegory? To represent the Eternal suggests a stand-in for, an imitation or a distanced
copy of the Eternal and not the Eternal itself. Yet, I argue that Blake uses the word
representation in a way that does not equate it with imitation or depiction. At the end of
his letter to artist Ozias Humphry about his painting A Vision o f the Last Judgment (fig.
12), Blake writes, “Such is the Design which you my Dear Sir have been the cause of my
producing & which but for you might have slept till the Last Judgment” (E 554). Blake
describes his work as a kind of awakening as opposed to the sleep the work would have
been prone to without Humphry’s rousing encouragement. This particular phrasing
indicates that Blake’s painting is in some sense the Last Judgment and not an imitation or
fanciful construction; after all, he claims, “The Last Judgment is one of these Stupendous
Visions[.] I have represented it as I saw it” (E 555). This vision does not exist in the
mind’s eye; rather, it is a literal vision and sensory experience, much in the same way that
the Last Judgment is presented to St. John the Divine as an event actually unfolding
#

before him.

-y

Moreover, Blake indicates that his painting is a representation of the event in the
sense that it re-presents the event. As a re-presentation, the work is not a stand-in for the2
2

Quoting E. S. Shaffer, Joseph Anthony Wittreich, Jr. says o f the visionary, “[He] ‘is actually

seeing the events played out in the heavens.’ The heavens are therefore a stage from which the visionary

sees some o f the time— and hears some o f the time— a drama unfold" (“Painted Prophecies” 107).
Although Wittreich equates the visionary experience with that o f a spectator o f embodied performance, he
maintains, “[Blake’s] illuminated books are [...] picture-prophecies” (108), which “contain both pictures
and words” (107) as did “the book given to [John o f Patmos] by Christ,” thus emphasizing their pictorial
and verbal qualities but stopping short o f equating these works with embodied performance.
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Fig. 12. A Vision o f the Last Judgment, 1808, pen and watercolour, Petworth House,
Sussex. © National Trust. Used with permission.
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event, but the event itself—a “production of presence” to borrow a phrase from Egginton
(43). To re-present means to do again, but not in a way that is imitation; it takes part in
the original moment. The painting, then, participates in the actual event as it presents it.
Referring to the specific figures in his work, Blake explains, “[I]t ought to be understood
that the Persons Moses & Abraham are not here meant but the States Signified by those
Names the Individuals being representatives or Visions of those States as they were
reveald to Mortal Man in the Series of Divine Revelations” (E 556). The word
“representatives” functions in a way that supports the argument that Blake uses
representation in an unconventional way. Here, he equates representatives with visions,
indicating that Moses and Abraham, as representatives of specific States—abstract states
of being, which are temporarily occupied by people as they pass from one state to
another—are incarnations or concretizations of those States. A representative or vision in
this case means an embodiment.
We are used to thinking of art objects, and indeed all media, as a way to imitate
reality or to project a stand-in for the real experience. As Iser states, “Western tradition
has repeated time and again” that artistic representation in general, and literary in
particular, is “an act of mimesis” (Prospecting 243). Going against the grain, he argues
that representation is not mimetic at all; rather, it is a performance, and he emphasizes
“the performative qualities through which the act of representation brings about
something that hitherto did not exist as a given object” (236). In this way, artistic
representation does not imitate the world—it creates one. However, as my earlier
discussion of Iser pointed out, his idea of this created world characterizes the world of the
imagination as a virtual rather than an actual space.
In seeking to imitate reality as closely as possible, contemporary media aim
toward those conventional mimetic ends for which Iser critiqued the Western tradition.
As Gitelman notes, “[M]edia represent and delimit representing, so that new media
provide new sites for the ongoing and vernacular experience of representation as such”
(4), suggesting that media and audience interactions shape “popular ontologies of
representation” (7). She explains, “Media are so integral to a sense of what representation
itself is, and what counts as adequate—and thereby commodifiable—representation, that
they share some of the conventional attributes of both art historical objects and scientific
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ones” (4). The value of media (such as film, music media, videogames, and
communication devices) is contingent on the extent to which they present stand-ins for
reality as well as their ability to offer an authentic experience of the actual world. For
instance, new videogames replace older ones in part because the graphics today seem to
offer more life-like images, thereby making the audience feel as if the experience is truer
to reality. Gitelman indicates that our judgment of “what counts as adequate [...]
representation” is shaped in part by the way media depict the world and our experience of
it. As a medium, or multimedia form, Blake’s illuminated works also participate in
notions of representation and reality. However, unlike some modem media, Blake’s
works do not aim for conventional mimesis in order to approach the real world as closely
as possible. Instead, his works offer us the world of the imagination, but this world is not
less real than the everyday world in which we live. Through the media of the illuminated
works, he attempts to reshape our understanding of art and representation.
The man who writes, “[T]he notion that man has a body distinct from his soul, is
to be expunged” and calls for “an improvement of sensual enjoyment” (MHH, pi. 14, E
39) seems at odds with the man who says, “Mental Things are alone Real what is Calld
Corporeal Nobody Knows of its Dwelling Place” (VLJE 565) and declares, “I assert for
My self that 1 do not behold the Outward Creation & that to me it is hindrance & not
Action it is as the Dirt upon my feet No part of Me” (E 565), a biblical echo from the
gospels that functions as a sign of leaving behind that which is not worthy. ’ The first
statement unifies flesh and spirit, body and mind, and implicitly reaffirms the physical
and sensory part of life. In contrast, the latter statements seem to dismiss or reject the
physical world, a sentiment that runs throughout A Vision o f the Last Judgment:3
3

Jesus tells His disciples to treat as dirt on their feet those that reject Him as the disciples spread

His word. See Luke 9.1-5: “Then he called his twelve disciples together, and gave them power and
authority over all devils, and to cure diseases. / And he sent them to preach the kingdom o f God, and to
heal the sick. / And he said unto them, [...] whatsoever house ye enter into, there abide, and thence depart. /
And whosoever will not receive you, when ye go out o f that city, shake off the very dust from your feet for
a testimony against them.” See also Mark 6.6-11, and Matthew 10.1-15. If the physical world stands for the
dirt on Blake’s feet, then it is somehow unworthy o f being accepted and must be left behind.
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This world of Imagination is the World of Eternity it is the Divine bosom
into which we shall all go after the death of the Vegetated body This
World <of lmagination> is Infinite & Eternal whereas the world of
Generation or Vegetation is Finite & [for a small moment] Temporal
There Exist in that Eternal World the Permanent Realities of Every Thing
which we see are reflected in this Vegetable Glass of Nature. (E 555)
Here, Blake seems to separate the imagination from the material world and subordinate
the latter. How can we reconcile the contradiction between a Blake who can say that body
and soul are not separate and a Blake who suggests that the physical or vegetative part of
being is less than the spiritual or eternal part? The way he characterizes the world of the
imagination and the everyday world resonates with Plato’s Myth of the Cave. Blake
writes, “tho on Earth things seem Permanent they are less permanent than a Shadow as
we all know too well.” Blake implies that our world, the perceived world, the natural
world is a shadow, like the shadows cast on the wall of Plato’s cave that merely reflect
the silhouettes of the reality outside of the cave, whereas the world of the imagination
(like Plato’s ideal forms) signifies “Permanent Realities.”
However, the Platonic parallels are ruptured in other parts of the text and, indeed,
in other works by Blake. The physical world in itself exhibits and houses the divine and
the Eternal. In “Auguries of Innocence,” Blake shows how the world exists on two
planes—one of a surface image and the other of a deeper reality:
To see a World in a Grain of Sand
And a Heaven in a Wild Flower
Hold Infinity in the palm of your hand
And Eternity in an hour. (1 -4, E 490)
For Blake, the world around us is so much more than our limited perception allows us to
see. However, seeing the deeper structure of the physical world is possible. The reason
many of us cannot see “a World in a Grain of Sand”— a tiny part of the earth that is, in
fact, big and glorious and divine—has to do with faulty perception. Blake looks at the sun
and sees not a “Disk of fire somewhat like a Guinea,” but “an Innumerable company of
the Heavenly host crying Holy Holy Holy is the Lord God Almighty” (E 566). While
Blake often describes the senses as closing up and limiting the potential of imagination,
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he also uses them to experience the infinite. Like St. John seeing the revelation, this kind
of experience hinges on the use of expanded perception over limited perception. It would
seem that without the senses, the Eternal would be beyond our reach, or, put another way,
the senses are a way (or the way) to the Eternal. The mind alone is not capable of
achieving this.
Indeed, despite the seeming antipathy to the physical body when he calls the
natural world the dirt upon his feet, in the Marriage, both Ezekiel and Isaiah
acknowledge the senses or perception as components in the visionary process. Isaiah
claims, “I saw no God, nor heard any, in a finite organical perception; but my senses
discover’d the infinite in every thing” (pi. 12, E 38), while Ezekiel explains his “desire of
raising other men into a perception of the infinite” (E 39). Isaiah recognizes the limitation
of “organical perception” or sensory perception, but he explains that his senses are still
able to perceive the infinite in the world. Sensory perception has two levels: one organic
and one visionary. Similarly, Ezekiel suggests that humans can achieve a vision of the
Eternal through perception. Through the imagination, Isaiah and Ezekiel are able to use
their senses in a way that transgresses their conventional limitations.
What change occurs to the senses in order for them to fulfill this potential? Soon
after these exchanges with the prophets, Blake explains, “If the doors of perception were
cleansed every thing would appear to man as it is: infinite. For man has closed himself
up, till he sees all things thro’ narrow chinks of his cavern” (pi. 14, E 39). Thus, the
natural world expresses or is imbued with the Eternal, and the senses, which are part of
the corporeal body, can do more than see in a mundane sense—they can lead humans to
Blake’s notion of vision. Janet Warner’s explanation of the eternal and fallen form
disentangles the paradox at play in Blake’s idea of the body and the senses. She states,
“in Blake, Eternal Form and Fallen Form (or vegetative form) are essentially the same they exist in one and the same body, and they exist in the flesh. It is not that there is a
physical body and a spiritual body; they are rather two aspects of one” (23), and “it is
only our perception of them that differs” (29). Our perception needs correcting so that we
can see the infinite and divine in a world that from a mortal perspective seems finite and
impure. The physical world itself, then, is not the “Dirt upon [his] feet” that he shakes
off; rather, the dirt is a mistaken idea of the world—it is the world seen with faulty
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perception. Conventional perceptions of reality and mistaken interpretations of the nature
of the world, then, lead to a limited understanding that masks the true nature of existence.
The world of our misperception is a world of mortality and impermanence. The
fact that this world has an end and is not eternal makes it something odious to Blake. For
him, “Eternal Identity is one thing & Corporeal Vegetation is another thing” (E 556). He
declares, “We are in a World of Generation & death & this world we must cast o ff’ (E
562). The impermanent “Shadows” of this world come about thanks to our belief in the
mortality of the natural body and world. A shadow is something impermanent, something
that comes about due to shifts in light and positions of objects. In the Bible, the phrase
“the shadow of death” appears repeatedly (especially in the Book of Job). Blake also
explicitly ties shadows to death in works such as The Book ofUrizen and The Book o f
Ahania, where Urizen is said to have a “deathful shadow” {Urizen 20.26, E 80) and to be
“a death-shadow” (Ahania 2.41, E 85). In a letter to Thomas Butts, Blake includes a
poem in which he writes, “We like Infants descend / In our Shadows on Earth / Like a
weak mortal birth” (E 713). However, the true nature of this world is not death but eternal
renewal:
The Nature of Visionary Fancy or Imagination is very little Known & the
Eternal nature & permanence of its ever Existent Images is considerd as
less permanent than the things of Vegetative & Generative Nature yet the
Oak dies as well as the Lettuce but Its Eternal Image & Individuality never
dies, but renews by its seed, just [as] <so> the Imaginative Image returns
[according to] <by> the seed of Contemplative Thought[.] (E 555)
According to Blake, this world does not house mere copies of eternal counterparts as
Plato claims. In fact, Blake’s sense of renewal and regeneration is thoroughly un
Platonic. The view that this world and the things in it die and end is one that provides a
false understanding of reality. Flawed perception, based in rational and empirical science
rather than imagination, is the cause of this mistake. When perception is freed from its
imposed limitations, it can reveal the true nature of reality, which is eternal. The oak does
not die in the sense that it is no longer a part of this world or no longer exists, but renews
itself and thus reflects the eternal oak. Such a vision of the world, where things are not
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finite and renew themselves, suggests a parallel to the re-presentation of visionary art,
demonstrating the eternal presence of this world—the eternal immanence in all things.
This renewal or repetition would seem to be inferior to Blake’s fondness for
originality. Edward Larrissy addresses this apparent contradiction in Blake’s thinking.
In discussing the difference between Blake’s chosen method of relief-etching, rooted in
inspiration, and the more traditional intaglio engraving, Larrissy says, “Since printing is
permitted by the possibility of repetition, what we have is two types of repetition, a
positive and a negative, each the reversal of the other” (68). For Blake, “[t]he former is a
repetition that is always new, the latter the repetition of weariness and despair” (69). I
interpret his discussion of the oak tree as a view of a physical world that is made up of
continual renewal, where each rebirth from a seed signifies neither a copy nor
“mechanical” repetition, but a “redeemed repetition” to borrow terms from Larrissy (71).
With his art, “The Nature of [which] is Visionary or Imaginative,” Blake seeks to
“Restore <what the Ancients calld> the Golden Age,” to restore the “Reality [which] was
Forgot,” while “the Vanities of Time & Space only Rememberd & calld Reality” (VLJE
555). The illuminated works allow us to move beyond the limited, conventional view of
the world that we take to be concrete reality and travel into that “Reality [which] was
Forgot,” which is, in fact, concrete and real, not virtual or merely mimetic, and which has
a full-bodied presence. Blake entreats us to enter his painting in the crux of the Last
Judgment:
If the Spectator could Enter into these Images in his Imagination
approaching them on the Fiery Chariot of his Contemplative Thought if he
could Enter into Noahs Rainbow or into his bosom or could make a Friend
& Companion of one of these Images of wonder which always intreats
him to leave mortal things as he must know then would he arise from his
Grave then would he meet the Lord in the Air & then he would be happy
General Knowledge is Remote Knowledge it is in Particulars that Wisdom
consists & Happiness too. (E 560)
Precisely what “entering” entails Blake does not make clear, but his language suggests,
on the surface, that this entrance is an intellectual one, as the spectator would enter “in his
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Imagination approaching [the images] on the Fiery Chariot of his Contemplative
Thought.” Indeed, Behrendt’s analysis of this passage focuses on the mental activity:
An act of perception of this sort sets up a different dynamic than does the
standard gallery picture [...] for it requires that the viewer be both
participant and co-creator. It also dictates that the communication that is
the object of both parties (artist and viewer) is of a sort that transcends the
limitations of the physical medium and approaches a sort of telepathic
communication that transpires ‘in the air’, where the viewer leaves the
‘grave’ of vegetable, human [...]. (“‘Something in My Eye’” 85)
Behrendt emphasizes the role of the audience as active participant and co-creator rather
than as passive observer. He rightly points out the elevated level of perception that this
kind of audience engagement entails. However, Behrendt’s idea of a Blakean audience
remains at the level of mental interaction, even if it is a direct interaction with the artist
himself.4
Yet, 1 argue that Blake’s call to “enter” his works goes further than the telepathic
or mental connection that Behrendt describes. Blake’s images and allusions point to an
entrance as a full-bodied, sensory act, as well as a mental one, that occurs when the
spectator shifts his/her conventional understanding and use of perception and sees
Blake’s world as something present that he/she can enter into and inhabit fully. The result
of this entrance, as Blake states, is a union with the divine and a blissful state. This idea
of entering a work of art is taken up by Iser in his reader-response theory:
Literature simulates life, not in order to portray it, but in order to allow the
reader to share in it. He can step out of his own world and enter another,
where he can experience extremes of pleasure and pain without being
involved in any consequences whatsoever. It is this lack of consequence
that enables him to experience things that would otherwise be inaccessible
owing to the pressing demands of everyday reality. And precisely because
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According to Behrendt, Blake’s goal with his art in terms o f audience reception is by no means

unique: “This is the sort o f telepathic communication that is everywhere the aim o f Romantic art, be it
visual or verbal” ( 170). 1 would argue that the kind o f full-bodied entrance o f the audience that I see as key
to the nature o f the illuminated works does, in fact, separate Blake from other artists.
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the literary text makes no objectively real demand on its readers, it opens
up a freedom that everyone can interpret in his own way. (Prospecting 29)
Like Blake, lser uses the word “enter” in describing the interaction between a reader and
a text. However, Iser’s qualification of the experience as without “consequences” for the
reader indicates the opposite implication in Blake’s understanding of a spectator’s
entrance into a work. For lser, a sharp divide exists between the solid reality of the
everyday and the ephemeral intellectual space of the imagination. Blake destabilizes this
binary opposition that equates reality with the actual and imagination with the virtual.
The imagination and Blake’s art do, in fact, make “objectively real demand[s] on its
[audience],” and herein lies the radicalism of Blake’s hail to the spectator.
Addressing the audience of his painting A Vision of the Last Judgment, Blake uses
the term “Spectator” rather than viewer to indicate someone who, by seeing, involves
himself or herself in the spectacle. The connotations of the term suit Blake’s construction
of a particular kind of audience interaction for his work. According to the OED, the word
was first used in the late sixteenth century to describe members of a theatrical audience.
Thus, Blake implies that his audience interacts with his work the way a spectator does
with a live event or performance. On top of the original use of the word, we also have
Joseph Addison and Richard Steele’s sense of spectator (based on their early eighteenthcentury publication The Spectator) as a person who engages in the political and the
cultural arenas. Blake’s spectator, then, is someone who not only watches an event unfold
but also participates in a wider social context. In fact, Adam Smith uses the term in The
Theory o f Moral Sentiments (1759) in a way that fuses the dramatic and the social
connotations. He posits an “ideal man within the breast” (147) or “the great demi-god
within the breast” (245) as a sort of moral centre and “tribunal of [our] own consciences”
(130) who “prescribes and approves” (245). Smith views this ideal man as an “impartial
and well-informed spectator” (130), an “impartial spectator of [our] own conduct” (148),
thus implying both a witness who sees live events in the sense of a dramatic or live
performance and a judge who evaluates and guides behaviour toward other human beings
in the social sense of the wider human community.
Furthermore, action necessarily depends on sight. In explaining the way sympathy
works, Smith highlights the power of physical sight:
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Grief and joy, for example, strongly expressed in the look and gestures of
any one, at once affect the spectator with some degree of a like painful or
agreeable emotion. A smiling face is, to every body that sees it, a cheerful
object; as a sorrowful countenance, on the other hand, is a melancholy
one. (11)
Smith explicitly links a feeling of sympathy for another, or being able to identify with
another, to physical sight. By seeing someone in pleasure or pain, we are moved to feel a
similar sensation. For both Smith and Blake, then, to be a spectator is to be both mentally
(or emotionally) and physically involved and includes the dramatic and social
implications, though Blake avoids Smith’s emphasis on morality.
In addition to the term spectator, the biblical allusions in Blake’s hailing of the
spectator reaffirm the dual aspect of this entrance as mental and physical. In the first part
of the quotation Blake speaks of the Spectator “Entering] into these Images in his
Imagination approaching them on the Fiery Chariot of his Contemplative Thought” (E
560). The fiery chariot alludes to 2 Kings where God takes the prophet Elijah to heaven
in “a chariot of fire,” leaving his student Elisha behind:
And it came to pass, when the LORD would take up Elijah into heaven by
a whirlwind, that Elijah went with Elisha from Gilgal.
[ .................................................................................................................................... ]

And it came to pass, when they were gone over, that Elijah said unto
Elisha, Ask what I shall do for thee, before I be taken away from thee.
And Elisha said, I pray thee, let a double portion of thy spirit be upon me.
And he said, Thou hast asked a hard thing: nevertheless, if thou see me
when I am taken from thee, it shall be so unto thee; but if not, it shall not
be so.
And it came to pass, as they still went on, and talked, that, behold, there
appeared a chariot of fire, and horses of fire, and parted them both
asunder; and Elijah went up by a whirlwind into heaven.
And Elisha saw it, and he cried, My father, my father, the chariot of Israel,
and the horsemen thereof. And he saw him no more: and he took hold of
his own clothes, and rent them in two pieces.
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He took up also the mantle of Elijah that fell from him, and went back,
and stood by the bank of Jordan;
And he took the mantle of Elijah that fell from him, and smote the waters,
and said, Where is the LORD God of Elijah? and when he also had
smitten the waters, they parted hither and thither: and Elisha went over.
And when the sons of the prophets which were to view at Jericho saw him,
they said, The spirit of Elijah doth rest on Elisha. And they came to meet
him, and bowed themselves to the ground before him. (2 Kings 2.1-15)
Here, the chariot that comes to take Elijah does not signify a dream or dream state; it is
not simply the vehicle of a metaphor. Rather, an actual chariot comes for him in a waking
state. The concrete object coincides with the spiritual moment of Elijah’s return to God.
Like many events in the Bible (and indeed myths in general), this event demonstrates the
fact that the spiritual and the physical are mutually present and seamlessly interfused.
Similarly, Blake’s writing continually identifies the concrete with the abstract—the body
with the mind—the physical with the spiritual. These kinds of identifications do not
merely highlight similar characteristics between two objects as conventional metaphors
do; rather, they point to a literal transformation of objects, as well as showing the
interconnection of the concrete and the abstract.5
Moreover, on an interpersonal level, Elijah and Elisha’s relationship shows how
an entrance can be both concrete and abstract. Elijah grants Elisha one final request
before Elijah must go to heaven. Elisha asks for “a double portion of [Elijah’s] spirit [to]
be upon [Elisha].” Elijah acquiesces to the entreaty only after he acknowledges that it is
“a hard thing” Elisha asks. Elijah explains, “[l]f thou see me when I am taken from thee,
it shall be so unto thee; but if not, it shall not be so.” So the wish will be granted only if
Elisha sees the moment God takes Elijah. The condition Elijah imposes reaffirms the
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For instance, in Isaiah, the prophet explains how God “hath made [his] mouth like a sharp sword;

[...] and made [him] a polished shaft” (49.2). The first part o f the line functions metaphorically with the
use o f a simile, as God makes Isaiah’s mouth like a sword, but then the metaphoric level shifts into the
literal level, as God makes Isaiah into “a polished shaft”— not like “a polished shaft” but an actual shining
blade. And, in A Vision o f the Last Judgment, the Last Judgment also stands for different signifieds at once:
an event foretold in the Bible, Blake’s painting, and a kind o f enlightenment within an individual.
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importance of vision and seeing something firsthand. Elisha must be a witness, a
spectator, to Elijah’s encounter with God, a fact Blake picks up on when he calls for his
“spectators” to approach his art on the “Fiery Chariot” of their thought.
What is more, throughout the passage, images of doubling and splitting abound.
For example, Elisha asks Elijah to become a part of him, for Elijah to incorporate himself
into Elisha somehow. He requests “a double portion of [Elijah’s] spirit,” the chariot
“parted them both asunder,” Elisha “took hold of his own clothes, and rent them in two
pieces,” and Elisha “smote the waters” and “they parted hither and thither.” These images
emphasize the union and division of two individuals and suggest that, by taking on “a
double portion of [Elijah’s] spirit,” Elisha both becomes Elijah yet retains his own self.
The transfer of Elijah’s spirit manifests itself in a material object: Elisha “took the mantle
of Elijah that fell from him.” While functioning as a concrete token or sign that Elisha
will become the next prophet in Elijah’s place, the mantle also functions as an external
manifestation of Elijah’s entrance into Elisha, of the fact that “The spirit of Elijah doth
rest on Elisha,” a fact proclaimed by “the sons of the prophets” when they see Elisha. The
garment is external to Elisha, but it is also intrinsically important as a material sign of the
transference of visionary power. Much like Elisha’s viewing of the fiery chariot functions
as a performative moment—by seeing the chariot, Elisha performs the ability to see
visions—the viewing of Elisha with Elijah’s mantle functions in the same way—when
the people see Elijah’s mantle upon Elisha, he becomes Elijah for the people. By
inheriting Elijah’s mantle, Elisha ceases to be only Elisha—now, he is both Elisha and
Elijah. Blake’s use of this allusion, then, refers both to the performative impact of
spectating and to the dual aspect of entering and vision as both physical and spiritual. By
the same token, when the spectator sees the painting A Vision o f the Last Judgment, a last
judgment potentially enacts itself in him/her in the very act of spectating (fig. 12).6
The second allusion in Blake’s key passage also draws on this idea of entrances.
He shifts from the idea of the spectator entering the images to one of the spectator
“Entering] into Noahs Rainbow or into his bosom” (E 560). Noah’s rainbow refers to

6

Blake’s original painting A Vision o f the Last Judgment is lost. The corresponding image

provided is an earlier pen and watercolour version o f the work (1808).
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Genesis 9.8-17, where God promises Noah that he will never again bring on a flood and
destroy his creation. As a sign of this covenant, a rainbow appears. Again, we have the
concrete and the abstract intertwined—the physical phenomenon of the rainbow with the
abstract promise it signifies. Noah’s bosom, like Blake’s earlier reference to the “Divine
bosom” (E 555), more directly points to the entrance of one human being into another.
While the Bible does not include a reference to Noah’s bosom specifically, it does
mention Abraham’s bosom in the story of Lazarus. In one of the parables, Jesus tells the
story of a rich man and Lazarus, a sick and dying beggar who “was laid at [the rich
man’s] gate, full of sores” (Luke 16.20). Presumably, the rich man denies aid to Lazarus,
who dies shortly after “desiring to be fed with the crumbs which fell from the rich man’s
table” (16.21). Jesus says, “And it came to pass, that the beggar died, and was carried by
the angels into Abraham’s bosom: the rich man also died, and was buried; / And in hell
he lift up his eyes, being in torments, and seeth Abraham afar off, and Lazarus in his
bosom” (16.22-23). Abraham explains to the rich man that each man finds himself in the
place he belongs thanks to his earthly deeds.
The relevance of the parable to a reading of Blake’s implicit call on us to enter his
works rests on the rich man finding Lazarus in Abraham’s bosom. On the one hand,
Lazarus has died and gone to heaven; on the other hand, he is being embraced by
Abraham. The parable concretizes the spiritual idea of heaven with Abraham’s gesture of
embracing Lazarus, where the latter finds himself literally within the arms of the former.7
To enter Blake’s work has a similar meaning, but he takes this idea a step further by
revising the entrance from an embrace (though this still includes physically touching) to
incorporation. We are affected not only intellectually and spiritually in an engagement
with Blake’s works, but also physically as we literally enter them, occupying the physical
space of the world of the imagination they hold, the world of the imagination that they
are—thus experiencing a “perceptual immediacy” (to borrow a phrase from Bolter and
Grusin (22)).
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This duality also arises in the physical and spiritual entrance that occurs in the process o f

inspiration, particularly in Blake’s Milton where people enter into each other’s bosoms and Milton enters
into Blake as a star. In chapter four, I focus on this kind o f inspiration and the greater implications for
identity.
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Biblical entrances encompass people entering city gates or structures, wisdom or
curses entering the hearts of people, spirits or demons entering people, and the possibility
of entering God or heaven. Perhaps the most significant example of an entrance is Jesus
himself. In the parable of the Good Shepherd, Jesus says, “I am the door of the sheep.
[...]. I am the door: by me if any man enter in, he shall be saved, and shall go in and out,
and find pasture” (John 10.7-9). Jesus figures himself as an entrance, as a door to be
passed through, but He is also the goal on the other side of the threshold. Blake implicitly
takes up this figuration in both the Last Judgment when he says, “it is the Divine bosom
into which we shall all go after the death of the Vegetated body” (E 555) and also in the
address “To the Public” at the beginning of Jerusalem, where he writes about “entering]
into the Saviours kingdom, the Divine body” (pi. 3, E 145). By appealing to his audience,
the spectator, to “Enter into these Images,” Blake suggests that his work functions as a
divine revelation, as a means of salvation. His work is the medium through which the
spectator accesses the Eternal, through which he/she can enter the world of the
imagination, but his work is also an incarnation of the imagination itself.
Blake aligns the act of entering his images not only with entering Noah’s rainbow
or Noah’s bosom but also, significantly, with friendship. Blake asks us to “make a Friend
& Companion of one of these Images of wonder which always intreats him [the
spectator] to leave mortal things as he must” (E 560). The relevance of friendship can be
found later in the Last Judgment, when Blake explains, “for a Man Can only Reject Error
by the Advice of a Friend or by the Immediate Inspiration of God” (E 563). This
quotation has two possible meanings: either “the Advice of a Friend” stands in contrast to
“the Immediate Inspiration of God,” where the former provides a distanced relationship
to enlightenment (the rejection of error) and the latter an immediate one, or the two are
equivalent so that they both offer immediacy. Given the context of the Last Judgment as a
whole, I argue for the latter meaning. If vision or imagination is superior to fable or
allegory because the latter is somehow distanced from reality, then vision or imagination
must signify an immediate apprehension of the thing one sees. Immediacy marks the
actions of spectating, entering, and making a friend of Blake’s images. This immediate
experience must be one that lacks objectivity in the sense of a distanced perspective of
the thing under consideration. Blake emphasizes the details of the experience, not the
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overall view: “General Knowledge is Remote Knowledge it is in Particulars that Wisdom
consists & Happiness too” (E 560). The particulars are key; the spectator needs to enter
into the works in order to be amidst the details, needs to “enter[] into & discriminate[]
most minutely” the world of the imagination. An external viewpoint cannot provide this
experience. A subjective position is needed, a position akin to Lazarus within Abraham’s
bosom, or Elisha who incorporates Elijah’s spirit, or those who must enter the Divine
door, which is Jesus. The works, then, have to become real to us in a physical sense in
order to accomplish this dual physical and spiritual entrance.
In this specific case, Blake uses his painting of the Last Judgment as the image to
enter. However, throughout the Last Judgment, he uses the term Last Judgment to mean
several different things, but the most important meaning is enlightenment. Blake uses the
term to refer to the event in scripture, to a “Stupendous Vision[]” that he sees (E 555), to
his painting, and to poetry. The Last Judgment prophesied in the Bible will occur when
Jesus comes to judge and divide the righteous from the wicked, the good from the evil; it
is also the time when flesh and spirit will be united.* Blake dismisses the moral aspects of
the Last Judgment when he argues, “Men are admitted into Heaven not because they have
<curbed &> govemd their Passions or have No Passions but because they have
Cultivated their Understandings” (E 564). For Blake, questions of right and wrong do not
factor into one’s entrance into heaven. Rather, the nurturing and development of one’s
way of thinking and perceiving, the process of enlightenment, determines it. Furthermore,
enlightenment conquers death. Blake writes, “for in Paradise they have no Corporeal <&
Mortal> Body that originated with the Fall & was calld Death & cannot be removed but
by a Last judgment. While we are in the world of Mortality we Must Suffer” (E 564).
Here Blake implicitly identifies the Last Judgment with enlightenment, where death
equals ignorance. He does not explicitly reject the physical body; rather, he rejects the8
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In 1 Corinthians, Paul explains “the resurrection o f the dead” that will come at the end o f time

(15.42). He says, “Behold, I shew you a mystery; We shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed, / In a
moment, in the twinkling o f an eye, at the last trump: for the trumpet shall sound, and the dead shall be
raised incorruptible, and we shall be changed. / For this corruptible must put on incorruption, and this
mortal must put on immortality” (15.51-53).
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associations of mortality that arose with the fall of humankind. Significantly, Blake refers
to a Last Judgment, not the Last Judgment, suggesting that one can undergo a Last
Judgment at any time, not only at the end of the world, though a Last Judgment, an event
tied to an individual at any point in time, will inevitably participate in the Last Judgment,
a communal moment at the end of history. Discrete or individual acts can lead to this
apocalyptic event within a person: “whenever any Individual Rejects Error & Embraces
Truth a Last Judgment passes upon that Individual” (E 562). Therefore, Blake’s works
have the potential to enact a Last Judgment on their spectators by helping them reject
error.
Blake explains, “Truth is Eternal[.] Error [...] will be Burned Up & then & not till
then Truth or Eternity will appear[.] [Error] is Burnt up the Moment Men cease to behold
it” (E 565). Again, Blake points to perception, and, significantly, to the implicit choice
involved in seeing truth. Paradoxically, if ceasing to behold error bums error up, then, by
the same token, simply beholding or seeing truth creates it. Specifically, by entering
Blake’s images, his works of art, the spectator can “arise from his Grave [...] [and] meet
the Lord in the Air” (E 560). Viewing, then, has the potential corresponding consequence
of entering, and to enter the works enacts a last judgment upon the audience; seeing
makes it happen (much like Elisha becomes a visionary by seeing the vision of the fiery
chariot). Blake’s painting of the Last Judgment, then, functions self-reflexively because
the spectator experiences a last judgment by looking at the work about the Last
Judgment. Ideally, the subject of what you see in the painting is what is happening to you
as you see it.
This visionary or life-altering event is precisely what is at stake in Blake’s
illuminated works. While the subject of the illuminated works differs from the painting’s
subject of the Last Judgment, their purposes are the same. In its fullest manifestation, an
engagement with the illuminated works leads the audience to undergo a last judgment. A
Blakean construction of spectatorship involves active choices, not passive reception.
Seeing in a way that leads to an entrance or a last judgment (or becoming a visionary like
Elisha—he chooses to tear his clothes and become the new Elijah, and, thus, a new Elisha
made up of both men), then, necessarily depends on a particular kind of sight—a
consciously active one where the spectator chooses how he/she will see, and,
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consequently, chooses to remake notions of human potential and the nature of reality.
The media of the illuminated works physicalize the imagination, but the spectator must
choose to see this reality unfold. How does Blake attempt to accomplish this particular
feat in the illuminated works? He does so by including an explicit meta-level through the
use of verbal and visual self-reflexive episodes or moments.
The illuminated works explicitly provoke the audience’s awareness of the
spectating process itself, a process the audience participates in as they reflect on it. This
formal and integrated use of self-reflexivity self-consciously shows the constructedness
of Blake’s works by highlighting not only who created them and how they were created
but also the audience’s activity of interaction, in this case a combination of reading,
viewing, and spectating. This self-reflexivity distances the audience from a simple
escapist interaction by forcing a more aware engagement. However, Blake pointedly
continues his call for his audience to enter his works, thus becoming a part of the world
of the imagination—an action that on the surface seems to stand in contradiction to the
meta-techniques of forcing the audience to reflect on his artistic media as such. As in the
example of naming Himself the door, in the “Revelation of Jesus Christ, which God gave
unto him, to shew unto his servants things which must shortly come to pass,” Jesus
parallels twentieth-century media theory. After all, “he sent and signified it [the
revelation] by his angel unto his servant John” (Revelation 1.1). On the one hand, the
Angel brings the Book of Revelation with him to give to John, but, on the other hand, he
also seems to be the message of Revelation, just as Jesus brings salvation and is
salvation, recalling Marshall McLuhan’s well-known statement that “the medium is the
message” (7). McLuhan specifically refers to a new understanding of human identity and
media with his example of the machine, which “altered our relations to one another and
to ourselves” (8). With respect to these relationships and this new awareness, he
provocatively claims that the content does not matter—“it mattered not in the least
whether [the machine] turned out cornflakes or Cadillacs”—but the nature of the new
medium of machine technology itself does matter. While the content does matter with
respect of the Book of Revelation, it is important to note that Jesus equates the centrality
of the message with its medium. Blake, too, explicitly takes up this position with respect
to his illuminated works, wherein the last judgment enacted upon the audience depends
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upon the medium that conveys the content and upon the active participation of the
audience. Both elements matter in provoking a fundamental shift in the way the spectator
conceives of human identity and the world.
Gitelman explains that one aspect of media is the way they shape our “modes and
habits of perception” (1). A particular medium cannot help but influence the way we
engage with it and the activity it facilitates: “As much as people may converse through a
telephone and forget the telephone itself, the context of telephoning makes all kinds of
difference to the things they say and the way they say them” (7). Similarly, Blake viewed
the multimedia form of the illuminated works as having the power to mold our
perceptions. Besides believing these “Illuminated Books” produced in “Illuminated
Printing” (Prospectus of 1793, E 693) to be a new form of production, he also attached a
visionary quality to the form in large part due to its origins. According to John Thomas
Smith, a friend of Blake’s brother Robert, Blake had “one of his visionary imaginations,”
where the dead Robert visited Blake and imparted this new engraving method to him
(501). The link to the dead imbues this form with a visionary and spiritual quality,
associating Blake with prophet-poets such as Milton, who draw on the heavenly muse,
and biblical prophets inspired by God.
Generally, in traditional modes of production, engravers would etch into an actual
copper plate (known as the intaglio method). In Blake’s method for most of the
illuminated works (known as relief-etching), he used small brushes to draw and write on
a plate with “an impervious liquid,” and then placed it in an acid bath, “eating the plain
parts [...] away” to allow the words and designs to stand in relief (John Thomas Smith
501). The actual process involved in creating the works assigns a double importance to
them. In the Marriage, Blake writes,
this [i.e., correcting misconceptions] I shall do, by printing in the infernal
method, by corrosives, which in Hell are salutary and medicinal, melting
apparent surfaces away, and displaying the infinite which was hid. If the
doors of perception were cleansed every thing would appear to man as it
is: infinite. For man has closed himself up, till he sees all things thro’
narrow chinks of his cavern, (pi. 14, E 39)
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As a prophet-poet, Blake constructs himself as the figure who will rectify human notions
about the nature of the world and humanity’s relation to it. The power to do so lies in the
medium (as much as the message), specifically Blake’s illuminated printing. As Edward
Larrissy notes, “we must read Blake’s intention o f ‘melting apparent surfaces away’
(including its figurative aspect) as referring not to any type of engraving, but specifically
to his own method of relief etching” (65). Metaphorically, this method signifies the road
to proper vision, the cleansing process that the senses—“the doors of perception”—
undergo that allows humans to see the infinite and divine in what, from a mortal earthly
perspective, seems finite and impure. In a more literal sense, Blake foregrounds the
material processes and labour involved in his art-making practice, his “infernal method”
of engraving. As Joseph Viscomi states, “The ‘infinite’ can thus be said to be ‘displayed’
in the printing sense of being made prominent, as it literally would be when the design
was etched into relief’ (81; also qtd. in Larrissy 66). The waste, or error, gets burnt away,
leaving the infinite or Eternal in full view. By underlining the duality of this art form, he
reaffirms mind and body and the spiritual and the physical.9
The example above exemplifies one of many kinds of self-reflexive strategies that
Blake uses in the illuminated works, strategies that appear to be at cross-purposes with
his implicit plea to his spectators to enter his images in the Last Judgment. On the one
hand, he uses these self-reflexive techniques, which have the effect of preventing an
unthinking, and only temporary, escape into his works, but, on the other hand, he
implicitly requests his audience to immerse themselves in his art. The immediacy
attached to such entrances and the distance provoked by the works’ self-reflexivity
resonate with the way media theorists Jay David Bolter and Richard Grusin conceptualize
new media, such as virtual reality simulators, and much older media, such as perspective
9

Larrissy bolsters this duality present in Blake’s method by referring to another new medium that

arose in Blake’s time. Larrissy says, “[l]t seems eminently probable that Blake is specifically relating touch
and sight by reference to a precisely contemporary phenomenon [ 1784]: the invention o f relief printing for
the blind” (66). He continues, “It seems likely, then, that Blake is providing an analogue o f relief printing
for the blind, one that exploits the figurative senses o f blindness and vision, in that it makes relief etching a
means o f access to imaginative vision among those who require their ‘doors o f perception’ to be cleansed.”
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painting. Bolter and Grusin address “our culture’s contradictory imperatives for
immediacy and hypermediacy” (5). Immediacy signifies a desire for “transparency” (19),
“the real” (21), the “authentic” (53), and “a sense of presence” (22), in short, an
“experience without mediation” (22-23). Bolter and Grusin define immediacy as “[a]
style of visual representation whose goal is to make the viewer forget the presence of the
medium (canvas, photographic film, cinema, and so on) and believe that he is in the
presence of the objects of representation” (272-73). By no means is this kind of
representation a modem invention: “At least since the Renaissance, [the desire for
immediacy] has been a defining feature of Western visual (and for that matter verbal)
representation” (24). This “logic of immediacy dictates that the medium itself should
disappear and leave us in the presence of the thing represented: sitting in the race car or
standing on a mountaintop” (5-6), and, I would add, walking in the world of, for example,
Urizen and Ore after we have answered Blake’s call to enter his works. Conversely, the
imperative for hypermediacy leads to “opacity” (19) and signifies “a fascination with
media” (12). Bolter and Grusin define hypermediacy as “[a] style of visual representation
whose goal is to remind the viewer of the medium” (272). They also categorize
“medieval illuminated manuscripts]” as hypermedia, along with many computer-related
media, such as “a buttoned and windowed multimedia application” (12). Blake’s
illuminated works also fit under this category of hypermediacy due to their multimedia
format and self-conscious unveiling of their construction.
However, the correspondence between the illuminated works and Bolter and
Grusin’s media theory breaks down in two important ways: one, the logic of immediacy
fails to correspond precisely to the illuminated works when one considers the fact that
they do not try “to erase all traces of mediation” (5), but, rather, they highlight the media
employed; and, two, even though “[h]ypermedia and transparent media are opposite
manifestations of the same desire: the desire to get past the limits of representation and to
achieve the real” (53), there remains an underlying awareness that the experience
achieved in either case can only ever be less than everyday reality or never fully equated
with reality. Blake argues for the reality of the imagination in the Last Judgment, as 1
have discussed. And the imagination can help us to more fully perceive the Eternal in the
everyday world. Contrary to Blake, Bolter and Grusin argue that “immediacy” or “the
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self [...] becoming] one with the objects of mediations” remains a “utopian state,” not
(currently) fully realizable (236).
Despite the inexact correspondence between the logic of Blake’s art and “the twin
logics of immediacy and hypermediacy” (5), they are useful terms in describing the
seemingly dual impulses present in Blake’s works, so 1 will continue to employ them in
the remainder of my chapter as Bolter and Grusin define them. However, a more suitable
parallel can be found in theatrical models because the illuminated works function so
much like dramatic performance, as I argue in chapter one. The theatrical correlations
here are medieval spectacle and Brechtian epic theatre. Where the former works on the
logic of immediacy, the latter works on the logic of hypermediacy in that it refuses a
transparent interaction with the representation. 1 argue that these two opposing modes of
engagement do not, in fact, reflect cross-purposes in Blake; rather, they serve the same
purpose: to catalyze an experience of the world of the imagination. First, I will examine
the implicit Brechtian associations within the illuminated works. These self-reflexive
episodes take the shape of scenes of engraving, writing, painting, reading, viewing, and
performing, as well as direct addresses, entrances, intertextual allusions, and adaptations.
A Brechtian alienation-effect is necessary to prevent simple absorption, but the alienation
is not permanent; it has the potential to lead the audience to a place where they can
choose to make a fundamental shift in perception, thereby choosing to experience the
illuminated works like a medieval performance, where what we experience is continuous
with, not separate from, our perceived world. I argue, then, that the self-reflexive
moments in Blake’s works provoke a two-stage process in the act of spectatorship:
alienation followed by deep immersion (not mere escapist absorption).
In order to facilitate an entrance into the alternate but real and material space of
the imagination, Blake forces us to question the barrier between our reality and the reality
depicted in his works in both stages of the two-stage process explained above, a process
that creates a Blakean spectatorship. The first stage requires a solidification and
reaffirmation of this barrier, while the second stage demands its destabilization and
disintegration—yet both stages rely on a number of self-reflexive techniques. First, I will
focus on the reaffirmation or revealing of this boundary. In art, such as literature, film,
visual arts, and theatre, self-reflexive moments tend to undermine an escapist aesthetics
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and the naturalness of the medium’s representation. They remind the audience that
someone has constructed the object within a medium that contains particular conventions,
liberties, and limitations. These elements, then, force a critical and active rather than
passive response to the work. For instance, self-reflexivity can call into question the
artist’s sincerity, the veracity of the story or of the image, the ideology presented in the
work and the artist’s rationale for making the work. The result is that a distancing or
alienating effect occurs.
Turning specifically to theatre, self-reflexive moments or self-reflexive drama,
known as metatheatre (a term coined by Lionel Abel) or metadrama, can consist of stage
design or story elements and, perhaps the most jolting for the audience, a breaking of the
fourth wall. When an actor turns to the audience and shows an obvious awareness of their
presence, or even speaks directly to them, the audience is ejected from their safe position
as voyeurs. Such a method of performance opposes more traditional methods, such as the
construction and maintenance of “stage illusion,” where the audience, according to
Samuel Taylor Coleridge, provides a willing suspension of disbelief and a “temporary
Faith which we [the audience] encourage by our own will” (5, 1: 130). Of their own
volition, the audience succumbs to the illusion before them as reality rather than merely a
representation of it.
As Richard Hornby explains in his study addressing the gaps in Lionel Abel’s
definition of metatheatre, “there is much more to metadrama than the simple technical
definition of ‘drama about drama.’ The metadramatic experience for the audience is one
of unease, a dislocation of perception” (32). Metadrama has the potential to cause
“‘estrangement’ or ‘alienation’” in an audience. Bertolt Brecht, arguably the most famous
proponent of alienation and the breaking of stage illusion, refused to allow a night at the
theatre to become a simple pleasure of escapist entertainment. Instead, he articulated and
implemented what he named der Verfremdungseffekt or the alienation-effect. In a
discussion on Chinese theatre, Brecht states,
the Chinese artist never acts as if there were a fourth wall besides the three
surrounding him. He expresses his awareness of being watched. This
immediately removes one of the European stage’s characteristic illusions.
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The audience can no longer have the illusion of being the unseen spectator
at an event which is really taking place. (91-92)
Brecht redefines the theatrical medium from “the means of pleasure” into “an object of
instruction” so that what he does is “convert [...] [theatrical] institutions from places of
entertainment into organs of mass communication” (40). For Brecht, alienating the
audience from what they see onstage allows them to better learn and act. Thus, “the
technique which produces an A-effect [Alienation-effect] is the exact opposite of that
which aims at empathy” (136). Using various kinds of alienating or self-reflexive
techniques, Brecht’s “theatre was to be «ewempathetic, wwillusionistic, A?o«Aristotelian”
(Flornby 16) so that theatre could serve as a call to action and encourage the audience to
take responsibility in the actions occurring onstage. Brecht’s alienation-effect makes it
difficult for the audience to subscribe to the Coleridgean suspension of disbelief, much
less to feel as if they are participants in the dramatic action. In part, Blake also uses
metadramatical self-reflexive strategies to alienate his spectators and to disrupt the
“temporary Faith” into which the conventional “stage illusion” allows the audience to
fall. After all, Blake does not seek a merely superficial and temporary state; he seeks a
fundamental alteration.
Hornby outlines five key elements of metadrama—the play within the play, the
inclusion of ceremonies or performances, role-playing or acting, the reference to real or
literary figures and events, and self-reference (32)—all of which are present in Blake’s
illuminated works. The second element needs little explanation: the works depict a
proliferation of performances, including dancing, singing, playing musical instruments,
playing games, processions, grandiose spectacles, praying, and marriages or unions.
Likewise, the other four metadramatical elements find expression in Blake’s works. For
instance, the play within a play takes various forms in Blake’s works, forms which signal
a mise err abyme of different kinds. One kind comes by way of a song within a song,
where bards sing their poetry in Blake’s book of poetry (as does the Bard in Milton)-,
another arises in repeated scenes of writing and engraving (and inverse writing and
engraving, which is in itself an alienation from a process that should be familiar, namely,
reading; see Milton pi. 30 and Jerusalem pi. 41 for example). In a Brechtian sense, Blake
makes his audience aware of his role in the creation of his art and of art’s status as a
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constructed object through these repeated scenes, which become regular motifs in his
works. A familiar example is the scene in the Marriage discussed earlier, where Blake
describes the infernal printing presses of hell, which employ a method corresponding to
his own method of creation as an engraver who uses acid baths to burn away the
untreated surfaces of copper plates. In addition, a resonant image can be found in “The
Tyger” where the poet alludes to the blacksmith who beats metals and works in
furnaces—another hellish scene of creation—producing the creative force responsible for
the tyger. In fact, there are several instances, spanning all his works, of this kind of self
reflexive construction of the scene of creation: in The Book ofUrizen, the eponymous
figure holds a book open overtop of Blake’s own two-panelled text, implying a
connection between the words we see in the two panels and the words within the two
pages Urizen holds open for us (pi. 5); on the title page, Urizen writes with one hand and
illustrates with another, creating a kind of “self-portrait” of Blake as poet and visual artist
according to David V. Erdman (The Illuminated Blake 183)—a tree arced like a tablet
grows behind two stone tablets that sit behind Urizen, creating a visual mise en abyme
effect of a book within a book within a book (fig. 13); in “The Lamb,” trees form an
archway encasing the text of the poem, where the archway doubles as a reading tablet and
once again functions as a mise en abyme; in the Marriage, devils appear to be writing on
scrolls (pi. 10); in Jerusalem, Albion sleeps on a book and sits beside an open scroll with
a miniature figure—Blake according to Erdman (316)—who appears to have written it
(pi. 41); and Urizen lies beneath Blake’s poetic text and holds his place in a book as he
looks up through the text above to the top portion of the plate where someone lies overtop
a scroll, a scene which more generally references books and reading (pi. 64). Each of
these textual and visual references forces the audience to contemplate the act of creation
and the act of reception, and they indicate an art form that reflects on itself. They do not
allow the spectator to forget that the objects before him/her are constructed; as a result,
they distance him/her from what is being presented (though the works’ non-linear
narrative qualities and complex mythic universe also go a long way to discourage us from
simply escaping this world).
As plays within plays exhibit a theatre contemplating itself, Blake’s multimedia
art works exhibit media contemplating themselves as media within media. The
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Fig. 13. The Book o f Urizen, copy G, title page, object 1, c. 1818, Lessing J. Rosenwald
Collection, Library of Congress. © 2010 the William Blake Archive. Used with
permission. This project is supported in part by a William Blake Archive Reproduction
Grant for Graduate Students.
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multimedia aspect of the illuminated works functions to produce an awareness of
mediation in similar way as Bolter and Grusin’s hypermediacy:
[HJypermediacy expresses itself as multiplicity. If the logic of immediacy
leads one either to erase or to render automatic the act of representation,
the logic of hypermediacy acknowledges multiple acts of representation
and makes them visible. Where immediacy suggests a unified visual
space, contemporary hypermediacy offers a heterogeneous space, in which
representation is conceived of not as a window on to the world, but rather
as ‘windowed’ itself—with windows that open on to other representations
or other media. The logic of hypermediacy multiplies the signs of
mediation and in this way tries to reproduce the rich sensorium of human
experience. [...] In every manifestation, hypermediacy makes us aware of
the medium or media [...]. (33-34)
As media that operate at least partly on the logic of hypermediacy, the illuminated works
offer “a heterogeneous space” rather than “a unified visual space”: not only do they
integrate verbal and visual aspects, but these two fields also help express the processes of
engraving, drawing, painting, and writing both implicitly, due to the way Blake formed
the works, and explicitly in the way the verbal and visual spaces depict those processes.
In this way, the illuminated works offer “windows that open on to other representations
or other media.” Blake presents us with words as designs, designs as words, plates
divided into colour and non-colour, various frames encapsulating the images and words,
and a collision of word and image as figures and designs move within the words and vice
versa. For example, the title page to the Songs o f Innocence includes the letters of the title
turning into tree leaves and, at the same time, a tree whose branches and leaves turn into
the words (fig. 14); a scene of reading as a woman helps her two charges; tiny figures—
seemingly not part of the same “window” as the reading scene—reclining, standing and
performing on the letters of the title; a box at the bottom of the plate separated from the
design by a line—this box houses words that identify authorship and publication details;
and a firm rectangular line that demarcates the entire design, a line that is then in turn
surrounded by yet another layer of design in the non-coloured space that holds the page
number. Each of these elements not only functions as a separate “window” but also as
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Fig. 14. Songs o f Innocence and o f Experience, copy Z, Title Page for Songs o f
Innocence, plate 3, object 3, 1826, Lessing J. Rosenwald Collection, Library of Congress.
©2010 the William Blake Archive. Used with permission. This project is supported in
part by a William Blake Archive Reproduction Grant for Graduate Students.
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windows on top of or colliding with other windows, making the plate “a heterogeneous
space” of verbal and visual aspects and dividing it into separate planes or acts of
representation. All of this leads, on one level, to an inundation of media forms and a
conscious awareness of the process of mediation that occurs between art objects and the
audience, and, on another level, to media thinking about media.
While Bolter and Grusin argue that hypermediacy, despite revealing the media
used to the user, strives for the real as much as immediacy does, I contend that in Blake’s
works the logic of hypermediacy necessarily strives for the opposite effect: an alienation
between the audience and what is represented. By distancing the audience from the thing
represented, Blake does much more than demonstrate a simple pleasure in or “fascination
with media,” as Bolter and Grusin say of the logic of hypermediacy (12). While the logic
of hypermediacy strives for the real as it reveals its media and does not seek to distance
the audience, Blake’s self-reflexive techniques first initiate alienation in order to provoke
a later self-conscious immersion in the works, along with an acknowledgement of the
world of the imagination as real. According to Brecht, “The aim of this technique, known
as the alienation effect, was to make the spectator adopt an attitude of inquiry and
criticism in his approach to the incident” (136). He claims, “[Ojnce the spectator [...] is
forced as it were to cast his vote; then a change has been launched which goes far beyond
formal matters and begins for the first time to affect the theatre’s social function” (39). In
order to incite social change, “everything must be seen from a social point of view” (98).
In this light, art functions as a tool to be used in catalyzing the audience to engage in the
world, not escape from it. Brecht and “his idea for a theatre with the power to provoke
social change, along with his attempts to reactivate stage-audience exchange” (Bennett
21), resonate with Blake and his view of the illuminated works as having this power for
change and for revitalizing the relationship between art and the audience. Like Brecht,
Blake calls his audience to action. These kinds of self-reflexive moments, then, demystify
art as mere entertainment and keep the audience vigilant and prepared to answer this call.
Another way the illuminated works manifest the distancing impulse is through
adaptive strategies, which correspond to Hornby’s metadramatic element of real-life or
literary allusion. Blake’s works often revise or respond to an earlier source text, thereby
adapting it subtly or overtly. As “a form of intertextuality” (Hutcheon 8), adaptation
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points to itself as a text directly in relation to other texts, another self-reflexive move that
reveals the work as a text among texts. Blake shows a propensity to adapt not only his
own works, but also those of other texts and artists. Julie Sanders explains that
“[adaptation can be a transpositional practice,” traversing genres and media; “[i]t can
parallel editorial practices” by deleting and omitting; “[i]t can also be an amplificatory
procedure” that expands upon the text in some manner (18); it can “offer[] commentary
on a sourcetext” by critically revising the original (19); and, finally, it can be “a simpler
attempt to make texts ‘relevant’” by updating them and their themes for contemporary
audiences.10 Blake’s adaptations do all of the above to varying degrees. He, arguably,
adapts his own work by producing multiple copies of the same work, specifically when
they include significant changes; he also adapts, where the meaning highlights
intertextuality, by continuously returning to and reworking the same events throughout
his corpus, such as scenes of creation, conflict, and redemption involving Urizen, Los,
and Ore. In this kind of adaptation, we “grapple with the complex intertextuality [and
intratextuality] of his illuminated poems” (Behrendt, Reading William Blake 34) and
think about one rendering of an event or character in light of an earlier or later one.
Blake purposefully adapts other art objects and texts as well. He adapts the statue
known as the Laocoón (also an episode from Virgil’s Aeneid) by engraving it and adding
various words and phrases referring to Christianity, art, and ideology, thereby giving the
statue, and the epic episode, a new context (fig. 1). Likewise, in Visions o f the Daughters
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In Shakespeare and the Problem o f Adaptation, Margaret Jane Kidnie interrogates the term

adaptation. Her study focuses mainly on plays and the question o f text and performance. She questions how
we come to label something as an adaptation and how we know an adaptation when we see it. Many people
differ in opinion when it comes to recognizing a particular articulation o f a work as an adaptation or simply
a production or performance. Some critics argue that any articulation o f a pre-existing text (in any medium)
is an adaptation. Kidnie points out that such a move leads to the “danger o f emptying the term o f meaning”
(5). Her answer is to “treat[] adaptation as a necessarily provisional category o f study.” She makes the
astute argument “that adaptation as an evolving category is closely tied to how the work modifies over time
and from one reception space to another. [...] an understanding o f the work as an ongoing process rather
than a fixed object makes alternative critical practices potentially available to adaptation studies since the
‘work as process’ reshapes in significant ways the politics o f reception” (5-6).
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o f Albion (to which I will return later), Blake reworks James Macpherson’s Ossianic
work Oithona: A Poem by omitting some episodes, changing names, and “updating” the
thematic concerns of this supposedly ancient bardic song to include issues of slavery and
sexual liberation. In The Book o f Urizen, Blake revises the story of creation and the fall as
they are set down in the Bible. In Milton, Blake takes on John Milton’s Paradise Lost and
explicitly sets out to do what Milton set out to do—“Justify the ways of God to man” (pi.
1)—but this time through a process of rewriting and correcting. And Blake directly
responds to Byron’s mystery play Cain with The Ghost o f Abel, a brief drama revising the
conclusions regarding murder and forgiveness implicit in Byron’s drama. Seen in light of
Hornby’s metadramatic category of references to literature and reality, these direct
adaptations make visible the constructed nature of the work of art.
Blake’s elisions between characters as well as between character and author fit
under Hornby’s category of role-playing. In works where Blake specifically addresses
other poets, it is difficult not to conflate Blake with the speakers of his prophetic works,
particularly when he includes himself or his personal history within the framework of the
visual and verbal narrative. By adapting and revising other authors, Blake gets to perform
a little role-playing of his own. In The Ghost o f Abel, he addresses a fellow poet, calling
Byron “a voice in the wilderness” (pi. 1)—a reference to John the Baptist—thus aligning
Byron with himself as a fellow prophet-bard. In the work, both Byron and Blake might be
said to perform the role of visionary; furthermore, Blake might be said to reenact what he
thinks is the better Byronic identity by revising Byron’s play Cain. A similar argument
applies to Blake’s reworking of Paradise Lost and his relationship to Milton.
Moreover, Blake fashions himself into a dramatic character when he explicitly
presents himself as one of the many characters in Milton. In fact, we find images of Blake
that include his name as if to eliminate any doubt of his identity (pi. 29 and 36). He adds
to the construction of this dramatic persona by including personal details such as a
reference to his brother Robert (pi. 33) and by setting the climax of the work in his
garden at his cottage in Felpham (pi. 36), where he lived for a few years at the beginning
of the nineteenth century. In the Marriage, he references his birth year as the beginning
of a revolution: “As a new heaven is begun, and it is now thirty-three years since its
advent: the Eternal Hell revives” (pi. 3, E 34). Thirty-three years signals Blake’s current
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age and aligns him with Christ, who is said to have been thirty-three when he was
crucified. In addition, Europe begins with the speaker having a discussion with a fairy,
whom he brings home. The speaker tells us that the fairy proceeded to “dictate^
EUROPE,” referencing the title of the work and making us question if Blake intends his
audience to take him for the speaker.
Blake’s characters role-play or act, in the stage sense, when they repeat each
other’s actions, thereby enacting a part that has already been played, so to speak, by
another character earlier in the work or in another work altogether. One way to view
characters entering one another in Milton is through the lens of performance. When
Milton enters Blake, the latter in effect plays the former as much as the former plays the
latter by joining identities (I discuss the relationship between performance and these
kinds of entrances more fully in the final chapter). The elisions between Blake and the
speaker/character or between character and character in his illuminated works serve to
distance the audience from the work and function self-reflexively to point to themselves
as a construction.
This alienation-effect seems to contradict Blake’s call to enter his works. One
way to negotiate this apparent contradiction is to see the distance Blake places between
his art and his audience as enabling a more engaged audience, an audience that can
choose to walk into and become part of the world of the imagination, instead of becoming
passively absorbed at a superficial level. Nevertheless, it differs from the “paradox” at the
heart of Brecht’s alienation-effect: it “seems virtually to exclude the audience” by
distancing them but seeks “an interactive relationship at the same time” (Bennett 29).
Blake does distance with the goal of creating an active spectatorship, but he also
understands artistic representation differently than Brecht does. For Blake, the world of
the imagination—the performance of the illuminated works—is not virtual or severed
from material reality, thus an eventual entrance is both desired and possible. Blake
facilitates the entrance into his works, the second stage in the two-stage process of
Blakean spectatorship, by subverting the boundary between art and reality, the opposite
impulse to reaffirming it. With “the modem political drama of the epic theatre of Brecht
[...], there is still a feeling that a ‘true’ reality is possible, a better society that will come
when capitalism is swept away” (Hornby 47), but, for Blake, the imagination, what others
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see as merely depicted in art, is reality. Blake’s call to action is not about creating a better
future world; it is about seeing the infinite world, the world of the imagination that exists
in our world. Moreover, this world interpenetrates the everyday world—it is not just
influential, as Brecht sees dramatic performance. Despite “proposing] a more immediate
and interactive theatre” (Bennett 22), Brechtian theatre does not include this
interpenetrative vision of performance and reality.
In non-Brechtian fashion, Blake also draws the audience into his imaginative
space with self-reflexive moments, especially in plates that show the interpenetration of
the two spheres, a kind of breaking of the fourth wall. However, the effect of these kinds
of self-reflexive moments should not be aligned with that of comedies, for instance, that
use the broken fourth wall as a way to incorporate the audience and make them feel as if
they are part of the joys and romances unfolding on stage. This comedie inclusion does
not rely on a self-conscious choice of the spectator, but on a reaffirmation of escapist
entertainment. In her analysis of the Hollywood film musical genre, Jane Feuer explains
how these ends, namely a remystification of the medium, can be attained using self
reflexive techniques. Rather than striving to effect some sort of revolutionary change or
awareness in the audience with self-reflexive moments, this genre simply reinscribes the
ideology of mass entertainment by drawing the audience back in after an initial
(temporary) demystification of the genre and film production in general. Feuer states,
“[W]e tend to associate reflexivity with the notion of deconstruction within film-making
practices. The MGM musical, however, uses reflexivity to perpetuate rather than to
deconstruct the codes of the genres” (173). For instance, Singin ' in the Rain depicts the
backstage workings of film production, thereby demystifying cinema, but, ultimately, the
revealing of these workings functions to celebrate cinema’s power of entertainment,
thereby foreclosing critical thinking and allowing an escapist absorption into the film.
Conversely, Blake’s self-reflexive strategies lead to an alienation followed by an
immersion, not to demystification for the sake of remystification.
Blake encourages this process by softening the border between the real world and
the imaginative space of the created world. The best example of this encouraged
incorporation manifests itself in the form of self-referentiality, the final category from
Hornby’s elements of metadrama. He defines self-reference as a kind of direct or indirect
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address within the play to the audience—a moment with explicit self-reflexive aims (as
opposed to the general employment of the convention of the aside or soliloquy)—where
“[t]he play stops[] [and] [t]he audience is made to examine the play as a play, an artificial
construction” (103). Although self-reference reveals the medium’s construction, 1 claim
that, in Blake’s works, it also challenges the boundary between imaginative and real
space. The result is a unification of the two worlds. In fact, in some images in the
illuminated works, the characters appear aware of the division between their imaginative
reality and our reality. I categorize this acknowledgement under Hornby’s self-reference.
Indeed, Blake’s art has many examples of indirect addresses to the audiences,
addresses that reveal the constructed nature of the medium: characters sometimes push
upon the frame of the design as if they are aware that they are enclosed by such an
artificial border, forcing the audience to reflect on this fact. For instance, Urizen carries a
spiked globe as he attempts to move forward on the picture plane by pressing upon the
frame of the picture itself (Urizen pi. 23; fig. 15). Likewise, in Jerusalem, Albion directs
his hand and arm out into the comer of the frame almost touching the number of the plate
(pi. 95). And in Europe, a chained figure looks up while holding his hands flat out in
front of him, as if pressing on the fourth wall, the boundary that is meant to separate him
from reality (pi. 13; fig. 16). In these instances, it is as if the characters are attempting to
pass beyond the divide between the story world that the author has created and the actual
world that the audience occupies. Conversely, at times, the frame seems to push back and
shape the movements of the figures within the design, implying that the world of the
audience, which is apparently distinct from the space of the characters, impinges on the
world of the imagination. For example, trees bend and grow in a distorted manner along
the shape of the frame as if the frame forces this particular growth—in “The Fly” the two
trees that stand on either side of the frame strangely unite at the top of the frame, forming
an arch (or upside-down U; fig. 17); and on plate 7 of Urizen where Urizen’s skeleton
takes mortal form, the skeleton hunches in a ball as if being pressed upon by the left,
right and bottom sides of the frame, as well as from above with the words pressing down
to form a top frame.
Another form of destabilizing self-reference occurs when characters directly
address the audience, when they violate the boundary between worlds. The repeated
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Fig. 15. The Book o f Urizen, copy G, plate 23, object 22, c. 1818, Lessing J. Rosenwald
Collection, Library of Congress. © 2010 the William Blake Archive. Used with
permission. This project is supported in part by a William Blake Archive Reproduction
Grant for Graduate Students.
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Fig. 16. Europe a Prophecy, copy B, plate 13, object 15, 1794, by permission of
University of Glasgow Library, Department of Special Collections.
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Fig. 17. “The Fly,” Songs o f Innocence and o f Experience, copy Z, plate 40, object 40,
1826, Lessing J. Rosenwald Collection, Library of Congress. © 2010 the William Blake
Archive. Used with permission. This project is supported in part by a William Blake
Archive Reproduction Grant for Graduate Students.
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phrase “Mark well my words, they are of your eternal salvation” in Milton (for example,
3.5, E 96) seems to reach out from the narrative into the spectator’s world. Also, Blake’s
figures often address us by staring directly at us. Los, who grips himself in pain, stares at
the spectator wide-eyed and open-mouthed (Urizen pi. 7), and King Nebuchadnezzar
looks at the spectator as he crawls over top the words “One Law for the Lion & Ox is
Oppression” (MHH pi. 24). Urizen holds his book of brass open (Urizen pi. 5), as if he
were presenting it to the spectator, commanding him/her to follow his rigid laws,
especially in those copies where his eyes are clearly open and directed straight ahead (as
in copies C, F, B, and G). The ambiguous figures of Blake’s arcane mythology become a
little more immediate and a little less distant as they breach our world. An interesting
example of this direct address is the frontispiece to Songs o f Experience in which the
Bard and winged child stare straight ahead (fig. 18). The corresponding design from
Songs o f Innocence does not achieve the same effect, as the figure of the piper and
winged child look only at each other. The frontispiece to Experience seems to indicate a
shift between the two works, which is not surprising given the contradictory tone of the
two works in that the world of experience exhibits speakers who are much more self
aware and who are most aware of the horrors of their reality.
The direct addresses that exist in the visual realm rely on seeing—the audience
looking at the character looking back at them. In the image mentioned above, Los is
looking directly at the spectator, looking at him/her as he/she looks at Los. In fact,
Mitchell argues that most of the images in Urizen, whether explicitly engaging the
spectator’s gaze or not, work in a self-reflexive manner. He says,
the necessary frontality of symmetrical forms poses an almost threatening
address to the viewer. The pictures in Urizen ‘come at us’ directly. We are
not allowed to view them as detached voyeurs who spy on a scene which
betrays no awareness of our presence. The isolation of the figures, their
frontal arrangement, and the fact that many of them look directly out of
the picture make it clear that their primary relationship is not with a larger
world or landscape in which they exist but with us, their viewers. The
ultimate effect of Blake’s symmetry, in other words, is to draw the reader
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Fig. 18. Songs o f Innocence and o f Experience, copy Z, Frontispiece to Songs o f
Experience, plate 28, object 28, 1826, Lessing J. Rosenwald Collection, Library of
Congress. © 2010 the William Blake Archive. Used with permission. This project is
supported in part by a William Blake Archive Reproduction Grant for Graduate Students.

120

into it, or what is the same thing, invite the reader to incorporate the
pictures into himself. (Blake’s Composite Art 139-40)
The spectator of Urizen cannot simply look passively; he/she is called into the world of
the work.11 Here, the important element is vision. As Julia Thomas argues, “the very
conditions of visuality” include “the fact that, as we see, we are also positioned as
objects, [and] spectacles” (2).
The audience’s role as audience alters in moments like these. As Rajan says of the
effect of the preludia that precede the “continental prophecies” (America and Europe),
these moments of indirect and direct self-reference provoke a particular kind of reception:
“Rather than read these works mimetically or dramatically, as adumbrating or performing
[...] [their stories], we are therefore called on to read them reflexively, as texts that are
configured within the scene of their own writing” (“(Dis)figuring the System” 384) or the
scene of their own construction. Similarly, Brecht speaks of the necessity for actors “to
drop the assumption that there is a fourth wall cutting the audience off from the stage and
the consequent illusion that the stage action is taking place in reality and without an
audience. That being so, it is possible for the actor in principle to address the audience
direct[ly]” (136). What Brecht uses (and views) as solely an alienating move, Blake uses
to alienate and immerse.
Furthermore, in distinguishing dramatic theatre from epic theatre, Brecht makes
the following distinctions: whereas dramatic theatre “wears down [the spectator’s]
capacity for action” and reaffirms the fact that “he is unalterable,” epic theatre “arouses
[the spectator’s] capacity for action” and shows him “he is alterable and able to alter”
(37). Like Brecht’s epic theatre, Blake’s illuminated works use techniques to provoke
action and to encourage us to alter our conventional views of ourselves and of our
relation to the world but without causing a permanent alienation. By making the spectator
a spectacle through the direct gaze of the figures in the visual images, Blake forces
him/her into the realm of performance and out of the safety of mind, or the reading closet.
Viewing, then, becomes an active event. It also brings the spectator into the world of1
11

Similarly, Rajan points out that the designs “draw us irresistibly into this space, because the

body is pushed into the foreground and represented frontally, so as to deny us any distance from what we
see” (“(Dis)figuring the System” 404).
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Urizen and Los because these characters look at the spectator as an object. Together, the
staring figures and direct verbal calls to the audience suggest that in the very moment of
looking or reading, the spectator is being redefined. While Blake’s works distinguish
themselves as constructed art objects through these self-reflexive moments, they also
undermine the binary relation between subject and object, actor and observer, audience
and art object/performance through this very self-reflexivity. Blake’s world impinges on
our own, inviting us to inhabit an alternate reality, calling us to enter the world of the
imagination.
Blake’s verbal call to cross the threshold of the imagination finds its pictorial
equivalent in the illuminated works. The fact that many of these works begin with a
visual entrance indicates the great importance that Blake places on a particular
engagement between his audience and his multimedia art. Less explicitly, plates that
include scenes of reading and the mise en abyme effect of the book within a book
(discussed earlier as examples akin to self-reflexive metatheatricality) dismantle the
boundary between life and art as plays within plays do in the theatre. For example, in the
title pages to Thel and The Book o f Urizen, trees (life) mimic reading tablets (art)—a
common visual motif, especially in Urizen—by forming archways around the title of the
poems (fig. 13). Whereas a theatre audience is made to question where theatrical
performance ends and life begins when presented with a play within a play, Blake’s
audience is made to question where the world of the illuminated works ends and the
everyday world begins.
Blake’s works also merge or confuse the roles of character and spectator. In
America, Blake blatantly plays with the verbal-visual divide. On the title page, he embeds
two separate scenes of reading amidst the words of the title and depicts youthful figures
pointing to the words “America” and “Prophecy,” as they trying to draw the older figures
away from the books upon their laps and toward the title of Blake’s poem (fig. 10). This
self-reflexive gesture signals that Blake’s poem, not the books that currently capture their
attention, should be the focus of the older figures, and it is Blake’s poem “America: a
Prophecy” that we, his audience members, are currently reading. If the figures
acknowledge the work Blake’s audience holds in their hands, then the divide between the
characters and the audience does not signify an impenetrable barrier. Likewise, Blake
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also uses direct address in the frontispiece for All Religions are One where a figure, who
seems to represent “the voice of one crying in the wilderness” as the image’s caption
indicates, looks straight ahead into the audience’s world and points off to the right toward
something just beyond the frame (fig. 19). The figure seems to be asking the audience to
follow him into his space and explore what we cannot see beyond the frame, what will
become visible only if we choose to participate and enter the work.
The illuminated works also contain more explicit visual depictions of entryways
in various guises, but the ones that begin the works function most clearly as self-reflexive
strategies pertaining to the audience’s stepping into an alternate reality. Blake uses gothic
arches in both the frontispiece (in the 1795 copy) and title page of There is No Natural
Religion. In the frontispiece, two figures enact their little scene before two arches, while
on the title page one arch fills the entire composition of the plate, encasing the words of
the title as if the words stood on the very threshold of the entryway (fig. 20). In the title
page especially, the work manifests itself as an entrance, an entrance Blake’s audience
inevitably passes through with a simple turning of the page but which takes a much more
fundamental shift of perception in order to pass through in the way described in the Last
Judgment. In addition, on the title page of Milton (a work that has no frontispiece so that
the title page is the first plate we see and acts as a frontispiece), the eponymous hero
stands with his hand on the vortex, apparently about to enter it, performing the same
action we inevitably perform when we pick up Milton (fig. 21). As Mitchell has argued,
the “vortex serves as an image of the gateway into a new level of perception” (Blake's
Composite Art 73), and his analysis of the “vortex of a book,” which draws on Frye,
suggests that Blake’s works themselves become such vortices. Frye points out that books
are not the only objects that have vortices. He explains:
Blake says that everything in eternity has what he calls a ‘vortex’ [...] a
spiral or cone of existence. When we focus both eyes on one object, say a
book, we create an angle of vision opening into our minds with the apex
pointing away from us. The book therefore has a vortex of existence
opening into its mental reality within our minds. When Milton descends
from eternity to time he finds that he has to pass through the apex of this
cone of eternal vision, which is like trying to see a book from the book’s
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Fig. 19. All Religions are One, copy A, frontispiece, object 1, 1795, Huntington Library,
San Marino, California. Used with permission.
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Fig. 20. There is No Natural Religion, copy C, title page, plate a2, object 2, c. 1794,
Lessing J. Rosenwald Collection, Library of Congress. © 2010 the William Blake
Archive. Used with permission. This project is supported in part by a William Blake
Archive Reproduction Grant for Graduate Students.
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Fig. 21. Milton a Poem, copy D, plate i [1], object 1, 1818, Lessing J. Rosenwald
Collection, Library of Congress. © 2010 the William Blake Archive. Used with
permission. This project is supported in part by a William Blake Archive Reproduction
Grant for Graduate Students.
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point of view; the Lockian conception of the real book as outside the mind
on which the vision of the fallen world is based. [...]. But in eternity the
perceiving mind or body is omnipresent, and hence these globes in eternity
are inside that body. (350)
Engaging or entering the vortex of another object equals entering the object itself, a kind
of identification without a loss of identity. The difference between Eternity and our world
hinges on the perceived relation between subject and object and the ability to enter the
vortices of other things. In Eternity, subject and object have a more fluid relation, which,
therefore, makes it possible to be a subject that becomes/enters an object. In the world of
Generation, our flawed perception sees the mind as a thing unto itself completely separate
from everything that surrounds it, making entrances into other things or crossing into
their vortices impossible. However, in Eternity, the relation among things functions
differently, or is perceived differently, so that objects and their corresponding vortices
exist within us and within each other, making vortical entrances possible and easy.
Mitchell extends Frye’s discussion of objects to human beings: “‘passing the vortex’ of a
thing, whether a stone, a flower, or a person, involves an entry into the interior life of that
object” (71). Thus, entrances involve individuals entering things as well as other
individuals.
Milton’s right hand not only presses upon the vortex, suggesting his own forward
momentum (as do his feet as one moves forward), but it also beckons the spectator to
follow. By depicting him in profile, Blake makes the connection stronger: Milton is still
in part turned toward the audience as he is turning away into the world of the work. He
functions as a kind of bridge uniting the spectator to the world that sits before Milton
waiting to be entered, waiting to be explored. The frontispiece to Jerusalem is similarly
constructed: with his face in profile, Los moves forward into a darkened doorway with
his right foot already positioned ahead and past the threshold. His left hand is raised and
seems to press against the door while at the same time to beckon the audience to follow.
In his right hand, Los holds a circular lantern, which throws off light and implies that he
can guide us into this unknown and untravelled territory. On one level, both Milton and
Los fulfill a literal narrative function of entering a vortex to begin a quest of redemption
and of entering a doorway to begin a self-sacrificing journey to save another. But, on a
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meta-narrative and self-reflexive level, both characters represent the spectator’s entrance
into Blake’s universe, into visionary space, and both characters encourage the spectator to
make his/her own entrance. Mark Lussier maintains, “The physical concept that
facilitates Milton’s passage from eternity to generation, the vortex, provides [...] two
way transportation, becoming the vehicle by which matters eternal descend to the limit of
contraction and matters generational ascend to the eternal realms of thought” (“Blake and
Science Studies” 195). I would add that the vortex found in Milton is emblematic of the
illuminated works as media that allow a “two-way transportation.” Blake’s emphasis on
entrances seems to be symptomatic of the fact that, in his illuminated works, he
constructs his multimedia art objects as gateways, implying an audience relationship to
media that heads toward immediacy and participation. However, such an experience of
immediacy cannot be easily purchased as escapist engagements with various forms of
entertainment; rather, it requires a Brechtian alienation before the goal can be reached.
Blake’s self-reflexive techniques, such as these prefatory depictions of entrances,
distance the audience from a false sense of temporarily falling into a fictional mental
space so that they can consciously choose to see the two worlds as interpenetrable and
move through them in order for a fundamental alteration in perception or last judgment to
occur.
The implications of Blake’s self-reflexive strategies become more complex when
viewing Visions o f the Daughters o f Albion, which constructs a more layered
understanding of what it means to “enter” his works. In Visions, a more aggressive form
of these strategies leaves little doubt that the spectator cannot simply remain passive. The
prophecy reflects the socio-political situation of late-eighteenth-century England—but it
also resonates with that of our times. This reflection, along with the more assertive call
on the spectator, suggests that only when we enter the illuminated works can we then
effect change in our own world.
Blake’s Visions begins with a frontispiece (fig. 22) that differs in composition
from the title page of Milton and the frontispiece of Jerusalem. The plate in question
depicts the entryway of a cave housing Bromion and Oothoon sitting back-to-back and
chained to one another next to a despairing Theotormon; Bromion, wide-eyed and open
mouthed with hair standing on end in a look of shock or terror, stares beyond the picture
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Fig. 22. Visions o f the Daughters o f Albion, copy C, frontispiece, plate i, object 1, 1793,
by permission of University of Glasgow Library, Department of Special Collections.
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plane off to the left of the plate; Oothoon, who occupies the central position of the lower
half of the plate, kneels and hangs her head either in defeat or in sorrow; and Theotormon
clutches his head with his arm so that we cannot see his face, while he sits off to the right,
slightly elevated from Bromion and Oothoon. The top half of the plate shows the outer
edge of a cave mouth, where the trio sits as water laps around them on the shore. In
addition to the cave, Blake delineates a cloudy sky and a horizon. To the left side, just
above Bromion’s head, we can see one little clearing in the sky so that the sun is visible
as a plain disc. The lines distinguishing the clouds from one another and from the clear
sky, along with the semi-circular outer edge of the cave, form the shape of an eye, with
the sun forming the pupil. No figure waves the spectator into the work, as do Milton and
Los in Milton and Jerusalem. Instead, the eye seems to stare directly at the spectator,
almost angrily or menacingly. Much like the figures who stare directly ahead that I spoke
of earlier, here this disembodied eye (perhaps Blake’s eye) functions as a direct address,
calling attention to the fact that the spectator is an audience of a work of art and, on the
one hand, alienating him/her, but on the other hand, drawing the spectator into the work
as if he/she has some agency in the drama that unfolds.
Significantly, Blake uses this self-reflexive technique to begin one of his most
socially and politically relevant works. Visions focuses on themes relating to female
sexual repression, sexual repression in general, moral conventions, and physical and
mental slavery. In reference to the frontispiece in general, Behrendt states, “its very
nature as a single, striking visual image presented for perusal and processing before the
verbal text is read or digested lends it special power not only to epitomize the work but
also significantly to influence the manner and mind-set in which that text will be
apprehended by its reader” (Reading William Blake 89, original emphasis). By jarring the
spectator, thereby preventing him/her from using the work as a form of escapism, and by
placing him/her within the boundaries of the story space, Blake makes the social aims of
this work clear: the spectator is called to act, to participate in the dilemmas encountered
in the work and to create change in a social context. This effect is similar whether the
plate functions as a frontispiece, its position in most copies of Visions, or as a tailpiece,
its position in copy A.
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However, difference arises in the vision of Oothoon at the end of the work. When
the plate functions as a tailpiece, it signals a call to do something about these social
problems, so the work ends with an imprisoned image of Oothoon. This final image
suggests that even the world of the imagination needs altering, needs intervention. When
the plate functions as the frontispiece, it signals the spectator’s entrance into the work and
concludes with a freed (visual) image of Oothoon (fig. 23), indicating that our entrance
into the work at the beginning has played a part in her liberation. In this case, Visions
ends with the words “Thus every morning wails Oothoon, but Theotormon sits / Upon the
margind ocean conversing with shadows dire. / The Daughters of Albion hear her woes,
& eccho back her sighs” (8.11-13, E 51). The verbal portion of the plate ends about
halfway down the plate. Just beneath, Oothoon bursts forth from flaming clouds,
occupying the centre part of the plate. Below her, on the bottom-right side of the plate,
we see three women (presumably the Daughters of Albion) huddled together on a plot of
land in the middle of the ocean; two of them stare up at Oothoon as the third buries her
head into herself. This plate, too, exhibits self-reflexivity. The Daughters of Albion look
to Oothoon—she looks at the spectator—and the spectator looks back to the Daughters as
representatives of the spectator’s social world, of women who need to fight their social
enslavement. A circuitous relation exists: the direct gaze of Oothoon breaches our space
and pulls us into her world at the same time she enters ours. In the picture space, she
exists as a revolutionary figure who has freed herself from society’s chains and beckons
us and the Daughters to do the same. However, David Aers questions the delineation of
Oothoon that Blake seems to provide:
Blake presents Oothoon as able to transcend the consciousness of her
fellow women absolutely, but how this can be so, how she has attained so
clear a revolutionary critique of sexual and social exploitation, and of their
interaction, how she has reached so full an understanding of the
psychological effects and perverted indulgences of repressed sexuality
[...], this remains a mystery. For no one, not the most “revolutionary”
figure, stands clearly outside alienated society, beyond alienation. (505)
Aers explains that completely rising above the ideologies of one’s social environment is
quite impossible. However, he argues that Blake qualifies this seeming transcendence by
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Fig. 23. Visions o f the Daughters o f Albion, copy C, plate 8, object 11, 1793, by
permission of University of Glasgow Library, Department of Special Collections.
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having Oothoon exhibit behaviour that simply reinscribes the dominant misogynistic and
patriarchal ideology (i.e., offering to catch maidens for Theotormon’s sexual pleasure)
and by “leaving] Oothoon lamenting and bound to Bromion” (506), as the final words of
the poem and frontispiece indicate.
Anne K. Mellor makes a similar argument. She highlights Oothoon’s resistance to
a Wollstonecraftian “rational modesty” that, according to Blake, represses “both British
women and British men” (“Sex, Violence, and Slavery” 366, original emphasis), while at
the same time showing how Oothoon finds herself in no better a position than the two
men in the work: “the frontispiece [...] implies that all three characters remain trapped
within Bromion’s caves” (368, original emphasis). Even though Oothoon seems to be the
most progressive or visionary character in the poem, her idea of free love fails from a
feminist perspective, as only Theotormon gets to enjoy a freer sexual lifestyle.12 Mellor
states that the Motto to the work hints at another possible state of affairs:
But if the Motto urges the reader to imagine an alternative to the slavery of
modesty other than free love, the poem does not suggest what that
alternative could be. As the creator of this poem and its designs, Blake
must take responsibility for what the work does not say as well as for what
it does say.
Mellor makes a valid point, especially in light of Aers's claim that no one stands outside
his/her social relations and contexts. However, 1 argue that, though Blake does not give
us a concrete and precise alternate view of the way the world could work, he does
something equally important. He encourages a collective revolution—even without
offering us an alternative vision to the problematic male-centred vision of free love
Oothoon gives us in the poem. As Aers points out, Blake refuses to allow Oothoon to rise
12

It is important to note that this so-called male fantasy is not accepted by Theotormon, perhaps

suggesting that this liberal alternative is as flawed as the current repressive state o f affairs. Also, Helen
Bruder offers a counter-perspective to Mellor’s critique o f Blake, praising Blake for giving Oothoon power
over her own desires (89), despite her failed attempt at liberation. In trying to “better understand Blake’s
limitations [...], as well as appreciate his achievements” (94), Bruder sees this failure within the larger
picture o f wom en’s rights at the time, holding women themselves partially responsible for the lack o f
success in the progress o f their cause (115).
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completely above her social environment: “This counteracts the over-optimistic
tendencies and represents the poet’s unflinching realism, his final rejection of any too
easy idealism about human consciousness endemic to so many self-styled ‘revolutionary’
organisations’’ (506). On the one hand, the tailpiece, along with the image on the
frontispiece, shows us how Oothoon is trapped in her ideological environment in the
verbal text. On the other hand, the tailpiece visually offers us a freed vision of Oothoon,
albeit one that is linked to the still seemingly chained Daughters below her and to us, as
we all gaze at each other, creating a circle of interconnectivity. In the text, the Daughters
can only echo Oothoon’s laments and sighs, showing that complete change can occur
only as a community. The spectator’s individual engagement with and entrance into the
work, then, does not signify a futile event. Rather, this engagement is a necessary step
toward change on a larger scale. Through the image of the disembodied eye, the work
calls on the spectator to enter the world of the poem, an entrance that will empower
him/her, facilitating the fight to tear down rigid and repressive social values and
conventions in both worlds.
Furthermore, the work's self-reflexivity has explicitly theatrical dimensions. With
Visions o f the Daughters o f Albion, Blake adapts James Macpherson’s Oithona: A Poem,
one of the tales supposedly composed by the ancient highland bard Ossian. Sanders
claims, “[I]t is usually at the very point of infidelity that the most creative acts of
adaptation and appropriation take place” (20), as is the case with Blake’s adaptation
(what Hornby would regard as real-life or literary allusion)—one of his numerous self
reflexive strategies that initiate a distancing followed by an incorporation of the audience.
Blake not only transposes the medium by making it an illuminated work, but he also
alters many of the plot points of Macpherson’s tale. Nevertheless, the story still contains
many recognizable features of Oithona (the emphasis on sight, the rape, the resulting
implications for female virtue and reputation, the cave, the violent rapist, the name of the
heroine, etc.). In fact, a couple of the alterations are reminiscent of Fran9ois-Hippolyte
Barthelemon’s adaptation of Macpherson’s Oithona for the stage (Haymarket Theatre,
1768). In Barthelemon’s operetta Oithona: A Dramatic Poem Taken from the Prose
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Translation o f the Celebrated Ossian,13 the poem was set to music and dramatized.14 It
included the addition of several speaking and singing choruses, including a lone voice, as
well as a group of men and a group of women, groups which sometimes create a tension
as they sing about the various attributes of the sexes. The operetta received some public
attention in a poor review in (at least) one London periodical. The Monthly Review of
April 1768 reviewed the performance of Oithona: “From the character of this Composer,
we have no doubt but the music of this piece has great merit; but as a literary
composition, it appears to be an absurd mixture of the majestic and the familiar, the
sublime and the silly, the heroic and the nonsensical” (335). Blake may not have actually
seen Barthelemon’s performance, which did not have a successful or long run,15 and he
may not have read the printed version of the text, but some interesting similarities and,
perhaps merely coincidental, intertextual relations exist nonetheless. For instance, both
the operetta and Blake’s poem add an explicit layer of sexual and gender politics that
Macpherson’s poem does not explore. Dafydd Moore also makes a loose connection
between the operetta and Visions when he explains that the former includes “a number of
added passages about the battles of the sexes and the nature of women,” while describing
the latter as “another meditation on relations between the sexes and sexual morality” (35).
Another similarity between the two works is the addition of a chorus, something
Macpherson’s poem lacks. Although Blake does not identify or label the Daughters as a
chorus, and despite their lack of dialogue (they never speak), they certainly are choral. As
a group that watches the drama from the vantage point of the stage (or story space) and
reiterates Oothoon’s sighs four times throughout the text, most notably at the beginning
and at the end (thereby shaping the focalization of the work), the Daughters do display
choral attributes. Although a chorus seems to function as a kind of “self-reference,”
Hornby does not classify choruses under his various categories of metadrama. Instead, he
131 am indebted to David Worrall who drew my attention to this version o f Macpherson’s tale and
suggested a possible connection to Blake.
14 Corinna Laughlin briefly discusses the adaptive strategies in Barthclemon’s retelling o f
Macpherson’s Oithona. She says that Barthelemon “transforms it subtly into [a] Gothic-Shakespcarcan”
version at the level o f language and story (520).
15 Dafydd Moore notes, “The opera Oithona opened in a two-act version promising all three acts
the following night, only to disappear without trace and never be performed again” (36).
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insists that they are a “mere acknowledgment of the audience,” “merely conventions of a
presentation style,” and “they do not destroy the world of the play, but instead enlarge it
to include the audience” (104). In the case of the operetta, I concur; however, in the case
of Visions, I believe the choral effect is entirely different and does, in fact, destabilize the
boundary between work and audience. Through these allegorical figures, Blake includes
the women of England (and perhaps even all women) on the stage of his drama, but this
chorus does not reveal more awareness than the protagonist Oothoon, as one might
expect with a Greek chorus, or as Barthelemon provides with his chorus (see, for
example, p. 7, where the chorus philosophizes on the nature of humanity).16 Instead,
Blake’s chorus mirrors Oothoon in echoing her. Like the menacing eye, Blake critically
challenges one main component of his audience—all the women of England—to end the
cycle of non-action and to effect change by putting them “on stage” with the action of the
performance. This particular adaptation of the chorus moves in the direction of Aers’s
idea of interactive and collective acts toward social change.
Blake makes two other significant changes to his version of Macpherson’s
Oithona (and, implicitly, to Barthelemon’s, which does not veer from the original plot
points much): Oothoon does not (nor does she want to) kill herself as a result of the stain
the rape places on her female reputation or “fame” (Macpherson 186). In fact, Oothoon
quickly realizes, unlike Oithona, that she is still pure and not stained. Secondly, her
beloved does not seek (or want) vengeance. Theotormon is the one who cannot deal with
the negative implications of the rape, while Oothoon frees herself from them almost
immediately. In Macpherson’s poem, Oithona’s lover pursues her (rather than the other
way around, which is what happens in Blake’s poem), wanting her back and challenging
her rapist to a battle to the death (which the beloved wins). By removing these aspects of
the beloved, Blake complicates male responsibility in female oppression. Theotormon
represents one aspect of the patriarchal ideology, an aspect that praises female virtue and

16

Laughlin explains how Barthelemon, like other adapters, tries to give Macpherson’s tale a

coherence that is simply not present: “Macpherson’s work is carefully [...] fragmentary; adapters o f the
poems tend to fill in those gaps, thus changing the effect o f the poems substantially” (521). Laughlin points
out that one o f the ways Barthelemon fills in the gaps is to give the chorus insights into motivation and
explain what the original never does explain (521-22).
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modesty, while Bromion represents the aspect that believes men own women and that
they exist for male pleasure. Besides the more general intertexual and self-reflexive
implications, Blake’s adaptation of Macpherson’s and Barthelemon’s Oithona into
Visions o f the Daughters o f Albion more specifically enacts, first, a Brechtian distancing
by startling the audience out of any possible complacent and escapist attitudes toward the
work of art and, second, an incorporation by drawing the audience into the story space
and bending the fabric between its world and our own.
Incorporation stands for an “immersion” into the work (a word Linda Hutcheon
uses in her book A Theory o f Adaptation) as well as for the experience of immediacy,
which Bolter and Grusin explain as “being immersed” (232). With respect to narrative
representation, Hutcheon categorizes “three modes of engagement—telling, showing, and
interacting with stories” (27). In the first chapter and in this one, I have discussed how
Blake uses two of these three modes of storytelling at once: telling, through the verbal
text, and showing, through the visual text. What I have attempted to show specifically in
this chapter is that Blake also fulfills the interactive kind of storytelling, Hutcheon’s third
category. Hutcheon’s main illustration of the interactive type of storytelling is the
videogame: “[T]he move to participatory modes in which we also engage physically with
the story and its world—whether it be in a violent action game or a role-playing or
puzzle/skill testing one—is not more active [than the telling and showing modes] but
certainly active in a different way” (23). She points out, “[I]n a game adaptation [...]
players can inhabit a known fictional, often striking, visual world of digital animation”
(13). The level of activity in this mode includes the physical and not just the mental
aspect of engagement (or the basic physical aspect of holding a book or standing before a
work of art).
While it is anachronistic to compare Blake’s illuminated works to videogames
(adaptations or not), it is useful to consider this kind of participatory mode in relation to
Blake’s statement about his audience entering his works. As I have argued, Blake
constructs a two-stage level of audience engagement with the media of his illuminated
works: a level of Brechtian alienation in which we are made aware of the art object as a
construction and are called on to make change as well as a level of incorporation that
allows us to cross the divide between our space and the imaginative space. Blake’s
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illuminated works ask us to imagine a way of interacting with art objects that is atypical.
He asks us not only to mentally participate in his universe and ideas, but also to literally
step into that other world, to live it. The videogame allows a participant to navigate and
effect change in that virtual space. 1 would argue that one of the main differences
between the videogame and Blake’s illuminated works, then, is that the world Blake
presents us with is not virtual. Bolter and Grusin affirm the failure of even virtual reality
simulators: “Virtual reality is immersive, which means that it is a medium whose purpose
is to disappear. This disappearing act, however, is made difficult by the apparatus that
virtual reality requires” (21-22). More than the cumbersome presence of the device or
interface, the fact that the users, no matter how amazing the experience is, will
acknowledge virtual reality as just that—virtual, not reality, and fake—forecloses the
possibility of a truly immersive experience. As Bolter and Grusin acknowledge, “The
user of virtual reality is constantly aware of the discrepancies between the virtual scene
and the real world, and that awareness is an important part of her experience” (253).
Blake’s illuminated works, however, strive toward the collision of reality and
imagination so that the audience may see the world of imagination as a reality.
What Blake’s illuminated works offer is an immersive experience. Hutcheon does
not dismiss the immersive aspect of any of the three modes of storytelling. She says,
all three modes of engagement can be considered immersive: the act of
reading a print text immerses us through imagination in another world,
seeing a play or film immerses us visually and aurally, and interacting
with a story in a videogame or in a theme park adds a physical, enacted
dimension. In each there is a sense of being ‘transported’ [...], in
psychological and emotional terms. (133)
However, Hutcheon explains that the main difference between telling and showing when
compared with the interactive mode of storytelling is that the latter allows a “more
immediate kind of immersion” (25); “in the showing mode we do not physically enter
that world and proceed to act within it,” unlike the interactive mode. While I agree with
Hutcheon’s claim that the interactive mode of the videogame includes the body in a way
that showing and telling stories do not, I also have some reservations about the level of
physical interaction possible. Despite the use of bodies to manipulate the game world by
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pressing buttons on controllers or running on a mat, bodies do not cross the barrier of the
television to find themselves in another world, even if bodies do control the movements
of the avatar that exists in that space. 1 have been arguing that the illuminated works
encourage an actual entrance. Unlike videogames, Blake encourages the spectator to
radically alter his/her perception and understanding of the way he/she relates to other
individuals and objects so that mind and body make the leap together—even if such a
leap is difficult to imagine. Nevertheless, associating Hutcheon’s category of the
immersive mode with Blake’s illuminated works makes sense given Blake’s
understanding of fourfold vision, Generation, and Eternity. By entering his works in a
visceral way, the spectator alters the way he/she engages with the world on a fundamental
level. Of course, unlike the videogame, Blake’s works do not offer a clear path for the
journey through the story space. By entering his works, the spectator does not set out on a
goal to destroy the enemy, nor does he/she take on an avatar and act within that
boundary. Rather, the spectator’s entrance marks a key paradigm shift in his/her
engagement with the world at large. The point is not some tangible goal, like saving the
princess, but what happens to the identity of audience when they choose to enter the
imaginative space in a physical way, leading to profound ramifications for their
understanding of human existence.
In Hutcheon’s schema, live theatrical performance tells a story by way of showing
(versus the telling of the written word or the interacting of the videogame). However, in a
medieval understanding of spectacle, theatrical performance fits more closely with the
interactive model than either the telling or showing models. In the context of Blake’s
illuminated works, Hutcheon’s category of immersion finds a less anachronistic model in
medieval theatre. Indeed, in trying to understand Blake’s self-reflexive layers in the
context of the performative and theatrical elements of his work, I find William
Egginton’s How the World Became a Stage: Presence, Theatricality, and the Question o f
Modernity a particularly fruitful source to help theorize this aspect of the illuminated
works. Egginton isolates the theatre as a crucial space for a discussion of the changing
relations between a subject and the world, “tracing the development of the theatrical
experience of space out of the experience of presence characteristic of medieval
spectacle” (121). He contrasts two major ways humans have related to the world and
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space, at least in the Western world: the medieval magical worldview and the modem
worldview of causal relations, or “two modes of spatiality: presence and theatricality”
(124). In the medieval world, people interacted with spectacle in a way now foreign to us,
or in a way that we might find naive. The significant role of religion and ritual,
specifically Catholicism, led to the easy acceptance of divine presence in the world and to
the belief that all could “share in the essence of a thing.” Egginton explains:
at its core, Catholic doctrine, and particularly those aspects of it that will
become the heart of the liturgical drama in the Middle Ages, operates
according to the logic of sympathetic magic. Certainly anthropologists and
sociologists of magic and religion since Frazer have remarked upon the
magical elements of the sacrament of the Eucharist. As Gregory Dix
points out, the sacrament is, practically speaking, a magical ceremony
whose performance is ‘neither a memorial nor a representation, but an
actual representation of the sacrifice of Christ.’ In other words, the
sacrament of the Eucharist is the prototypical instance of that motion of
mimesis as production of presence that characterizes both the magical
worldview and the medieval experience of spectacle. (43)
Sympathetic magic entails a world in which humans wield power: if I perform this
particular ritual, then this phenomenon will occur. This magical worldview, then, does
not displace human agency for a supernatural one; rather, it puts humans even more in
control and in touch with what goes on in the universe. Having this view implies a belief
in the possibility of “representation" as Egginton explains it. Significantly, the main
types of theatrical performance in this time were based on biblical stories, such as Noah
and the Flood, and known as mystery plays. Such a view is not a “leap of faith” on the
part of social members; it is the simple “reality” of what it meant to live in the divine
presence of things (44).
The belief in and acceptance of church ritual and medieval spectacle as a reality—
rather than as a Brechtian distanced representation—align themselves with the second of
the two moves involved in our engagement with Blake’s illuminated works. The self
reflexive aspects provide the initial distance that allows us to form a critical stance from
which to effect social change; then they draw us in and disturb the boundaries between
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our space and the space of the imagination so that these two spheres exist within one
another. What I am suggesting here is that the mode of understanding reality that Blake
constructs in his illuminated works parallels that of medieval spectacle. The crucial point
of comparison rests on a definition of representation, specifically as a “production of
presence”; I argue that Blake uses the term representation in a similar way in the Last
Judgment. Bolter and Grusin’s contemporary understanding of media that function on a
logic of immediacy comes close to the idea of presence at the heart of medieval spectacle.
These kind of media attempt to mask mediation, while attempting to make the user feel as
if what is represented achieves an authenticity or reality. However, this logic of
immediacy, as I have already noted, fails to mesh with Blake’s idea of immediacy for the
simple reason that representation remains a kind of fiction: “It is important to note that
the logic of transparent immediacy does not necessarily commit the viewer to an utterly
naive or magical conviction that the representation is the same thing as what it
represents” (Bolter and Grusin 30). My argument about the illuminated works rests on the
fact that they encourage precisely the experience that the logic of transparent immediacy
does not, where what is represented is reality in the medieval sense of spectacle and the
magical worldview. Far from being a naive understanding of the world, sympathetic
magic highlights the potential power humans have to affect the space they occupy.
Through a Brechtian distance, which allows a critical awareness and prevents simple
absorption into art, Blake’s illuminated works move us toward reclaiming this power and
this view of the world.
The understanding of performance with respect to actors playing a part differed as
well in medieval times. Egginton distinguishes between what he calls “dramatization”
and what we might call “acting”:
Dramatization, I want to suggest, marks a different relation to reality than
does the modem term ‘acting.’ Whereas an actor takes part in the
production of an imaginary reality that coexists or momentarily replaces
social reality, dramatization makes present, adds a bodily dimension to, a
narration that is already in some sense real. (50)
When Egginton uses the term “imaginary reality,” he seems to connote the not-real rather
than the real, Eternal, and divine, which is how Blake uses the term. To this end, Blake’s
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illuminated works correspond to Egginton’s definition of dramatization. The world that
includes Los, Ore, and Urizen is not imaginary, if we take imaginary to mean not real,
and it is not virtual compared to our own world; Blake’s universe is of the imagination
and of Eternity. Blake resists the more modem and scientific view of the universe, with
its principle of cause and effect and singular focus on abstract reasoning and
experimentation and proofs. For him, reason needs imagination. He vehemently opposed
Deism and its vision of a clockmaker God who distanced Himself after the creation of the
world and he fully embraced the presence of the divine in this world, the reality of
miracles, and the truth of revelation.17 For example, in the poem “Mock on Mock on
Voltaire Rousseau,” Blake critiques the philosophies of natural morality and religion of
both men, telling them that their ideas are “vain” because the world contains more than
merely the natural and physical; it contains the spirit of Jesus and the imagination. Blake
writes, “And every sand becomes a Gem / Reflected in the beams divine / Blown back
they blind the mocking Eye” (2, 5-7, E 477; see also the address “To the Deists” in
Jerusalem pi. 52, E 200-01). Faulty perception and reason’s usurpation of the
imagination chains us to a vision of the world as merely physical and impermanent. If we
break these mental chains, we can reach a higher level of perception to find the divine
and the Eternal in the world. The world of Generation and the objects produced in it
(such as art), however, offer immersion into the divine presence. The imagination exists
in itself and comes to transgress our perceived mundane reality. The illuminated works
(as art objects), then, do not function as a gateway leading us out of one world and into
another; rather they collapse the boundary between worlds, showing us that this world is
suffused with the Eternal.
Blake embodies the medieval idea of presence specifically in his painting Angel o f
the Revelation. He places St. John the Divine (the small figure) in the foreground,
watching the spectacle before him and transcribing his visions, while the Angel (the large
17 As V. A. Dc Luca argues, “For Blake Presence is available, and [...] [it is] in fact [one of] the
cornerstones o f his faith" (240-41). De Luca’s essay leads up to an analysis o f writing as revelation in

Milton: the fact that the letters are “both read and seen" turns words into images, something that Blake’s
illuminated works also do with their “wall o f words” (238). The notion o f presence is a fundamental aspect
o f Blake’s understanding o f the world and the various levels o f perception and modes o f being in the world.
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figure) holds the script or text of the revelation in his hand in the middle ground and the
procession of horses and riders passes in the background. This depiction makes it clear
that what John sees is not a mere representation, not an action in a separate sphere, but
one that crosses into his reality. Blake accomplishes this by having the Angel breach the
implicit divide between spaces: one foot is on the ocean in the middle ground while the
other is beside John on the earth he occupies in the foreground.1s Thus, John does not
merely witness a spectacle before him; he exists in the same reality as the performance—
in this way, he is immersed in it. This painting epitomizes the nature of Blake’s
illuminated works and their relation to our reality. The vision is physical, not confined to
the mental, just as Elijah’s and Elisha’s vision of the fiery chariot manifests itself both
spiritually and physically. Blake’s works function as live performances, but performances
in a world of presence. Jesus tells John, “What thou seest, write in a book” (Revelation
1.11), justifying Blake’s inclusion of both pictorial and linguistic spaces, but also the
performative dimension of the works since John also watches the dramatic action unfold.
The medieval magical worldview that Egginton describes was eventually replaced
with the modem view due to a change in the structure of relations between audience and
spectacle, leading away from presence and toward theatricality. Tracy C. Davis’s
assessment of the “distinction between the theatrical and theatricality” (128)
demonstrates that the magical worldview is necessarily opposed to theatricality rather
than merely the theatrical. She attempts to disentangle the two terms because she finds
that they tend to be used interchangeably: “The difference hinges on the audience.
Theatricality is not likely to be present when a performance is so absorbing that the
audience forgets that it is spectating.” The key difference is that, in a relation to
performance described as theatrical, one is absorbed in the presentation before one;
however, in a relation to performance described as theatricality, one is “aware of the
condition of spectating” (129). Davis links theatricality with the kind of “disengaged
viewing” that Brecht promotes. In an experience that can be defined in terms of

ls The painting echoes the positioning o f Milton in the frontispiece to Milton and o f Los in the
frontispiece o f Jerusalem. Both Milton and Los leave one foot behind in the space closest to the viewer,
arguably the space o f the viewer— our world— while the other foot steps forward into an unknown space o f
the vortex or the darkened doorway— an alternate world, possibly the world o f imagination.
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theatricality, “a person must decide to be a spectator, not merely a witness, engaged and
conscious of the transaction of display and reception.” For Davis, “theatricality is a
condition of being” (131), as Egginton claims. Her analysis draws on Thomas Carlyle’s
understanding of the term theatricality: “For Carlyle, theatricality is not mimetic but
reflects the Habermasian concern for the public sphere, involving volitional
spectatorship.” She concludes by saying, “I am, therefore, arguing for enabling effects of
active dissociation, or alienation, or self-reflexivity in standing aside from the suffering
of the righteous to name and thus bring into being the self-possession of a critical stance.
And, like Carlyle, 1 call this ‘theatricality’” (153). Davis draws together Brechtian
alienation, self-reflexivity, theatricality and “volitional spectatorship,” elements that are
key in the kind of audience Blake constructs for his illuminated works, while Egginton’s
focus on presence adds the remaining crucial element.
Egginton discusses the change in worldview as “the shift from presence to
theatricality” (66), a shift that occurred once “the conventions of spectacle changed
during the sixteenth century to produce a theater based on metatheatrical staging
practices” (121). As the theatre became more self-reflexive and transparent in staging
techniques, accepting the spectacle as a seamless part of everyday reality became
difficult. Egginton marks this change as one of separable spheres. He says, “This
telescoping of separable spaces requires audiences to negotiate different levels of reality,
which they do by means of characters or avatars [...]” (121). Rather than existing within
the framework of presence, without separable spheres, the world now existed as one with
various bounded spaces that became the “appropriate” sites of certain kinds of spectacle
and performance. Judd D. Hubert, for instance, takes it for granted that plays do not exist
in the same sphere as reality. He asserts,
Magritte’s famous painting This Is Not a Pipe has relevance to theatrical
representation in the sense that a play may venture so far in the direction
of realism as to represent a ‘true’ event but will never come close to
coinciding with it. At the other extreme, a play dealing with pure fantasy
can do no less than generate its own referent, while pretending all along to
reproduce it. But art has no greater foe than reality, taken in the sense of
everyday existence. (11)
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Contemporary theatre scholarship has questioned the belief that theatrical performance
does, in fact, exist in a separate hermetic sphere and can offer no reality. Aleksandra
Wolska challenges the conventional view of theatrical performance, namely as an
ephemeral form that does not come to bear on reality:
In the criticism of performance, we have lost our theoretical hold on the
rather obvious fact that theatre engages forces of becoming as well as
those of vanishing. Contemporary critics privilege performance’s structure
of disappearance. The analysis of theatrical events remains dominated by
metaphors of loss, framed by categories of repetition and transience. (85)
Performance does not vanish and disappear. She says, “[T]he premise that time is a
continuum inseparable from spatial extension allows us to see that a performance does
not stop with the fall of the curtain, but continues in the body and mind of the viewer”
(88); “performance subsists in the seams of reality as the ur-drama that goes on when we
try to do anything at all” (93). In light of Egginton’s juxtaposition of presence with
theatricality, Wolska’s claims suggest that, even in this modem world, performance
offers a kind of presence by continuing into life, rather than dying away on the stage.
Viewing a performance somehow forges an unbreakable bond to us so that it lives and
continues through us and permeates reality as we continue to act and exist in the world.
The fundamental reconstruction of the relation between us and the world (and to
performance specifically) from medieval to modem times inevitably led to changing
ideas about the individual and about human subjectivity. Egginton defines subjectivity as
“a set of ideas about how the human individual relates to the world and, more
specifically, has knowledge about the world” (125). He goes on to explain the
“fundamentally misconceived set of ideas about the human individual and its relation to
the world,” beginning with Descartes and
the modem philosophical tradition [that] has described the grammatical,
first-person subject as the foundation of all possible knowledge, thereby
making the world in which the subject and all other thinking and
perceiving beings dwell a secondary object, a ‘standing reserve’ of
resources in which the subject moves about, picking and choosing at will
and constructing his or her own surroundings, and a ‘world picture’
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( Weltbild): a screen of representations constituted and compared by the
subject for their relative accuracy in depicting the real.
In this understanding of our relation to the world, presence cannot exist because the ‘I’ is
part of a separable sphere, the subject to all other objects. In a world of presence, the
relations among things are less rigid. The T is not the firm ground from which all
knowledge stems. Egginton continues, “Theatricality is the historically-specific
description (i.e., mine [Egginton’s]) of the historically-specific form of mediation that
structures the spatiality of [our] experience in the modern world.” Such a form of
mediation allowed for a revised conception of our relation to the world. This revised
understanding “was an intellectual invention made possible only by a theatrical
experience of spatiality, one in which viewers had learned to become disembodied
spectators of an action that only involved them as characters, as virtual rather than actual
participants” (138). Thus, the world of presence transitioned into the modern world of
theatricality.
Blake’s illuminated works provoke both kinds of modes of being in the world. On
the one hand, they function on a level of theatricality, as they jar the spectator out of
being uncritically absorbed into the story space and enact a kind of Brechtian alienation.
On the other, they function on a level of presence: the same “jarring” techniques
simultaneously beckon the spectator to become a participant in the world of the works. A
modern-day cinematic example illustrates what I argue Blake’s call for us to enter his
works achieves as well as how the self-reflexive techniques operate. In the 1984 film The
NeverEnding Story (based on Michael Ende’s German novel Die unendliche Geschichte,
1979), the crucial act of Bastian (the boy protagonist) is one of recognition.
In the attic of his school, Bastian reads a tale about the land of Fantasia, a land on
the verge of destruction due to the overwhelming power of a negative force—the
Nothing. Fantasia functions as the space of the imagination, while the Nothing functions
as a lack of action or a rejection of agency, a rejection that arguably rests on disbelief and
misperception of the nature of this world. As Bastian approaches the end of the tale, with
Fantasia in its final moments of existence, Atreyu the Warrior, who believes he has failed
in his mission to save his world, arrives at the palace and stands before the Empress. She
explains that it has not been a failure; he has brought their salvation with him: “The
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earthling child, the one who can save us all.” Atreyu, who sees no evidence of the child in
Fantasia, can only doubt what the Empress says, questioning the futility of his own
mission. In response, the Empress makes a sort of plea for escapist fiction and the need
for Bastian to have become enthralled in their story before he could take action: “It was
the only way to get in touch with an earthling. [...] He has suffered with you. He went
through everything you went through and now he has come here.” For the final sentence
of her explanation, the film cuts to Bastian reading the book and her words are echoed in
his space, as we watch him slowly raise his head with a look of disbelief. And for the last
two words, we cut back to the Empress. Here the cuts and sound begin to destabilize the
boundary between the two spaces. She continues, “He is very close, listening to every
word we say.” We cut back to Bastian who exclaims “What!” Until now, the
conversation between the Empress and Atreyu has been quiet and their surroundings still.
With Bastian’s exclamation, their world begins to break apart again as if his refusal to
accept what she says, that he can enter their world, provokes the destruction of the final
part of Fantasia. Bastian’s view of reality and fiction continues to be dismantled, as he
continues to be alienated from a simple absorption in the tale he reads, an absorption that
has no material consequences.
The self-reflexivity of this sequence is heightened as the Empress explains that
Bastian is “part of the NeverEnding Story,” a fact he does not “realize.” She points out to
Atreyu, “Just as he is sharing all of your adventures, others are sharing his,” creating a
mise en abyme and implying that we, the audience of the film, take part in Bastian’s tale,
just as he takes part in Atreyu’s. At this, Bastian again declares his disbelief, shouting
“But that’s impossible!” as he slams his fists on the book, a sign that he is becoming
involved in the story in a different way than his earlier absorption throughout the majority
of the film. When she refers to the book Bastian has before him “in which he’s reading
his own story right now,” the camera cuts to the continued destruction of Fantasia and
then to Bastian running away from the book to another part of the attic. The explicit selfreflexivity of the Empress’s words startles Bastian so that he now physically reacts to
what she suggests is the true nature of his relationship to the book and to Fantasia.
Although he continues to question the veracity of what she says, he also begins to
question the potency of his actions. His literal distancing from the book suggests he is no
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longer enthralled with the story as he once was; he can no longer escape and believe it is
just a story, though his words continue in the vein of doubt:
Bastian: 1 can’t believe it. They can’t be talking about me.
Atreyu: What will happen if he [Bastian] doesn’t appear?
Empress: Then our world will disappear, and so will 1.
Atreyu: How could he let that happen?
Empress: He doesn’t understand that he’s the one who has the power to
stop it. He simply can’t imagine that one little boy could be that
important.
[At this point, we cut to Bastian who returns to the book and begins
reading again.]
Bastian: Is it really me?
Atreyu: Maybe he doesn’t know what he has to do?
Bastian: [Finally, speaking directly to the characters of Fantasia] What do
I have to do?
Empress: He has to give me a new name. He’s already chosen it. He just
has to call it out.
Bastian: But it’s only a story. It’s not real. It’s only a story. [The palace
continues to crumble and Atreyu is thrown to the floor] Atreyu no!
Empress: Atreyu! [Speaking directly from her world to Bastian’s] Bastian,
why don’t you do what you’ve dreamed, Bastian?
Bastian: But I can’t. I have to keep my feet on the ground!
Empress: Call my name! Bastian, please, save us!
Bastian: Alright, I’ll do it! I’ll save you! I will do what I dreamed! [Shouts
out a window] Moonchild!
Throughout the above scene, we have continuous cutting between scenes of
Fantasia and Bastian’s world. Shots of Fantasia being pulled apart and exploding parallel
shots of Bastian sitting in the attic, surrounded by a progressively worsening
thunderstorm. This sequence exemplifies the importance of film editing and its
relationship to the audience, which Lev Kuleshov examined in the early days of
cinema—the early twentieth century—as part of his now canonical theory of editing and
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reception. The Kuleshov effect suggests that an audience will form a correlation between
two shots, even if they depict a different place or time and have no necessary or inherent
connections; such a theory advocates an active spectatorship. Kuleshov’s theory
acknowledges editing’s potential to create meaning in a film and convey ideas, as well as
the spectator’s role in this process. The same principle works in this scene: the
juxtaposition of Fantasia’s destruction with the inclement weather of Bastian’s world
encourages us to see that one space affects the other, as in sympathetic magic. As the one
worsens, so does the other. Here, we have a visual link to the two worlds, a link that the
Empress has been trying to explicate throughout the scene. This link functions in a
similar manner to the symbol of the oracle that Atreyu wears around his neck and the
symbol on the front cover of the book that Bastian reads. The Empress explains to
Atreyu, and implicitly to Bastian, that, without Bastian’s intervention, Fantasia will cease
to be. If he does not appear, if he does not enter Fantasia (and the book he is reading),
both she and Fantasia will disappear. She explains that only Bastian has the power to stop
the Nothing from destroying Fantasia, a power he has had all along without being aware
of it. When the Empress finally says Bastian’s name (rather than referring more generally
to an earthling child), she looks directly at the camera and at us, the real-life audience. By
looking at us directly, she calls on us too, thereby distancing us and incorporating us into
Fantasia at the same time, as Blake’s self-reflexive moments do. When the film cuts to
Bastian’s response to the Empress, he too looks at the camera and at us, which has a
similar effect to the Empress’s gaze. A mise en abyme similar to the Empress’s reference
to the NeverEnding story occurs thanks to the visual images. This sequence implies that
entering Fantasia gives one agency and power in the earthly world, as Bastian shows.
Although Bastian initially questions the possibility of characters in a book calling
on him and knowing his name, he stops being absorbed in the story he reads, and, thus,
he stops forgetting his full potential as a human being, which includes the active power to
effect change and to transgress the conventional borders between the physical world and
the imagination. His reply that he cannot help because he has “to keep [his] feet on the
ground” comes from the conditioning his father and society have instilled in him about
maintaining a grip on reality and pushing the imagination aside. Breaking free of those
mental chains, he moves from being an “emotionally punch-drunk spectator” (Brecht 28)
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caught up in an escapist fiction to being a self-aware participant, leading him to a magical
view of the world in the medieval sense. Bastian chooses to acknowledge the call of the
Empress by realizing that he is an agent rather than a mere observer, an agent who can
choose to bridge the gap between worlds, his own and that of Fantasia; finally, his self
awareness leads him to enter the text at the same time as the text bleeds out into his world
so that the separate spaces collapse and become one—as in medieval presence. Once he
calls out the name, the Empress stands before him as the two worlds come together. The
bestowing of a new name functions in a revelatory way. In Revelation, Jesus declares,
“Him that overcometh will I make a pillar in the temple of my God, and he shall go no
more out: and I will write upon him the name of my God, and the name of the city of my
God, which is new Jerusalem, which cometh down out of heaven from my God: and I
will write upon him my new name” (3.12). As Bastian accepts the nature of reality as
infinite, his renaming of the Empress signals the fact that a last judgment, an apocalypse,
is occurring as the two worlds become one or their as their interpenetrability is revealed.
As Bastian calls out the new name, the lights flicker on and off until we have a
blackout. Then we see a tiny light, revealing the Empress and Bastian standing face-toface. As the light becomes more intense, we realize that the source of it is a tiny grain of
sand, the only remaining piece of Fantasia, which the Empress holds in her hand. The two
characters are neither in Fantasia, nor in the school attic. Though they are fully lighted,
their background is not. This nondescript space of solid blackness allows us, for the first
time, to be neither in one realm or the other, but in both at the same time as the two
characters come together from their respective worlds. The Empress reveals to a
crestfallen Bastian, who mourns the passing of Fantasia, that all is not lost: “Fantasia can
arise in you, in your dreams and wishes, Bastian.” Unclear of what this means, Bastian
asks, “How?” In response, she gives him the light she holds in her hand and explains,
“[T]he more wishes you make, the more magnificent Fantasia will become.” I read the
wish as an act of the imagination. Bastian’s entrance into the world of the imagination is
visually signified in a physical moment of connection: the Empress passes him the grain
of sand as their hands touch. Despite the fact that only one grain of sand remains of
Fantasia, the Empress tells Bastian that this grain of sand—perhaps like Blake’s world in
a grain of sand—means Fantasia’s continued existence. Fantasia will always be a part of
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Bastian, as long as he acts imaginatively. His first wish takes him on a ride on Fantasia’s
luck-dragon, Falkor, who takes Bastian through the lands of Fantasia seeing the world
and people who had been destroyed by the Nothing. Bastian’s wish has revived it,
indicating that he can intervene and make a difference, in this case redeeming the world
of the imagination. As Bastian says, “It’s like the Nothing never was!” Still riding Falkor,
Bastian’s next wish brings him to his own world, enabling him to stand up for himself
and face the bullies who tormented him at the beginning of the film. Shouting out the
Princess’s new name results in Bastian’s newfound sense of agency, and it precipitates
actual change in both worlds. Bastian is no longer a distanced viewer; he is a performer
in what was once a mere story, distinct from reality. He experiences a kind of epiphany
that re-aligns his view of himself, of the world, and of the possible, allowing him to effect
change in Fantasia and by extension in his own world.
It is this process that the illuminated works encourage for their audience. When
spectators, like Bastian, climb aboard the fiery chariot of contemplative thought, they
take a ride into the illuminated works. By entering Blake’s works, we do not leave behind
our world; instead, we realize that our perception of it has been faulty until now so that
the entering is really a resituating of our context, a revision of what we understand the
world to be and what we understand our position in the world to be. The context of
medieval and Brechtian theatrical spectatorship, as well as current media reception
theory, offers a new view of Blake’s works to arise, one that includes an alternative
understanding of how he intended his works to be experienced. Wittreich rightly asserts,
“Blake, who begins his version of the fall with the story of the closing off of the senses,
would repair the ruins of the fall by opening them up again. The effect of Blake’s
multimedia art is to open the eye and, opening it, to guide the mind through spaces it has
not traveled before” (“Painted Prophecies” 108). Part of being able to engage with space
and objects in the magical worldview depends on consciously thinking outside the box. In
this way we embody both perspectives—medieval presence and modern theatricality—at
once. Unlike the medieval perspective, as modem subjects, we live in a world that has
lost its magic—we have to actively reassert it. We have to remove the spectacles (or
eyeglasses) of Generation and see with a fourfold vision. The performativity of all the
illuminated works, which create the world of the imagination as they re-present it,
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succeeds in a “production of presence” only if audience uptake occurs. Herein lies the
importance of Brechtian alienation, which facilitates this experience and prevents the
audience from being uncritically wrapped up in a fictional tale. Without this, the works
will only ever be representations. These images do not exist as virtual imitations of
reality; rather, they signify the space defined by “the magical worldview and the
medieval experience of spectacle” (Egginton 43). We make our entrance without being
entranced (in the sense of bewitched). As Brecht’s ideal spectators, Blakean spectators
must choose to take up the challenge of actively effecting change in the human
community, but they, unlike Brecht’s ideal spectators, must do so without dismissing
what they see before them as separate from them and their world. This is the acceptance
of presence, but from the viewpoint of an aware spectator who willingly chooses to cross
the space of theatricality and move into that of presence. When the audience heeds
Blake’s call and enters his works, they take to the stage so to speak, unsettling the distinct
roles of actor and audience—and all the world becomes a stage. In this way, the
illuminated works provoke their spectators to reexamine their relation to the world, to art,
to the possible. They force them to question their potential, and, thus, human perception,
identity, and existence, aspects that will be explored in greater detail in the chapters that
follow.
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The Theatrics of Urizen: Performance, Interpellation, and Sensory Perception

The verbal-visual art form of Blake’s illuminated works signals not only dramatic
performance, as I showed in chapter one, but also a specific type of dramatic technique.
Several decades ago, Northrop Frye wrote, “Blake’s engraved poems [...] present,
ideally, a unified vision of the three major arts to the individual as the musical drama,
with its combination of speech, sound and setting, presents it to the audience” (186). By
uniting painting, poetry, and music through design and text, Blake’s works inevitably
tend towards performance: “While painting solicits the eye, poetry addresses the ear
through the medium of an actual or implied voice (rhythm, rhyme, sequence, and so on)”
(Otto, “Blake’s Composite Art” 42). Extending Frye’s observation paralleling the
illuminated works with musical drama, W. J. T. Mitchell states, “If we meditate a little
further on the dramatic unity of Blake’s design we notice that this is not the unity of a
realistic theatrical scene, but more like the visual presentation of melodrama, mime, or
dance, forms which depend upon exaggerated bodily and facial gestures to make up for
their lack of verbalization” (Blake’s Composite Art 29). Interestingly, Mitchell associates
one of Blake’s plates with primarily “illegitimate” forms of drama. It is precisely
Mitchell’s brief comparison of Blake’s design to illegitimate forms that 1 will examine in
greater detail but with specific attention to the illuminated works.
During the Romantic period, legitimate theatre distinguished itself from
illegitimate theatre, a distinction that arose due to the Stage Licensing Act of 1737, which
gave the Theatres Royal—Drury Lane and Covent Garden—a monopoly on traditional
tragedy and comedy thanks to the “restriction of the spoken drama to those theatres
holding patents granted by the monarch” (Russell 108). The censorship of the spoken
word that followed paved the way for the proliferation of illegitimate (i.e., non-licensed)
theatrical forms at the end of the 1700s (Moody 10, 16-17). The minor playhouses turned
to hybrid forms, such as pantomime, harlequinade, burletta, and melodrama, in order to
circumvent the Licensing Act. As Jane Moody explains, this hybridity led to a crossing of
the boundaries between various genres, highlighted in the fact that “the language of
theatrical nomenclature [...] is often vague, indistinct and gloriously arbitrary [...]. In
production too, illegitimate forms frequently overlapped” (80). The legitimate
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performances at the two royal theatres had an exclusive claim on traditional dramatic
speech, while illegitimate performances were forced to turn toward the unspoken in the
form of spectacle, music, mime, and dance.
Blake's illuminated works do not discard the spoken, but they employ both the
verbal and the visual in a way that gives the works a dramatic shape. For this reason, I
argue that many of Blake’s works make use of the melodramatic genre specifically.
Melodrama includes the spoken word, but, more importantly, it also incorporates
affective strategies and visual excess. In addition, melodrama straddled both the patent
and non-patent theatres of the Romantic period, while retaining its associations with
illegitimacy. By associating Blake with the melodramatic, I will show how viewing his
works as theatricalized situates him in an alternative vision of Romanticism, one that
concerns itself with the body, the senses, the image, the external, the communal, and the
social as opposed to the more conventional Wordsworthian Romanticism that concerns
itself with the interiority of the individual. I will focus on The First Book ofUrizen,
which delineates the separation between the self and community, as the best example of
how these melodramatic tendencies and concerns tie in both formally and thematically
with the illuminated works. Alongside the melodramatic, I will use Louis Althusser’s
theory of interpellation, which he dramatizes as brief scenes of interpersonal exchange, to
examine the fall ofUrizen, thereby offering a reading of the poem that diverges from
critics’ usual interpretations, which emphasize the book, writing, and textuality.
Blake produced The First Book o f Urizen in 1794, shortly after the French
Revolution and its horrifying aftermath. The work implicitly examines the revolutionary
ideals of brotherhood and equality by dramatizing the rupture of an ideal community at
the same time that it explicitly examines social relations. In addition, the poem draws
heavily on elements of performance and theatricality. In this chapter, I will explore how
Blake engages with these elements, primarily in his representation of the senses and
sensory experience as well as his use of language and images. While other works seem
more dramatic because they include more direct dialogue between characters, I will,
instead, focus on Urizen, in which characters do not, for the most part, speak for
themselves. I do so for three important reasons: 1) it is the illuminated work with the
highest ratio of full-page designs (as opposed to plates that intertwine both text and
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image) to words—a fact that forces us to engage with the designs themselves and
interpret their relevance as visual images to the work as a whole; 2) the low level, or even
absence, of spoken dialogue' resonates nicely with illegitimate dramatic forms and places
a greater emphasis on the body, the senses, and the visual aspect of the characters for
conveying psychological and emotional insights; and 3) Blake configures the action of
the poem as an on-stage drama or spectacle. The visual element and the representation of
the body and senses in the poem help to create a theatricalized form by way of the
illuminated book. Blake makes the senses, particularly sight and sound, powerfully
creative forces and potential gateways to eternity, not unavoidable impediments.
Approaching Blake’s Urizen through the lens of drama and dramatic performance results
not only in a new understanding of the genre of Blake’s illuminated books and their
relation to his time but also in a new context for interpreting human identity and potential
in a fallen world.
Interpretations of the poem often rely on biblical readings, whether they are
archetypal such as Frye’s, politically radical such as David Worrall’s, or subversive such
as Jerome McGann’s." Throughout this chapter, I will interpret Urizen not in a biblical
context (though this is relevant to my argument as well) but in a dramatic one. Blake's
relation to dramatic genres goes beyond brief similes and comparisons; it contains a more
involved response (both implicit and explicit) to the broader discussions of the period,
discussions of gestures and the expression of the passions, the word and the image, the
internal and the external, the mind and the body, and art and aesthetics. Blake’s
privileging of the mental realm is not a foregone conclusion when one considers the
depiction of the body and the senses in the poem as well as what is at stake in the
multimedia form he uses for his artistic production, given the ideas circulating in his12
1 Only copies A, B, and C contain Urizen’s soliloquy (pi. 4, E 72)— the single utterance o f the
entire work (John H. Jones, “Printed Performance” 80-83).
2 Worrall contextualizes Urizen firmly in Blake’s times, in “his contemporary radical culture”
(Introduction 15) where religion was political and dangerous (as the case o f Tom Paine indicated), not just
the “private idiosyncrasies o f one man.” thus placing Blake in “a wider world o f artisan print culture” (14);
McGann assesses the satiric elements o f the Urizen books and demonstrates that “they are part o f a
deliberate effort to critique the received Bible and its traditional cxegetes from the point o f view o f the
latest research findings o f the new historical philology” (“The Idea o f an Indeterminate Text” 324).
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time. My reading counters post-structuralist readings, such as that of Paul Mann in “The
Book ofUrizen and the Horizon of the Book” in which Mann argues that the poem is
fundamentally “a book about books” where “Blake examines the ontology of books”
(49).3 Mann asserts that “Urizen itself seems rather to enforce enclosure, to insist that all
attempts to find a way out of the text-world will only deposit one inside another
imprisoning horizon” (62). By contrast, I see Urizen as a work that, while showing
enclosure, is concerned with the social, suggesting ways to move from the inside to the
outside. Mann’s argument relies heavily on the text of the poem, ignoring the role of the
visual image. If the work is a book about books, and Urizen is primarily a text, then how
are we to locate the meaning of the images? 1 would argue that Mann’s argument
implicitly suggests that the image merely illustrates visually what the text states
linguistically. In contrast, I interpret the illuminated works as composite art (in Mitchell’s
sense) dependent on performance, the body, the senses, and excess, thereby positioning
Urizen within the melodramatic theatre of the Romantic period.
Melodrama began as a French import and was, at various stages in its evolution,
associated with the gothic, the domestic (a Victorian development), moral absolutes,
spectacle, excess, the unspoken, and illegitimate forms such as pantomime or
harlequinade. Gillian Russell outlines English melodrama’s origins:
melodrama [...] was inaugurated at Covent Garden in 1802 by Thomas
Holcroft’s The Tale o f Mystery, an adaptation of a mélo-drame by the
French dramatist [Charles Guilbert de] Pixérécourt. As it developed in the
nineteenth century, melodrama’s most notable aspect was its confounding
of orthodox distinctions - between genres of tragedy and comedy,
between literary and non-literary performance styles (particularly the
relationship between the spoken word and the expressiveness of the body)
3

More recently, Tilottama Rajan, in her trauma-centred reading, notes that “the scene o f writing

extends throughout the entire text,” while interpreting the Urizen trilogy as one which grapples with the
“difficulty o f writing” ((Dis)figuring the System” 385). And John H. Jones argues that Blake undermines
the authority o f the author and the fixity o f texts by producing a number o f different sequences for the
plates o f Urizen, thereby privileging the reader in the creation o f meaning: “More than any other o f the
illuminated books, William Blake’s The [First] Book ofUrizen is concerned with the process o f
bookmaking and its effect on readers” (“Printed Performance” 74).
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and between culture hierarchies and media [...]. (103)
Interestingly, the Theatres Royal—the sites of legitimacy—first imported and, indeed,
continued to stage the controversial form of melodrama, which so clearly became aligned
with the illegitimate. Explicating the ideological implications of the so-called legitimate
in opposition to the illegitimate, Jeffrey Cox and Michael Gamer state,
Within the tightly controlled world of the London stage, legitimacy
gestured towards patent or ‘major’ theaters (as opposed to ‘minor’ upstart
ones), towards conventional tragedy and comedy (as opposed to
innovative genres such as the melodrama and the burletta), and towards
notions of traditional political authority (as opposed to the principles
associated with revolutionary France and the ‘pretender’ Napoleon).
(xxiii)
Illegitimate forms represented not only lowbrow entertainment that aimed at visceral
pleasures rather than intellectual but also larger notions of illegitimacy, suggesting their
potential to embody a radical and threatening politics. The kind of cross-fertilization of
genres that arose from the Licensing Act (melodrama is a prime example) endured its fair
share of attacks. For example, The Satirist's infamous picture of 1807 targeting
illegitimate forms, “[cjommonly dubbed ‘The Monster Melodrama’,” illustrates a four
legged and four-headed creature dressed in a clown costume while “a host of playwrights
and shareholders suckle” its teats (Cox and Gamer x).4 The print attacks both illegitimate
and legitimate theatre-managers, actors and playwrights, satirizing the contamination of
the legitimate stage by the illegitimate and the degradation of the stage in general. The
appeal of the minor theatres forced Drury Lane and Covent Garden not only to add
melodrama and pantomime to their repertoire but also to alter their legitimate
performances to include more illegitimate elements in order to keep up in terms of profit
4

Cox and Gamer explain, “The head o f Sheridan, key playwright and proprietor o f Drury Lane,

laughs as the great actor Kemble cries out, having received a knife to the neck; Grimaldi, great pantomime
clown, repeats one o f his infrequent lines, ‘Nice Moon,’ while the head o f Harlequin erupts from the back
o f the beast. The beast’s tail is labeled ‘A Tail o f Mystery,’ punning obviously on Thomas Holcroft’s
adaptation o f Pixerecourt, A Tale o f Mystery [...] The beast, while suckling these authors o f pantomimes
and melodramas, tramples upon the works o f Shakespeare and a scroll bearing the names o f the ‘legitimate’
playwrights” (x-xi).

157
with the popular performances in the illegitimate playhouses (Thomson 183). Cox states,
“[T]he melodrama [in particular] offered Covent Garden and Drury Lane a new form of
serious drama, capable of importing the tactics of their rivals onto their legitimate stages”
(“The Death of Tragedy; or, the Birth of Melodrama” 166). As a result, even legitimate
drama was accused of becoming closer and closer to illegitimate forms and practices. The
“monster melodrama” print also emphasizes the negative attitude many critics had toward
types of drama that relied on non-spoken forms, precisely because these dramatic modes
were popular with audiences.
Cox argues that the form of melodrama initiated such fervent attacks because of
its three main components; “what is specifically disturbing [...] is the introduction of
instrumental music, extensive pantomime and powerful spectacle into what was in the
first instance a form of patent house serious spoken drama” (168). Due, in part, to these
integral non-verbal aspects, melodrama became associated with the unspoken quality of
illegitimate performances. Simon Shepherd addresses the antagonism between
illegitimate and legitimate dramatic forms, an antagonism that rests partly on the use of
(or lack of) speech. Speaking more specifically about the melodrama, he states,
the binary opposition between the spoken and the unspoken [...] dogs
melodrama’s history. To accept that opposition is to take on board an
assumption about melodrama’s status. For the split between the spoken
and the unspoken is assumed to originate in the institutional place of
melodrama, staged in unauthorized theatres, using music to replace
dialogue. Thought of thus, melodrama is positioned as the illicit, striving
to be spoken drama, but remaining an inadequate substitute. (145)
Like Moody, Shepherd attempts to displace the hierarchy between legitimate and
illegitimate forms and dislodge the notion that only legitimate forms have something
substantial to offer an analysis of Romantic theatre and Romanticism in general. The
perceived inadequacy or illegitimacy of melodrama rests on the importance assigned to
the verbal aspects of drama as opposed to the embodied theatrical ones. However, recent
recovery ventures, such as The Jane Scott Project, emphasize the importance of these
more ephemeral and experiential aspects of the genre in the same way as performance
scholarship does, shifting the focus from the page to the stage, thereby refusing to give
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the text absolute dominance. Shepherd’s alignment of the unspoken with melodrama
indicates the form’s dependence on the visual and on the body.' Similarly, Martin Meisel
asserts, with respect to “the activity of seeing,” that “melodrama and the melodramatic
are specially tuned to its pleasures and capacities” (65). To make the point, he examines
spectacles as well as lighting and other stage effects. Melodrama’s (and, indeed, much
illegitimate theatre’s) special emphasis on seeing and the visual is one it shares with
Blake’s illuminated works.
In particular, The First Book ofUrizen signals performance and theatricality
through its emphasis on the external, the bodily, the unspoken visual aspects, aurality and
orality, affect, expression, and excess in both the text and designs. I argue that Blake
stages his own brand of (illegitimate) drama in this illuminated work (his vision of
creation and the fall) by paying particular attention to expression as it relates to the body,
affect, spectacle, and excess. As Michael Booth explains, “the melodrama of the
nineteenth century, the most popular dramatic form of its age, [was] a form that depended
more on visual excitement and the thrill of the moment” (13). However, etymologically,
the term melodrama refers in part to music: “The word itself, meaning ‘song-drama’ or
‘music-drama,’ is Greek” (44). My use of the term does not rely on this definition of
melodrama, or on the conventional melodramatic elements that provoke its abuse, such as
“concentration on plot at the expense of characterization [...] the character stereotypes,
the rewarding of virtue, and punishment of vice” (13-14).*’ Rather, I use the term in a56
5 Despite not having any records, besides written accounts, o f the actual performances o f various
Romantic dramatic spectacles, scholars have utilized inventive ways o f shedding light on this ephemeral
aspect o f the dramatic texts that survive. For instance, Jacky Bratton and Gilli Bush-Bailey’s Jane Scott
Project revitalized the plays o f Jane Scott during a workshop, incorporating as many aspects from the
original context as possible, such as melodramatic acting and gestures, music, body movement, and dance.
Bush-Bailey calls their endeavour “an actively engaged theatre-archaeology” (13), “attempting] to realise
something o f Scott’s work beyond the texts submitted to the Licensor” (8).
6 While early criticism o f melodrama dismissed its content as escapist, as does Booth, more recent
criticism, such as that o f Jim Davis and Komelia Tancheva some thirty years later, argues that the content
o f melodrama had a value that applied to the social and political realms. In a defence o f melodrama that
takes the audience into account, Davis defines melodrama “as a crucial rather than peripheral phenomenon
o f cultural history” (21). Also, Tancheva claims, “(Mjost o f the moral premises in melodrama are directly
contingent upon a play’s participation in the debates proper to its specific cultural context. Thus,
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similar manner to more recent critics of the genre. In their Introduction to Melodrama:
Stage, Picture, Screen (1994), Jacky Bratton, Jim Cook, and Christine Gledhill theorize
melodrama as follows:
Rather than displacing the political by the personal, melodrama produces
the body and the interpersonal domain as the sites in which the socio
political stakes its struggles [...] the notions of excess, sensation, spectacle
and affect by which melodrama is most commonly characterized become
key terms in a debate about how the form engages with and processes the
complexity of modernity and the politics of cultural change. (1)
My analysis of Urizen does not assess the ways in which characterization, plot-devices,
and the moral implications parallel those of melodrama; rather, it focuses on the
melodramatic “notions of excess, sensation, spectacle and affect” that Blake exploits in
order to retell the story of the fall. Blake’s emphasis on the body and the senses also
prompts my use of the melodramatic. Cox maintains, “[I]t was the sensational nature of
these plays [melodramas] that was the key, as in Douglas Jerrold’s attempt to distinguish
between the legitimate and the illegitimate drama by considering the nature of their
dramatic appeal: ‘1 describe the legitimate drama to be where the interest of the piece is
mental; where the situation of the piece is rather mental than physical’” (167). The body
was a key characteristic underlying the core qualities of the melodramatic, which
positioned this genre in opposition to the conventionally Romantic tendencies toward
mental and interior explorations. Blake’s emphasis on these various elements reifies the
dramatic nature, rather than simply linguistic-pictorial nature, of the illuminated works.
Moreover, addressing these melodramatic features of Blake’s art form opens up not only
a previously unrecognized cultural and social significance of his works in the domain of
theatre and performance but also a new context for interpreting Urizen and its
explorations of identity and community.

discussions o f ‘melodrama’ should necessarily take into account not only the specifics o f the genre and the
way in which it elaborates a ‘melodramatic’ world-view, but its reception and interpretation, and the ways
in which it is used to express specific ideological formations” (62). Both critics argue for the relevance of
reception and audience engagement in discussing the significance o f the melodramatic form.
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The study of the body’s expressiveness (whether through the face, limbs, or
voice) has a history that connects Blake to the various artistic, scientific, and dramatic
theories of his time. Discussions of expression in the fields of physiognomy, chironomia,
gestures, and passions formed the basis of many theories of art and science in the
eighteenth century. Drawing books, acting manuals, rhetoric and eloquence guides, as
well as scientific treatises categorized and classified various bodily expressions and
gestures.' As Janet Warner has shown, Blake draws on the iconography of past masters
such as Michelangelo and Giulio Romano as well as on “the tradition of the language of
gesture used by orators, actors, and artists” (5), having encountered these theories either
directly through Johann Caspar Lavater or indirectly through the sheer proliferation of
these discourses and ideas during the period.s Blake annotated Lavater’s Aphorisms on
Man and engraved some plates for one of the English translations of Essays on
Physiognomy in 1789. Sibylle Erie points out, “Lavater argued [...] that engravings were
crucial to understanding his physiognomical doctrines - they literally embodied his
argument” (356).
Blake’s interest in Lavater is not difficult to explain; his illuminated works exhibit
a drive to express various interior states not only verbally but also visually, embodying
them in the contours of the design. While Lavater believed the engravings helped to show
“how character manifests itself on the body” (Erie 359), Blake used them to delineate
psychological and emotional states. Looking at a number of examples from Blake’s78
7 For instance, Charles Le Brun’s Expressions des Passions (1698, translated by John Williams as

A Method to Learn to Design the Passions in 1734), Gerard de Lairesses’s The Art o f Painting in All Its
Branches (English translation 1738), Johann Caspar Lavater’s Essays on Physiognomy (English translation
1789-98), Gilbert Austin’s Chironomia; or, A Treatise on Rhetorical Delivery (1806); Henry Siddons’s

Practical Illustrations o f Rhetorical Gesture and Action Adapted to the English Drama (1807; adapted
from Johann Jacob Engel’s treatise ldeen zu einer Mimik, 1785-86).
8 For instance, in William Blake: His Art and Times, David Bindman discusses James Gillray’s
print Doublures o f Characters (1798) in this context: “Here, in a reference to Lavater’s book on
physiognomy, Fox and his Whig friends arc represented by their ‘real’ countenances and by their ‘doubles’,
which reveal their underlying nature” (25). Each man has two faces placed side by side, but each face
differs in expression, thereby showing the difference between their “normal” and more “wicked”
characteristics as well as the role o f facial gestures in relaying the information.
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Visionary Heads series, Anne K. Mellor examines the influence of Lavater and Johann
Caspar Spurzheim, a well-known phrenologist, explaining, “Blake was conversant with
physiognomical and phrenological concepts and vocabularies, but he used them with a
light touch, to communicate his ideas jocoseriously to a circle that understood this visual
language” (“Physiognomy” 71-72). In addition, Warner postulates that Blake’s education
at Henry Pars’s drawing school would have surely included some study of the theories of
gesture and expression: “The language of art is the language of the Passions cast in
familiar types and attitudes, and to become familiar with this language was the aim of
every student. It was a language of facial expressions, of hand and body gestures, and of
pantomimic attitudes” (35). Warner explicitly positions Blake within a context that aligns
theories of art with acting practices: “the conventions of theatrical gesture were closely
related to the language of gesture used by painters, who in turn were constantly turning to
antique sculpture for inspiration” (60). She goes even further and claims, “The attempt to
express feelings through a position of the body allies Blake’s activity with similar
attempts of a play director or a ballet master” (60).
While Warner aligns Blake with theories of gesture and expression as they relate
to acting, Moody relates illegitimate theatrical forms to such theories. She says:
the iconography of illegitimacy participated in a broader cultural and
scientific transformation in which the human body began to be understood
as an eloquent compendium of visible signs. [...] In their emphasis on the
physiological basis of gesture (tears of grief, the paleness of fear) and the
silent copiousness of the human hands, these treatises [on chironomia]
defined theatrical performance as the laboratory of gestural expression.
According to Gilbert Austin, those who wished to learn the power of
gesture to communicate thoughts independently of language should study
the silent art of pantomime. The idea of a wordless language of signs
which might constitute ‘the exterior and visible signs of our bodies’ thus
underpinned contemporary definitions about the art of modem eloquence;
the most dynamic expression of that eloquence could be found in the
production of illegitimate theatre. (83)
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The language of expression dominated illegitimate forms.'* Far from being superficial
displays of histrionics, illegitimate dramas embodied the theories of gesture and
expression circulating at the time, and through this embodiment, they provided audiences
the chance to contemplate the relation between internal psychology and external
manifestations. As a result, in the context of the more academic treatises, illegitimate
forms “stimulated public interest in the external, non-verbal expression of human
emotion.” Moody adds, “The realisation of pictures on stage, for example, was one of
melodrama’s most characteristic devices,” which was executed in the form of tableaux,
using “the momentary stillness of human bodies, which pervade illegitimate theatre”
(82). At the same time, we also see the rise of Lady Emma Hamilton and her tableaux
vivants: a collection of her poses was published in 1797 as Lady Hamilton's Attitudes
(Warner 61). Even in the 1820s, the fascination with the expressiveness of the motionless
human body continued with the sensational Andrew Ducrow, who performed his poses
plastiques équestres at Astley’s Amphitheatre: “the performer struck attitudes on
horseback,” posing as figures from Greek and Roman myth or heroic figures (Moody 85).
According to Moody, these various forms of expressive theatricality “all confirm that
pervasive fascination in late Georgian culture with the wordless depiction of dramatic
character,” thereby situating Blake’s own interest in the visual realization of his
characters and their emotional states.9
9

The legitimate also exhibited some o f these tendencies. Playwright Joanna Baillie, who wrote for

the legitimate stage though her works are often labeled melodramatic, makes the expression and delineation
o f the passions the foundation o f her Plays on the Passions, thereby signaling her “transference to literature
o f a psychological theory that originated in acting” (Thomson 196). Even legitimate stage actors such as
David Garrick drew on physiognomy and painting treatises; Stuart Sillars points out that they "were very
influential in the theatre, Garrick himself following many o f the suggested postures and expressions” (14).
However, Moody argues that the most blatant tendencies emerge on the illegitimate stage and in
illegitimate forms: “Though such descriptions [from treatises on gesture] also influenced the writing and
performance o f tragedy and comedy (see for example Joanna Baillie’s striking discussion o f ‘those
feelings, whose irregular bursts, abrupt transitions, sudden pauses, and half-uttered suggestions, scorn all
harmony o f measured verse’), it was illegitimate genres - and especially the violent gestures o f melodrama
- which gave this hyperbolic iconography its most spectacular expression” (84).
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The eighteenth century also saw a proliferation of paintings of Shakespearean
drama, some of which depicted actors of the time performing a scene.10 Michael S.
Wilson explains how audiences could align an experience of watching still bodies on a
stage with one of viewing paintings in a gallery: “The very absence of a text, however,
authorized so complete a dissociation of stage picture from dramatic action that [...]
visually literate patrons [...] could regard a pantomime almost as if it were a gallery
exhibition” (197). Blake himself makes a curious remark linking acting with painting. In
an 1805 letter in which he dismisses the current obsession with a boy actor, Blake says,
“as to Real Acting it is Like Historical Painting. No Boys Work” (E 764). For Blake,
these two professions can be taken up only by grown men, suggesting that each requires a
certain maturity and mastery. It is interesting, however, that he aligns these two vocations
and makes a direct parallel between them. Warner points out that Thomas Wilkes’s A
General View o f the Stage (1759) “recommended the aspiring actor to study historical
paintings for character, dress and manner” (63), and David Garrick used this genre of
painting for tableaux purposes (Thomson 154). In this light, Blake’s quotation implies
more than just a connection in terms of mastery between “Real Acting” and “Historical
Painting”; it also implies a link in terms of the difficulty of staging human expression in
both media, thus raising dramatic performance to the level of painting, specifically
historical painting, the most exalted of genres.
What becomes clear is that images and paintings had a deep connection to
theatrical performance in this time, so much so that it is impossible to disregard the
implications for Blake’s illuminated books. Seen in the context of tableaux and dramatic
paintings, Blake’s designs of, for example, Urizen, Los, and Ore add a specifically
theatrical element to his works. Moreover, Blake extols the virtues of expression and
gesture, especially in art. In his marginalia, he opposes Sir Joshua Reynolds who believes
that the depiction of the passions—even by an artist such as Michelangelo—distorts and

10

For instance, Fuseli’s Garrick and Mrs Pritchard as Macbeth and Lady Macbeth after the

Murder o f Duncan (1768), Reynolds’s Garrick between Tragedy and Comedy (1762), and Thomas
Lawrence’s John Philip Kemble as Coriolanus before the Hearth o f Aufidius (1788), and the Boydell
Shakespeare Gallery (1788-1805), which solicited painters to delineate scenes from Shakespeare in order to
exhibit them in one location.
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deforms rather than beautifies the human form and painting itself (Connolly 28). Blake
writes, “What Nonsense. Passion & Expression is Beauty Itself—The Face that is
Incapable of Passion & Expression is Deformity Itself’ (E 653). Reynolds argues that
“[n]o one can deny, that violent passions will naturally emit harsh and disagreeable tones
[...],” while Blake counters: “Violent Passions Emit the Real Good & Perfect Tones” (E
660). Evidently, Blake endorsed not only the delineation of passions but also the
excessive or extreme passions specifically. Such an endorsement explains the violence of
many of the designs in his illuminated works. The violence is not confined to the passions
either; it arises in spectacles of nature and in the way individuals act on each other.
Steven Bidlake attempts to reinforce “the dynamic violence at work in the rhetoric and
imagery of Blake’s prophecies” (1) and “its affective intensity” (2) rather than downplay
its horror “as the unqualified triumph of apocalyptic imagination” (15). Bidlake views the
violence in terms of revolutionary ideology, taking it on its own terms without purifying
its horrors. While the violence on display can certainly be seen as the language of
revolution and apocalypse, I read it as the language of melodramatic excess.
Like Booth’s description of melodrama, Blake’s works also have “an incredible
amount of violence, physical disaster, and emotional agony” (14). This “emotional
agony” reflects various theories of the passions as well as gestures and is evident in
Blake’s characters when they express their emotions in word and image. Even guides for
“legitimate” stage performance draw on the unrestrained language of melodrama as well
as theories of expression and gesture. For instance, The Thespian Preceptor (1807, and
rpt. in 1810, 1811, and 1818), which was “[pjerhaps the most widely used acting manual
of the early nineteenth century” (Zunshine 217), uses exaggerated and excessive
descriptions of the body under the influence of particular passions. Booth highlights the
similarity of the manual’s language and the melodramatic as he summarizes the main
directives for enacting the passions:
The stage passion of Grief, for example, which is ’sudden and violent,
expresses itself by beating the head or forehead, tearing the hair, and
catching the breath, as if choking—also by screaming, weeping, stamping
with the feet, lifting the eyes from time to time to heaven, and hurrying
backwards and forwards.’ Despair ’rolls the eyes, and sometimes bites the
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lips, and gnashes with the teeth.’ The whole body must be ‘strained and
violently agitated. Groans expressive of inward torture, accompany the
words.’ Significantly, the extremes of despair ‘can seldom or ever be over
acted.’ For Jealousy the fists are ‘violently clenched, the rolling eyes
darting fury.’ As the actor ‘must frequently fall upon the ground, he
should previously raise both hands clasped together, in order to denote
anguish.’ (205)
Urizen takes up this excessive language in its textual articulation of emotion and its
affective aims. Phrases such as “Lo, a shadow of horror is risen” (3.1) and “what Demon
/ Hath form’d this abominable void” (3.3-4) play on melodramatic gothic horror images
meant to arouse fear and anxiety. In his invocation, Blake points to the intensity of that
which we are about to read through his diction when he says to the Eternals, “fear not /
To unfold your dark visions of torment” (2.6-7), alluding to the painful and ominous
nature of the story about to be told. Indeed, in Urizen, “The dread world” (3.30) is one of
“tormenting passions” (2.19) where “voices of terror” (3.33), “howlings & pangs & fierce
madness” (5.24) and “Dread terrors! delighting in blood” (23.7) abound. Blake’s diction
is both visceral (“renting” and “wrenching” and “hurtling bones” and “furious limbs”)
and intensely passionate (“anguish,” “groaning,” “gnashing,” “mad raging,” and “ghastly
Sick torment”). Los, one of the characters in this grand drama, “wept, obscur'd with
mourning: / His bosom earthquak’d with sighs” (13.48-49), and the binding of Urizen
“Struck horror into his soul” (13.47). The acute sway of the passions resembles the
melodramatic performances that appeared on both the illegitimate and legitimate stage.
Examples of such extreme passions and language can be found in a number of
melodramatic plays. For instance, in Holcroft’s^l Tale o f Mystery, during one of the final
climactic encounters, the stage directions explain that one character “shrieks” and another
“[flails back and covers his eyes, with agony," while "[mjusic o f terror” plays (Act 2,
scene 3). Predating Holcroft’s play, the first official melodrama of the English stage,
George Colman the Younger’s popular Blue-Beard; or, Female Curiosity! (Drury Lane
1798), already showed the way melodramatic tendencies had begun to invade even the
legitimate stage. As Cox and Gamer explain, Colman was “a creator of the new theatrical
hybrid that would come to be known as melodrama” (76). The play included “music [...],
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provided stirring action,” “spectacular sets of pantomime,” and a “huge animated
panorama [...] complete with moving skeleton and bleeding walls.” Compare the
following excerpt with those above from Blake:
Monsters of Hell, and Noxious Night,
Howl your Songs of wild delight!
To your gloomy Caves descending,
His career of Murder ending,
Now the Tyrant’s Spirit flies:
Bathed in a flood
Of guilty Blood,
He dies! He dies! (Colman 2.8.49-56)
One can see that similar images and terms are at play in Colman’s language and in
Blake’s. We have gloominess and howling, talk of flames or hell, and an overall
melodramatic sense with the “shrieking” and “shadows” in one and “wild delight” and
“monsters” in the other.
Similarly, another popular show of the time and an explicit melodrama, Matthew
Lewis’s Timour the Tartar; A Grand Romantic Melo-drama in Two Acts (Covent Garden
1811), utilizes the language of excess but also numerous dashes and exclamation marks
to express textually what the actor would do in performance. Here, the tyrant Timour
reacts to the unmasking of an imposter, who happens to be his bride-to-be:
Tim.

Scarce can 1 believe my senses!—Bewildered
—Confused— Rage, Love, Disappointment,
all at once contend within my bosom!—Her
charms—Yet to resign all hopes of Georgia’s
Heiress—I must to solitude, and consult—
Bermeddin! Guards! Bear her to the Fortress! Away!

Zor. (Kneeling). Oh! hear me, Timour! Show but one
spark of mercy! Listen to the sobs of a breaking
heart, of a distracted desperate Mother! Yon Tower
confines my Boy: Send me to a dungeon, send me
to death; But till I die, let me share the prison of
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my Child.
Tim.

Slaves obey me!—

(They drag her toward the Fortress).
Zor.

Barbarian! Tyrant!—My Boy!—My Darling!—
Let my shrieks rend your dungeon-walls! Let my
anguish, my despair.... (1.3.36-51)

The dialogue shows signs of breaks or pauses in the flow of speech, signaling spaces
where the actor could gesticulate and reinforce the emotions underlying the scene. In
particular, Zorilda’s final words in this exchange exemplify the outpouring of her
passionate desperation, even if we do not actually hear her “shrieks”: her speech is not
only marked with breaks and exclamations but also with the words “anguish” and
“despair.”
Even Joanna Baillie’s “legitimate” dramas take up the language of excess typical
of melodrama. In Orra (1812), the stage directions in final scene of the play state that
Hughobert, after being informed of his son’s death, “Beat[s] his breast and groan[s]
deeply'' while the protagonist “gives a loud shriek, and shrinks [back] with horror,"
exhibiting “all the wild strength o f frantic horror," in her final action. In De Monfort
(Drury Lane 1800) from the Plays on the Passions, after the eponymous hero has
committed murder, "his face is seen in all the strengthened horrour o f despair, with his
hands and cloaths bloody"', he is described as being "fi]n great anguish," and he
"[s]hrinks back with horrour" when he sees the murdered corpse (4.3). His sister Jane
“burstfs] into tears" and ‘faints" upon learning of his deed (5.1). As De Monfort looks at
the corpse, he declaims:
What fated end, what darkly gath'ring cloud
Will close on all this horrour?
O that dire madness would unloose my thoughts,
And fill my mind with wildest fantasies,
Dark, restless, terrible! ought, ought but this! (4.3.73-77)
De Monfort’s murderous action merely intensifies what he has felt for much of the play.
Now, having transgressed a law as well as society’s moral code, he is trapped by the
terrors of his mind and crippled by the fear of what repercussions he will now face.
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Others hear “such piteous groans!” (5.2.7) emerge from his room where he awaits
judgment. They explain, “Remorse and dark despair o’erwhelm’d his soul” (5.2.16).
Finally, death takes him: “From violent agitation of the mind, / Some stream of life
within his breast has burst” (5.2.26-27). All the despair, horror, terror, and violence
resemble the language Blake uses to describe the action of Urizen. Like melodramas and
dramas that exhibit melodramatic tendencies, Blake’s work suggests an emotionally
charged spectacle, placing the passions and their extreme expression front and centre.
Distinguishing the melodramatic from the tragic in terms of excess, Peter Brooks
explains, “Melodrama is similar to tragedy in asking us to endure the extremes of pain
and anguish. It differs in constantly reaching toward the ‘too much,’ and in the passivity
of response to anguish, so that we accede to the experience of nightmare” (The
Melodramatic Imagination 35).'1 I would argue that the level of pain and anguish in
Blake’s work tends toward the melodramatic, for there seems to be no relief from the
physical and psychological agonies that the characters endure, and their reactions to such
pain are futile. In addition to the extreme passionate effusions, the spectacular setting, the
extreme weather, and the excessively violent action are also melodramatic. The world
itself is described as “[r]age, fury, intense indignation / In cataracts of fire, blood & gall, /
In whirlwinds of sulphurous smoke” (4.45-47), while life is “[sjund’ring, dark’ning,
thund’ring! / Rent away with a terrible crash, / [as] Eternity roll’d wide apart” (5.3-5).
Scenes of fire and blood proliferate throughout the work. For instance, a bloody orb pours
forth from Los’s spine and head (pi. 17); Los spectacularly bursts out of an inferno with
his arms wide open and his untamed wild hair waving in the air (pi. 18); three inverted
figures fall through flames as giant serpents coil themselves around the falling bodies (pi.
6); several other figures also find themselves amidst raging infernos (e.g., pi. 3, 7, 11, 16,
and 20); two creatures, a mixture of human, serpent, and bat, emerge from green leafy1

11 Brooks elaborates further on this distinction by claiming that melodrama had displaced tragedy
because the tragic was no longer possible after the French Revolution: “Melodrama does not simply
represent a ‘fall’ from tragedy, but a response to the loss o f the tragic vision. It comes into being in a world
where the traditional imperatives o f truth and ethics have been violently thrown into question, yet where the
promulgation o f truth and ethics, their instauration as a way o f life, is o f immediate, daily, political
concern’’ (15).
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terrain (pi. 25); and Urizen’s offspring fantastically come into being—Fuzon explodes
flaming out of the sky, Thiriel emerges from the clouds, Grodna pulls himself out of
earth, while Utha bursts forth from the water (pi. 24; fig. 24). Many of the events of the
poem, textual and visual, demonstrate Blake’s “use of palpably violent action and
imagery” (Bidlake 2), and his penchant for excess and grandiose spectacle aligns his
work with illegitimate forms of theatre.
Urizen demonstrates the convergence of illegitimate theatrical expression with
theories of the passions and gestures by focusing on the body’s ability to convey the
interior states of characters through melodramatic modes of expression. Brooks explains
how melodrama, specifically the French variety emerging shortly after the French
Revolution, brings with it a (re-)new(ed) appreciation for the body. In a discussion of the
silent film genre, he states: “silent cinema revives a certain semiotics of the body which
first made its appearance in melodrama - or proto-melodrama, since the name was not
then coined - at the moment of the French Revolution, which itself calls into being a new
valorization of and attention to meanings inscribed on the individual body” (“Melodrama,
Body, Revolution” 11). While Blake diverges from the moral order that melodrama
attempts to create, he does latch on to a similar “aesthetics of embodiment” that comes
out of the revolution (17). Brooks argues, “The body in early Romantic literature, and
thereafter, assumes a new centrality as a site of meaning; during the Revolution, in the
popular genre of melodrama, we have a kind of literalistic realization of this new
importance of the body as the site of signification” (18). Blake, then, uses the visual
image of the body in ways that speak to the internal and external divide associated with
the closet and performance.
In addition, Brooks analyzes silent moments in a way relevant to Blake’s designs.
Blake’s engravings are silent, but they express a deeper layer of meaning beyond a
simple illustration of the text. Brooks says, “It is in the context of melodrama’s constant
recourse to acting out, to the body as the most important signifier of meanings, that we
can understand the genre’s frequent recourse to moments of pantomime, which are not
simply decorative, which in fact often convey crucial messages” (19). Brooks invests
silent bodies with significance, and so does Blake. For instance, he describes Urizen as
“Dark revolving in silent activity” (3.18) and his actions as “cold horrors silent” (3.27).
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Fig. 24. The Book o f Urizen, copy G, plate 24, object 24, c. 1818, Lessing J. Rosenwald
Collection, Library of Congress. © 2010 the William Blake Archive. Used with
permission. This project is supported in part by a William Blake Archive Reproduction
Grant for Graduate Students.
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Urizen’s actions have the quality of mimed performance. The soundlessness of Urizen’s
actions aligns him with the mime of illegitimate drama and evokes an eeriness that
accompanies his labour. Similarly, Blake’s designs, which rarely appear to “speak”
(though they sometimes appear to release groans or screams), seem closer to mime,
tableaux, and attitudes.
The visual bodies function as sites for individual struggles and for exploring the
wider social and ideological implications of the separation of self—the fall from a
cohesive collective to an isolated selfhood—that constitutes the heart of the poem. When
Blake “depicts bodies in extremis and bodies surpassing their mortal capabilities”
(Connolly 32), he reflects in the outward and physical not only an internal conflict but
also a more social one concerning the relation between individual and community. On
plate 16 of Urizen, a figure, his knees raised tight to his chest, sits amidst flames with his
hands behind his head so that his elbows point outward (fig. 25). The youthfulness of the
figure, his wavy hair, and the surrounding flames indicate that the figure is Los; however,
in copy A, Blake adds long white facial hair, undermining an easy identification (copy A
is the only copy in which the youthful figure is conflated with the old one). The image
seems to unite Los with Urizen, an old man with long white hair. Blake, then, visually
presents Los and Urizen as physically fused together. This verbally unarticulated moment
suggests that the separation and division that each figure undergoes and enacts makes
them alike, despite their opposing characteristics and actions. Another example of how
outer components convey inner ones occurs on plate 19; Enitharmon stands awkwardly
and almost perpendicularly, as if her body’s misshapen contortion expresses an internal
one (fig. 26); she also grabs or pulls at her hair with both hands. Her irregular pose, with
“the emphatic forward movement of her legs and the contrary movement of her torso, and
elongation of the body” (Bindman 37), expresses the contortions and pain involved in the
act of separation from Los, whose hunched-over figure she stands beside, indicating how
unnatural the activity of disjoining individuals is.
Through Blake’s iconography, these personal conflicts of separation reveal
themselves to be widespread and social. Specifically, the image of a body wrapped
tightly within itself—its knees pulled in towards its chest—suggests a deeper meaning
through its numerous repetitions. For example, Urizen is depicted on his hands and knees,
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Fig. 25. The Book ofUrizen, copy G, plate 16, object 14, c. 1818, Lessing J. Rosenwald
Collection, Library of Congress. © 2010 the William Blake Archive. Used with
permission. This project is supported in part by a William Blake Archive Reproduction
Grant for Graduate Students.
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Fig. 26. The Book o f Urizen, copy G, plate 19, object 19, c. 1818, Lessing J. Rosenwald
Collection, Library of Congress. © 2010 the William Blake Archive. Used with
permission. This project is supported in part by a William Blake Archive Reproduction
Grant for Graduate Students.
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with his arms pulled tight alongside his body and one knee raised up to his face, as the
surrounding rock oppressively presses down on his frame by some unseen force (his
facial features are pursed together, paralleling the compression of his body) (pi. 9). On
plate 8, Blake depicts a hunched-over skeleton with its knees up on either side of its
shoulders. Its hands are wrapped around its head, pulling in tight to its chest, highlighting
the extreme curvature of the spine. Also, Los is presented in a series of these positions
throughout the work: on his knees with his face directed out, howling in agony, gripping
his head with crisscrossed arms while his hair sticks out in all directions (pi. 7; fig. 27);
open-mouthed with his eyes looking upward in distress, sitting with his knees tight to his
chest beside a similarly positioned skeletal figure (pi. 11); and huddled in a ball on his
knees with his head in his arms and his elbows resting on his thighs (pi. 19; fig. 26). Plate
4, which also depicts a young male figure grabbing his head while sitting on the ground
(or perhaps at the bottom of a body of water) behind what appears to be a screen of rain
(or seaweed), offers a way to read all the iterations of this pose: the act of declaring a
separate selfhood, what Urizen takes to be a liberating act of independence, is in reality a
restrictive act, something the prison-like bars or rain in the design suggest.
This repeated image of restriction, which highlights the oppressive confinement
that the separation of self causes, contrasts visually and ideologically with Los's
liberating pose of bursting forth from flames with arms wide open. These images show
how the visual sphere of the illuminated works offer something in excess of the linguistic
sphere. Brooks makes a similar point about the power of the visual aspect in melodrama:
“Words, however unrepressed and pure, however transparent as vehicles for the
expression of basic relations and verities, appear to be not wholly adequate to the
representation of meanings, and the melodramatic message must be formulated through
other registers of the sign” (The Melodramatic Imagination 56). Many of the designs of
Urizen depict excessive poses that could function as illustrations for how to act out
“grief' or “despair” according to the Thespian Preceptor, the acting manual to which
Booth refers. The designs also reveal how bodies “convey crucial messages,” as Brooks
explains.
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Fig. 27. The Book ofUrizen, copy G, plate 7, object 9, c. 1818, Lessing J. Rosenwald
Collection, Library of Congress. © 2010 the William Blake Archive. Used with
permission. This project is supported in part by a William Blake Archive Reproduction
Grant for Graduate Students.
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In a defence of the significance of the non-spoken parts of melodrama, Simon
Shepherd discusses what he calls “a dramaturgy o f the unspoken" (150), re-evaluating
melodrama on its own terms rather than as an “illegitimate” form that uses silent action
or spectacle as a replacement for language: “[The] dramatic effect is not, clearly, a trivial,
entertaining substitute for dialogue, not struggling, always inadequately, to speak. Rather
than being stupid it is more like stupefying, in that it unsettles its subjects, transports
them beyond their narrow prejudices” (150). Shepherd focuses on the non-spoken
moments of a play in order to legitimize what is considered to be an illegitimate form; he
wants to undermine the binary of spoken and non-spoken in order to undermine the
implications that each term has. Indeed, he makes a case for why the word does not hold
more sway than the image. For him, the silent “illegitimate” parts of theatre do not exist
as mere compensation for a lack of speech; rather, non-verbal moments must be
understood on their own terms. And Moody points out, “The primacy of rhetoric and the
spoken word in legitimate drama gave way in melodrama and pantomime to a corporeal
dramaturgy which privileges the galvanic, affective capacity of the human body as a
vehicle for dramatic expression” (86). Brooks, Shepherd, and Moody assign a relevance
to the silent bodies and other on-stage sights that antitheatricalists would often criticize as
degrading the stage.
Likewise, in Urizen, Blake uses the visual sphere to draw out the characters’
various psychological and emotional states, primarily through facial expressions and
body positioning. For instance, several images of Los express his emotional states (grief,
despair, terror, pain, etc.) through facial expressions, such as a slanting of the eyes and
furrow of the brow to indicate the pain or sorrow he feels, and an open mouth to suggest
that he gives voice to his inner turmoil by way of a howl or a shriek—all of which are
gestures revealing his body’s connection to its interior. Another more specific example is
Blake’s depiction of a chained Urizen, sitting with his knees up tight to his chest and his
arms, dangling beside them so that his hands rest by his feet. His long white beard flows
between his knees, and his head is tilted up. His eyes are closed. A halo-type crown of
light beams appears behind his head, presumably an effect of the sun in the background.
Compositionally, Urizen takes up the entire space of the frame and is depicted frontally.
In copy G, Urizen is pictured crying, tears streaming down his face, and his eyebrows
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furrow to express sadness. Unlike the final image of the work—Urizen trapped beneath a
net—which evokes a sense of ironical humour at the image of a self-proclaimed god
figure trapped with a flimsy rope, this image evokes pity and sympathy for Urizen and
conveys a sense of grandeur, depending on the intensity of the halo effect (pi. 22; fig. 28).
This image complicates an absolute negative response from the audience toward him and
his actions. Not only do the textual descriptions of Urizen’s character and his actions
shape our response to him, but also the designs depicting his body do as well. The body
forms part of the acting theory of twentieth-century dramatist Antonin Artaud. His
discussion of the actor emphasizes his/her body: “An actor is like a physical athlete [...]
his affective organism is similar to the athlete’s” (139) in that the body functions as a site
of expression in both cases. He explains that an actor should “use his emotions in the
same way as a boxer uses his muscles” (140), making the most of the “affective
musculature” he possesses (139). The designs of Los and Urizen in particular
demonstrate the way Blake utilizes the “corporeal dramaturgy of the human body” in
order to provoke varied affective responses from the audience in a way that the text either
does not or does only partially.
Blake uses the body and visual depictions of the body not only to elicit affective
responses and articulate characters’ various internal states but also to celebrate the self as
a set of social relations rather than as a solitary individuality. Urizen participates in a
socially-based Romanticism through its depiction of the body and bodily sensation and
functions: characters and things “appear” and are “seen” or go “unseen,” and “voices”
speak out or are “silenced.” These aspects have a key significance in the meaning of the
text. Sight and sound, particularly the act of watching and speaking, combine to make the
poem visually, orally, and aurally performative.
In order to explore Blake’s incorporation of the senses and his dramatic form, I
begin with an analysis of Wordsworth’s nearly contemporaneous “Lines written a few
miles above Tintem Abbey” (1798) as a contrastive point of reference. Like Urizen, it
focuses on the perceiving self and can be considered a depiction of the fall in the way M.
H. Abrams reads Wordsworthian Romanticism as a vision of innocence-fall-redemption,
which relies on “Wordsworth’s chief model, Paradise Lost” (65). Abrams explains the
fall from innocence to experience that colours human existence for Wordsworth: “Tintern
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Fig. 28. The BookofUrizen, copy G, plate 22, object 11, c. 1818, Lessing J. Rosenwald
Collection, Library of Congress. © 2010 the William Blake Archive. Used with
permission. This project is supported in part by a William Blake Archive Reproduction
Grant for Graduate Students.

179

Abbey [...] [is a] poem[] of what it means to grow to maturity [...]. Life is growth, but
growth means loss, and the loss deeply matters,” despite “finding] in the attributes of
maturity ‘abundant recompense”’ (444-45). The difference between Wordsworth’s view
of fall and redemption and Blake’s expresses itself in part through their contradictory
depictions of sensory perception, specifically sight and hearing. By creating a form that
connects to theatre and performance and that suggests the subversion of the interiorexterior binary, Blake stands apart from a Wordsworthian Romanticism, especially as it is
constructed in the canonical “Tintern Abbey.” My comparison between Wordsworth and
Blake will show that Wordsworth’s poetry reveals interiority as its main concern.
Similarly, Timothy Webb, in his analysis of Romantic drama, states that Wordsworth,
along with Coleridge, Shelley, Byron, and Keats, focuses on the “complexities of self’
rather than “the external world” in his drama (13). However, Blake depicts the eye,
mouth, and ear in a way that directly calls forth aspects of performance and embodiment.
His representation of the senses and sensory experiences erodes the distinction between
reading and performance, between interiority and exteriority, and between memory and
direct perception. In “Tintern Abbey,” the eye and ear dominate the sensory images,
much as they do in Blake’s Urizen, yet Wordsworth’s poem does not intimate
performance and embodiment the way that Blake’s work does. Rather, Wordsworth
includes a subject who sees and hears nature in order to reflect the affective relations
between the subject and nature and to relay private visual and aural enjoyments of natural
landscapes.
In light of my claim that Blake’s art form aligns itself with melodramatic forms of
drama in contrast to a Wordsworthian poetics, I find Elaine Hadley’s distinction between
the “melodramatic mode” and the “romantic mode” of responding to the society of the
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries useful. She places Wordsworth in the latter
mode as its exemplar. Hadley writes a recuperative history of melodrama by showing
how it figures crucially as a mode of response, one worth examining and situating against
the more familiar romantic mode. Leaving aside her examination of the two modes in
relation to society’s hierarchical structures and capitalist markets, I draw on the opposing
constructions of identity that Hadley finds in the two modes. She states, “the
melodramatic mode played a constitutive, if agonistic, role, especially for romantic
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conceptions of subjectivity and community. [...] The melodramatic mode [...], in its
always public and theatrical response to the classification of English society, also resisted
romantic poetry’s interiorization of the subject” (11). Whereas Hadley aligns the
melodramatic mode’s conception of identity with the social sphere, where “one’s
subjectivity [takes] shape in a public and interactive space” (15) and “people are socially
constituted” (31), she associates the romantic mode’s conception of identity with the
“private space” (16) of the lone individual.
Hadley argues that, with “The Old Cumberland Beggar,” Wordsworth
“translates] the scene of [social] exchange to a ‘mental theatre,’ which is [...] pointedly
untheatrical in some crucial ways, for it is neither public nor strictly visible, neither
performed nor spoken. [...] Wordsworth’s poem evacuates the public sphere and
recreates an imaginative version of it” (29).12 Moreover, any effects of social exchange
emerge only during solitary reflection, not during actual face-to-face contact. Making
note of Marjorie Levinson’s and Alan Liu’s critiques of “Wordsworth’s aggressive
effacement of the material impact of market culture on the English countryside” (29-30),
Hadley asserts that Wordsworth distances himself and removes himself from the reality
of the everyday and from society.
Encapsulating the romantic view of identity, Hadley states, “[T]he romantic
subject’s internalization of feeling and virtue still results in a form of identity that is seen
to be private and essential, the exclusive possession of the individual” (33). While this
comment applies to Wordsworth, it does not apply to Blake. The lyrical, subjective form
Wordsworth (and, indeed, many of the Romantics) often uses is not a form Blake often
uses; even when he does use the lyrical form, such as in the Songs, he often frames the
speaking voice with another narrative position or includes a dialogue between two or
12 Interestingly, in Book 7 o f The Prelude, Wordsworth makes a reference to his visit to the non
patent theatre Sadler’s Wells and describes the spectacles o f London life. He explains that, in his youth,
“theatres [...] were his delight,” but qualifies it by noting that “[l]ife then was new, / The senses easily
pleased” by “all the antics and buffoonery” (7.438, 440-41,464). He also moves from more moderate
scenes o f the city to more grotesque ones, such as his depiction o f Saint Bartholomew’s Fair: “[W]hat a hell
/ For eyes and ears! what anarchy and din / Barbarian and infernal! ’tis a dream, / Monstrous in colour,
motion, shape, sight, sound” (7.659-62). David Francis Taylor points out the ambiguity o f Wordsworth’s
view o f theatrical spectacle, one that “delights and disturbs him in equal measure” (91).
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more characters. In Blake’s works, characters often speak for themselves and their inner
states are expressed in a more immediate form in the designs. And Blake rarely lyricizes
his own subject position. When Blake does include himself in his works, he does so by
including himself as one among several characters, refusing to give absolute priority to
his own inner processes. By creating a dramatic form with his illuminated works, Blake
avoids the “interiorization of the subject,” as well as “the suppression of the social,”
which Levinson sees as “the primary poetic action” of “Tintem Abbey” (37).
In “Tintern Abbey,” Wordsworth designs a scene that gives rise to the tension
between actual perception in the moment and remembered perception. He recounts his
feelings upon seeing the impressive landscape around the ruins five years after his initial
visit. Upon his return he says,
again I hear
These waters, rolling from their mountain-springs
With a sweet inland murmur.-Once again
Do I behold these steep and lofty cliffs,
Which on a wild secluded scene impress
Thoughts of more deep seclusion; and connect
The landscape with the quiet of the sky. (2-8)
Wordsworth configures the senses as conduits through which Nature passes in order to
reach or affect humans, in this case Wordsworth himself. He sees and hears the natural
world before him, a different kind of seeing and hearing than the kind that occurs when
he is in the city. He refers to the image before him as “a wild secluded scene,” potentially
hinting at theatrical connotations, but any gesture toward the theatrical is cut short by the
fact that the “scene impress[es] / Thoughts of more deep seclusion”—this experience is
very much a private and isolated one that draws the only human agent further into
himself. The poet finds himself alone without any other witnesses or participants (that is,
we are led to believe so until the end of the poem when Dorothy unexpectedly appears).
Unlike Urizen, which focuses on the social interactions of characters who impact each
other in significant ways, “Tintem Abbey” records the asocial: the solitary Wordsworth
and his seemingly passive reception of an unpopulated landscape.

182
Much of the poem excludes references to people. The only sign of other human
beings in the first half of the poem arises in the following lines:
these pastoral farms
Green to the very door; and wreathes of smoke
Sent up, in silence, from among the trees,
With some uncertain notice, as might seem,
Of vagrant dwellers in the houseless woods,
Or of some hermit’s cave, where by his fire
The hermit sits alone. (17-23)
The “farms” and “wreathes of smoke” suggest human activity and life. However, except
for an idealized imagining of some “hermit [who] sits alone” (23) in his cave,
Wordsworth does not acknowledge the presence of human beings specifically. As
Levinson argues, Wordsworth makes “a sort of metonymic slide toward the hermit/poet”
by “idealizing] vagrants” (43), redirecting attention from the external world back to
himself. Demonstrating “a selective blindness” (Levinson 24) and “acts of exclusion”
(32), Wordsworth distances the landscape from other human beings and their suffering;
any human sign is aestheticized or idealized as “pastoral farms.” What he fails to note is
the reality of human labour and the struggle for sustenance. His “wreathes of smoke” and
“hermit’s cave” are merely aesthetic images, not emblems of human poverty and the
struggle for survival. Sight and sound serve a private and isolated connection with the
natural world. Indeed, later in the poem, Wordsworth makes the ironic claim that he is in
tune with humanity:
For I have learned
To look on nature, not as in the hour
Of thoughtless youth, but hearing oftentimes
The still, sad music of humanity. (89-92)
Seemingly, nature has joined him to the rest of humanity and enabled an external
connection, yet earlier he glosses over the presence of human beings and specifically
does not depict them. Levinson notes, “the ‘still, sad music of humanity’ drowns out the
noise produced by real people in real distress” (45). He neither sees nor hears real human
suffering. Not only does Wordsworth keep himself separate and distanced from others,
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enjoying isolation, but he also aestheticizes general human ills as musical art, avoiding
their material impact.
Memory makes what is absent appear, functioning as a compensation for the loss
of the original experience. However, appearance is confined to the mental and silent
realm in the context of this poetic scene, with the recollection of the landscape “passing
even into [the poet’s] purer mind” (30). Moreover, many of the sounds are barely audible
or non-existent (i.e., silent): “sweet inland murmur” (4), “the quiet of the sky” (8),
“wreathes of smoke / Sent up, in silence” (18-19), “tranquil restoration” (31),“serene and
blessed mood” (42), “an eye made quiet” (48), and “quietness and beauty” (128).
Conversely, Wordsworth associates sound or louder activity—“fretful stir” (53), “fever of
the world” (54), and “[t]he dreary intercourse of daily life” (132)—with the repellent
noise of the city. This kind of representation of sound diminishes the role or force of this
sense in the poem. Similarly, the sense of sight, though important on one level in order to
see nature in the first place, becomes secondary to the mind’s eye. The physical eye is
“made quiet,” its natural dynamism and active looking stilled, as if too distracting for the
inner eye to achieve its serenity. Actual vision is subordinated to mental images that the
memory summons. Here, salvation or redemption or restored paradise exists only after an
evacuation of dynamism, unlike Blake’s Eternity, where strife and activity distinguish it
from the rest and inactivity (and tempting delusions) of Beulah.
Wordsworth structures the poem around the power of memory instead of the
present moment, and nature’s impact on an individual seems dependent on recollection.
Wordsworth writes of the past encounter with the natural world as producing
a feeling and a love,
That had no need of a remoter charm,
By thought supplied, or any interest
Unborrowed from the eye.—That time is past. (81-84)
These days, he no longer needs the physical eye; the child’s ability to experience nature
in such an affective and sensory way is past. A more mature Wordsworth relies on
recollection to provide pleasure. Now “thought” is primary, not the senses. In his
remembrance of things past, he seems to forget that the senses are, in fact, directly
responsible for stimulating the memory to think on Nature, which gives him so much

184

pleasure. Instead, as an adult, he can only feel with his mind, not his senses. Since his
youth (and his past sensory capabilities with nature) is gone, the current Wordsworth can
rely only on recollected thoughts to move him, as “The picture of the mind revives again”
(62). For Blake, the withering of the physical senses leads to despair and a disconnection
from Eternity—the loss of sight and sound is crippling. It is not so in Wordsworth thanks
to the power of memory, a power Blake eschews in favour of the more dynamic
imagination.
At the end of the poem, Wordsworth unexpectedly turns to his sister, Dorothy,
who has presumably been his companion all along but whom he has not bothered to
introduce until now. Her presence exacerbates, rather than mitigates, the isolation of the
speaker. In fact, he and his sister never talk, and he does not allow her a voice. Instead, he
sees her as a version of himself:
My dear, dear Friend [...] in thy voice I catch
The language of my former heart, and read
My former pleasures in the shooting lights
Of thy wild eyes. (117-20)
As the poet looks into her eyes, the act of seeing does not reinforce the multiplicity of the
world. Rather, he sees only himself and recalls his past. This solipsistic viewpoint has a
narrowing effect. Dorothy’s presence does not allow for an expansion and a drama to
unfold between people. She merely reflects Wordsworth’s interior, thereby closing down
any breach between internal and external that this encounter could have intimated:
“Dorothy functions in the poem as a final surface, the condition for the poet’s ongoing
reflective life” (Levinson 45). He explains to Dorothy what her relationship to nature will
develop into as she matures, the same development he himself has experienced.
According to Wordsworth, the external world will lose its affectiveness on the individual,
and only memories will remain. “[W]ild ecstasies” (139) will be followed by “sober
pleasures” (140) of age, pleasures confined to the mind. He erases the potential of eye
and ear, “lovely forms” (141) and “sweet sounds” (143), in the physical realm; only the
individual’s closet rendering of past sensations remains, clearly a form of compensation
for him.
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“Tintem Abbey,” then, becomes an elegiac exploration of the decreasing intensity
of physical sensation and the concomitant development of the memory’s ability to
capture those past experiences—a loss or fall followed by a compensation or redemption.
The marvels of Nature, its sights and sounds, are solitary pleasures that each individual
can enjoy, but they do not seem to exist in any kind of public space or have any kind of
social bearing. Even when it seems as if their shared experience of the landscape might
have the potential for a kind of opening (in contrast to the inward motion carried on in the
majority of the poem), Wordsworth curtails this potential by making it clear that
Dorothy’s role is merely to reinforce his own inferiority. Both her voice and her eyes
reflect what he wants out of the landscape, not her unique experience. This moment of
union is in many ways even more solitary and individual than the majority of the poem in
which Dorothy’s presence is not acknowledged. They stand “on the banks of this
delightful stream [...] together” (151-52) at the end of the poem, but Wordsworth points
this out only to ensure Dorothy will memorialize him when she recalls her visit to Tintem
Abbey once he is gone. Seeing and hearing for Wordsworth, then, do not offer the basis
of human relation. Moreover, the conception of identity that emerges from the poem is
one that constructs the self as the private and interior affair of the lone individual.
Wordsworth’s delineation of the fall consists of a solitary individual’s loss, which
is followed by a recuperation of what was lost through the power of memory. By
contrast, Blake’s depiction of the fall pays greater attention to the role of bodily and
external factors and to the relations among individuals; it does not concentrate on one
figure. Wordsworth celebrates the redemptive powers of the static faculty of recollection
as a solitary venture; Blake, however, prizes the creative force of the imagination and the
energy of public action to recreate the paradise that was lost as a lived (rather than
remembered) experience and as a communal endeavour.
Blake revises the separate accounts of the creation of the physical world and the
fall of humanity from the Book of Genesis. Unlike Genesis, Blake ties together these two
separate events, uniting them into what Sibyl C. Jacobson calls a “simultaneous creation
fall” (61). While William Dennis Horn argues that Urizen’s actions and perceptions cause
this dual event—“Urizen divides from the other immortals and supposes that he is self
sufficient” (272)—I argue that the blame for the fall does not rest with one individual or
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couple; we have no tempting serpent, no Adam and Eve. Rather, the fall occurs as a result
of a shift in the mode of perception and consciousness of a specific social group, which
Blake calls the Eternals. Urizen’s actions do help precipitate the fall but only in relation
to the corresponding actions of the Eternals. Precisely what or who these Eternals are is
never explicated with absolute clarity. However, they appear to be a community of
individuals wherein distinct identities reside without any tension within the unified
whole. Tristanne Connolly argues that the eternal community is a “unified human
existence free from identity loss” (221), while Warner states, “the Eternal Man [...], even
though mingling with other forms, is always aware of his own identity” (31). The
Eternals reside in a social environment in which neither the individual nor the whole
surpasses or overwhelms the other.
A pre-fallen state, then, consists, somewhat paradoxically from a fallen
perspective, of distinct identities, which always assert and maintain their inevitable
connection to the unified whole—for instance, through intermingling at a fundamental
and literal level. Thus, holding to the notion of a self—an “1”—is not in itself a signal of
falleness. As Horn argues persuasively, “The mere postulating of a self as an independent
entity results in a mistaken view of the world, a view in which self-subsistent egos are
alienated from self-subsistent external objects. Thus it is not the concept of T as a
principle of unity which Blake names the original sin; rather it is the mistake of seeing
the self as an independent entity” (268). The fall, then, lies in the belief that the “I” is
independent rather than relational. My reading of the fallen state expands on Horn’s
assessment to include a view of the “I” as alienated from other selves.
The poem begins with a crucial shift in this eternal space, as Urizen, one of the
Eternals, seems to break off from the community by declaring his independence. The
poem tends to be read as an allegory of the division between reason, often a negative
faculty in Blake when it acts on its own, and imagination, a typically positive faculty,
where Urizen stands for reason and Los stands for imagination. For instance, Mark
Lussier states, “Urizen separates from other elements of thought [...] in pursuit of a
sovereign self, as the rational faculty strives for dominance” (“Blake and Science
Studies” 191; see also Paananen 31). While these readings continue to be fruitful, my
own interpretation focuses more on the relationship between Urizen and Los as
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individuals within a community and less on their symbolic significance. Blake presents
the loss of this particular social dynamic through a retelling of the story of creation and of
the fall. 1 argue that, in addition to equating these two events, he also depicts them in
terms of identity-creation, as an event to be witnessed and heard—a melodramatic
performance or spectacle of self and an Althusserian scene of interpellation.
Significantly, Blake delineates his story of the fall and of the separation of the self
theatrically both through the melodramatic and through scenes of identity-formation,
which I read as Althusserian interpellative scenes of hailing. These two means of
delineation emphasize the social over the solitary self. At the beginning of the poem,
Blake asks the Eternals to relate their tale of this cosmic event. According to the tale,
Urizen appears to cause the fall by separating himself from the rest of the Eternals and by
creating the physical universe as we know it. Blake refers to Urizen as “Self-closd, allrepelling” (3.3, E 70); he is a circumscribed and separate consciousness, rejecting all
others, disavowing his bond to the whole, and displacing himself from the “immediate
co-presence with the other Eternals” (Essick, “William Blake, Thomas Paine, and
Biblical Revolution” 201). Indeed, Urizen creates the T in some respect as he
continually repeats the pronoun in the only direct speech of the entire work. Retelling his
version of the events, he proclaims, “I alone, even I!” “Here alone 1” (4.19, 4.24, E 72),
as if his individual selfhood were an absolute certainty. In the span of thirty-five lines, he
uses the pronoun “I” seven times, thereby reifying his perception of himself as a distinct
identity. Through his language, he creates a subject who speaks and addresses an-Other;
Urizen names himself T in one breath and names the Eternals ‘you’ in the next: “7 have
sought for a joy without pain [...] Why willyon die O Eternals?” (4.10-12, E 71,
emphasis added). Such a statement constitutes one of the fundamental structures of
grammar as well as of interpersonal relations: the first-person T and the second-person
‘you’. Yet, Urizen’s act of identification and classification comes in chapter two, second
in a chain of events, second to the Eternals’ act of naming him Urizen in chapter one.
Upon seeing “a shadow of horror [...] rise[]” (3.1, E 70), Blake tells us that “Some said /
‘It is Urizen’” (3.5-6, E 70). On the one hand, the Eternals name the shadowy figure that
emerges into their sight and, thus, help bring Urizen into existence. On the other hand,
the act of seeing has already implicitly completed the act of the linguistic performative.
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By seeing Urizen, the Eternals create him as an object to be beheld, as if seeing Urizen
were equivalent to creating him.
In his book about the nature of seeing, art historian James Elkins argues,
“[VJision reaches outward and creates the objects themselves” (The Object Stares Back
29; original emphasis). The Eternals’ act of seeing Urizen functions in much the same
manner. The poem begins with the following lines:
Of the primeval Priests assum’d power,
When Eternals spum’d back his religion;
And gave him a place in the north,
Obscure, shadowy, void, solitary. (2.1-4, E 70)
The “primeval Priest[],” Urizen, has somehow asserted his power, perhaps through a
declaration of independence, and the Eternals, in trying to quell his uprising, only seem to
make matters worse by banishing him into isolation. Mitchell asks,
When, for instance, did the ‘primeval Priest’ assume power? Was it before
or after his spuming by the Eternals? The construction of the first two
lines makes these questions unanswerable. The rebellion took place
‘when’ the reaction occurred. (“Poetic and Pictorial Imagination” 343)
Mitchell settles the question of who is blameworthy by viewing the acts of both the
Eternals and Urizen as irrevocably tied together; consequently, he holds both parties
responsible for the events that unfold in the poem. However, this scene of expulsion, as
well as the poem as a whole, provides us with several conundrums. Who falls? Urizen,
the Eternals, or both? Who initiates the chain of events that leads to Urizen’s separation?
Does Urizen identify himself or do the Eternals identify him? Does Urizen separate
himself from the community, or does the community reject him?
The confusion does not confine itself to the verbal dimension of the poem. Plate
22 depicts Urizen bound in chains, eyes closed, seated with his knees pulled tight to his
chest (fig. 28). In many copies, Blake inserts the plate later in the poem so that the chains
could signify the confinement of self that Urizen’s act of independence ironically
causes.1’ However, in copy A, Blake arranges this plate as the third one in the work,13
13

When positioned later in the work, the plate could represent the literal binding o f Urizen by Los,

who forges the chains when he attempts to control the catastrophe o f Urizen’s division from the Eternals.
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positioning it immediately after the Preludium. At this point, the only information we
have is that Urizen “assum’d power” and, for that, the Eternals “gave him a place in the
north.” By viewing this plate prior to the story proper, the audience is left with little
guidance about how to respond. Most of Urizen’s explicit actions are yet to be told.
Indeed, the position of the plate raises the question of Urizen’s metaphoric imprisonment:
does he chain himself by assuming power, or do the chains signify his expulsion from the
eternal community? Whose act leads to oppression?
The ambiguity of this chicken-and-egg scenario suggests that the problem goes
beyond the act of one individual. The problem is embedded in the social network of the
immortal community. In arguing that a Urizenic mode prevails in the poem, Mitchell
states, “Urizen thinks he has created a real world within his mind, and since the universe
of the poem is totally mental, it is a real world. The Eternals and Los confirm the
substantiality of his creation by treating it as if it were real, and their behavior toward it
repeats the pattern of Urizen’s initial activity” (“Poetic and Pictorial Imagination” 350). I
agree with Mitchell’s assessment but would go further and say that Urizen himself, as a
disconnected individual selfhood, comes into being thanks in part to the other characters
in the poem confirming him as such. In fact, the cast of characters continues to expand—
at first slowly and then more rapidly. Los, another Eternal, appears after Urizen’s
rebellion and his expulsion; Los’s sudden appearance and the fact that he bears a unique
name indicate that he, like Urizen, is divided from the Eternals. Soon after, Los divides
even further, producing a female counterpart, Enitharmon, and then they divide further by
producing a child, Ore. After this, Urizen produces his own children, and the number of
individual selfhoods rapidly increases. These births are also constructed on the basis of
sight: Enitharmon appears directly in front of Los’s eyes, and Urizen’s children emerge
from the elements. Rather than a natural biological birth, one individual brings life into
existence through the act of seeing. Los sees Enitharmon “[wjaving before [his] face” (E
78), while Urizen “sicken'd to see / His eternal creations appear / Sons & daughters of
sorrow on mountains” (23.8-10, E 81). Connolly argues,
There is a momentum or domino-effect in this series of growths out of
growths. It continues when Urizen’s embodiment causes Los’s
embodiment, which in turn causes Enitharmon to come into separate

190

being, giving birth to Ore. Following this, the children of Urizen are
embodied. Like a cancer or a weed, the material body propagates
uncontrollably. Like a black hole, its weight and gravity pulls all around it
into its darkness. (90)
Connolly targets the physical body and its material creation in her discussion of
cancerous propagation in The Book o f Urizen. She notes that Blake’s works exhibit a
genuine repulsion but also a genuine ecstasy when it comes to the body: “he at once
reviles and glorifies the human body” (vii). How are we to negotiate between these two
extremes? Some critics note the necessary limitations of the physical body, but qualify
the limitation. Acknowledging the deficiencies of the material body, Jacobson attributes
the production of social relations to its capacities: “The parts of the body are an imposed
limitation” (70), a kind of enclosure. “Yet the brain and the senses make possible
relationships beyond the self, albeit limited” (71). Connolly also pursues this argument
when she claims, “Through his illustration of fibres, which can be identified with nerves,
Blake calls attention to the usually hidden organ of sensitivity, the nervous system which
links body and mind, and in turn links people with each other, keeping the individual
from being a prisoner in his own body” (64). For both critics, Blake emerges as an
opponent of Cartesian dualism—the body has an undeniable connection to the mind. In
fact, the body and the senses make social bonds possible.141 would add that any
limitation the body demonstrates results from fallen perception and restrained
imagination. The cancerous propagation in Urizen results not from the creation of
material bodies but from the construction of singular, separate identities. Corporeality
does not enter the text until after Urizen declares his independence and he is expelled
from the eternal community. The primary signal for the fall is not the body but the
14

Frye explains Blake’s anti-dualistic sentiments regarding mind and body: “The prophecies

resound with bitter complaints o f the inadequacy o f the body, o f the impotence o f the eye to see and o f the
nose to smell, but the moral in Blake is that the body is weak enough already without trying to split it in
two [...] it is a change o f worlds that is necessary, the lifting o f the whole body to a fully imaginative plane
by getting rid o f the natural man” (194). 1 take Frye’s point that dualism is not what Blake wants, but Blake
does more than just tolerate the body. As Jacobson and Connolly imply, the body plays a crucial role in the
formation o f community.
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limiting of perception—perception of oneself and one’s identity in relation to a social
unit.
The physical body functions as a representation of the material consequences that
the eternal community suffers through faulty perception and the power of ideology. Louis
Althusser’s theory of interpellation offers a way to understand the ruptured social
dynamic presented in The Book o f Urizen as the emergence of ideology, specifically what
I call the ideology of the self. An ideological reading of the separation of self in Urizen
resonates with a melodramatic one in terms of the social and the theatrical, particularly
with respect to the constitution of the self in a social space and the emphasis on the
senses and the external. In “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses,” Althusser’s
analysis of ideology includes the key concept of interpellation. Two of his examples of
the way interpellation functions feature the meeting of two friends:
To take a highly ‘concrete’ example, we all have friends who, when they
knock on our door and we ask, through the door, the question ‘Who’s
there?’, answer (since ‘it’s obvious’) ‘It’s me’. And we recognize that ‘it is
him’, or ‘her’. We open the door, and ‘it’s true, it really was she who was
there’. To take another example, when we recognize somebody of our
(previous) acquaintance ((re)-connaissance) in the street, we show him
that we have recognized him (and have recognized that he has recognized
us) by saying to him ‘Hello, my friend’, and shaking his hand (a material
ritual practice of ideological recognition in everyday life [...]). (161)
By calling someone, by acknowledging someone as a subject, and, by the same token,
having that other person hear our call and acknowledge us, we participate in a scene of
interpellation. Further, the first example in particular demonstrates the way in which we
accept the ideology of the self; we are able to respond to the question “Who’s there?”
with “It’s me,” thereby defining ourselves as a “me” separate from the “you,” the voice
on the other side of the door. Judith Butler aptly describes this two-way creation of
ideology when she says, “Although there would be no turning around without first having
been hailed, neither would there be a turning around without some readiness to turn”
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(“Conscience Doth Make Subjects of Us All” 7).15 This readiness is our acceptance of the
individual and isolated identities of which we take society to consist.
While Althusser stresses the linguistic aspect (or perhaps even the oral/aural
aspect) of interpellation, 1 also stress the visual aspect. He evidences recognition in the
above example by way of the verbal greeting, but recognition also comes from facial
cues. One does not need a verbal greeting to confirm when individual recognition has
occurred. The act of looking can replace or coexist with verbal recognitions, as it does in
Urizen. 1 find parallels between this visual recognition the way verbal-based
interpellation works in Althusser’s discussion. He argues that “all ideology>hails or
interpellates concrete individuals as concrete subjects” ( 162, original emphasis); “The
existence of ideology and the hailing or interpellation of individuals as subjects are one
and the same thing” ( 163) . Ideology is a force that imposes on all of us by calling us into
a state of subjectification, a state we find ourselves in even before we come into the
world. As Althusser notes, to be a subject is to be autonomous and yet bound: “[the term]
subject in fact means: (1) a free subjectivity, a centre of initiatives, author of and
responsible for its actions; (2) a subjected being, who submits to a higher authority, and is
therefore stripped of all freedom except that of freely accepting his submission” (169).
By misrecognizing or ignoring the aspect of freedom in our subjection, we allow
ourselves to be trapped in a system, one of “ideological constraint and pre-appointment”
(165).
Althusser seems to present us with a conundrum when he further explains this
ideology. He continues, “[Y]ou and I are always already subjects, and as such constantly
practice the rituals of ideological recognition, which guarantee for us that we are indeed
concrete, individual, distinguishable and (naturally) irreplaceable subjects” (161-62).
Therefore, society is such that it cannot break the cycle of ideological subjectification
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Butler’s reading o f Althusser’s theory o f interpellation focuses on the hail o f the law, and the

role o f guilt in the response to the hail. She writes, “The call itself is also figured as a demand to align
oneself with the law, a turning around (to face the law, to find a face for the law?), and an entrance into the
language o f self-ascription [...] through the appropriation o f guilt” (6). However, in Althusser’s essay, the
hail by a police officer makes up only one example, what he calls a specialized form o f interpellation, and
he explains that our readiness to turn “cannot be explained solely by ‘guilt feelings’” (163).
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because we relate to each other on the level of distinct subjects from the very beginning
(i.e., birth) to the very end (i.e., death). The conundrum exists in the fact that an ideology
is something that can be changed or dismantled. However, by saying that we are “always
already subjects,” Althusser suggests that this state of affairs is just the way things are
with no other possibility—and, thus, not an ideology. Yet, he persists in using the term
ideology to explain the nature of social relations. We have names and roles and
responsibilities even before we enter the world. Ideology manifests itself in “rituals of
ideological recognition”: “the hand-shake, the fact of calling you by your name, the fact
of knowing, even if I do not know what it is, that you ‘have’ a name of your own,” all of
which confirm “that you are recognized as a unique subject” (162). By simply greeting or
naming each other, acknowledging one another as others, we interpellate each other, we
reinscribe the oppressive frame that makes us and our fellow human beings subjects—
both as individuals within the system of relations and as subjects to this system.
In addition, Althusser calls his examples of interpellation and hailing a “little
theoretical theatre” (163), a “mise en scène of interpellation” in which we are “actors”
(165), thus setting up a theatrical discourse for these moments. He does not take the
metaphor further, but, by configuring interpellation as theatrical, he emphasizes the social
relations at play and the greater communal implications. My reading of vision and
identity may seem to point more readily to a Lacanian reading of ego-formation—not
surprisingly, Althusser was highly influenced by Lacanian psychoanalysis.Ift However,
my focus rests not on the individual who sees his/her image and equates it with “a
coherent self’ and a “corporeal wholeness” (Jay 346), as in the mirror-stage, but on the
formation of an isolated identity that results from the mutually dependent processes of 16
16

For a more in-depth discussion, see Martin Jay 374-75. Also, Mark Bracher’s psychoanalytic

reading o f The Marriage o f Heaven and Hell in his article “Rouzing the Faculties” uses the Althusserian
term interpellation but insofar as it applies to Lacanian theory. Bracher explores the psychological
transformative potential o f the text on the reader through the way “the poem pressures us” (177) and
“interpellate[s] [us] into a position” (179). He is less concerned with identity and identity-formation than
with the way the text imposes upon the reader in order to provoke an active response: “by interpellating us
to a position where we must either accept [the symbolic] code or construct it through interpretation, Blake’s
poem arouses our faculties to act in such a way as to enact a marriage that constitutes psychological
transformation” (203).
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seeing and being seen, or of hearing and being heard. Thus, using Althusser’s theory,
rather than psychoanalytic theories of subject-formation, allows me to better interrogate
Blake’s central concerns as they apply to the self: community and social relations.
Moreover, Althusser’s reference to the “mise en scène of interpellation” indicates that he
acknowledges the fact that the formation of a separate self cannot and does not happen in
a vacuum. The interpellative separation of self is neither an abstract nor a solitary
moment; it is one that arises through the scenes of daily life as we connect with others.
By associating the interpellative scene with the theatrical, he implies that the scene is
artificial and constructed in much the same way as the theatre constructs a kind of reality
through numerous repetitions or stagings. What this suggests is that interpellative
relations are constructed rather than inevitable and that the resulting subject is one that
continuously gets reaffirmed or constituted through subsequent reiterations. Once again,
we are faced with the paradox of an ideological—and, thus, changeable—view of
relations with the subject who is “always already” such—and, thus, cannot be otherwise.
My application of Althusser, especially his reference to irreplaceability and
uniqueness, places more emphasis on the self—as signifying a coherent singular and
isolated personal identity—than subjecthood or subjectivity where “human subjects” are
“conceived [...] as agents” and/or “understood as subjected” to institutions of power
(Henderson 3).17 Nevertheless, Blake’s idea of a fallen selfhood does pave the way for a
consideration of subjectivity in this sense, especially as being subjected to ideology.
Blake rewrites the Judeo-Christian creation myth and the subsequent fall as the
primordial scene of interpellation, the primordial scene of the constitution of selfhood. I
argue that the poem suggests the fall occurs through an Althusserian interpellation; that
is, the eternal community lapses the moment it recognizes separate selfhoods. Both the
Eternals and Urizen recognize his separate self; consequently, both are complicit in the
deed.
Moreover, this recognition emerges through the activity of the senses. Seeing,
when attached to things appearing, has a kind of creative force in the poem, as if seeing
17

Moreover, my reading o f Blake’s Urizen leaves the redemptive power o f vision open, while

Althusser remained skeptical o f sight, especially in relation to knowledge, because, as Jay explains, he
“identified ideology with a reliance on sight o f any kind” (374).
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and coming-into-being arise mutually or mutually cause each other. Chapter one begins
with the literal rising of Urizen, which provokes the Eternals to describe Urizen as the
“primeval Priest[],” to give him “a place in the north,” and to later name him, all of which
are ways of classifying his uniqueness as a part to be rejected from the eternal whole. At
the same time, Urizen perceives himself to be a separate identity, an isolated “I”. By
seeing Urizen rise, then, the Eternals acknowledge him as an independent identity, and
their responses to him follow from this acknowledgment. Elkins states, “Seeing is being
seen” (The Object Stares Back 12): “looking happens in both directions” (21); “Vision
runs back and forth from objects to eyes, and whatever is seen also sees. [...]. And seeing
is self-definition. Objects look back, and their incoming gaze tells me what I am” (86).
Such a view of sight and perception suggests that the senses play a crucial role in the
creation of identities. By seeing someone, one identifies or defines the other. This
twofold structure suggests that, in order for the ideology of the self to take hold or come
into effect, both Urizen and the Eternals must subscribe to it. Both acknowledge and
recognize Urizen as a unique entity; therefore, both are complicit in the fall, and both are
responsible for the domino effect that ideological interpellation sets off: you recognize
me, I recognize you, we recognize them, they recognize us.
This mutual recognition gives rise to an ideology of self. Addressing the
contradiction between the “always already” of subjectivity and ideology, Althusser
explains, “What is represented in ideology is therefore not the system of the real relations
which govern the existence of individuals, but the imaginary relation of those individuals
to the real relations in which they live” (155). By defining these relations as imaginary,
Althusser indicates that this way of being in the world and with each other is not a
necessary one. Thus, change can occur. By recognizing each other, we are in fact
misrecognizing the system of relations that binds us for one that is unalterable, permanent
and inevitable. In this light, conventional and mundane social interactions take on a
sinister quality: they inscribe us in a false system and lead us to a false consciousness.
Ideology is this system to which we submit and which we accept as truth. The Eternals’
recognition, or misrecognition, of Urizen as a separate identity combined with Urizen’s
self-enclosure and his self-perception as separate mark the beginning of ideology, the
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beginning of the interpellation of subjects, which in Urizen occurs by way of perception;
yet, as an ideology, an imaginary state of affairs, it can be altered.
Conversely, Wordsworth’s “Tintem Abbey” does not demonstrate this kind of
awareness of social relations. Even though Wordsworth indicates the creative force of the
senses when he refers to “all the mighty world / Of eye and ear, both what they halfcreate, / And what perceive” (106-08), he does not articulate this force as one that
manifests its results in the external world, at least not in a social context. His own relation
to nature may be based partly on how he constructs it, but the larger community of
human beings does not factor into this equation. The only consequence of this halfcreating and half-perceiving is an individual, internal experience. Also, this partial
creative ability is mentioned only here. Throughout the rest of the poem, Nature
“impresses” Wordsworth and teaches him (110-12), which is a more passive
configuration. Critiquing this construction of relations, Levinson states,
The poem argues that ‘thinking things’ largely construct the object world,
so that the latter, while its first cause is ‘a motion and a spirit,’ is subject to
an efficient cause as well. There is, however, no indication of reciprocity.
‘Thinking things’ and their products, thoughts, apparently suffer no
interference from the material and social world. Thought is free - the mind
is its own place, the world is another. (40)
Blake, on the other hand, in restaging melodramatically the fall and what it signifies—the
introduction of ideology as the misperception of the true nature of the relations between
self and community—shows no such “operational ignorance concerning the degree to
which the subjective eye—the individual ‘I’—is constituted by its field of vision: a
horizon, a structure, and a set of relations external to individual psyche insofar as that
psyche leads an independent existence,” as Levinson says of Wordsworth (45).
Wordsworth’s rejection of the system of relations in the world, in civil society, is an
“ideology-refusing” stance (Levinson 50), while Blake’s view of human society and the
individual’s place in it acknowledges the over-arching influence and structuring aspect of
ideology, as well as community relations.
Standing in contradistinction to Wordsworth’s “Tintem Abbey,” Blake’s Urizen
provides a depiction of the senses that suggests human relations and embodied
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performance. Rather than being bound to the shadows of recollection, the senses have an
actual impact in the world and on others, primarily through creative acts. Moreover,
identity is necessarily part of a larger social network. To these ends, the poem more
closely resembles Hadley’s “melodramatic mode” than her “romantic” one. For example,
a main concern in Urizen is proper perception, primarily in a social context. The poem is
full of “noises ruinous loud” (13.24, E 77): blasts, thunders, rolling, swelling, trumpet
sounds, spoken words, crashes, earthquakes, belching, beating, forging, panting,
trembling, pangs, stamping, hammering, hurtling, clashing, smiting, writhing, hissing,
shrieks, and howling. The sounds often occur as a consequence of activity and activity
itself is configured as physical, indicating the exterior and public realm. For instance,
creating and forging are most definitely of the body as well as of the mind. Los’s
activity—“heav[ing] the dark bellows, / And turning] restless the tongs; and the hammer
/ Incessant beat; forging chains new & new”—is a material one, which is odd given that
he is the Eternal Prophet. The physicality of his activity suggests that imagination is not
confined to the mental realm. Of course, his activity connotes a certain degree of
negativity by echoing Urizen’s forging of his metal books (4.24-25, E 72). However, as
explained above regarding the senses, material activity in itself is not negative in Blake.
After all, Blake’s forging and engraving of his illuminated art has redemptive potential.18
In addition, Blake makes numerous references to vision, to things “seen” and
“beheld” or “unseen” and “hid” from sight. The poem narrates characters seeing things
appear and coming to pass or failing and refusing to see things. Many things simply
“appear” in the poem without much of an explanation or description of the event. By
replacing words such as “occur” or “happen,” the word “appear” stresses the act of
seeing. The preoccupation with coming into being also takes the form of birth. The
created world is figured “like a womb, / Where thousands of rivers in veins / Of blood
pour down the mountains” (5.29-31, E 73). Also, “Like a human heart struggling &
beating / The vast world of Urizen appear’d” (5.36-37). Here, Blake uses a visceral simile
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In reference to Milton, Thomas A. Vogler states, “The goal is not to escape ‘Albions land: /

Which is this earth o f vegetation on which now I write’ [...] but to experience it as a home, to be at home
in it, to be human in it— which means to be creative, to be an artist, to labor in a material medium” (175).
Avoiding the exertions o f the material body and material forms, then, is not desirable.
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that compares the creation of the world to the bloody birth of a human being. Moreover,
this depiction significantly differs from the biblical account in Genesis in which God’s
ability to create is wholly performative and bound to the linguistic realm, not to vision.19
Similar to the text, some of the images depict characters with their eyes closed or
hidden, suggesting perhaps that they are blind. Other designs show a character in such a
way that we see only the back of his/her head; for example, the figure running through
flames with his head deliberately pointed away from us (pi. 3) and a floating Urizen with
his hands by his turned-away head (pi. 27; fig. 29). These kinds of images draw attention
to the characters’ capacity for sight or their refusal to use it. Moreover, these images
contrast starkly with the images that face us squarely, particularly those who stare
directly at us. Both the images in which characters face us and those in which they
decidedly do not force the audience to consider vision (in terms of seeing and being seen
or not seen) and our relation to the work. However, seeing and hearing do not represent
strictly benign forces, despite their associations with creation or creativity. This is
perhaps not surprising given the fact that The Book o f Urizen revises Genesis’s account of
the fall of humanity as well as its account of the creation of the mortal world.
After Urizen’s fall, all the senses take on negative connotations. Nowhere is this
made clearer than in the description of the formation of Urizen’s body, one of the most
visceral descriptions in any of Blake’s texts. First, Urizen’s nerves “Shoo[t] out ten
thousand branches / Around his solid bones” (11.6-7, E 76). Then, his brain, heart, eyes,
ears, nose, torso and tongue painfully form:
His nervous brain shot branches
Round the branches of his heart
On high into two little orbs
And fixed in two little caves

His Eyes beheld the deep. (11.11-16)

19

For instance, “God said [...] let the dry land appear: and it was so” (1.9), or “God said, Let us

make man in our image [...] So God created man in his own image” (1.26-27).
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Fig. 29. Urizen, copy G, plate 27, object 23, c. 1818, Lessing J. Rosenwald Collection,
Library of Congress. © 2010 the William Blake Archive. Used with permission. This
project is supported in part by a William Blake Archive Reproduction Grant for Graduate
Students.
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Two Ears in close volutions

Shot spiring out and petrified
As they grew

In ghastly torment sick;
Hanging upon the wind;
Two Nostrils bent down to the deep. (11.21-27, 13.1)

Within his ribs bloated round
A craving Hungry Cavern;
Thence arose his channeld Throat,
And like a red flame a Tongue
Of thirst & of hunger appeard. (13.5-9)
Blake isolates each sense and graphically delineates its painful shrinking and
solidification. If the fall results in part from the activity of the senses, then are they not
fundamentally a negative aspect of humanity? Does not Urizen, as Mann argues, depict a
hopeless world in which we are trapped by sensory experience and the ideology that this
experience creates? Does not the fact that objects and people “appear” in this poem
potentially imply that sight is passive, as it is in “Tintem Abbey”? For example, when the
Eternals see Urizen’s world take shape, the activity of seeing seems passive:
like a black globe
View’d by sons of Eternity, standing
On the shore of the infinite ocean,
Like a human heart struggling & beating
The vast world of Urizen appear’d. (5.33-37, E 73)
The world at first seems to be passively “view’d by sons of Eternity,” but the position of
the phrases and the use of similes to describe the world coming into existence suggest the
opposite is true. The simile refers to the Eternals viewing a black globe, which represents
the world; viewing is directly related to the “appearance” or incarnation of Urizen’s
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world, which one would conventionally expect to have been constructed. However,
Blake’s language refers to vision not construction. The Eternals see Urizen’s world
coming into being and as a result are complied in the creation as well. Angela
Esterhammer argues, “the heavy emphasis on the ‘unseen’ and ‘unknown’ at the
beginning of The Book o f Urizen implies that the role of language in this text is to make
things visible, indeed to bring them into existence” (“Calling into Existence” 121). I
would argue that the emphasis on seeing throughout the work implies that the role of
vision is also to bring things into existence. Although 1 do not deny the power of the
performative utterance in Blake’s works, the visual aspect and the role of sight remain
secondary to the textual or linguistic in much criticism. For example, Mitchell asserts,
The most far-reaching shift signaled by the search for an adequate concept
of visual culture is its emphasis on the social field of the visual, the
everyday processes of looking at others and being looked at. This complex
field of visual reciprocity is not merely a by-product of social reality but
actively constitutive of it. Vision is as important as language in mediating
social relations, and it is not reducible to language, to the ‘sign,’ or to
discourse. (“What Do Pictures Really Want?” 82)
Mitchell reminds us how important the visual is in the world; seeing impacts our
relationships with each other and with our environment as much as language. Blake’s
melodramatic depiction of the creation-fall and the intertwined ideology of self rely
heavily on the visual field. While the world is Urizen’s, and he is responsible for its
construction, the Eternals’ act of watching Urizen implicates them in the construction of
both Urizen’s identity and his world. Viewing or seeing, then, is never simply a passive
event in Blake; it is an action in which we actively participate.
Similarly, hearing functions actively. For instance, when Ore awakens the dead,
his voice demonstrates the power to create life:
The dead heard the voice of the child
And began to awake from sleep.
All things heard the voice of the child
And began to awake to life. (20.26-29, E 80)
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Ore, or, more correctly, Ore’s voice causes the dead to “awake from sleep” and things to
“awake to life” or come into existence. Here, the voice has the power to change death
into life. Like sight, the voice, the act of speaking, has the power to bring something into
being. Hearing, then, like seeing, is not passive. In fact, the act of hearing implicates the
dead in this scene of interpellation—they hear Ore and meet his call. Hearing functions
actively; the listening ears meet Ore’s voice rather than simply receiving it. This active
quality of the sense of sound is reaffirmed by Elkins: “My ears are anything but passive
recipients of noise. Out of the buzzing continuum of sounds 1 listen for certain things: I
am acutely sensitive to voices, to rhythmic tappings that might be footsteps, to whistles,
howls, shrieks, creaks, and whines” {The Object Stares Back 34). Not only are the senses
discriminating, but they also seem to discriminate in ways bound up in interpellation. We
are watching and listening for the sights and sounds of another individual and by doing so
acknowledge his/her separate existence. In the process, we also construct him/her. By
associating such creative powers with sight and sound, Blake suggests a more
performative, performance-based, performance-oriented genre—a genre in which sight
and sound are crucial.
In chapter three, soon after Urizen’s lone speech, Blake presents us with the
appearance of Los, the Eternal Prophet and representative of the imagination. Typically,
Los is depicted as a positive force in contrast to Urizenic reasoning. However, in The
Book o f Urizen, the relation between the two is ambiguous, as I have already noted. Los
simply appears without introduction as a player in the drama between Urizen and the
Eternals. The first mention of Los does not signal him as a new character, nor does it
signal his entrance into the poem. Rather, he is just there, already present in the action:
And Los round the dark globe of Urizen
Kept watch for Eternals to confine
The obscure separation alone;
For Eternity stood wide apart,
As the stars are apart from the earth. (5.38-42, E 73)
By not giving Los a formal introduction into the text, Blake emphasizes the way he enters
the work. Los’s entrance is startling. It is as if we should already know who Los is. The
use of the conjunction “And” suggests that this happens to be just another episode in the
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story of Los and Urizen, as if Los has been present continuously in the poem. This
strange gap forces us to question his identity, his existence, and his appearance all the
more.
Los, by watching or by being made to watch Urizen, exposes himself to the kind
of division and separation (a kind of illness in Blake) that Urizen has undergone; in a
way, his vision creates his own separate identity distinct from the Eternals. Worrall says,
“Which came first? The answer is both” (Introduction 21). For Worrall, their
simultaneous coming into being refers to the dual narratives of the Urizen texts and the
dual authorships: both Los and Urizen tell the story. I would agree about the simultaneity
of their appearance, but 1 align that simultaneity with the relational process of
interpellation. By recognizing each other, they both emerge as isolated individuals,
suffering from what Victor N. Paananen calls a “diseased solipsism” (31). Los’s despair,
resulting from the sight of Urizen’s identity-formation, is followed by a rending of the
two beings. The impact of seeing Urizen is significant for Los. The separation is figured
in terms of sight—subject and object—and in terms of a physical separation.
Los, too, endures this fall in the act of seeing. Eternity now stands “wide apart”
from the solitary figure of Urizen and from Los thanks to his preoccupation with
watching the changes in Urizen: “He watch’d in shuddering fear / The dark changes &
bound every change / With rivets of iron & brass” (8.9-11, E 74). Los reacts to what he
sees by trying to bind Urizen. Some critics read this act as a compassionate act, while
others see it as a Urizenic one. For instance, Connolly calls Los’s binding of Urizen “a
merciful action which gives Urizen identity and protects him from being ‘obscure’” (78),
but Mann argues, “Los’s antithetical posture toward Urizen is belied by the
fundamentally Urizenic nature of his activity. Since separation, isolation of selfhood, and
containment were invented by Urizen, binding Urizen is Urizenic” (54). Either way,20
20

Like Mann, Mitchell and Steve Clark see Los’s act as Urizenic. Mitchell states, “Los is absorbed

into the Urizenic mode o f consciousness” (“Poetic and Pictorial Imagination” 352), while Clark writes, “At
the very least, the relation o f Los and Urizen is one o f complex interdependence: syntactically, the ‘chains
o f the mind’ qualifies both protagonists, and as many critics have observed, Urizen’s actions repeatedly
prefigure and foreclose those o f Los” (135). Clark goes a step further to suggest that Urizen’s actions are
actually commendable as he tries to create form from chaos (145-46) and that Blake was o f “Urizen’s
‘party without knowing it’” (149).
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with respect to Los, literal seeing causes a paradigm shift in the way he begins to see
himself and the other Eternals. Los continues “dividing / The horrible night into watches”
(10.9-10, E 75), thereby persisting in his need to see Urizen and what he endures. Los’s
act of keeping watch and surveying Urizen separates him from the eternal community
and, in this act, Los becomes Los—the separate entity—or comes into being by virtue of
vision.
Los’s appearance invokes the kind of domino effect that results from ideological
interpellation: you recognize me, I recognize you. As Mann points out, “The Urizenic
genesis is the production or rather the continual reproduction of selfhood” (56); herein
lies the cancerous effect. By distinguishing himself from the group of Eternals, Los
seems to mimic Urizen’s separation, and, indeed, Los mimics other Urizenic actions in
the chapters that follow. Los unintentionally participates in the continued dividing of
Urizen by attempting to stop Urizen’s changes. The embodiment of Urizen, then, is as
much a result of Urizen’s self-contemplation and self-enclosure as it is a result of Los’s
actions and his seeing Urizen as distinct from him, as a viewable object, an object for
visual consumption. The creation of separate selves proliferates once Los has forged a
body for Urizen. Los is now lost, and his role in the fall is far from peripheral.
The division and separation of Los and Urizen occurs repeatedly, and the bard
recounts them in various ways. However, the role of vision in Los’s fall persists: “Thus
the Eternal Prophet was divided / Before the death image of Urizen” (15.1-2, E 78). The
bard states that the act of viewing Urizen as divided (his “death image”) provokes the
division of Los. Seeing Urizen outside the eternal community—in which identities merge
while retaining distinction—suggests that Los now divides himself from Eternity and can
no longer merge with the eternal identities. As a result, he sees Urizen as an isolated self,
an isolation that is equivalent to the “death image” because of the implicit self-expulsion
from communal interaction. Death and mortality, as components of the fallen worldview,
emerge as a consequence of the shift in perception within the entire eternal community
when it names death for the first time in the poem. Upon looking at Urizen after Los’s
binding efforts, “The Eternals said: ‘What is this? Death. / Urizen is a clod of clay’” (6.9
10, E 74). In the context of the social relations among the group, such a statement shows
how Eternity itself, or at least its ‘residents’, is compromised. By recognizing or naming
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mortality, the Eternals are responsible in part for ushering death into the world, where
death signifies both an end to life (or life as they know it) and ignorance (of the true
nature of social relations). Following this division, Blake writes:
And now seen, now obscur’d, to the eyes
Of Eternals the visions remote
Of the dark separation appear’d.
As glasses discover the Worlds
In the endless Abyss of space,
So the expanding eyes of Immortals
Beheld the dark visions of Los,
And the globe of life blood trembling. (15.6-13, E 78)
Blake’s simile comparing telescopes to the Eternals’ vision turns on the word “discover.”
Here, too, there is a sense that the newness of the discovery, of having something come
into being because one is now able to see it (as an astronomer “discovers the Worlds”
with his “glasses”), implies a kind of creation. At first, union exists in Eternity, but with
the separation of Urizen (and Los), presence and absence come into being. Separation
allows Urizen to be seen, to be present as an objective phenomenon to the Eternals;
conversely, it also allows him not to be seen, to be absent to them, as when they initially
“gave him a place in the north” (2.3, E 70) for his self-defining act. Urizen “abstracts]”
(3.6, E 70) himself from the Eternals by “self-contemplating” (3.21, E 73), by viewing
himself as unconnected and discrete from the whole. Again, Blake uses the word
“appear’d,” and this particular simile implies that, by seeing, by discovering or
uncovering, the Eternals also help make this event concrete. Similes in Blake tend to
make obscure moments or events more physical, as when Blake compares “the dark
separation appear[ing]” to the discovery of a planet through a telescope. Having someone
see their division helps to concretize the division of Los and Urizen, and it also helps to
make them come into “Self-closd” being.21
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Mitchell argues that the Eternals themselves are Urizenic in their appearance, as plate 15

suggests. Here, Blake depicts a group o f figures in the sky creating something below them. Depending on
the copy, there are sometimes three figures and sometimes four (as in copy G). Blake illustrates either two
old men with white hair and long beards with one young man or two o f each. Mitchell assesses the one with
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Los himself divides even further in the wake of the initial division and binding of
Urizen. Los’s pity at the sight of Urizen produces his female counterpart, Enitharmon:
The globe of life blood trembled
Branching out into roots;
Fib’rous, writhing upon the winds;
Fibres of blood, milk and tears;
In pangs, eternity on eternity.
At length in tears & cries imbodied
A female form trembling and pale
Waves before [Los’s] deathly face.
All Eternity shudderd at sight
Of the first female now separate
Pale as a cloud of snow
Waving before the face of Los. (18.1-12, E 78)
As with Urizen and Los, who rise or appear to the sight, Enitharmon’s separation is an
event for the eyes to behold. She “waves before” the face of Los and comes into being
before his eyes, as if her creation and his seeing her are inextricably conjoined. His
“deathly face” emphasizes the fallen quality of this continual separation. Eternity, or the
whole community of Eternals, responds to her appearance, and in acknowledging her
separateness, it too participates in the continual reproduction of the rituals of ideology,
interpellating others as subjects, as separate individuals. Blake writes, “Eternity
shudder'd when they saw / Man begetting his likeness / On his own divided image”
(19.13-15, E 79). Blake’s diction, the use of the words “likeness” and “image,” explicitly
three figures and argues that Blake is showing how the two old Urizenic Eternals manipulate the younger
Eternal, or Los (“Poetic and Pictorial Imagination” 345-46). However, 1 would argue that the four-person
plate suggests that the Eternals consist o f two youthful Los figures and two older Urizen figures; the old
figures no longer outnumber the youthful ones, suggesting that they are all equally complicit in the actions
o f the poem. Thanks to the resemblance between Urizen and the older Eternals and between Los and the
younger ones, it is difficult to distinguish between the characters in this poem and difficult to easily assign
blame. In fact, the Eternals do not manipulate Los into Urizenic action; the action results naturally from the
emergence o f the ideology o f self within the eternal community— all are infected.
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unites vision and sight to identity-formation. The perpetuation of interpellation continues
as Enitharmon “bore an enormous race” (20.45, E 81). Urizen’s production of identities
occurs after Los and Enitharmon’s. Again, new individuals enter the world by way of
appearance: Fuzon, Thiriel, Grodna, and Utha appear as they emerge from the various
elements (23.8-10, E 81; fig. 24). Creation results from the act of seeing.
The Eternals respond to these events by trying to evacuate vision, shutting out the
sights they see by erecting an edifice—called the ‘Tent of Science’—to enclose Urizen,
Los, Enitharmon, and the others. In this example, the ideology of self and the social
constitution of identity intersect in an explicitly theatrical articulation, resonating with
both Althusser’s theory of subject-formation and Hadley’s melodramatic mode of
identity-formation—as well as with melodramatic spectacle and embodiment more
generally. Urizen begins with the voice of the Eternals and with the bard hearing their
words. He says, “Eternals, 1 hear your call gladly; / Dictate swift winged words, & fear
not / To Unfold your dark visions of torment” (2.5-7, E 70). Not only do his words
resonate with Althusserian interpellation (Blake hears the call of the Eternals), but also
the unfolding of visions suggests the pulling back of a (stage) curtain to reveal the
spectacle hid within. The bard indicates that the Eternals summon him and utter the
words of the poem to him. He does not mention the act of writing (with the implicit
counterpart of reading); rather, he initiates this poem as a kind of performance—the
Eternals speaking/dictating the events for him to hear. In addition, the comparisons to
staged drama solidify when one considers the ‘Tent of Science,’ where, I argue, Blake
references theatrical spectacle in a more literal fashion. Critics such as Leslie
Tannenbaum, Sibyl C. Jacobson and F. B. Curtis interpret the ‘Tent of Science’ in a
biblical context. Tannenbaum refers to it as “separating the fallen world from Eternity” in
a “reversal of the Apolcalpyse” (34); Jacobson notes, “This passage from Urizen echoes
the description in Exodus of the curtaining of the tabernacle” (71); and Curtis explains it
as a possible reference to the “tent and darkness in A. Geddes’ The Holy Bible” (93).
Rather than its biblical roots, 1 examine the tent’s theatrical status.
Blake theatricalizes the ideological or interpellative moment when separate
selfhoods are recognized, specifically when the Eternals construct their edifice. After
watching characters divide into numerous self-contained identities, the Eternals
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eventually become unable to endure the sight of further divisions. As a result, they create
a curtain to hide the events from their eyes. The Eternals command:
‘Spread a Tent, with strong curtains around them
Let cords & stakes bind in the Void
That Eternals may no more behold them.’
They began to weave curtains of darkness.
They erected large pillars round the Void,
With golden hooks fastend in the pillars;
With infinite labour the Eternals
A woof wove, and called it Science. (19.2-9, E 78)
The reference to the “Tent” as “curtains of darkness” suggests a stage curtain that masks
or reveals the drama on the stage, a stage demarcated with pillars, hooks, cords and
stakes. Mary Lynn Johnson and John E. Grant aptly call what the Eternals are viewing a
spectacle in a note to the work: “The spectacle o f ‘love and jealousy’ [...] is too painful
for the Eternals to contemplate” (Blake’s Poetry and Designs 1979, 153). With the Tent,
Blake directly connects seeing with spectatorship of a theatrical nature. The Eternals
seem to watch the others as if the ideology of self, the production of identities, is
something they witness on a stage (rather than participate in themselves). The
construction of this structure, then, indicates that, like an audience, the Eternals view the
world as a stage and the beings upon it as performers.
The Tent of Science that the Eternals build not only functions to block out what
they are seeing, but it also exemplifies the ideology of self in material terms. The
structure creates the dynamics of audience and spectator, of two separate spaces—the
space of the actors, which include Urizen and Los, and the space of the audience, or the
Eternals. Elsewhere in Blake’s works, the Tent appears to be “a temporary and protective
dwelling place, representing] a man’s philosophy,” according to S. Foster Damon (397).
If this construction is representative of the philosophy or science of the Eternals or of the
performers they wish to hide, then such a philosophy or science is performative—they
have a theatrical worldview in that ‘all the fallen world’s a stage.’ By naming the Tent, or
the fabric or weaving that constitutes this edifice, Science, the Eternals imply that such a
structure represents a system or an ideology. This ideology creates the network of human
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relations as a division between performers and audience, or subjects and objects, I and
you.
“The Eternals closed the tent / They beat down the stakes, the cords” (19.46-47, E
79) and shut out the horrific spectacle of embodiment, separation, and identity-formation,
all of which becomes a performance. Paananen argues, “What we call ‘science,’ a
knowledge based on delusive ‘nature,’ is not the truth about our existence but that which
separates us from the truth. The Newtonian world machine, a ‘scientific’ model of nature
that denies imagination a role in perception and separates subject and object, has been
completed” (34). The Tent, then, represents in literal form the Eternals’ misapprehension
of reality. Their false reality is one in which Urizen, Los, and Enitharmon exist as
separate from their collective and where the senses are rejected (as the hiding away of the
others indicates) rather than utilized to re-establish a pre-fallen state or to find
redemption. The Eternals believe that they can merely close the curtain on the
performance and return to Eternity unaffected by the spectacle of identity-formation. But
this is impossible. Eternity is not a place to which they can return; rather than a
geographical or cosmological location, it is a way of seeing. Despite their attempt to seal
off Urizen and Los and the others from their view, the Eternals themselves will remain
fallen—their perception has shifted along with the others that they reject.
In Althusserian terms, their social network has degenerated into one governed by
interpellation. The Eternals recognized Urizen, and Urizen responded to their hail or call.
At the same time, Urizen recognized the Eternals as other than himself, and they
responded to his call. At this moment, the eternal community fractured, allowing for the
relation between subject and object to emerge and for unique individuals to establish
themselves, thereby threatening the overall whole. Building the Tent shows that the
Eternals are compromised and that their perception is fallen, much as the first depiction
of them suggests. As Stephen Behrendt points out, “Even the conventional invocation of
the muses is inverted here, for it seems more as if the Eternals have sought Blake out to
record their visions” (Reading William Blake 133; also qtd. in Worrall, Notes 129). By
calling on Blake, they prove themselves to be inside the ideology of the self; they stage a
scene of Althusserian interpellation. The theatricality at play in the construction of the
Tent is concomitant with the fall. Blake’s use of the Tent as a theatrical space more
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directly redefines the interpersonal relations between the Eternals and the others as
theatrical, and, therefore, interpellation as theatrical.
While my reading of Urizen as the primordial scene of interpellation has focused
primarily on verbal articulations, 1 do not intend to rank Blake’s visual bodies second to
the text; they offer something more as well. At times, Blake creates moments in his
designs that are not represented in the text. For instance, in the narrative sequence of
Enitharmon’s birth, the corresponding design does not illustrate the text quoted above.
The text suggests that the emerging being, “The globe of life blood,” materializes before
Los’s face. All the emotion—the majority of the pain—is attributed to the “female form”
and not to Los. However, the design of Los hunched over streaming blood from his body
while a giant red orb hangs from his head indicates that Enitharmon literally pours forth
from his body in a manner that seems anything but painless (pi. 17; fig. 30). In the image,
Enitharmon does not merely appear “waving before his face”; instead, Los grasps the
sides of his head with his hands and appears to be in a physical struggle. The blood
pouring from Los is immense: much of the plate consists of his free-flowing blood and
nerve fibres, and a great number of bloodlines or veins are visible on his back. The image
of Los relays his part in the birth, which is not present in the poetry. It is a strictly visual
moment without even a few ‘stage directions’ to indicate Los’s exact role or the precise
nature of Enitharmon’s birth (i.e., how did she come to wave in front of Los’s face as a
giant globule?). In this moment of extreme duress, we are encouraged to look at and
visually consume the bodies, to consume the image in all its excess. Blake’s
melodramatic bodies may correspond to a textual description, but they, like Brooks’s
assessment of the bodies of silent film, cannot be reduced to linguistic interpretation.
There is always something that remains unarticulable, though the designs express so
much. Elkins writes, “The skin communicates between the body and the outside world in
a variety of ways, serving as an intermediary, an interface, between the two realms. [...]
The skin also communicates by representing states of the body and mind to the outside
world. It is a conduit, and it is also a writing surface on which the body’s thoughts are
inscribed” (Pictures o f the Body 46). In his designs, Blake provides us with a way to
connect, perhaps empathetically, to, for example, Los’s internal emotional and
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Fig. 30. The Book o f Urizen, copy G, plate 17, object 17, c. 1818, Lessing J. Rosenwald
Collection, Library of Congress. © 2010 the William Blake Archive. Used with
permission. This project is supported in part by a William Blake Archive Reproduction
Grant for Graduate Students.

212

psychological state. Such a method of representation—the spectacle of extreme anguish
and the excess that is not contained by the verbal sphere—suggests the melodramatic as a
mode of performance, encouraging an affective, rather than purely cerebral, response in
the audience.
What happens to the audience as they look at the spectacle? What good is it to see
images of separation like the one of Los and Enitharmon mentioned above? Morris Eaves
views the act of seeing, or more specifically beholding, when the beholder is changed to
become that which he or she witnesses, in a negative light. Indeed, much of my own
argument suggests that vision is a key factor in the fall. Eaves argues, “either man makes
his environment or it makes him” (“The Title-page of The Book ofUrizen” 229). If what
Eaves argues is true and “Urizen is his own victim. ‘He became what he beheld’ should
be his epitaph” (230), then the same goes for Los, Enitharmon, the Eternals, and so forth.
Mann similarly argues, “Los ‘becomes’ Urizen” and “he becomes what he beholds, a
stone, as stony Urizen” (54). Likewise, Steve Clark states, “Los [...] immediately
dwindles to the image which he has constructed, and so ‘became what he beheld’” (135).
With respect to Los, it very much seems that beholding a fallen Urizen allows him to
“become” as well—that is, become fallen just like Urizen. Mann takes it a step further:
“The reader also falls: the later equation, ‘they became what they beheld,’ includes us. If
we tend to imagine ourselves outside the book, looking in, we are very much like the
Eternals” (56). Since we are already fallen, there does not seem to be much value in
Blake’s pointing out that we are fallen, or in replicating our fallen state. Rather, Blake
seems to want to clear avenues to the Eternal rather than obstruct them. By depicting
vision as an active force, whether good or bad, he shows the energetic side of sight and
the potential that lies within. Yes, it is capable of making us fall, but by the same token, it
is capable of making us rise. Creation may be figured as a fall, as something negative,
but, even in Urizen, the implication that we can try to access the Eternal from our fallen
position is present. The act of seeing in Urizen, while it more often than not results in a
negative production, possesses the potential for a positive production. Blake imbues
vision with a great deal of power.
Vision has the ability to engender specific human relationships in Blake’s Urizen.
Once Los ceases in his attempt to bind Urizen’s changes, looking provokes in him the
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feeling of pity: “He saw Urizen deadly black, / In his chains bound, & Pity began”
(13.50-51, E 77). Pity arises in him when he sees Enitharmon: “But Los saw the Female
& pitied” (19.10, E 79). As “The Divine Image” indicates, pity is “one of the Divine
attributes” (Damon 327). It is one of many particular conditions and states of human
relations, and, like mercy, peace and love, it forges bonds among people. Blake suggests
that the way we come to relate to one another is, for better or worse, by and large a result
of the visual sense. Seeing, then, is significant in determining how we engage with each
other and—as do all the senses—provokes emotions that unite us to our fellow-beings.
One implication is that by creating a medium in which we see the characters, he is
pushing us, his audience, into a more relational context, a less self-involved one, as well
as showing how sound and sight are linked to power, the power to create things or effect
paradigm shifts. By including this conception of vision in his work, he inverts the
conventional hierarchy of mind over body by showing the potency of physical sight and
incarnated performance.
In fact, imagination and its creative force are not disconnected from the physical
body. Ideally, the creative force of the imagination functions in unison with the creative
force of the senses—mind with body—to achieve enlightenment. To argue, as Mann
does, that “Blake writing Urizen is Blake repeating Los’s errors” (56), is to undo Blake’s
vision of art and imagination. The fall, or the power and truth we ascribe to merely
imaginary networks of relation, needs to be altered, but it is not a hopeless or permanent
state. I find a more redemptive possibility in this act of seeing, particularly in a dramatic
context. Despite the negative consequences of seeing in these cases, Blake highlights the
power of vision, which is quite extraordinary; we must learn to use this capacity to lead
us to eternal vision, something that Blake suggests is possible even from a fallen position.
Unlike Wordsworth, whose representation of the senses situates him in the space of the
closet and within Hadley’s romantic mode (where identity is constituted in a private
space), Blake, who bridges the division between interior and exterior through the senses
and emphasizes identity as constituted in a relational context, stands in Hadley’s
melodramatic mode. Blake’s turn toward melodramatic techniques, which emphasize the
visual and external spheres in various ways, demonstrates an understanding of identity as
relational and stresses the importance of social interconnections.
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Blake’s designs also reaffirm the power of vision, and reach beyond the world
presented in the work to the world of the audience. In some copies of Urizen, Blake
visually depicts figures gazing straight ahead, as if looking into our world and, at times,
even staring directly at us. For instance, Urizen gazes at us as he presents his book of
metals (pi. 5, copies C and F), suggesting that the books he makes are intended for us; a
despairing and newly formed Enitharmon seems to be looking at us as her body bends
perpendicularly away from a hunched-over Los (pi. 19, copy B); the child in the
Preludium directs his gaze toward the audience (pi. 2, copies B, C, D, F, and G); some of
Urizen’s children stare straight ahead after they first appear (pi. 24, copy B); and the
praying child beside the sleeping dog stares at us (pi. 26, copy G). Perhaps the most
significant plate in which a character looks directly at us is the howling Los (pi. 7; all
copies; fig. 27). With this plate, Blake exploits the tension between visual and verbal
description and the differences in affective response. There is a difference between seeing
Los’s body in the throes of horror and pain and reading about Los howling. The poetry
can directly relate to the image of a howling Los on at least three separate plates:
Los wept howling around the dark Demon
And cursing his lot; for in anguish,
Urizen was rent from his side (6.2-4, E 73-74)

Los howld in a dismal stupor,
Groaning! gnashing! groaning!
Till the wrenching apart was healed. (7.1-3, E 74)

On ages roll’d ages in ghastly
Sick torment; around him in whirlwinds
Of darkness the eternal Prophet howl’d. (10.5-7, E 74-75)
All three quotations include a verbal reference to Los’s howl. Although Blake’s diction is
both visceral (e.g., “rending,” “wrenching” and “gnashing”) and intensely passionate
(e.g., “anguish,” “groaning,” and “ghastly Sick torment”), his design relays Los’s
emotional state in a more direct way; we can see his naked body gripped in anguish, his
muscles clenched, and his eyes and mouth contorted to express horror and pain. Engulfed
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in flames, Los kneels in an irregular manner—his torso is bent forward at a perpendicular
angle to the ground, but his hands are crisscrossed to wrap around the sides of his head
(rather than on the ground to support his weight). The verbal and visual delineations elicit
different kinds of responses. The visual design concerns itself with showing the external
manifestation of Los’s internal anguish described in the text.
David Bindman relates this design back to theories of gesture (discussed earlier in
this chapter), showing how Blake worked within the context of his time:
Blake’s work in the 1790s tends to exploit more fully the expressive
possibilities of the human body through physiognomy and bodily gestures.
Blake still had recourse, probably unconsciously, to Le Brun’s categories
of facial expression, and in The Book o f Urizen on occasions appears to
follow them quite closely. Los’s reaction to the unformed Urizen in plate 8
corresponds partially to Le Brun’s illustration and description o f ‘Terrour
or Fright’. (34)
The parallels that critics such as Bindman and Warner find between Blake’s designs and
treatises on gesture and expression suggest that Blake exhibits a keen interest not only in
depicting the external realities of internal workings but also in what Le Brun was doing:
“emphasizing the relation between psychology and physiology” (Warner 38). By
imitating Le Brun’s terror and astonishment with “the open mouth and wide-open eye”
(40) and utilizing such extremes of expression, Blake depicts the separation of selfhood
in melodramatic terms. As Los’s pity is aroused when he sees Urizen chained, our
empathy is stirred by the visual effect of seeing Los under duress. Elkins states,
“Empathy [...] has to do with an involuntary sharing of sensation between our bodies and
something or someone we see” {The Object Stares Back 137). The images elicit an
affective response in the audience as they look at Los’s face and body, but the fact that
Los also stares out at us as he lives through this torturous experience enhances our
response because this gesture more directly “speaks” to us. One implication of this direct
visual contact is that Los is potentially reacting to seeing us, thereby acknowledging our
position within the ideological framework of social relations in the same way as our gaze
interpellates him, making him a subject. As a result, we are implicated in the ideology of
self, in the creation and fall.
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Nevertheless, perhaps Blake’s figures also call on us in order to stir us out of our
complacency. Los’s gaze prevents the audience from becoming absorbed in the fiction;
he encourages us to take up a self-conscious position as participants and to abandon our
desire to be mere passive receivers. These self-reflexive engagements interpellate us,
showing us that we are part of the fallen world. They make it impossible to close the Tent
curtain as the Eternals do, which is equivalent to ignoring the problem. By
acknowledging our complicity as audience/co-creators of Urizen and the scene of
interpellation, we take the first step toward righting the problem. The fact that characters
hear and see each other come into being and that identity-creation is a matter of sensory
perception suggests a kind of performance in which the audience—the perceivers—co
create the product onstage. However, like a staged drama, an audience changes the
significance of the performance; the audience helps constitute the reality of what is
staged. This power translates into the power to alter reality itself and to break free from
the ideology of self through the power of sense perception, albeit a transformative kind.
From a strictly textual perspective, the narrative trajectory seems to signal a world
unsalvageable. Fuzon and his siblings abandon the world, leaving “the pendulous earth”
(28.21, E 83). The world offers no hope and they, in turn, give up hope for it:
The remaining sons of Urizen
Beheld their brethren shrink together
Beneath the Net of Urizen.
Perswasion was in vain;
For the ears of the inhabitants
Were wither’d & deafen’d & cold.
And their eyes could not discern
Their brethren of other cities. (28.11-18)
Mann argues that “Urizen functions precisely as a critique of exodus (of Exodus)” (64)
because we are left on the pendulous earth. There is no exit. Rajan reads the end as a
hopeless repetition of the beginning of the poem, thereby “conceding the futility of the
project, begun by the Eternals when they confined ‘Urizen’ geographically by giving him
a place in the North” (“(Dis)figuring the System” 409). It is true that the poem ends in a
scene of ominous enclosure, but throughout and even near the end, Blake provides us a
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way out. The senses are key in achieving redemption for the inhabitants: “No more could
they rise at will / In the infinite void, but bound down / to earth by their narrowing
perceptions” (25.45-28.1). Without their more expansive abilities, the inhabitants of the
world are lost. They can no longer participate in Eternity. Division and separation does
not seem to necessarily forego their relationship to the Eternal, but the closing of the
senses does. The withered, deaf, and cold ears and the undiscerning eyes are to blame for
the utter despair at the end of Urizen. The eyes and ears, then, and the potential to
reinvigorate and expand these senses appear to be the primary ways of restoring a lost
connection to the Eternal.
Through an imaginative use of sense perception can we break free of ideology
and see the interdependent relationship between self and community. This restoration
remains within our grasp if only we reexamine the potential of our perception. Makdisi
claims:
it is precisely in accepting that what can be perceived defines what is
possible, and that what is possible defines what can be perceived, that the
fall takes place, every day. The fall, in other words, does not constitute a
reality. Rather, it constitutes a certain highly circumscribed ontology of
perception and of being—a mode of perceiving which is precisely what
makes reality real to the limited forms of life appropriate to it. The latter,
stripped of the capacity for imagination, and ‘bound down / To earth by
their narrowing perceptions,’ regard this fallen world as the only world,
this reality as the only possible reality, themselves as the only possible
forms of being, and hence their history as the only possible (that is, legally
sanctioned) history [...]. ‘Impossible history,’ on the other hand [...]
refus[es] to take for granted that which the law mandates as ‘possible’ and
‘necessary.’ (William Blake 262)
Makdisi’s reading of Urizenic perception and the fall, though primarily focused on the
politics of lived and recorded history, suggests the positive (and necessary) potential of
the senses to provide a glimpse of Eternity with the help of imaginative acts. His idea of
making the impossible possible reinforces my point about Blake’s notion of the senses as
partaking in creation. We have a far greater ability with our imaginations and bodies than

218
we think we do; success is only a matter of not restricting the capacity of the senses,
raising them in order to experience the infinite. Blake may depict the sensory world as
one of experience, as a fallen world, but he recognizes the unavoidable relation between
the mind’s imaginative abilities and the bodily senses.
If a focus on the linear narrative makes it difficult to see the poem as anything
more than a hopeless view of the fall, then I would argue that non-linear readings
focusing on the designs thwart this negative reading. Specifically, I am referring to the
iconography of the poem, which centres on two opposing poses: the confined figure and
the liberated one. The implications of the poses revolve around a romantic versus
melodramatic reading of identity and the power of the senses. The repeated pose of the
hunched figure exemplifies the attempt to cut off sensory perception. It is telling that, in
all of the images of figures hiding their eyes, their ears, or both, the figures depict sorrow
or pain or terror—some kind of oppressive and restrictive emotion. The opposing image
of the figure standing tall with arms wide open suggests an openness to sensory
perception. For instance, on plate 6 in copies A, B, C, F, and G, three figures fall through
the flames. The figures on either side grip their ears and eyes, respectively, as their bodies
take up contorted postures (fig. 31). The central figure, however, straightens his whole
body and stretches out his arms in a cross position. Although all three figures are falling,
the one in the middle seems to suggest the possible road to redemption as he embraces
the world through eyes and ears.
Moreover, all three figures have a serpent coiled around them, but only the central
figure’s serpent reveals its head, which forms a semi-circle around the figure’s head.
Arguably, the serpent represents Ore, the revolutionary force in the poem, as it does in
Europe (Otto, “Re-Framing the Moment of Creation” 238-39) and elsewhere, suggesting
that the road to redemption lies in this kind of freeing openness. As Paananen states, “Ore
represents the possibility of revolutionary change. [...] if we do not restrain the
passionate element in us [...] revolution will begin that will lead through political change
to, finally, a return to Eternity” (36). Seeing Ore as serpent, then, allows us to read the
central figure as embracing revolution, as embracing the path to redemption. Lussier
convincingly argues that Blake’s opposition to “the empirical tradition” and “to rational
demonstration and its dependence on memory” provides a “liberati[on] [of] perceptual
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Fig. 31. The BookofUrizen, copy G, plate 6, object 7, c. 1818, Lessing J. Rosenwald
Collection, Library of Congress. © 2010 the William Blake Archive. Used with
permission. This project is supported in part by a William Blake Archive Reproduction
Grant for Graduate Students.
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dynamics from the fixed-point perspective from which Newton makes his
pronouncements, and thus denies the integral role played by the observer’s energies in the
determination of reality in preference for an illusory objectivity” (“Blake and Science
Studies” 200). The visual designs of Urizen provide us with multiple perspectives from
which to engage the work and multiple ways to affectively respond to the bodies we see,
thereby encouraging us out of a solipsistic space. By using iconography to offer
something outside of the textual sphere, Blake parallels the power of sight in the poem:
we the audience help to construct this avenue to redemption by our very act of seeing.
The more we try to get beyond the ideology of the self and the more we embrace the
imagination, the more expansive our physical bodies will appear. Our senses become
valuable in allowing us to get outside ourselves; doing so helps to undermine the
ideology created with the fall of the eternal community. The senses allow for an
integrated mode of being through expressivity; they allow for the social; and, most
importantly, they enable us to take the redemptive path away from the ideology of self
toward a more integrated and expanded understanding of identity and community.
Blake’s melodramatic mode of representation allows the potential of the spectacle
of the interpellative moment to emerge. Baz Kershaw reasserts the power of the spectacle
against anti-spectacle sentiment: “spectacle may produce a sudden deconstruction of the
world as we thought we knew it. [...] [And] work paradoxically to open up new domains
for radical revisions of the way things are. They are therefore an especially powerful
potential force for progressive activism” (599). While Kershaw is referring specifically to
more contemporary “deconstructive spectacles” of performance art (just one of many
types of spectacles he outlines in his essay), I would argue that this point about
“opening] up new domains for radical revisions of the way things are” applies to what
Urizen accomplishes with its melodramatic focus on the body, the senses, the external,
excess, spectacle, as well as social relations.
Reading the work in the context of melodrama, then, offers a way to see it not
only as a radical revision of the biblical story but also as a radical revision of identity and
community by stressing the social influences on identity-formation. In the poem, Blake
examines the rupture of an ideal community, a rupture caused by faulty vision and which
results in fragmentation and division (the fall). He locates the problem in Urizen’s act of

221

self-identification, an act that entails a double process: Urizen wills his own separate
selfhood and the Eternals recognize him as such. The Eternals share equally in the
construction of his singular identity by virtue of seeing and hearing Urizen come into
“Self-closd” existence (3.4, E 70). This process demonstrates an Althusserian
interpellation and the emergence of an ideology of the self, which paradoxically includes
both recognition and misrecognition in that what is recognized is merely imaginary and
the true nature of social relations is forgotten.
Nevertheless, Althusser opens up the possibility for change by labeling ideology
imaginary, despite its very real and material reach and consequences. Although The Book
o f Urizen ends with the continuing proliferation of selves and an image of the created
universe as a place to abandon, Blake, like Althusser, also includes the potential for
change. If the system of human relations is illusory or faulty, as is suggested by the
emphasis on a fallen state, then Urizen and Los and the rest of the Eternals are not
irrevocably lost. Perception is key—seeing has a creative force in the poem, and, though
it works negatively to form singular and distinct identities, the possibility to use such a
potent force for a positive outcome surely exists. Redemption is possible for them, and so
too for us. If Eternity is a mode of perception, then perhaps the ideal community is within
our reach. Perhaps with cleansed or altered senses we can see more correctly and get
beyond a system of interpellation and an ideology of the self, and, thereby, refashion the
existing social dynamic.
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(En)Acting Identity in Blake’s Milton

“Wondrous were their acts” (40.2, E 141), exclaims Blake upon seeing Milton’s and
Ololon’s self-annihilation and unification in the illuminated poem Milton (dated 1804;
printed between 1810 and 1818). The awe of human action expressed in this particular
phrase encapsulates one of the primary effects of the work: the enactment and
performance of deeds seem to be more significant than any one individual, and,
furthermore, “doing” (taking action) rather than simply “being” (or existing)1reifies
identity. My reading positions Milton as a key text for reconsidering Blake’s view of
action and his depiction of identity as a paradoxical combination of essentialist and
constructivist notions, and it suggests how such a reconsideration affects Blake’s relation
to both the Romantic period and the present.
Ostensibly, the poem functions as a revision of John Milton’s Paradise Lost,
correcting his orthodoxy; however, it also does much more: it explores the nature of
identity and its relationship to action. Nevertheless, outlining a basic narrative or even
sketching a linear map of the events in the poem is difficult. The poem repeats actions,
obscures cause and effect, interweaves the identities of characters, confuses a traditional
sense of time as distinctly past, present and future, and even seems to describe several
events as simultaneous or as one single event.12 The poem begins with Blake, as speaker,
invoking Muse-like beings to inspire him to tell the story of John Milton’s acts in
Eternity; a bard in Eternity seems to take over the story, and he narrates Satan’s fall,
which is quite different from the historical Milton’s account. The Bard’s version of
events seems to provoke the character Milton to take action; he leaves Eternity in an
attempt to alter his current state of discontent by going to Earth and undertaking the
process of self-annihilation, where he will destroy the Satan within himself and reunite
1 Mark Bracher’s Being Form'd: Thinking Through Blake's Milton explores questions o f
metaphysics and ontology in a reading o f the poem, and the resulting implications for “what it means to be”
(1), specifically examining the relationship between being and Being or “the being o f the individual” (151)
and “the totality o f being” (152), arriving at the conclusion that “the individual [...] constitutes Being
itse lf’ (277).
2 For instance, Ian Balfour states, “Milton can be said to have one and only one action, a single
moment that is repeated, witnessed, contested, or avoided by every character in the text” (147).
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with his Emanation. In the end, this action brings about the second coming of Christ and
the apocalypse, along with the salvation of humankind. As the story unfolds, various
encounters and events occur, all seemingly at the same time. However, the repeated acts
by various characters, particularly acts of inspiration and self-annihilation, occupy the
central focus of the poem. Examined individually, these acts provide insights into the
importance of inspiration and self-annihilation for a given character in the context of a
specific scene, but, taken together, these acts suggest a greater scope beyond one
individual character; they indicate the significance of inspiration and self-annihilation for
all individuals both inside and outside the poem. In this chapter, I will concentrate on the
performative reiteration of these kinds of acts, using Judith Butler’s theory to reread
Blakean inspiration, and I will examine Blake’s concept of identity, both personal and
poetic, in the context of theories of identity, action, and performance.
The theories and philosophies of thinkers such as Friedrich Nietzsche, Michel
Foucault, Louis Althusser, Jacques Derrida, Judith Butler, and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick
have helped to deconstruct essential identity as a theoretical concept, leaving it without
reliable or stable markers that signify sameness and continuity. This deconstructed “I”
results in an understanding of identity as illusory, discursively and socially constructed,
contingent, and performative. However, William Dennis Horn is critical of “postModemism’s” configuration of the self as a “dogmatic rejection of all notions of
centrality or agency” (260). In his article on Blake’s questioning of the self, Horn sees
Blake (and indeed the whole eighteenth century) as anticipating our postmodernist
concerns with the self, arguing that there is a similar “self-scrutinizing honesty” in both
(283). Horn also aligns Blake with the deconstructive approaches of postmodernism by
demonstrating how “the concept of the self [...] is not merely a fiction, but an error in
thought” in Blake’s works (268). However, Horn never goes so far as to say that Blake
destroys the self altogether, preferring instead to distinguish between a view of the self as
isolated and as interdependent; it is the former view—the self as self-sufficient and
independent—that leads to a “mistaken view of the world.” Following Horn’s analysis of
Blake, I believe that Milton challenges an absolutist understanding of the Blakean self,
making it difficult to position Blake easily under the aegis of postmodern theories of
identity. On the one hand, Blake destabilizes the singular, personal identities of his
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characters; on the other hand, he reaffirms his aesthetic view about the importance of a
firm, clear, “bounding outline” (Descriptive Catalogue E 550), suggesting a clarity and
stability in relation to identity specifically. I argue that Blake complicates any singular
understanding of identity but without completely effacing either the self or human
agency. This complication plays out through the performative aspects of the poem.

Performance and Performativitv
In the introduction to their 1995 collection of essays, Performativity and
Performance, Eve Sedgwick and Andrew Parker discuss how the word “performative”
has gathered meaning in two distinct fields—“philosophy [specifically linguistic
philosophy] and theater” (2)—and how the divide between the two is not as clear as it
may seem. This double meaning is apparent in Milton, a highly “performative” poem in
both senses of the word. For example, in two of the four copies of the poem, Blake adds a
Preface urging the public and artists to “Rouze up” (E 95) against oppression and the
restraint of the imagination resulting from the commercializing interests of society. With
this address to the audience, even before the poem proper begins, he introduces a
performative gesture. By calling on his audience, Blake acknowledges the public space
outside of the poem, the public space in which he wants them to do something. 1 read this
example as a kind of Austinian performative (in which words do things and have power
to make things happen), specifically the kind that follows the “I dare you” structure.
Sedgwick says of the “I dare you” performative, “[Although T dare you’ ostensibly
involves only a singular first and a singular second person, it effectually depends as well
on the tacit demarcation of the space of a third-person plural, a ‘they’ of witness—
whether or not literally present. In daring you to perform some foolhardy act [...], ‘I’ [...]
necessarily invoke a consensus of the eyes of others” (Touching Feeling 69). The dare
does what it says and includes a performance in a “public” space where the dared actor
either performs or fails to perform a deed to be viewed by an (presumed) audience, who
would then applaud or deride success or failure. In part, Milton, alongside Blake’s call,
dares the audience to do something related to their selfhoods. This call, then, functions
primarily as a linguistic performative, whereby the command to “Rouze up” challenges
us to do so; yet the implicit element of the witness or spectator in the challenge connects
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it to the theatre as well.
In addition, Blake’s poem explicitly moves toward the performative in the
theatrical sense. Our understanding of what it means for something to be dramatic (even
when not written according to the strict generic conventions of drama) and stageable
continues to change. For instance, one may not expect a work structured as an epic rather
than as a play to be found on the stage. Yet, recently, Amador, a production company in
the United Kingdom, has staged “William Blake’s ‘Milton’” as a one-man performance.3
Some may counter that the poem, if dramatic at all, moves in the direction of a
monodrama (like, for example, Tennyson’s Maud{1855)), in which the drama of
Milton’s struggle belongs only to his own mind. After all, the poem aligns Satan and
Milton repeatedly. Milton acknowledges himself to be Satan—someone who imposes on
others and holds to the idea of a discrete, isolated self—because he identifies Satan’s
characteristics with his own actions and ideas, an acknowledgment that obscures the
apparently firm outline of identity that Blake describes elsewhere: how can Satan be an
individual identity and yet also be the part of Milton that must be annihilated? While
examining this as a psychological poem where the characters are part of an individual
psyche (as Andrew Cooper does (55)) offers interesting insights, my reading of the poem
moves in a different direction: a dramatic—not monodramatic—one.4 Also, in light of the
importance of the relational constitution of identities in Milton (and, indeed, Blake’s
other works), reducing the poem to the product and effect of one individual psyche
undercuts Blake’s depiction of the transformative effects of inspiration. Thus, aligning
Milton and Satan implies more than just Milton’s inner struggle.
Besides the content, the framework of the poem and the role of the narrator point
toward the theatrical, and, moreover, reposition Blake in relation other Romantic
conceptions of poetic identity. He does not rely on a singular narrative voice to give us a
description of their various mental states; characters often speak what they feel or express

3 Accompanied by a live orchestra, Richard Ramsbotham (the solo performer) interacts with
massive wall projections o f Blake’s designs, many o f which are from Milton.
4 John Howard reads Milton symbolically and psychologically as an exploration o f “the unity o f
cosmic, historic, topical, and personal existence” (21). He argues that, in part, the poem is a “psychodrama”
(254).
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their inner states more immediately in the designs. Furthermore, Blake does not simply
write the poem from the position of speaker-narrator; he includes himself as part of the
dramatis personae, thereby not privileging his inferiority. Blake participates in this poem
not only as the inspired poet who records Milton’s deeds for posterity but also as a
character—one among many. While the poem does have some autobiographical elements
(i.e., the inclusion of Blake’s wife, his brother, his cottage at Felpham, and his conflicted
relation to Milton), I argue that it goes beyond the traditional Romantic autobiographical
and subjective poem (most notably, Wordsworth’s The Prelude; or, Growth o f a Poet's
Mind ( 1805)). The difference is that Blake focuses on action and a host of other
characters rather than on the contemplative moments of a single consciousness (i.e.,
Wordsworth as poet), thereby creating a dramatic space.
In terms of the poetic voice or identity, the Romantic period provides us with
many paradigms. In Romantic Identities: Varieties o f Subjectivity, 1774-1830, Andrea K.
Henderson argues that post-structuralists (Zizek, Derrida, Lacan, and Althusser) have
mounted an “attack on the very idea of self-identity,” thereby undermining the
conventionally “Romantic view of subjectivity” (2-3). However, her thesis is that the
Romantic period itself offers “competing models of the self’ (2) distinct from a
Wordsworthian model of “psychological depth” (1), and she proceeds to interpret a select
number of Romantic-period authors to a large extent in the context of class, money, and
the marketplace. I would add the poetic paradigms that also offer more general views on
identity. For example, there is the “egotistical sublime” (Keats’s term) of Wordsworth
(Keats 279), who holds fast to his sense of self through his memories and to his
relationship to the natural world through those memories. There is the performative
paradigm in Byron, who blurs the line between himself and his fictional creations and
calls attention to the process of writing. And there is the model of the chameleon poet in
Keats, who argues for an annihilation of the self. These three examples offer varied
implications for poetic identity and its construction.
Yet the boundaries separating these examples are not firm, particularly with
respect to the Wordsworthian and Byronic ones, which are, in fact, different kinds of
performative models. With its emphasis on sincere expression and speaking a more
human (rather than ornate and poetic) language, critics tend to view Wordsworth’s
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“Preface” to Lyrical Ballads as “the manifesto of Romantic authenticity par excellence”
(Russett 37), implying his opposition to performativity. However, Judith Pascoe
interrogates this stereotypical and conventional view, which opposes Wordsworth to
theatricality and performativity, as well as to performative poets such as Byron. She has
argued persuasively that “Wordsworth’s [...] mode of presentation [constructs] the
institution of an authorial voice so stable that the poet is conflated with the narrator of the
poem” (178). This conflation represents an attempt to be authentic or sincere. She
contends, “Wordsworth [...] struck a pose, but his was that of the sincere rural dweller,
the natural talent.” His poetics attempt to depict a cohesive and expressive, rather than
performative, speaking “I”: “a fragmented consciousness [...] is, paradoxically, precisely
what Wordsworth’s antitheatrical sincerity works to conceal.” Poets such as Byron and
even Wordsworth, given Pascoe’s new insights, suggest a certain drive toward the
theatrical and performative in the Romantic construction of the speaker, a drive that
Blake—who offers us yet another model—certainly shares.
The important difference between Wordsworth’s poetic model and other models
of the time lies in the fact that Wordsworth’s poetry emphasizes the past moment—things
done or felt and then considered in a calm reflective stance. In contrast, Blake, like
Byron, centralizes the present moment. In the poem Milton, Blake rejects the
Wordsworthian focus on memory and contemplation of the self and turns toward a
different model, a model typically associated with Byron and his “1 was there” approach,5
which places him on display through associations and parallels with the Byronic hero.
Blake begins by replacing memory with inspiration—a process that emphasizes the
present moment and present action—by invoking the daughters of Beulah (inspiration)
rather than the daughters of Mnemosyne (memory). While doing so, Blake, in a more
Byronic move, does not simply act as a narrator of recollected events (as Wordsworth
5

By this 1 mean Byron’s habitual emphasis on his real-life experiences, particularly the ones that

define him as a world traveler. He often writes passages in the present moment, highlighting the fact that he
really had visited various wonders and historical monuments in other countries and had firsthand
experience o f exotic cultures, as he does in, for instance, Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage (1812-18). In Byron

and Place: History, Translation, Nostalgia, Stephen Cheeke explores this “I was there” element o f Byron’s
writing, arguing “that in fact the notion o f being there represents the most powerful and complex aspect o f
Byron’s work” (6).
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tends to do)—he participates in them (both in the text and design) in the moment, in the
present, constructing himself as a character. Blake, as a character, participates in
conflated moments of inspiration that the other characters enact or undergo. In addition,
Blake describes (both verbally and pictorially) a moment of the poem in which he is
being visited by Ololon, Milton’s Emanation. Blake’s cottage garden, then, becomes the
site of a crucial event in the poem. In both these cases, Blake has not only written himself
into the verbal drama, but he has also engraved and painted himself into the visual drama
so that we see him act (or acted upon) as well as read about it. Thus, in Milton, the epic
poet does not merely recount; he also participates in visionary acts of inspiration. As a
character within his own poem, Blake makes himself a performer—he is an actor among
his own “Visionary forms dramatic” (Jerusalem 98.28, E 257), contributing to the acts of
inspiration and self-annihilation and performing his identity within the space of the poem.
Milton suggests the theatrical or performance-based performative in other ways.
Manfred Pfister differentiates drama from narrative forms as follows: “whilst the receiver
of a dramatic text feels directly confronted with the characters represented, in narrative
texts they are mediated by a more or less concrete narrator figure” (3); “In other words,
the characters are allowed to present themselves directly in their role as speakers. It is
therefore the figures’ speech, and, above all, their dialogical speech, which constitutes the
predominant verbal matrix used in dramatic texts” (6). The epic Milton begins with an
apparent narrator, Blake the poet; however, we soon see that he becomes subsumed in the
poem as a character. Furthermore, the other characters speak for themselves, delivering
speeches of their own unmediated by a conventional narrator figure. In fact, in his
Annotations to Swedenborg, Blake articulates a distinction between writer and characters
when he chastises Swedenborg for conflating the two: “Thus Fools quote Shakespeare
The Above is Theseus’s opinion Not Shakespeares You might as well quote Satans
blasphemies from Milton & give them as Miltons Opinions” (E 601). Blake presumes
that the characters have their own voice, a voice which cannot be immediately aligned
with the writer. He complicates this viewpoint by presenting himself as the nominal
author and narrator at first, but then he makes the author and narrator a character rather
than a governing voice. Consequently, we can take nothing for granted in this poem.
Even when Blake himself speaks, his very dramatizing of himself makes it impossible to
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take anything at face value. Moreover, like any other character, he writes himself as
having limited knowledge about the unfolding events of the poem.
The embodiment that marks theatre also correlates Blake’s works to the stage.
The word theatre refers to “seeing and sight” in Greek, as Joseph Roach explains (46).
The theatre is a sensory experience in that we typically see (and often hear) the actors and
the spectacle on the stage. It is of the body and uses the senses in a way that private,
silent reading does not. Blake’s poem not only forces a visual engagement with his
designs thanks to his composite art, but it also emphasizes the body and action more than
the space of the mind and contemplation. For Blake, the imagination is not separate from
the body. For example, in the invocation, Blake calls on higher powers to tell the story of
Milton in Eternity:
Daughters of Beulah! Muses who inspire the Poets Song
Record the journey of immortal Milton thro’ your Realms

Come into my hand
By your mild power; descending down the Nerves of my right arm
From out the Portals of my Brain, where by your ministry
The Eternal Great Humanity Divine, planted his Paradise[.] (2.1-8, E 96)
He asks the Daughters of Beulah to physically write about Milton’s quest, using his body
as a conduit. Blake implores them to enter and take over his physical body, his “hand,”
“the Nerves of [his] right arm” and his “Brain,” so that they may write this vision of
Eternity. Surprisingly, this kind of invocation scene is very much of the body. As Angela
Esterhammer notes, “its intensely physical conception of the process of inspiration” is
“[rjadical” (Creating States 185). Emphasizing the physical act of writing and the body
parts involved in such an act, Blake subordinates the more esoteric counterpart of poetic
creation. He does not ask for spiritual guidance or for his mental powers to be fortified.
Even when he could use a more abstract word such as “mind,” he chooses, instead, the
concrete and biological term “brain.” He joins the idea of the immaterial imagination to
the material body as the site of paradise.
Furthermore, Blake does not figure Eternity as a space of immaterial bodies and
eternal rest. In Eternity, no one should rest in peace; to do so would mean stasis or a kind
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of death. At the beginning of Book II of Milton, Blake writes, “to / The Sons of Eden the
moony habitations of Beulah, / Are from Great Eternity a mild & pleasant Rest” (30.12
14, E 129). Beulah provides a place of rest, but Blake does not make this the desired
state. Eternity exists as a space of “the Great Wars of Eternity, in fury of Poetic
Inspiration, / To build the Universe stupendous: Mental forms Creating” (30.19-20, E
129). S. Foster Damon explains that Eternity is here defined as “a place of great activity,”
but not a physical activity; instead, he claims, “The great activity [...] consists in the
hunting of Ideas and the mental warfare between them” (130). While Blake does refer to
“Mental Fight” in the introductory lyric of the poem (1.13, E 95), the tone of this passage
about Eternity indicates the physical as well as the mental. It is true that Blake opposes
violent action in conflict so that “the Great Wars of Eternity” must preclude it, but it is
equally true that he does not oppose physical activity and embodiment. The actual
“build[ing of] the Universe stupendous” implies what we would call the external and
physical world. Esterhammer argues, “The sentence is never completed, but culminates
with and remains suspended on the present participle ‘Creating’ [...]. It is not certain
whether ‘Mental forms’ is the subject or object o f ‘Creating,’ but in either case the act of
creation itself is the main focus of the lines” (121). Blake does not clarify whether or not
such creation remains purely imaginative, suggesting that the construction of the universe
depends on both “Mental forms [that] Creat[e]” and^[the] Creating [of]” “Mental
forms.” I argue that this process of creation necessitates the involvement of the body,
given that the poem as a whole, particularly in its depiction of the role of the body in both
text and designs, does not reject physical or material interventions for mental ones, and,
in fact, makes them crucial to Milton’s journey.
As with many maxims one tries to attribute to Blake, an alternative perspective
can most certainly be found. For instance, in speaking of the natural world, he says, “I
assert for My self that I do not behold the Outward Creation & that to me it is a hindrance
& not Action it is as the Dirt upon my feet No part of Me” ( VLJ E 565). Although this is
Blake at his polemical best, I argue that his point is more about reshifting the focus in art
to the human and less about his disdain for the natural world or even for anything
physical. He singles out “Action” as the crucial human expression. To say that all his talk
of bodies, creation, and action is metaphorical, as Damon does, I think is to dismiss
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crucial aspects of Blake’s understanding of human existence. In Jerusalem, as elsewhere,
“the Great Wars of Eternity” and the dual activity of “Mental forms Creating” manifest
themselves in the ceaseless exchange of and conflict between ideas; Blake’s giant beings
conversed together in Visionary forms dramatic which bright
Redounded from their Tongues in thunderous majesty, in Visions
In new Expanses, creating exemplars of Memory and of Intellect
Creating Space, Creating Time according to the wonders Divine
Of Human Imagination^] (98.28-32, E 257-58)
Such an activity, as it is depicted in this long poem, not only externalizes the inner, but it
also depicts a bodily act—conversation—and the body—in this case, the tongue—as
leading to the embodiment and creation of the universe. As with Jerusalem, Milton's
ultimate creative acts constitute a union between imagination and physical performance.
Indeed, for Blake, the two are inseparable, and to think otherwise is an “Error”: “Man has
no Body distinct from his Soul [...] Energy is the only life and is from the Body” (MHH
pi. 4, E 34) so that energy depends on the body to become action. W. J. T. Mitchell
rightly states, “For Blake, the dualistic world of mind and body, time and space, is an
illusion which must not be imitated, but is to be dispelled” (Blake’s Composite Art 31).
Other details included in the poem indicate the vital importance of physical acts
(in addition to mental and imaginative ones) in Eternity. For instance, Blake aligns action
with sound, and, conversely, stasis with silence. As a negative state according to Blake,
silence connotes passivity. As a result, Los chastises Satan for seeking to cast off his
labour and to take up his brother’s, but, more vehemently, Los chastises Satan’s
passivity. Los exclaims, “If you account it Wisdom when you are angry to be silent, and /
Not to shew it: I do not account that Wisdom but Folly” (4.6-7, E 98), and he tells Satan,
“Get to thy Labours at the Mills & leave me to my wrath” (4.14, E 98). Los has the
ability to be wrathful and to express that wrath; Satan does not. Instead, he suppresses
any anger he feels, more content to remain silent than physically express or enact such
anger. Los clearly views this as a fault, while he views his own wrath positively. Later,
Satan succeeds in switching tasks with Palamabron. The switch results in a topsy-turvy
world that Los marks as a day of mourning to be remembered in future times:
follow with me, and tomorrow again
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Resume your labours, & this day shall be a mournful day
Wildly they follow’d Los and Rintrah, & the Mills were silent
They mourn’d all day this mournful day of Satan & Palamabron[.]
(8.21-24, E 102)
All activity ceases as each labourer puts aside his given task, and silence marks the
inactivity as an ominous day. This “mournful day” counts as an unusual one in Eternity,
suggesting that the stillness experienced on this day does not belong to the composition
of the place. Labour and activity define this realm and make it vital; the turn to rest
signals that something is not quite right, suggesting an unhealthy state of affairs.
The main action of the poem also criticizes silence and stasis while at the same
time elevating the physical over the contemplative. Interested in the catalyst of Milton’s
deed, Blake asks the Muses to tell him the reasons for such an act of gigantic proportions:
Say first! what mov’d Milton, who walkd about in Eternity
One hundred years, pondring the intricate mazes of Providence
Unhappy tho in heav’n, he obey’d, he murmur’d not. he was silent
Viewing his Sixfold Emanation scatter’d thro’ the deep
In torment! To go into the deep her to redeem & himself perish?
What cause at length mov’d Milton to this unexampled deed[?]
A Bards prophetic Song! for sitting at eternal tables,
Terrific among the Sons of Albion in chorus solemn & loud
A Bard broke forth! all sat attentive to the awful man.
Mark well my words! they are of your eternal salvation[.] (2.16-25, E 96)
Again, silence marks a kind of negative passivity in which Milton sees the situation of his
Emanation but fails to act to change this circumstance. Blake’s poem begins with
Milton’s passivity, but the rest of the poem depicts only his forthcoming action. Silence
here takes the shape of acquiescence as Milton ‘obeys’ and maintains his ‘silence.’ Prior
to the “prophetic Song,” Milton’s existence is marked by passivity, obedience, and
silence—related negative terms in the poem. He breaks free from this state by choosing
to act and embarking on a journey.
However, Milton’s quest seems strange for many reasons. For one, he is already
in Eternity, so his sense of dissatisfaction or unhappiness seems out of place.
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Nonetheless, he still needs salvation or enlightenment. Being in Eternity has not
conferred that on him. He has not achieved the ultimate Christian spiritual goal, leaving
us to ask what is the goal once you find yourself in Eternity? And how does identity
figure into a space such as Eternity? Milton does not find his salvation by mulling over
various theological questions or philosophies in his mind; rather, he achieves it by an act,
or, to use Blake’s words, by an “unexampled deed.” In fact, as David Riede argues,
“Blake ironically parallels Milton with Adam and Eve to contrast their aboriginal ‘happy
State’ with his unhappiness in the false heaven of his religious vision. Adam and Eve,
however, were happy as long as they obeyed God, while Milton is unhappy even though
‘he obey’d’ [...]” God (268). Blake also ironically contrasts the subject of Paradise Lost,
the cause of the fall of humanity (the failure to passively obey), with Milton’s heroic deed
(his resistance to passivity) that redeems humanity. Milton’s present or soon-to-come
activity contrasts with his past one hundred years of passivity, where he remains “silent”
and “ponders,” “obeys,” and “murmurs not”—antithetical modes of being to a prophet
poet—even as he watches his Emanation in torment. Now, after all this inaction and
silence, he speaks and begins his journey. By juxtaposing stasis and motion as well as
passivity and activity in this way, Blake aligns the poem with a dramatic space where
bodies act, often leading to redemptive possibilities.
Milton has an intriguing provocation for his actions here. He chooses to act only
after he has witnessed, heard, and spectated a performance: that of the “loud voic’d Bard”
who sings his prophetic Song (14.9, E 108). Blake directly links performance to effecting
change. Parker and Sedgwick explain, “[I]t’s the aptitude of the explicit performative for
mobilizing and epitomizing such transformative effects on interlocutory space that makes
it almost irresistible—in the face of a lot of discouragement from Austin himself—to
associate it with theatrical performance” (13). Far from being distasteful and impotent,
performance of a theatrical nature, whether literally taking place on a stage or not, has the
power to incite action, just as the Bard’s performance incites Milton’s singular act.6 The

h While critics disagree as to the potency and coherence o f the Bard’s Song in this respect (207OS), Peter Otto persuasively argues that the merit o f the performance lies in “The Bard’s visionary
deconstruction” (“Visionary Deconstruction” 228) in which he shows the problematic nature o f judgment,
particularly the judgment o f an individual, even Satan. I would add that Milton’s subsequent speech, in
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Bard’s Song also provokes the whole assembly: a “great murmuring in the Heavens of
Albion” follows the performance (14.4, E 108). John Hughes convincingly argues,
Beyond rage and indignation, Blake is also motivated by his affirmative,
visionary, political and ethical enthusiasm, and importantly mobilizes a
kind of thought that is based not on identity as interiority and reflection,
but on individuality as response. Here music becomes particularly
important, because Blake uses it to show how the exteriorized powers of
passion, sensation, imagination break out from the integral, centripetal,
identities of the self, of meaning, and of the moment. (92)
Included under the umbrella term ‘music’ are songs. For Blake, being a spectator who
watches and listens to a performance has active potential, and it suggests the importance
of interpersonal relationships—one character’s act or performance compels the response
of others. Indeed, the very state or identity of one can be affected by the actions of
another. In contrast, Wordsworthian poetics, “pondring the intricate mazes of
Providence”—or Nature as the case may be—does not lead to the visionary. In a Blakean
context, one attains or participates in the visionary, in the Eternal, through action and
vociferous speech (whether performing a song or speaking out and leaving Eternity), a
speech that is always part of an exchange with another(s)—not a solitary monologue.*
7
The decentralization of one specific voice can also be seen in the absence of
quotation marks, which confuses speakers throughout the poem. When the poem tells us
that a “Bard broke forth” to sing his song, the subsequent exclamation, “Mark well my
words! they are of your eternal salvation,” seem to be his. Yet Blake’s failure to set off
the speech makes it difficult to assign it to a speaker clearly. The exclamation may very
well belong to the narrating voice that has begun to tell us about the Bard’s song. The
result, here, is to conflate Blake and the Bard, as Balfour also argues (151), because the
which he names himself Satan, supports this view in that Milton appears to subvert the process o f judgment
and revise the way he views him self in relation to others; as Otto says, the Song “open[s] the possibility o f
a change between self and other.”
7 See Leonard W. Deen, who argues that “Blake [...] imagines human identity as active
conversing in paradise” (19), for an illuminating discussion o f the importance o f communication in Blake’s
understanding o f humanity and his vision o f Eternity.
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passage begins with Blake asking the Muses to tell the story of Milton through him and
then slips into the Bard’s story at the end; the “your” in the exclamation “your eternal
salvation” also conflates audiences: the assembly of Eternals and us, Blake’s audience.
These conflations indicate that both those in Eternity and on Earth (i.e., us) need saving,
making us part of the spectating assembly as well, and, thus, part of the poem. It also
gives performative force to the words, as they themselves have the power to save: “Mark
well my words! they are of your eternal salvation.” By marking them, the “words,” we
are led to salvation.
Furthermore, the use of such deictics, “/wy words,” “t h e y and “your eternal
salvation,” emphasize the uncertainty contained within the phrase and the whole process
of inspiration as configured in this poem. In reference to Roman Jakobson and JeanFrançois Lyotard, Esterhammer discusses the impact of “the shifting nature” of such
words in the context of a Blakean inspiration (the invocation passage being one example)
(Creating States 185). She rightly claims, “In the process of reading, a deictic interrupts a
constative statement by introducing a moment of ambiguity in which the reader must
decide on the appropriate frame or frames of reference. Blake exploits the contextdependency and the disruptiveness of deictics to revise the concept of inspiration” ( 186),
with “a focus on the individual as the defining term of vision—and on imaginative vision
as that which defines the individual” (188). Blake’s manipulation of deictics highlights an
ambiguity already present within them because of the significance of inspiration within
Milton. Blake creates multiple layers of potentialities: the Muses relaying the story to
Blake, the Bard performing the Song for Milton and the assembly, and Blake relaying the
story for us the readers. This layering serves to expand the moment of inspiration past the
narrative level to the level of the audience and to open it to a more inclusive process than
one confined solely to unique individuals.
These multiple layers function in a different but comparable capacity as well. For
example, the Bard’s performance operates self-reflexively, representing a prophetic
vision within a prophetic narrative, which arises out of a visionary moment. The Song’s
effect within the poem and the creation of these layers is much like a play within a play.
Pfister, in his formal analysis of the dramatic genre, says of these moments,
In a play-within-the-play one group of dramatic figures from the
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superordinate sequences performs a play (the subordinate sequences) to
another group of figures. By inserting a second fictional level into the text
the dramatist duplicates the performance situation of the external
communication system on the internal level. The fictional audience on
stage corresponds to the real audience in the auditorium and the fictional
authors, actors and directors correspond to their real-life counterparts in
the production of the text. (223)
Despite not being composed as a drama, the poem includes similar dramatic elements.
The song within a song functions in a parallel way to the play within a play as Pfister
describes it. The Bard sings his song for Milton (as well as the assembly); Milton
performs his actions, perhaps not for but in front of (speaking in visionary terms) Blake;
and Blake re-stages both in the poem he writes for us, the readers. In Hamlet, the play
within the play provokes the “superordinate” characters, or “fictional audience on stage,”
as the play within the play mirrors the “superordinate” action. Similarly, in A
Midsummer’s Night Dream, the play the mechanicals stage functions as amusement for
the “superordinate” characters. In both plays, the play within the play has the added effect
of making the real audience break with their suspension of disbelief through the
“duplication of] the performance situation,” as Pfister says. In Milton, the various levels
of prophetic narrative and inspirational experience function similarly, implicating the
audience in the visionary experience. The Bard’s Song, which represents one prophetic
narrative, occurs within the story of Milton’s journey of self-annihilation, which signifies
another visionary tale, a tale that, in turn, functions as the product of Blake’s own
visionary experience. The Bard sings a song that inspires Milton to act—Milton’s act
inspires Blake to write this poem—and yet there is a sense in which this poem was what
began the initial movement (i.e., Blake himself seems to be the Bard as well, provoking
Milton to act). In turn, we, as audience, engage with a visionary work meant to inspire us.

Identity. Acting, and the Correspondence between Inner and Outer
Such dramatic and theatrical contextualizations do two important things: one, they
place Blake and his composite art a little more clearly in his time, and, two, they offer a
fruitful backdrop against which to unravel Blake’s concepts of self and identity. The
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closet-versus-stage debate that raged during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries—the closet being a private and often mental space and the stage being a public
and sensory, bodily space—raised questions concerning the superiority and value of
reflection versus action, subjectivity versus objectivity, mental space versus public
sphere, and interiority versus exteriority. Stage critics such as Coleridge, Hazlitt, and
Lamb at times derided the stage, favouring instead the mental act of reading. They argued
that a staging of, for instance, Shakespeare’s King Lear could never equal the
performance that took place in an individual reader’s mind as he/she read the play. For
these critics, the embodiment and the “spectacalization” of the drama negatively opened
it up to the external world and sensory response. In contrast, writers such as Joanna
Baillie, and even Percy Bysshe Shelley with his Cenci (1819), advocated the staging of
their dramas—the public space of physical action and social interaction.
Jonas Barish’s The Antitheatrical Prejudice (1981) defends imaginative
expression, particularly that of human performativity and theatrical performance. As I
explained in the introduction, he delineates one, more or less, consistent strain of
antagonism toward performance: a fear of and resistance to mutability or role-playing.
The fear of this protean quality stems from the fact that it destabilizes what people had
taken to be a stable idea of identity. Surveying puritanical responses to the stage, Barish
states, “Players are evil because they try to substitute a self of their own contriving for the
one given them by God’’ (93). Performance is mutable and the identity of actors appears
unstable, as actors demonstrate the ability to change who they ‘are’ at will. Barish’s
account shows that, throughout theatre’s history, antitheatricalists prove to be
uncomfortable with the fact that actors can play, or “be,” different people. These
antitheatricalists cling to a belief in immutable identity to maintain a hold on some sort of
fixed ground in life, but theatrical practices—whether on the stage or in the everyday8
8 Around the same time, Stephen Greenblatt wrote Renaissance Self-fashioning (1980), which
takes several historical examples from the period and discusses the way they participated in the spirit o f the
age, “conceiving] o f themselves as malleable roles in life itself and as well as writing” (xiii) and
displaying “a profound mobility” (7). The role o f policing institutions in shaping selves and the opposition
from resisting individuals compose a main focus o f Greenblatt’s argument. My analysis o f Blake’s
representation o f identity, for the most part, does not focus on these kinds o f pressures on the formation o f
an individual identity, but it does engage with the effect all human identities have on each other.
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(such as rituals and ceremonies)—reflect the tenuousness of such a belief. The
antitheatrical fears that Barish outlines indicate a deep anxiety about the nature of
identity, an anxiety concerning the nature of the relationship between internal workings
and external manifestations. We find such an anxiety, as I will elaborate, in a number of
forms in Blake’s time.
The actor’s role-playing and ability to shift identities does not come without a
cost. Barish describes the double bind of such a freedom of identity:
[A]ll conditions of modern life have helped accelerate the decomposition
of the personality [...]. If, thanks partly to Freud, we have gained an
unprecedented freedom of self-creation, an undreamed of power to make
and remake ourselves at will, like Proteus or the chameleon or the actor,
we have also sacrificed in the process, as Plato, Rousseau, and Nietzsche
all prophesied and lamented, a certain clarity of outline, an integrity of self
to which our thoughts and acts could have unambiguous reference. (472
73)
Dispelling the notion of a fixed identity situates us in a sea of uncertainty with all its
positive and negative associations. Taking our cue from stage actors, we can “remake
ourselves” to be other than who family, society, or ideology designates us to be, but this
protean power also brings with it a loss of a solid ground because it implies that no
person need be fixed in a static role, so all relationships and ways of being in the world
prove unstable at best. How does Blake’s understanding of identity relate to Barish’s
model of the total “freedom for self-creation”? Milton’s acts of self-annihilation and the
merging of characters in inspiration most certainly situate the poem Milton in such a
discussion of identity—but to what extent? Whereas Barish states that, in rejecting a
unified and continuous sense of self, we also must reconcile the loss of certainty and
foundation or anchor from which we move about the world, Blake arrives at no such
conclusion. Even in Milton, where self-annihilation offers Milton the key to his
redemption (and to ours as well), Blake refuses to do away with separate individualities
or notions of the self altogether.
Barish’s exploration of the way performance frees us from fixed positions in life
takes us in the direction of constructionist theories of identity, but it does not address to
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any large degree the external impositions embedded in the creation of identity that others
address. For instance, philosophers and theorists such as Friedrich Nietzsche and Judith
Butler have argued that the “1” is merely a linguistic construct, an illusion, and that
individual identity is contingent on a number of external and ideological factors,
suggesting that various kinds of identities (personal, gendered, social) are constructed
over time rather than being innate in any sense. Is Blake more suited to these kinds of
identity theories that include some restraints and limitations? Again, I do not think so.
Despite emphasizing the role of self-annihilation and the taking up of various identities in
one body (thanks to inspiration), Blake does not articulate characters in his works so as to
make him fit uncomplicatedly under the category of identity-construction. As I have
pointed out, Blake does not reject essentialist notions, nor the “clarity of outline” that
Barish refers to, altogether. Yes, he destabilizes the singular, personal identities of his
characters in both the text and designs, but his familiar views about the importance of
“minute particulars, every in their own identity” (Jerusalem 38.23, E 185) and a firm,
clear, “bounding outline” (Descriptive Catalogue E 550) suggest the opposite. Rather
than pigeon-holing Blake as either-or, I hope to explore these extremes and see what
potentials arise from them and what implications these potentials have for his period and
for current debates about identity.
Union and disjunction describe the relation between Blake’s characters in
Eternity. The identities of characters merge together while remaining separate
somehow—characters combine yet retain particularities of self. Blake’s Bard compels
Milton to throw off his selfhood, which is Satan, suggesting that we too should follow
suit. However, although the Milton at the beginning of the poem is not the same Milton
who finishes his quest, at the same time, he is the same Milton. Negotiating Blake’s
seemingly contradictory views on identity is a challenge. I read Blake’s dual desire to
both escape the limitations of an unchanging identity and retain such a thing as a way to
open up possibilities for revolutionary change, while maintaining agency and
responsibility for actions. Characters usually commit acts only after being inspired or
provoked by another character. Yet being inspired does not entail the absolute control of
one character over another; instead, it is a fusion between or among characters so that an
act has multiple agents. This kind of inspiration entails activity on the part of both
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characters, displacing passivity altogether. In each moment of inspiration, a character’s
identity is not overwhelmed by the identity of the inspirer. Rather, the two merge together
and are expanded by this action.
These opposite drives in the poem—reaffirming and deconstructing identity—
necessitate a closer look at various definitions of identity. Three of the many entries on
identity in the OED are particularly relevant for my definition of the term in this chapter.
The first definition includes as key markers of identity “[t]he sameness of a person or
thing at all times or in all circumstances; the condition or fact that a person or thing is
itself and not something else; individuality, personality.” Also, with respect to personal
identity, the OED lists as defining components “the condition or fact of remaining the
same person throughout the various phases of existence; continuity of the personality.”
This understanding of identity, which emphasizes the etymology of the word as same or
sameness, comes closest to what I mean by “stable” or “singular” identity, particularly as
juxtaposed with unstable, unclear or obscured identities found in Milton. In the poem,
characters share deeds, undergo similar processes, and perform simultaneous acts,
suggesting that deeds identify a doer in the sense of establishing a doer’s identity. Of
course, Blake cannot fully cast off the notion of personal identity. While the self exhibits
continuity of personality, it also exhibits discontinuity by becoming or entering other
characters, thereby altering the “original” self in some way. Yet, as my analysis of labour
in Milton will suggest, Blake sees a person’s calling as fixed and continuous so that a
person is (or should be) his or her deeds (or work).
The second definition states, “Belonging or relating to identity [...], as in identity
crisis, a phase of varying severity undergone by an individual in his need to establish his
identity in relation to his associates and society as part of the process of maturing.” With
respect to this psychological term, there is a sense that, in the maturation process, one
finds or constructs a ground—some stable and firm element(s), whether memories, traits
of self, likes and dislikes—by which to distinguish oneself from others in order to assert
the “I.” Blake’s characters flow quite easily amongst each other’s identities without
experiencing any kind of identity crisis per se\ rather, the merging of identities allows for
reification and redemption, not crisis. Characters integrate with one another, enabling
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crucial events and changes as well as an integration that seems to empower rather than
cripple individuals.
The third definition from the OED places identity in the context of identity theft:
“the dishonest acquisition of personal information in order to perpetrate fraud, typically
by obtaining credit, loans, etc., in someone else’s name.” This definition points toward
the social practicality of having a community of fixed “I’s”. A belief in and perpetuation
of continuous and stable identities make various social relations and modes of existence
possible. However, someone can impersonate someone else by stealing his/her name,
which is a primary marker of identity in society, in order to access various financial and
personal records and accounts. In this context, the kind of identity commingling found in
Milton would be problematic.
Despite the theoretical discourse about and arguments for identity-construction,
most of us accept and practice the notion, or perhaps necessary fiction, of a continuous
and stable identity in our daily lives. Although various theories deconstructing the idea of
a stable “I” suggest we could, and perhaps should, do otherwise, most of us do not begin
each day anew as a blank slate. In general, we hold to memories (regardless of how
questionable their reliability may be), to our names, and to our established relations to
people and the world. Even if we could cast off these things, others would enforce the
stability and sameness for us, calling us by name and engaging with us as the past has
determined.
While Blake’s model of inspiration does not appear to translate well to the
practicalities of everyday life, it does offer some thought-provoking potential alternatives
to the way we interact with others and the world and to the way we perceive the limits of
human identity. As Horn argues in relation to The Book o f Urizen, Blake does not
denounce the concept of the “I,” only the concept of the “self as an independent entity,”
isolated from everything around it (268). Through the poem Milton and its configuration
of inspiration, Blake calls for a greater sensitivity to the dependence that the self has on
other selves and shows us the potential this view of identity holds—without completely
eliminating the coherent “I.”
In the context of these definitions of identity, I argue that Blake evokes and
juxtaposes the two extremes of an essential, unchanging, singular identity and a
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constructed, malleable, non-singular one. He discusses identity in a sustained manner at
least twice in his works—in his Annotations and A Vision o f the Last Judgment—not
including the several briefer references in his poetry. What does Blake mean when he
uses the term identity? Blake’s Annotations to Swedenborg’s Divine Love and Divine
Wisdom respond to Swedenborg’s claim that “there is one Infinite, Uncreate, Omnipotent
and God—is not one and the same Essence but one and the same Identity?” (E 604)
Blake writes,
Essence is not Identity but from Essence proceeds Identity & from one
Essence may proceed many Identities as from one Affection may proceed,
many thoughts Surely this is an oversight
That there is but one Omnipotent Uncreate & God I agree but that there is
but one Infinite I do not. for if all but God is not Infinite they shall come to
an End which God forbid
If the Essence was the same as the Identity there could be but one Identity,
which is false
Heaven would upon this plan be but a Clock but one & the same Essence
is therefore Essence & not Identity[.] (original emphasis)
Blake distinguishes between the terms essence and identity, terms that Swedenborg
aligns. For Blake, essence appears to be something singular and something that exists
prior to and separate from identity, perhaps suggesting that God himself is essence from
which other identities emerge and that God has no specific identity. All identities are also
infinite, by which Blake means immortal; they transcend the impermanence of vegetative
world. Hughes says that, here, Blake annotates “with an affirmation of the divine as an
ideal essence capable of infinitely various actualizations” (102), implying that essence, or
God, expresses itself through innumerable identities (of people and things). The
implication appears to be that we each have a part of that divine spark or essence having
arisen from it, but we are not equivalent to it because we cannot do the same (i.e., express
ourselves as, or create, particular identities).
As I will argue, Milton's performative re-articulations of inspirational moments
actually suggests otherwise. Leonard W. Deen makes the case for “identity-ascommunity” in his reading of Blake: “Identity is the community of men acting through
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the individual man to create a human world” (183). He attributes Blake’s qualities of
essence to the communal identity of humanity and his qualities of identity to the
particular expressions (i.e., individuals) of this communal form. In light of Deen’s
reading, I interpret Blake’s distinction between essence and identity not as the disjunction
between God’s abilities and our own but as the difference between the ability of a single
individual and those of the greater community of “I’s”. Such a reading demonstrates that
neither “individual man” nor “the community of men” can be sacrificed in the overall
understanding of identity.
In the Last Judgment, Blake continues to hold firm to the idea of identity and of
identities as separate, permanent, and eternal when he discusses the possibility of one
thing becoming another. He says,
In Eternity one Thing never Changes into another Thing Each Identity is
Eternal consequently Apuleius’s Golden Ass & Ovids Metamorphosis &
others of the like kind are being renderd a Permanent Statue but not
Changed or Transformed into Another Identity while it retains its own
Individuality. A Man can never become Ass nor Horse some are bom with
shapes of Fable yet they contain Vision in a Sublime degree being derived
from real Vision in More Ancient Writings[.] Lots Wife being Changed
into Pillar of Salt alludes to the Mortal Body being renderd a Permanent
Statue but not Changed or Transformed into Another Identity while it
retains its own Individuality. A Man can never become Ass nor Horse
some are bom with shapes of Men who may be both but Eternal Identity is
one thing & Corporeal Vegetation is another thing [...]. (E 556)
Temporary states or corporal changes such as the ones described above do not result in a
change on the level of identity, suggesting that identity is prior to or transcends the mortal
body and earthly life and all physical transformations. In this passage, individuality
relates to uniqueness (perhaps to the extent that we all demonstrate unique personalities
and abilities, or, as Damon says, it “differentiates each person from every other person”
(194)), while identity relates to some inner core that cannot be affected by physical
alteration (e.g., changing into an ass or pillar of salt).
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The distinction between these two terms is not at all clear. How precisely does
individuality differ from identity? If they do differ, does not this difference mean that
identity exists as a more abstract term for all humanity (since individuality, and not
identity, distinguishes us from others)? This cannot be if we consider the first passage on
essence, where Blake refers to a number of “identities.” Blake very clearly dissociates the
corporeal body from the “Eternal Identity” that animates it. He says that signs of
mutability may visibly appear in the material world, but “Each Identity” resists alteration
and maintains both continuity and unity. It seems odd for a revolutionary writer, for a
writer who wanted apocalyptic renovation, to oppose change so steadfastly. It is also odd
for one who previously writes that the body and soul are not, in fact, distinct to make a
distinction between a static soul and a body in flux. For Blake, it would seem identity or
the self does not or cannot undergo the revolutionary process—identity remains in a kind
of stasis. In the end, though, neither of the two above passages mirrors exactly the
representations of identity and the self found in Milton.
In art, Blake argues that without this “distinct, sharp, and wirey [...] bounding
line [...] the greater is the evidence of weak imitation, plagiarism, and bungling” (E 550).
He continues, “How do we distinguish the oak from the beech, the horse from the ox, but
by the bounding outline? How do we distinguish one face or countenance from another,
but by the bounding line and its infinite inflexions and movements?” In terms of the hard
line, art and life must mirror each other. Without this kind of definite distinction in the
world, “this line” which is “life itself,”9 we would be unable to distinguish between
objects and people; without this distinction, we would slip into interchangeability,
equality, and general “chaos.” Reinforcing the emphasis Blake places on discrete

9 In the context o f human divinity, Anne Mellor’s analysis o f the “bounding line” in Blake’s works
shows how something that seems restrictive can actually be vital and expansive: “For the divine vision o f
man as God to survive on earth [...] it must be imaged in a specific bounded form that can be seen and
imitated by men. Only if this vision is concretely presented to the five senses will men be able to see it
clearly [...] one must articulate that awareness within a unique and bounded form, a particular self-image
and social role. Otherwise, Blake believed, one’s consciousness o f one’s own divinity will fade away or be
repressed; and one’s Energy will be dissipated into incoherent, undirected activity” (Blake's Human Form

Divine 235). The divine and infinite, then, depend on firm outlines and precise or concrete expression.
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individualities, Saree Makdisi assesses Blake’s method in relation to his understanding of
freedom. He has persuasively positioned Blake’s repetitive drive regarding the copies of
his work in the context of commodification and industrialization, where Blake resists
both these emerging aspects of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century culture. Makdisi
states, “Blake tried to subvert the reproductive machinery of commercial engraving in his
illuminated books, using it to produce a number of dazzlingly heterogeneous ‘copies’ that
have no ‘original’ to refer back to [...]” ( William Blake 12). Makdisi quotes a letter by
Blake in which he rejects this aspect of the revolution (and, thus, equal rights discourses
such as Paine’s) that makes men interchangeable in a system of exchange because there is
a danger of “tum[ing] all of its members into equally homogenous and intermeasurable
units,” paralleling the “industrial logic of commodification” (“The Political Aesthetic of
Blake’s Images” 131; see also William Blake 201-03). Why then does Blake complicate
this matter in Milton? What does this kind of insistence on the singularity and
permanence of identity mean in this epic where the main action(s) entails characters
merging with one another? Or what does the fluidity of identity mean for the critic
piecing the works of Blake together? Milton contradicts the absolute view of identity that
emerges in Blake’s aesthetic treatises and annotations. The characters certainly do
undergo transformations as they participate in moments of inspiration, enter into other
characters, and seem to be one-and-the-same character, thereby destabilizing their
singular identities. This discrepancy between the poem and his other discussions of
identity leaves us with a conundrum. On the one hand, Blake’s more theoretical
statements seem to uphold a single, singular, continuous identity for each character; yet,
on the other, his poem explores ideas of multiple, various, discontinuous identities for his
characters by merging them.
The act of becoming another person finds a parallel in acting: actors enact other
identities on the stage. In relation to becoming someone else or acting the part of another,
Barish says, “One corollary of the concept of an absolute identity was the belief in an
absolute sincerity. If it was possible truly to know the ‘uniform, distinct and proper
being’ one had received from God, then it was possible either to affirm that being in all
one’s acts—to be ‘such in truth’ as one was ‘in show’—or to deny it by disguise or
pretense” (94). Role-playing and play-acting, then, are marked with hypocrisy; they
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expose an anxiety about the connection between the inner world of an individual and
his/her external acts. To be sincere meant one was natural and not the opposite—
hypocritical, acting a part, not meaning what one says, or having one’s deeds fail to
correspond to one’s principles or words. In Sincerity’ and Authenticity, Lionel Trilling
explains “a mind wholly at one with itself’ as “an instance of sincerity unqualified” (4),
and he later compares the “True, which is to say loyal, [to] never wavering in constancy,”
another aspect of sincerity. In this context, “sincerity” and the related term “constancy”
are associated with a stable and “true” identity, one given to exhibit steadfast behaviour
and consistent action regardless of varying circumstances, while inconstancy and
insincerity are associated with unstable identity, one prone to disguise and deceit (and
with chameleon-like or protean qualities), and one given to exhibit contradictory
behaviour under any given circumstances. To explore the point, Trilling discusses the
etymology of the word sincerity: “It derived from the Latin word sincerus and first meant
exactly what the Latin word means in its literal use—clean, or sound, or pure. An old and
merely fanciful etymology, sine cera, without wax, had in mind an object of virtu [or an
object of workmanship] which was not patched up and passed off as sound [...]” (12).
Such an etymology clarifies the correlation between sincerity and identity. The ideals of
constancy and sincerity reflect a need to link external behaviour or action to interior
feelings and intentions in order to maintain a belief in a unified self. To be inconstant or
insincere suggests a disconnection between those things, suggesting a fragmented self, a
self that is not whole.
Blake’s construction of identity relates to issues of sincerity and constancy, the
correspondence between inner and outer, between whom a person presents him/herself to
be and who he/she ‘actually’ is. These issues were topical in both the eighteenth and the
nineteenth centuries, suggesting that Blake’s understanding of identity engages with the
specific concerns of his time. As Elaine Hadley states, “‘Sincerity’ became a crucial
concept even as it was necessarily more difficult to ascertain” (21). One particular
theatrical example of this interest in the relationship between inner and outer is Baillie’s
Plays on the Passions, where she outlines her dramatic theory in which she articulates a
fascination with discerning and tracing the passions within an individual, with
understanding the internal workings and the resulting external manifestations. This
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attempt to delineate and represent the relation between inner and outer is particularly
evident in her De Monfort {1798) in which the title character questions the sincerity of his
rival, Rezenvelt, and chastises his friend Freberg for believing in the precise correlation
between internal and external. De Monfort states,
Freberg, though know’st not man; not nature’s man,
But only him who, in smooth studied works
Of polish’d sages, shines deceitfully
In all the splendid foppery of virtue.
That man was never bom whose secret soul
With all its motley treasure of dark thoughts,
Foul fantasies, vain musing, and wild dreams,
Was ever open’d to another’s scan.
Away, away! It is delusion all. (1.2.91-99)
De Monfort makes the distinction between a person as he/she is in social settings—even
implying a kind of performativity, artifice, and disingenuousness—and a person’s
internal nature. He very clearly tells Freberg that inner and outer do not match or equate.
In fact, the interior “secret soul” remains inaccessible to others. De Monfort does not
question the existence of this inner core, merely the ability for others to know it. Yet
when he cannot reconcile his (murderous) deeds to his own identity, he exclaims, “I have
no name—I now am nothing” (5.2.60-61) and attempts to obliterate himself. In the end,
De Monfort’s view that his acts and his identity are disjunctive leads to his inability to
stabilize his sense of self. Here, stability means the alignment of deeds with identity and
the outer with the inner.
Laura Kirkley, in speaking about translation practices in the late eighteenth
century, says of sincerity, “In an aesthetic context the term denoted all that was natural,
spontaneous, and original. Literary art could be condemned as contrived, artful or
imitative. Hence the aesthetic ideas informing English translation theory favoured the
creation of an ‘original’ perspective” (97). Indeed, Blake advocated original art over
copies. It is interesting that spontaneity is here associated with sincerity (reminiscent of
Wordsworth’s spontaneous overflow of powerful feeling that translates to the poetic
medium). Such a definition suggests that something unexpected and new could arise

248
without compromising the inner and outer dynamic. Thus, the potential for change and
creative response determines the concepts of sincerity and constancy.
In regards to identity specifically, how does Blake respond to this preoccupation
with sincerity and constancy at work in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries? For him,
a person’s talents or innate potentials should match one’s deeds, otherwise one’s self will
be at risk. Blake seems to suggest that turning away from what one’s identity demands is
insincere. In the Last Judgment, Blake discusses sinful action in relation to identity. He
states, “Forgiveness of Sin is only at the Judgment Seat of Jesus the Saviour where the
Accuser is cast out. not because he Sins but because he torments the Just & makes them
do what he condemns as Sin & what he knows is opposite to their own Identity” (E 565).
Blake indicates that Satan becomes an outcast not by sinning in the biblical or Miltonic
sense but by compelling people to perform actions that do not correspond to their
individual identities. Thus, people sin only when they do what is contrary to their
identity. Sibyl C. Jacobson explains that in The Book o f Urizen, “Urizen invents the ‘I’
and Laws” (63); in Milton, Satan takes on this Urizenic role: “Satan making to himself
Laws from his own identity. / Compell’d others to serve him in moral gratitude &
submission” (11.10-11, E 104). Identities are not interchangeable or equal; therefore, the
dubious distinction of inventing “the T and Laws” resonates with Blake’s famous phrase
“One Law for the Lion & Ox is Oppression” (MHH pi. 24, E 44), which indicates the
significance of actions to identity. Importantly for Blake, people cannot just change their
stations, or labour, in life. People are either Lions or Oxen (reminiscent of Nietzsche’s
eagles and lambs).
In Milton, Satan and Palamabron cannot exchange places, tasks, or roles. Los tells
Satan, “Anger me not! thou canst not drive the Harrow in pitys paths. / Thy Work is
Eternal Death, with Mills & Ovens & Cauldrons. / Trouble me no more, thou canst not
have Eternal Life” (4.16-18, E 98). Fundamentally, Satan represents eternal death, which
Frye defines as “physical life” (316). Thus, Satan stands for the impermanent and mortal
(and even corrupt) parts of the world, which oppose permanence and immortality (and
perhaps purity)—in other words, eternal life. Furthermore, examining Satan as an
individual (rather than a symbol) leads to a particular understanding of identity. By
demonstrating mutability with respect to his divinely assigned labour, Satan risks his self
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and subjects it to potential murder or existence-less-ness. This insistence on maintaining
stations in life and assigned roles seems antithetical to the protean nature of actors who
take on various roles. Deeds establish and reaffirm identity, and being forced into
alternative action, or being restricted from the action that corresponds to one’s identity,
places identity at risk. To this extent, the Blakean self that remains true to itself also
remains constant and sincere: one pursues one’s task with devotion, thereby ensuring that
the outer expression (deeds) reflects the inner calling (that which defines the identity of
an individual self, particularly in the case of Blake as prophet-bard). However, although
Blake appears to champion a sentimental or ideal reading of identity and actions, in
which constancy and sincerity equal a strict matching of inside with outside, in Milton,
the importance of inspiration and self-annihilation tells an alternative story.
If one considers the fact that characters merge and that Milton seeks self
annihilation, then Milton becomes more varied and nuanced in its notions of inner and
outer, sincerity and constancy, fixed identity and mutable identity. Blake’s characters
open themselves to the moment and to circumstances. Blake appears to practice a kind of
adaptability, as the actions of Milton casting off his selfhood and the merging of
identities suggest. Milton must undergo self-annihilation to redeem himself and his
Emanation, a process that seems to alter something (but what?) about his identity. Surely,
part of what is wrong with Milton at the beginning of the work has to do with his
vocation: he speaks not and acts not. Milton is not the Bard who performs the Song in
Eternity. Instead, Milton is the audience. On earth, Milton occupied the role of prophet
poet, but in Eternity that role has been suppressed. 1 argue that his discontent stems from
a kind of identity crisis. Redemption and being inspired would be impossible feats for
one closed to any kind of change, and, for Blake, one must necessarily achieve those
goals if one is to achieve a visionary existence. Achieving visionary moments and
redemption entails being protean enough to allow for an extreme inner alteration. The
characters in Milton undergo self-annihilation and partake in inspirational moments that
do not undercut identity; in fact, they reaffirm it. The apparent mutability belies a
constant and sincere inner self. Blake’s exploration of identity in Milton reflects the
tension between inner and outer, an anxiety evident in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. Blake revisioned constancy and sincerity to suit a post-Revolutionary world.
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He did not abandon the idea of firm and unwavering characters, nor did he reject the
possibility of change and the importance of self-transformation; rather, he maintained
stability together with a certain degree of transformative potential.
As Barish points out, the figure of the actor lends itself to this coupling of self
transformation and sincerity—albeit problematically. In examining the eighteenth
century, Lisa A. Freeman implicitly takes up these various conflicts arising from the
problem of determining and defining sincerity and constancy in relation to the actor. In
line with Barish’s account of acting, which undermined the plausibility of a direct
correspondence between inside and outside, she defines the various uses of the term
“character,” two of the most relevant being character as a moral marker and character as
performed on stage. She claims, “What the concept of character offered in the eighteenth
century, then, and what the theater could exploit by taking it up, was an understanding of
identity not as an emanation of a stable interiority, but as the unstable product of staged
contests between interpretable surfaces” (27). The generic conventions of drama in
general restrict, and arguably conceal, the interiority of character in comparison to lyric
poetry and novels; however, Freeman locates a particular preoccupation with and anxiety
surrounding the appearance and reality of character (and identity) in the 1700s, as well as
the theatre’s specific engagement with this anxiety. She designates the eighteenth-century
stage as a site that forces people to deal with the absence of certainty when it comes to
connecting external signs of character to interiority: “In the eighteenth century [...] the
problem of defining an individual, or the formation and attribution of what we term
‘identity,’ involved conflicts over the value of outward appearances, or surfaces, as ‘real’
indices of persons” (21). What the theatre seems to have made painfully clear is the fact
that, even offstage in life, knowledge of another person’s true self (if such a thing exists)
remains closed or hidden to objective examination. If one could not trust a “one-to-one
correspondence between signifier and signified” (22), between actions and character, in
cases of valuing or determining an identity, then “either [...] there was no true ‘inside’ or
[...] if there were, we have no ‘real’ access to it. The only basis for assessing others
consisted of multiple, contradictory, and competing ‘outsides,’ that which can be
observed but never confidently ‘known’” (27). As Freeman notes, such a state of affairs
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would be “frightening” for a public that valued character as a sign of moral rectitude. One
could no longer make such judgments with any degree of certainty.
The Romantic period produced actors who highlighted the tension between inner
and outer in the way that Barish and Freeman describe (i.e., by destabilizing notions of a
stable, singular self and by questioning the verifiability of character and moral rectitude),
in a way that questions sincerity, constancy, and intention. Whereas James Quin (1693
1766) continued the past stage tradition of “a fixed interpretation of characters and [...] a
mechanical art of acting” and a “style of declamation,” David Garrick (1717-79) broke
with the past and introduced “the school of natural acting” (Campbell 170, 176, 186).
Garrick achieved this “imitative action” through “the exact fashion of [his] preparation
for acting”: his practice involved “observing] and memoriz[ing] bit by bit any action he
saw about him and later repeating] this action on the stage” (187). The arrival of John
Philip Kemble (1757-1823) and his sister Sarah Siddons (1755-1831) to the stage told
both a new story and an old one. Kemble’s “style came from art not nature, [in] that it
was classically polished not romantically empathetic”; his preparation involved
“meticulous study” (Bate 94).10 According to Jonathan Bate, “Siddons’s preparation was
very different. It looks forward to the Method of Stanislavsky rather than backward to the
rhetoric of Quintilian. [...] She tried to get inside her character. As one commentator put
it, ‘from the moment she assumed the dress she became the character’.” According to
Peta Tait, “Stanislavski sought what is termed ‘truth of feeling’,” in other words “a
motivation for inner action” (89; see also Stanislavski 46). He advocates “the art of living
a part” (Stanislavski 12) because “[t]o reproduce feelings you must be able to identify
them out of your own experience” (24). Paradoxically, he also makes sincerity a key
marker of a good actor: “Sincerity of emotions, feelings that seem true in given
circumstances [...] is exactly what we ask of an actor” (50). While antitheatricalists
found reason to see the actor as insincere, Siddons (and Stanislavski after her) aligned

10 Qualifying the contrast between Kemble and Siddons or Kean, Kalman Bumim notes that “to
memorialize him as an elocutionist who put ‘manner before matter’ and preferred ‘effect rather than
expression’ is [...] false. Certainly his style was deliberate, calculated, and therefore different from
Garrick’s and Kean’s. If he had been throughout his career full o f artifice, coldness, and declamation, we
must be puzzled by his preeminence” (199).
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sincerity with role-playing through this kind of method acting. Stanislavski says to his
actors, “You must learn to adapt yourselves to circumstances, to time, and to each
individual person,” enacting “vivid powers of adjustment” (228); only then can one
perform sincerely. Rigidity and firmness, not adaptability and malleability, lead to an
insincere enactment or performance.
Stanislavski’s method and the method of Siddons, who heralds it, appear to
counter Denis Diderot’s theory of acting delineated in Paradoxe sur le comédien [The
Paradox of Acting] (1773). In “Telling Lies with Body Language,” which analyzes
Romantic-era actors who perform counterfeit gestures, Frederick Burwick highlights
Diderot’s paradox:
The idea of artistic control conflicted with the notion o f ‘feeling’ the part.
If actually caught up in the throes of emotion, Diderot argued in Le
Paradoxe, the player would lose all rational command of mime, gesture,
and elocution. Thus, to create the illusion of powerful emotions affecting a
character, an actor must play the role with studied deliberation. Total
constraint enables the actor to concentrate artistic training and skill toward
performing the very extremes of passion. (150)
For Diderot, then, inner cannot, in fact, correspond to outer. The actor’s talent lies in his
or her ability to command emotions, thereby expressing them with the proper force.
Diderot suggests that the performance will fail or be flawed and unbelievable if such a
distinction is not maintained. Although Diderot claims that an actor “excels in simulating,
though he feels nothing” (108), his emphasis on “self-possession” (23, 47) brings him in
line with Stanislavski who cautioned actors to “Never lose yourself on the stage. Always
act in your own person, as an artist. You can never get away from yourself. The moment
you lose yourself on the stage marks the departure from truly living your part and the
beginning of exaggerated false acting” ( 177). The resolution to the acting paradox that
Diderot delineated draws near to Stanislavski’s method, as Burwick indicates (151).
Later theorists would say that a skilled actor uses memory to create a believable
performance. Burwick contends,
The efforts to create genuine emotion by constructing a fictional
‘memory’ and fabricating a psychological ‘identity’ were aimed at
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reconciling the difference between acting a passion and feeling a passion,
thus overcoming the crux of Diderot’s paradox. The theorists succeeded in
internalizing the mimicry, giving it a subjective or psychological center.
Yet even these new approaches recognized that body movements
corresponded to emotional states. Therefore, the player must still master
the body language of the emotions even before attempting to master the
lines of a play. (151)
Siddons herself demonstrates such a mastery over her body and her articulation of
emotions and character. The resemblance of Siddons’s acting style to Stanislavski’s
method suggests a shifting attitude on the part of the audience. Furthermore, in contrast to
the plays and characters that Freeman argues undermine the idea that internal logic
matches external actions, Siddons attempts to erase such a tension between inner and
outer by making them appear seamless. Shearer West points out,
In the 1780s and 1790s, while she was enjoying London success, Siddons’
acting style was characterised by its energy, physicality, the flexibility of
her facial expressions and her ability to find fresh meaning in familiar
lines. She carried Garrick’s ‘natural’ style of performing to a deeper level,
making actors of his generation appear stilted and bland by comparison.
Her violent and emotional style chimed well with the expectations of
audiences brought up on the idea of sensibility - which favoured a
demonstrative display of feeling. They expressed their appreciation
emphatically, by crying, screaming, fainting, vomiting and other extreme
physical reactions. (192-93)
By fully embracing a character the way that Siddons did—the way she physically
expressed and facially gestured to articulate the emotional state of a character—she
seemed to erase the disjunction and anxiety that Freeman points out regarding internal
and external processes. Siddons did so by portraying a wholeness of identity; thus, the
division between character and actor seemed to get elided.
Siddons’s initial acting style elicited rave reviews. She was passionate and fully
embraced her characters, as if becoming them while onstage. Edmund Kean (1789-1833)
exaggerated Siddons’s approach “almost to a mannerism” (Downer 537). As Alan S.
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Downer explains, Kean performed roles by “mechanically depressing his voice, pausing
suddenly then rushing on, dropping his voice to a whisper then letting out all the volume
at his command, until more than one critic accused him of rant.” Bate tells us that Kean
had an “explosive style” (111), one that suited the excessively large theatre houses of the
day. The stylistic shift from Quin to Kean was a shift from stiff artificiality, where actors
showed no significant attempt to take on or become a character, to expressive
“naturalism,” where they clearly indicated an attempt to align inner and outer, leading
finally to an excessive style of performance, one that highlighted the performativity of the
act and undermined the correspondence between inner and outer.
Despite Siddons’s acting skills and the success of Stanislavski’s method, does
such an acting style erase this underlying tension between internal and external? 1 would
argue that in some ways it more intensely highlights the disruption: Siddons, who
“became the character” once onstage, offers evidence to her audiences of how one
individual identity could be so immersed in another as to almost make the original
identity disappear. 1 say “almost” pointedly here because Siddons’s physical body, as
well as her own celebrity, makes it impossible to ever accept a full replacement of
identities. One would always see Sarah Siddons upon the stage: Sarah Siddons as Lady
Macbeth or Sarah Siddons as Juliet for instance. Bate quotes William Hazlitt on the
problem of separating the body of the actor from the character, such as was exemplified
in Siddons’s acting of Lady Macbeth. Bate argues that Hazlitt’s discomfort arises in the
“conception of an idea of Hamlet [or Lady Macbeth], a thing-in-itself independent of its
phenomenal manifestations in the particulars of individual performances” (93). Siddons
makes it difficult for critics such as Hazlitt to maintain a clear separation between actor
and character. Furthermore, Julie A. Carlson identifies this discomfort with the gender
politics of the theatre and the social mobility of women. She explores how women began
to wield theatrical power and how male writers began to see this power as a threat. She
argues that Siddons played a substantial role in this gender dynamic by directing critical
attention to Shakespeare’s female characters, particularly that of Lady Macbeth, and
confounding the boundary between her person and the characters she played: “Hazlitt
[...] [and] Coleridge [...] state explicitly that their analyses of the Lady’s character are
indissociable from Siddons’s representation of it” (165). Personal identities, once thought
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to be reflected in external action, become problematic; the fact that many actors easily
enact a role undermines attempts to connect a person’s actions to a person’s interiority
with any degree of reliability, thereby putting into doubt any verifiable notion of a true
and static or permanent identity.
Shearer West and Judith Pascoe show how Siddons attempted to maintain the
illusion of inner corresponding to outer. West says of Siddons, “[S]he managed her
public façade so effectively that whiffs of scandal were quickly dispelled. [...]
throughout her life, she chose tragic roles that emphasized suffering virtue and self
sacrifice”; “She was particularly effective at manipulating the unconscious perceptions of
audiences who tended to see the performer and the role as two sides of the same coin”
(193). Pascoe paints a similar portrait of Siddons, who brought her domestic life onto the
stage at one point when she was taking leave of the Provinces for London. She brought
her children onstage, along with her obviously pregnant self, to demonstrate why she was
pursuing a London career (i.e., supporting her family). Pascoe states, “The actuality of
those three children and her stable home life served to mitigate the extraordinary
spectacle of female passion she created on stage” (24). In addition, “As part of this self
presentation, Siddons was enthusiastically involved in cultivating her public image
through portraiture” by being “closely involved in her own image-making” (West 193)
and by choosing artists and poses that would “suit” her best. What both Pascoe and West
demonstrate is that Siddons manipulated the visual in the production of the sincere and
authentic. People wanted to align visible externals with their idea of a hidden interiority
and hoped that the former would reaffirm the latter. Romantic acting helped make the
lines between onstage and offstage personas both indistinct and distinct, signifying the
disturbance between seeing externals and accessing an interior that Freeman raises.
Pascoe shows that the issues around Romantic performativity and the attempt to construct
a sincere and authentic self point to “an ongoing discursive conflict between the private,
felt self and the public, performed representation” (32). I would add that the conflict was
not simply discursive; it was an ontological, epistemological, and phenomenological
conflict as well.
If Siddons was a trailblazer in terms of acting styles in the late eighteenth century,
as West’s and others’ readings of her suggest, then Siddons was indeed something new;
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her style marked a change, one concerned with the alignment of the internal and external.
Nevertheless, a progression from Quin to Kean can also be traced, one that marked a
change in method and a concern with a more “natural” acting style. It is in this specific
context that I see Blake participating in the spirit of his times; he was not self-enclosed
and displaced from his time. The connections to acting theories and to Romantic actors
offer some evidence that Blake takes up the concerns and issues of the period,
particularly in Milton. He thematizes this ever-present tension between inner and outer,
this confusion between people and the roles they perform. In fact, the elements of identity
and action that Romantic acting elucidate suggest some interesting things about Blake’s
representation of character, particularly when it comes to inspiration. People enter one
another, and yet there are no surface markers to show that such a thing has occurred.
Milton walks around for the whole poem with the Bard in his bosom. Los enters Blake,
Milton enters Blake, Blake enters Milton, but we are never shown external signs that
demonstrate the change. Blake’s decision to obscure the visible signs of the internal
goings-on of his characters points to Freeman’s discussion of the problems with reading
surfaces. And, yet, this obscurity of identity gives way to a kind of clarity, as characters
find strength and reaffirmation in unions (as I will illustrate later).
Blake’s advocacy for a permanent identity that paradoxically allows for
alterations finds another articulation in his description of States. These States are
impermanent whereas Identity is permanent. The Angels of the Divine Presence tell
Milton:
Distinguish therefore States from Individuals in those States.
States Change: but Individual Identities never change nor cease:
You cannot go to Eternal Death in that which can never Die.
Satan & Adam are States Created into Twenty-seven Churches
And thou O Milton art a State about to be Created
Called Eternal Annihilation that none but the Living shall
Dare to enter: & they shall enter triumphant over Death
And Hell & the Grave! States that are not, but ah! Seem to be.
Judge then of thy Own Self: thy Eternal Lineaments explore
What is Eternal & what Changeable? & what Annihilate!
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The Imagination is not a State: it is the Human Existence itself
Affection or Love becomes a State, when divided from Imagination
The Memory is a State always, & the Reason is a State
Created to be Annihilated & a new Ratio Created
Whatever can be Created can be Annihilated Forms cannot
The Oak is cut down by the Ax, the Lamb falls by the Knife
But their Forms Eternal Exist, For-ever. (32.23-38, E 132)
Memories and reason and death are simply impermanent states, but they themselves do
not change the fact that a person’s identity is permanent. However, people have the
ability to learn, fall, become enlightened, grow, and redeem themselves. What, then, is
the link between identity and the states that a person passes through in life? Can others
ever know a person fundamentally—his or her permanent identity—or are these
transitional states all we can ever be privy to? Is all we have access to a continuous
reading of surfaces? Blake never uses the word “personality” (according to the online
concordance of the Blake Digital Text Project), so are a person’s traits bound up with
identity or with states? Esterhammer explains that, in Milton, states equate to “a
psychological condition or spiritual disposition” (204); they exist as states of mind or of
attitude or belief. For David Fuller, states connote error and therefore need to be
transcended or removed:
Blake develops in Milton more fully [...] his idea o f ‘states’ of being
which was eventually to become basic to this idea of forgiveness without a
price paid as the essence of Christianity. There is, Blake asserts, a central
core of each individual existence which one can reach by an action such as
that of Milton in the poem. But the bottom is a long way down. Many
things that we take for fundamental parts of our being are garments with
which we clothe ourselves to avoid what looks from the fallen perspective
like non-existence. (166)
States are things we mistake for our true selves, things that merely hide our “central
core.” These states tend to lead to error. In the end, though, by understanding sin as error
and error as simply a state of existence that can be cast off without permanently marking
the individual, Blake opens the possibility for “forgiveness without a price paid” and
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eliminates the vengeance of the Old Testament from Christian faith. This reconfiguration
of Christianity separates a person’s identity from his/her actions, as if the two are not
necessarily dependent. Yet Blake’s views on work (or the fulfillment of a calling), which
irrevocably unite doer and deed, contradict this position. One potential solution to this
apparent contradiction relies on the words of the Angels to Milton in the above quotation.
The Angels of the Divine Presence explain that Satan and Adam are merely States
and that Milton himself is one about to be created. They tell him, “Judge then of thy Own
Self: thy Eternal Lineaments explore / is Eternal & what Changeable? & what
Annihilable!” leaving it up to the individual to explore what parts of himself can and
should be subjected to annihilation, change, and re-creation. If Milton is “a State about to
be Created” through his journey to self-annihilation (and presumably this is an action that
Blake values), then, even if all states are necessarily errors, the action of passing through
them is not necessarily a mistake; in fact, according to the passage, passing through
States may be necessary in order to find that which is permanent or true. In this light,
identity appears to be something that we each find for ourselves, sifting what does not
necessarily belong to it from what does—in other words, discovering what is alterable in
ourselves. Lorraine Clark argues, “Blake exhorts his readers not to ‘know’ themselves or
to ‘create’ themselves, but to choose themselves” (15, original emphasis); the moment of
choice is “suspended between and beyond philosophical ‘knowing’ and aesthetic
‘creating’—‘beyond’ them not in some theological realm but in the realm of life or
actuality” (14-15). Perhaps choosing our identity through the process of self-examination
lies somewhere between intuitive knowledge of our essential selves and inventing
ourselves ex nihilo, a middle ground that foregrounds the here and now.
Esterhammer, who also sees states as political and linguistic, argues that “states
are static conditions (although their stasis is more an effect of perspective than actual
duration in time) during which relationships can be recognized” (Creating States 204).
By providing a means with which to recognize relationships, we can more precisely
understand the distinctions among people, things, and concepts. In proceeding through
and discarding states, we reaffirm ourselves, our power to impact the world, and our
vitality. But we must be open to protean alterations of ourselves in order to choose among
them and, thereby, uncover our eternal and permanent identity—though Blake does not
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explain how we know what to keep and what to discard or how we recognize our “true”
identity. Harold E. Pagliaro defines self-annihilation as an “exposure to continual risk”
(117) , one in which the self is open to change and to the death of an “old view of things”
(118) . Since permanent identity is not a transparent entity in the poem, not even to an
individual himself, then constantly transitioning through and discarding parts of the self
help approach this elusive yet permanent identity, perhaps even as actors perform and
become different people (as Siddons heralding Stanislavski’s method does)—testing out
different selves, searching only to discard, yet potentially maintaining parts too.
This idea of permanence at the core of identity despite a necessary degree of
mutability and the related tensions involved in acting a role resonate with performance
theorist Richard Schechner description of two modes of performance: “Looking at
performing worldwide, two processes are identifiable. A performer is either ‘subtracted,’
achieving transparency, [...] or s/he is ‘added to,’ becoming more or other than s/he is
when not performing” (175). He aligns the first of these performances with the shaman,
calling it “ecstasy,” and he aligns the second with the Balinese dancer, calling it “trance”
(comparable, in part, to the Stanislavski approach). In ecstasy, the performer experiences
“a soaring away from the body, an emptying of the body” (177). Conversely, in trance the
performer maintains an awareness of or connection to his/her body while allowing
him/herself to be taken over by the role he/she plays: “To be in trance is not to be out of
control or unconscious” (175), but, rather, to maintain one’s sense of self and be open to
role at the same time. Significantly, Schechner argues that “[n]o performing is ‘pure’
ecstasy or trance. Always there is a shifting, dialectical tension between the two” (179).
Blake’s moments of inspiration and self-annihilation can be viewed as shifting between
ecstasy and trance, between the identity of the doer being subtracted from—discarding
the annihilate and displacing the self to make room for another identity—and added
to— choosing the unannihilable, expanding the self with the identity of another to cross
beyond “the outline of Identity” (Milton 37.10, E 137). In fact, many of the characters
shift between these poles.
Blake’s poem implies a movement toward role-playing, and his characters seem
to parallel stage actors: characters join and become other characters with ease and
pleasure, yet without losing the notion of identity altogether. The characters associated
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more with negative connotations represent a counter-model that leads to a non-viable
mode of existence. For example, in The Book ofUrizen, the title character creates his
fallen state when he separates from the community of the Eternals and takes up his
Satanic self-consciousness, self-enclosure, isolation, and belief that he exists as an “I”
separate from a group of other “I’s”. However, although returning to a communal state
prior to this fall in our fallen state appears unlikely, if we view states as parts of ourselves
that we are testing out to find the true part, then perhaps role-playing or inspirational
merging with other identities (as occurs in Milton) and performing actions that belong
both to ourselves and to another provide a way of getting close to a pre-self
consciousness, a pre-division condition from within a fallen position. Perhaps this
condition is a “sincere” existence (as in the etymological sense) and a whole one. If we
must judge and discover those parts of the self (i.e., States) that do not belong to our
etemal/sincere/true identity, if we must find a way to resolve the tension between inner
identity and outer acts, then experimentation with our individual self—enacting or
becoming more than one identity or shifting between ecstasy and trance—seems to be
one way to accomplish such a feat.

Heroic Action and Heroic Identity
Part of the way Blake encourages this experimentation is by subverting
convention and revisioning epic heroism. By the time Blake produced his two illuminated
epics, Milton and Jerusalem, he had seen the American and French Revolutions, the
Reign of Terror, and the continuing Napoleonic Wars. The bloodshed and tyranny
marking these decades contrasts starkly with Blake’s promotion of love, friendship,
selflessness, and peace in his two epics. Indeed, two (A and B) out of four copies of
Milton begin with a Preface that condemns war-focused epics such as the classical
Homeric and Virgilian examples as well as those of Milton and Shakespeare, whom
Blake sees as following the same tradition in their writings. By contrast, Blake sees the
Bible—not the Old Testament with a tyrannical God, but the New Testament with the
loving, forgiving, and self-sacrificing Jesus who is both human and divine—as a better
model for the epic genre. Blake introduces his epic by rejecting “the general malady &
infection from the silly Greek & Latin slaves of the Sword,” a sickness that “Shakespeare
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& Milton were both curbd by” (Preface, E 95). Blake opposed the tyrannical and violent
element in Christianity, which he saw personified in Milton’s vision of God as a
punishing God and also, as Fuller has argued, in “his presentation of Christ’s supreme
merit in terms of military greatness in Book VI” (163). Riede rightly argues that Blake
provides “a radical critique of Milton’s Puritan (and essentially Pauline) Christianity, and
consequently of the idea of Christian inspiration that enabled Milton to write with
dogmatic authority by transcribing the word of God. As Blake saw it, such a claim for
inspiration made Milton akin to Moses, not as a prophet, but as the founder of an absolute
and tyrannical moral law” (258). The title of Blake’s poem explicitly references, and thus
reaffirms, his reworking of Milton’s Paradise Lost: Milton: A Poem in 2 Books To Justify
the Ways o f God to Men (E 95).
Balfour follows Harold Bloom’s thinking by placing Blake in the tradition of
“strong poets” (Bloom 5) who misread their forebears as “an act of creative correction
that is actually and necessarily a misinterpretation” (30). Balfour explains, “Blake
overturns the program of his predecessor, performing a certain disruptive kind of
quotation, a ‘Miltonic inversion,’ so to speak, and a prime example of the revisionary
mechanism [articulated by] Harold Bloom” (155).11Such a revision potentially leads to
what Mary Lynn Johnson calls an “interrogating, not justifying, [of] God's ways”
(231 ).112 Blake also revises, parodically according to Riede (264), the conventional
11 Joseph Anthony Wittreich, Jr. opposes Bloom’s vision as it applies to Blake. Wittreich claims
that Blake saw Milton not as a paralyzing force needing to be overthrown: “Blake [...] set[s] himself, most
emphatically, within the tradition o f Milton” (Angel o f Apocalypse 224). Accordingly, “the precursor, even
if mistaken, is not an oppressor but a liberator” (223). More recently, Lucy Newlyn, following in the
tradition o f Wittreich, posits a qualification o f Blake’s reworking o f his antecedent. She argues that Blake,
rather than opposing Milton, recovers the true Milton, “recovering the open-ended Milton who has become
obscured in the process o f reception, and whom Blake sees as a more salutary role model for his own
beliefs and creative practices than the authoritarian alternative” (10). While 1 find Bloom’s reading
convincing, 1 cannot help but agree, at least in part, with both Wittreich and Newlyn, especially given
Blake’s intense investment and continual attraction to Milton, despite their apparent differences.
12 In an astute reading o f the title page to Milton, Johnson asks, “is Milton, in flexing his left foot
to take a second step into Blake’s poem, leaving the secure foundation o f his theodicy behind him? Should
both poets— and their audiences— be interrogating, not justifying, God’s ways?” (231). Like Balfour, she
highlights the subversive and even parodic elements o f a seemingly innocuous direct quotation.
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invocation of the Muses, which Milton himself invokes (“Sing Heav’nly Muse” (Book 1,
line 6)). Instead of invoking the traditional Muses, Blake recreates them, saying, “the
Daughters of Memory shall become the Daughters of Inspiration” (E 95). In his epic, he
does not call on the daughters of Mnemosyne (the Greek goddess of memory) as they
stand; rather, he translates them into daughters of inspiration and imagination. The shift
from one to the other suggests that Blake is creating his own more innovative genre by
refusing to depend on “memory,” on Greek (or even biblical) models. For the most part,
he invents his own characters and events and actions, and, when he does not, he imagines
them in a context beyond the confines of history or orthodox theology. Of course, this
turn away from memory and imitation also represents Blake’s own particular aesthetics;
imagination and new inventions surpass the excellence of imitating classical models.
The John Milton with whom Blake takes issue is not the writer of the “anti
monarchical, anti-episcopal, and pro-divorce pamphlets [that] fearlessly attacked evils”
of the world, as Johnson states (234). Rather, he takes issue with Milton the poet and
bard. Paul Yoder says that Blake located the “source of England’s problems” in “the
acceptance of the classical epic tradition, as embodied in the myth of Trojan Brutus as the
founder of the British nation” (17), a story which “supported the English appropriation of
classical authority at both an ideological and a poetic level” (18). Pacifist Blake, being
put off by an imperial mindset, offers a different display of heroism. Moreover, Julia M.
Wright maintains, “Blake[] use[s] [...] Milton, the new national bard, as an emblem for
cultural complicity in and corruption by the imperial project for which the classical
nations provided the type”—for Blake, imperial England is “infected by classical culture”
(258). Battles and wars allow characters (mostly male) to express their heroism through
violent action, so “Milton bears bardic responsibility” for war-centred revolution in the
world (Erdman, Blake: Prophet Against Empire 426).
In response, Blake reworks the concept of epic heroism or dramatic heroism by
shifting the focus from deeds of war and violence to unselfish deeds of sacrifice and self
annihilation. While Shakespeare’s histories and tragedies often do tend toward war and
violence, particularly in establishing the heroic quality of main characters such as
Macduff, Edgar, Prince Hal, and his later incarnation King Henry V, it seems odd, at least
at first glance, for Blake to place Milton within the framework of this kind of poetry.

263

After all, Milton’s Paradise Lost is a theodicy. In this epic, arguably the Miltonic work
that most preoccupies Blake throughout his corpus and in this poem in particular, we find
a defense of God’s punishment of the disobedience of humanity. Milton portrayed the fall
as the result of both Satan’s temptation and of freely chosen disobedience, not as an event
fated by God. While Jesus volunteers to sacrifice Himself in the future in order to save
humanity from what Blake might call eternal death, Milton does not depict actual
sacrifice here, so the focus remains on disobedience and punishment, on an oppressive
religion governed by the tyrannical institutions of Blake’s time.
Blake centres his epic poem on self-sacrifice not only as a present reality in the
space of the poem itself, but also as a sacrifice committed by someone other than Jesus.
In Blake’s epic, Milton, a once-fallen human being who is still in error even in Eternity,
sacrifices himself. Heroism, then, belongs to humanity as well as to God (for Blake, all is
divine anyway). In Paradise Lost, Adam and Eve, if they are at all heroic, are so only in
how they accept their punishment and how they endure it, embodying what Milton calls
“fortitude / Of Patience and Heroic Martyrdom” (9.31-32). This passive obedience and
acceptance does not sit well with Blake as a kind of heroism or as a model to follow.
Instead, he structures heroism as something open to any individual: anyone can save
others through their unselfish deeds. In this way, humans mirror Christ; we can achieve a
similar level of heroism—we too are divine.
Blake’s Milton, then, does not pick up a sword to cast out his Satan; rather, he
forgives him through his deed of self-annihilation: “Satan must be forgiven or vengeful
slaughter will never end” (Erdman, Blake: Prophet Against Empire 425). In Paradise
Lost, Jesus (pre-sacrifice) expels Lucifer-Satan and his legions by means of the violence
of war, casting them down into never-ending torment and hell, which then leads Satan to
take revenge by tempting humanity (God’s favoured creation) to fall, thereby continuing
the cycle of vengeance. Blake makes another notable turn away from Paradise Lost by
having his Milton acknowledge Satan, “that thing of darkness” (as Prospero says of
Caliban), to be himself—not external to himself, but a mode of his thinking. The Miltonic
Christ is much more the warrior than the sacrificer because his sacrifice is scheduled for a
future time. Blake, however, implies that we can all be our own saviours, our own Christfigures, through sacrificial acts of identification, acts which do not have to be physically

264

violent in order to be potent and to effect change. Blake does not reserve epic heroism for
just One Man; he opens it up to any who choose this path. His revision of heroism leads
to a renovated vision of England, where all are free from oppression and tyranny—
aesthetic, monarchical, religious, institutional, and ideological.
Although he had attempted to create heroic characters earlier in his career, Blake
arrived at a viable vision of heroism only in his epics. As a revolutionary force, Ore
seems to be a good candidate for a model of heroism. However, Ore dissatisfies Blake;
for instance, in America (1793) Ore’s “visual similarities” with Urizen evidence his
inherent inadequacies and limitations (Welch 108). According to Dennis M. Welch, this
similarity between Ore and Urizen “suggests] that his work is not finally millennial but
instead part of an historical cycle from enslavement to rebellion to re-enslavement.” To
break this cycle, a new heroic model is required—one Blake provides in Milton. But who
is the hero of Miltonl Obviously, Milton himself is a good candidate. Blake presents us
with his vision of John Milton, both the visionary poet and orthodox Puritan. We
encounter Milton in Eternity after his earthly life but before his grandiose visionary
journey of redemption. In her brief discussion of “epic masculinity,” Judith Halberstam
argues that epic masculinity depends upon an adversarial relationship (using James Bond
as her primary example). She states, “The ‘bad guy’ is a standard generic feature of epic
masculinity narratives: think only of Paradise Lost and its eschatological separation
between God and Devil; Satan, if you like, is the original bad guy” (Female Masculinity
2). Her point sheds light on Blake’s reworking of epic heroism. Milton is in need of
redemption because he has acted like Satan through his self-righteousness and his strict
adherence to Old Testament orthodoxy. Deen claims, “In Blake’s eyes [...] the judgment
in Paradise Lost is vengeance, and the vengeful justice Satan suffers makes him in turn
an accuser and a seeker of vengeance” (171). In Blake, rather than trying to punish Satan,
Milton acknowledges that he himself is to blame for his predicament. A Satan does exist,
but, after the Bard’s Song, Milton sees himself as a “bad guy”; as a result, he actively
seeks to redeem both himself and Satan through self-annihilation, reshaping heroic
identity and what it means to perform heroic deeds in the process.
Blake’s remaking of heroism can be seen most explicitly in the face-to-face
meeting between these two figures. In Milton’s encounter with Satan, perhaps the climax
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of the plot (if this poem can be said to have one), Milton explains that his actions do not
signify a confrontation of enemies in a battle to the death—quite the contrary:
Satan! my Spectre! I know my power thee to annihilate
And be a greater in thy place, & be thy Tabernacle
A covering for thee to do thy will, till one greater comes
And smites me as I smote thee & becomes my covering.
Such are the Laws of thy false Heavns! but Laws of Eternity
Are not such: know thou: I come to Self Annihilation
Such are the Laws of Eternity that each shall mutually
Annihilate himself for others good, as I for thee[.] (38.29-36, E 139)
Milton dismisses Satan’s false religion, the religion of the mortal (historical) Milton prior
to his death and time in Eternity, prior to his decision to go to eternal death. In fact, he
comes not to destroy Satan as an enemy, or to punish him: this would only make Milton
another Satan, waiting to be destroyed and supplanted by a future foe. Instead, Milton
opposes Satan’s laws and desires to redeem Satan, in spite of the fiend’s flaws and errors.
As such, Milton rejects Satanic institutions—perverted religion that teaches people to fear
death and act in selfishness—and chooses to teach people to annihilate themselves in
spite of death, thereby reducing death’s power.
What Milton finally comes to realize is that all of what Satan represents and does
is “Self righteousness / In all its Hypocritic turpitude” (38.43-44, E 139). By the end,
Milton no longer participates in this kind of attitude and ideology. Instead, he embraces
self-annihilation because it is a kind of communal act: more than the doer undergoes a
change and reaps the benefits; one’s self-annihilation saves others as well. Importantly,
Milton does not vanquish Satan; the fiend vanquishes himself by encircling himself and
reifying his own selfhood, simply intensifying his mistake. Milton tries to explain to
Satan that an act of destruction would just make him like Satan, which is exactly what
Milton’s earthly self-righteousness accomplished. Breaking the cycle of victor-victim,
Milton, instead, chooses to annihilate himself and paves the way for a new kind of heroic
action, one not founded on the elimination of the enemy as the goal but rather on a
mutual redemption and expansion.
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Moreover, having dispensed with the typical talk of conquering one’s foes, Milton
must also reclaim his female Emanation. Dissatisfied in Eternity, he must redress wrongs
from his life on earth, namely to “resum[e]” “those three females whom his Wives, &
those three whom his Daughters / Had represented and containd” (17.1-2, E 110) during
“his bright pilgrimage of sixty years” “on earth” (15.52, E 110). This hero is decidedly
not the hero of the James Bond films that Halberstam describes. Milton’s masculinity is
unconventional. Blake, then, constructs one alternative to epic masculinity and heroic
identity—he constructs a new kind of hero. But, is Milton, in fact, the hero of this epic? I
argue that this poem has no Odysseus or Achilles or Aeneas or, to turn to another genre,
Macduff or Henry V. Unlike classical epic poets, Blake creates a hero-less epic, or, to be
more precise, a conglomerate hero: several characters partake in the heroism—none is
dispensable. Their achievement and progress depend on the interrelation of all.

Doers and Deeds: Establishing Identity
While several characters interrelate to create the heroism and heroic action of
Milton, the poem also makes an argument for every individual having a responsibility to
do the work that belongs to him or her, to fulfill his or her calling. Blake’s depiction of
work and deeds extends my earlier discussion of sincerity and constancy, as well as my
discussion of the tension between inner and outer. Blake’s anxiety about his calling at the
time the poem was written—he dated it 1804—reveals itself in the work. The date of the
poem suggests that much of the antagonism that Blake felt between himself and his
patron William Hayley—who had a say in the work Blake produced at this time—
expresses itself indirectly in the relationship between Milton and Satan and between
Palamabron and Satan. 1804 marks Blake’s return to London after his stay in Felpham on
Hayley’s estate, a stay commencing in 1800. Blake saw Hayley as trying to restrict him
from doing the kind of prophetic and imaginative work he wanted to do and should have
been doing; indeed, Hayley had Blake focusing on commercial kinds of engraving:
portraits, illustrations, and the like. Leaving Hayley and returning to London resulted in
Blake’s completion of two of his most involved works, the epics Milton and Jerusalem.
For Blake, work equals life. The well-known description of extraordinary pockets
of time reaffirms the place of work in the renovating aspect of life:
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There is a Moment in each Day that Satan cannot find
Nor can his Watch Fiends find it, but the Industrious find
This Moment & it multiply. & when it once is found
It renovates every Moment of the Day if rightly placed[.]
In this Moment Ololon descended to Los & Enitharmon
Unseen beyond the Mundane Shell Southward in Miltons track (35.42-47,
E 136)
These are exceptionally productive moments of time that we find, as if they exist within
the fabric of our reality in a hidden yet accessible way. These moments cannot be easily
found; only “the Industrious” find them. While industriousness suggests cleverness, the
association of work with the term cannot be ignored in a poem that prizes deeds and
makes labour the topic of the Bard’s Song. The Industrious have the ability to multiply
and expand these moments that affect all other moments in time, suggesting that what
they do (work—intense work) has power.13
Finding these moments of time enables heroic acts within the poem; for instance,
Ololon enters into one such moment—in fact, her redemptive quest takes place inside
one. Either she herself belongs to this group of the Industrious, or someone else’s work
has opened up this moment for her. The answer is probably a little of both. Ololon’s
parallel journey (i.e., seeking self-annihilation) with Milton’s becomes one of these
moments, but so too does the “inspirational” work of the Industrious (perhaps related to
13

Blake’s renovating moment(s) contrast with Wordsworth’s “spots o f time.” In Book XI (lines

258-79) o f The Prelude, Wordsworth talks o f “spots o f time” as “retain[ing] / A renovating Virtue,” which
“nourish[] and invisibly repair[]” “our minds” that suffer “the round / O f ordinary intercourse.” These
moments mend and refresh us; they help us through our mundane lives. Wordsworth says, “Such moments
[...] Are scattered everywhere, taking their date / From our first childhood.” The “memory” is key, as it
takes time past to alter present time, or at least our perception and state o f being in the present through,
what Wordsworth calls, a “beneficent influence.” One important difference between Wordsworth’s spots
and Blake’s moments seems to me to be the purpose and effect o f each. Wordsworthian spots o f time are
personal and allow for individual and private change, while Blakean moments entail action, which later
leads to change not only on an individual scale but a communal one. Also, Blake’s moments do not have an
explicit connection to memory or the past, as Wordsworth’s do. Instead, Blake’s moments have a strong tie
to the present. However, their ability to transcend the conventional limitations o f time enables them to
encompass past, present, and future as if it were all happening at once.
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the poetic genius), which opens the space for Ololon’s act. She herself, along with nearly
every other main character in this poem, contributes to such an inspirational moment; in
fact, all inspirational moments correspond to the renovating moment of the above
passage. Such moments expand time and renovate or alter all other moments. Rather than
a discrete and singular section of time, this powerful moment exhibits multiplicity.
Elsewhere, Blake proclaims, “A Moment equals a pulsation of the artery” (Milton 28.47,
E 126). Unsettling and distorting notions of linear time, he represents these moments as
equaling a fraction of a second and yet as occupying an indefinite amount of time as well,
reminiscent of “Auguries of Innocence,” where “Hold[ing] Infinity in the palm of your
hand / And Eternity in an hour” (3-4, E 490) become possible. Blake makes the farreaching power of these moments accessible to the Industrious specifically—those who
work, perform deeds, and labour.
In Blake’s Eternity, each individual occupies a specific role, carrying out a
particular task. Satan, a miller, runs the mills to grind grain, while Palamabron, a
harrower, works the land, breaking and evening the ground with his harrow.14 Turmoil in
heaven begins (or occurs simultaneously with Milton’s own turmoil) when Satan “soft
intreated Los to give to him Palamabrons station” (7.6, E 100), wanting to switch his
given labour as a miller with that of his brother Palamabron. Los finally submits, but the
outcome is disastrous: “Next morning Palamabron rose: the horses of the Harrow / Were
maddend with tormenting fury, & the servants of the Harrow / The Gnomes, accus'd
Satan, with indignation fury and fire” (7.17-19, E 100). Disorder ensues as Satan and
Palamabron exchange roles, for as Palamabron exclaims, “How should he [Satan] [...]
know the duties of another?” (7.28, E 101). Upon seeing the chaos that arises from one
brother taking over the responsibilities of another, Los proclaims, “Henceforth [...] let
each his own station / Keep” (7.41-41, E 101).
This scene in Eternity suggests the fixity of one’s position in life and that one
should not attempt to change it. Many critics explain that Blake’s attitude toward Hayley
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these two roles (i.e., Harrower and Miller) in the context o f the Bard’s Song.
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impacts the poem significantly.15 Blake believed that Hayley threatened his very life,
identity, or self by threatening his duty as a prophet-poet. In a letter to Thomas Butts,
Blake writes:
My unhappiness has arisen from a source which if explord too narrowly
might hurt my pecuniary circumstances. As my dependence is on
Engraving at present & particularly on the Engravings 1 have in hand for
Mr H. & I find on all hands great objections to my doing any thing but the
meer drudgery of business & intimations that if I do not confine myself to
this I shall not live. [...] I cannot live without doing my duty to lay up
treasures in heaven is Certain & Determined & to this I have long made up
my mind [...] if I myself omit any duty to my [self] <Station> as a Soldier
of Christ[] It gives me the greatest of torments [...] But if we fear to do the
dictates of our Angels & tremble at the Tasks set before us. if we refuse to
do Spiritual Acts, because of Natural Fears or Natural Desires! Who can
describe the dismal torments of such a state! [...] If you who are organized
by Divine Providence for Spiritual communion. Refuse & bury your
Talent in the Earth even tho you should want Natural Bread. Sorrow &
Desperation pursues you thro life! & after death shame & confusion of
face to eternity [...] You will be calld the base Judas who betrayd his
Friend!—Such words would make any Stout man tremble & how then
could I be at ease? But I am now no longer in That State & now go on
again with my Task Fearless. (10 Jan. 1803, E 724)
Blake faces pressure from Hayley (and others) to commit his life to engraving and forfeit
his desire to pursue visionary art in order to maintain a stable livelihood and income.
Andrew M. Cooper says, “Milton expresses Blake’s struggle to overcome preoccupying
self-doubts and recover his rightful place in the world” (75), and the poem evidences his
self-mastery in the face of doubt. Not succumbing to the pressure pushing him toward a
steadfast pursuit of profitable work to attain only monetary ends, Blake embraces his
divine “Task,” a task that he considers a “Spiritual Act” but one that manifests itself
15
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Riede 260; and Johnson 236.
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through corporeal acts and in a concrete product (i.e., the illuminated works). He will
refuse those who attempt to sway him from his path, those, like Hayley, who “will be
calld the base Judas who betrayd his Friend!”
In one of two allusions in this letter to the Parable of the Talents, Blake says, “I
cannot live without doing my duty to lay up treasures in heaven is Certain,” suggesting
that his life is tied to his performance of his prophetic-poetic duties; his very existence—
and even his eternal happiness if his character Milton is any indication—depends on the
fulfillment of his “Talents”—which in Blake’s case is his artistic skill and passion, not
his ability to make money as an engraver. He continues, “if 1 myself omit any duty to my
[self] <Station> as a Soldier of Christ[] It gives me the greatest of torments.” While the
final letter reads “Station,” Blake’s first instinct was to write “self,” suggesting a
connection between what one does (the expression of one’s innate potential) and who one
is (the self). Hayley, then, attempts to prevent Blake from enacting his divine potential as
a visionary artist, and, in so doing, risks Blake’s ability to remain true to himself and to
his calling, and thus undermines his very identity.
Similarly, Palamabron describes Satan’s acts as “self-imposition,” as imposition
on another self or identity, and he describes Satan himself as “Seeming a brother, being a
tyrant [...] While he is murdering the just” (7.21-23, E 100). By taking Palamabron’s
labours from him, Satan intrudes on Palamabron’s self and compromises his freedom,
implying that Palamabron’s actions and deeds—his work—define him and give him
power over his own person—in short, his work gives him his liberty. Satan’s attempt to
change his own position and his own tasks destroys Palamabron—robbing the latter of
his deeds makes the former a “murderer.” Here, we have not only a depiction of the
inflexible roles people must fulfill but also a depiction of the importance of actions to
identity. If one does not fulfill one’s potential or if someone prevents one from fulfilling
one’s potential, then one’s very existence is at stake, as if deeds consolidate and
constitute identity. Satan’s perversion of his (and Palamabron’s) proper action, then, seals
his fate. Palamabron envisions what lies ahead for Satan saying, “prophetic I behold / His
[Satan’s] future course thro’ darkness and despair to eternal death / But we must not be
tyrants also!” (7.23, E 100 - 7.25, E 101). Palamabron prophesies that what has just taken
place is the beginning of Satan’s downfall, yet Palamabron holds himself back from
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further attack, and perhaps (further) imposition on Satan’s future potential, thanks to his
fear of becoming a “tyrant”—an impediment to personal freedom—like Satan.
The dynamic between doer and deed and between identity and the expression of
one’s calling in the poem also has as a paradigm the Parable of the Talents. Blake
reworks the parable, alluding to it in more than one of his letters while at Felpham,
through the lens of Milton’s “Sonnet XIX” (“When I consider how my light is spent”). In
the sonnet, a near-blind Milton speaks of “that one talent which is death to hide / Lodg’d
with [him] useless” (3-4). In other words, Milton worries that his future blindness will
impede his ability to write poetry—his talent, metaphorically in this case, is his innate
gift—thereby making him unable to serve God. Unlike the servant in the parable,
however, he has not willfully buried his talent. Milton resolves the dilemma by
concluding the poem as follows: “They also serve who only stand and wait” (14).16
Blake, however, does not go along with Milton in his patient forbearance; instead, he
suggests that being unwilling or unable to fulfill one’s divine role leads to the murder of
one’s self, to a kind of annihilation (but a pointedly negative one as opposed to the
positive self-annihilation that redemption demands in Milton). Blake follows Milton’s
translation of talent from currency to poetic ability—one’s calling—and suggests that it is
part of one’s identity. To ignore or suppress one’s talent is to turn away from the Eternal.
In the end, performing one’s actions is firmly intertwined with one’s identity. Here, the
outer deeply impacts the inner, though this impact does not efface the role of the interior
space in shaping the external world of an individual.
The self can be found in the crucial action of the poem, an action that consists of a
twofold event: the moment of inspiration and of self-annihilation. The former act occurs
several times in the poem to different characters, while the latter act belongs to Milton
alone—even so, the poem makes clear that this act repeats, or potentially repeats itself, in
every individual. The emphasis on these two acts suggests an emphasis on the deed rather
than the doer, and it prioritizes action over reflection or contemplation. Deeds strongly
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connect to, and in fact initiate, change in the poem. This emphasis finds an early
articulation in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics where he says that “[vjirtue of character
results from habit,” indicating that repeated action, rather than some innate material,
creates the composition of personality (216). Unlike Aristotle’s Metaphysics, which
Blake satirizes in the Marriage, the Nicomachean Ethics offers a configuration of doer
and deed strikingly similar to Blake’s. In his discussion of virtue, Aristotle attributes
having virtue to habit and repetition, not to innate possession:
Virtue of thought arises and grows mostly from teaching, and hence needs
experience and time. Virtue of character results from habit [...] Hence it is
also clear that none of the virtues of character arises in us naturally. For if
something is by nature in one condition, habituation cannot bring it into
another condition [...] Thus the virtues arise in us neither by nature nor
against nature. Rather, we are by nature able to acquire them, and reach
our complete perfection through habit. (216)
In the nurture side of the nature-nurture debate, a person is not bom virtuous; he or she
becomes virtuous through education, learning and repeating virtuous actions. A virtuous
(and by the same token a vicious) character comes into being through habit. Nature’s
role, then, exists only in the capacity for virtue, not the actual possession of it.
Aristotle continues to link deed to action in subsequent passages:
Virtues [...] we acquire, just as we acquire crafts, by having previously
activated them. For we leam a craft by producing the same product that we
must produce when we have learned it, becoming builders, for instance, by
building and harpists by playing the harp; so also, then, we become just by
doing just actions, temperate by doing temperate actions, brave by doing
brave actions. (217)
For Aristotle, we acquire virtues in a similar fashion to the way we acquire crafts. Being
virtuous, or being a harpist, does not arise innately. We gain virtuousness, or harp
playing skills, through the process of doing—repeatedly doing. Actions, then, constitute a
person’s identity, moral or vocational. The action defines the person; the person’s identity
does not define the action that proceeds from the person.

273

Perhaps more importantly for Aristotle, “a person comes to be just from doing just
actions and temperate from doing temperate actions; for no one has even a prospect of
becoming good from failing to do them” (221). Milton would later argue a similar
position in Areopagitica:
what wisdome can there be to choose, what continence to forbeare without
the knowledge of evill? He that can apprehend and consider vice with all
her baits and seeming pleasures, and yet abstain, and yet distinguish, and
yet prefer that which is truly better, he is the true wayfaring Christian. I
cannot praise a fugitive and cloister’d vertue, unexercis’d & unbreath’d,
that never sallies out and sees her adversary, but slinks out of the race,
where that immortall garland is to be run for, not without dust and heat.
(1006b)
Without the opportunity for action, a person could not be virtuous, nor could someone be,
for instance, a harpist without an opportunity to play. When Blake blasts William Hayley
for preventing him from doing his work—creating his visionary art—he does so because
Hayley impedes him from fulfilling his identity as a prophet-poet. As Gerard Manley
Hopkins’s “just man justices” (1. 9) in “As kingfishers catch fire,” Blake, as prophet and
poet, must prophesy and poetize, thereby crying out, “ What l do is me" (1. 8; original
emphasis). Blake’s Milton has a similar crisis. We first encounter him in Eternity, but,
tellingly, he does not perform his bardic offices as he did on Earth. By ceasing his bardic
action, he has lost himself, which explains his “unhappy” state. This conclusion radically
changes what we take to mean by his journey of self-annihilation. If his identity is
already at stake, then questing for self-annihilation does not have the same meaning as it
does if Milton has a firm grasp of his identity. Presumably, through self-annihilation he
will somehow find or restore his true self.
However, actions alone do not forge the various shapes identity can take for
Aristotle. He says, “But actions are not enough; we must take as a sign of someone’s state
his pleasure or pain in consequence of his action” (219). In other words, intention is key.
Aristotle does not entirely remove agency from his version of identification. Yes, action
makes someone virtuous, and without action someone could not be virtuous; however,
“the agent must also be in the right state when he does them. First, he must know that he
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is doing virtuous actions; second, he must decide on them, and decide on them for
themselves; and, third, he must also do them from a firm and unchanging state” (221).
Aristotle complicates matters by insisting on the doer’s knowledge of the act (as opposed
to ignorantly doing an act that could be considered virtuous), the doer’s choosing to do
the act for itself and not for some selfish or corrupt reason and the doer’s resoluteness
when he/she performs the deed (as opposed to doing an act half-heartedly). Failing any of
these three would result in a dilution of the act and, as a result, of the identity of the doer.
As Blake states, “No man can think write or speak from his heart, but he must intend
truth” {All Religions are One El); hence, actions reflecting one’s “true” self cannot be
false, and intention validates action as well as the interior self.
Aristotle’s particular focus on intention changes radically by the time we come to
the late nineteenth century and then to post-structuralist thought. In her analysis of gender
as constructed in Gender Trouble, Judith Butler builds on Nietzsche and Foucault and
aligns herself with the newer tradition of prioritizing the deed without drawing a
necessary link to an agent. Nietzsche claims, “there is no ‘being’ behind doing, effecting,
becoming; ‘the doer’ is merely a fiction added to the deed—the deed is everything”
(“First Essay” 45; also qtd. in Butler 25). He argues that “the misleading influence of
language,” “the seduction of language (and of the fundamental errors of reason that are
petrified in it) [...] conceives and misconceives all effects as conditioned by something
that causes effects, by a ‘subject’” (Nietzsche 45). Nietzsche dismisses any belief in a
doer who acts intentionally and instead advocates a vision of reality in which people (and
animals) invariably express their identity without choice. As a result, Nietzsche argues
for free expression; he believes ideas about restraint are misplaced when considering
notions of strength. Comparing a bird of prey to a lamb, he explains that the one cannot
help but exert strength, while the other cannot help but exhibit weakness.
Butler qualifies Nietzsche’s exorcism of the ghost of agency or subjectivity
lurking behind action when she says, “My argument is that there need not be a ‘doer
behind the deed,’ but that the ‘doer’ is variably constructed in and through the deed. [...]
It is precisely the discursively variable construction of each in and through the other that
has interested me here” (181). For Butler, then, the self shapes the act just as the act
shapes the self, and both are shaped by the discourse of binary, heterosexual hegemony.
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In this way, she appears to sidestep questions of agency by putting doer and deed on even
ground. However, this formulation fails to show precisely how a doer can retain agency if
the deed constructs the doer as he or she performs the deed. If deeds create the doer, then
the doer inevitably faces becoming negligible in the enactment of social change. Butler
acknowledges this potential criticism of her argument, specifically as this criticism might
be shaped by feminist concerns. She imagines one critique to attack her erasure of agency
as follows: “Without an agent, it is argued, there can be no agency and hence no potential
to initiate a transformation of relations of domination within society” (33-34). Butler
counters by asking, “does [gender’s] constructedness imply some form of social
determinism, foreclosing the possibility of agency and transformation?” (11), a question
that she answers in the conclusion of her book. Butler finds no contradiction between
theories of agency and her theory:
For an identity to be an effect means that it is neither fatally determined
nor fully artificial and arbitrary. [...] Construction is not opposed to
agency; it is the necessary scene of agency, the very terms in which
agency is articulated and becomes culturally intelligible. [...] The critical
task is, rather to locate strategies of subversive repetition enabled by those
constructions, to affirm the local possibilities of intervention through
participating in precisely those practices of repetition that constitute
identity and, therefore, present the immanent possibility of contesting
them. (187-88)
Butler defends her argument against attacks that claim she erases agency by claiming that
agency is not antithetical to notions of constructedness. Despite her defence (indeed,
defences, as she continues to defend her position in her later works),17 her theory still
faces challenges. For instance, Alex Dick states, “[A]s a number of critics have pointed
out, Butler’s commitment to the (post)structuralist argument for the agency of language
itself posits the agency for social change out of the hands of real people and into the
hands of what she calls ‘discourse’” (101). Butler, skeptical of language, makes clear in

17

For example, see the Preface and Introduction to Bodies That Matter (ix-xii, 1-23) and the

Introduction to Undoing Gender (1-16).
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all of her works that we are inevitably caught in discourse, so a singular and independent
“I” cannot exist.
In Giving an Account o f Oneself Butler tries to think through agency and unique
identity. She engages with Italian philosopher and feminist Adriana Cavarero and what
Butler calls her theory of “sociality” (32) regarding storytelling. Speaking of an
individual self, Cavarero argues, “This who is precisely an unrepeatable uniqueness
which, in order to appear to others, needs first of all a plural - and therefore political space of interaction” (58). Butler says, “In [Cavarero’s] view, I am not, as it were, an
interior subject, closed upon myself, solipsistic, posing questions of myself alone. I exist
in an important sense for you, and by virtue of you. If I have lost the condition of address,
if I have no ‘you’ to address, then I have lost ‘m yself”; “we are bound to one another by
what differentiates us, namely, our singularity” (34). Cavarero, according to Butler,
cannot think about the subject in isolation because the subject’s relational position in the
social world is what defines it. Without others, no “1” could exist.
Butler finds Cavarero’s argument thought-provoking, but, inevitably, Butler
cannot reconcile herself to this idea of a singularity formed within relationality. She
counters that Cavarero’s attempt to maintain uniqueness does not succeed because her
theory “establishes] a structure of substitutability at the core of singularity” (35); “even
as Cavarero argues that singularity sets a limit to substitutability, she also argues that
singularity has no defining content other than the irreducibility of exposure, of being this
body exposed to a publicity” (34). On the one hand, Cavarero sets up an “I” that is unique
and relational, but ultimately without an essential ground: “[t]he self [...] has a totally
external and relational reality” (63), where “the reality of the self is necessarily
intermittent and fragmentary. The story that results therefore does not have at its center a
compact and coherent identity. Rather, it has at its center an unstable and insubstantial
unity” (63). On the other hand, Butler provides us with a view of identity without any
ground, without the possibility of a comprehensible agency of the individual. Cavarero
and Butler both offer invaluable insights into identity and its formation despite the
critiques of their theories. Cavarero’s uniqueness within a larger interconnectivity of
social relations and Butler’s performative identity lay the foundation for my reading of
Blake’s conception of identity in Milton.
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Identity in Blake’s poem exists in a dynamic relationship to notions of
interdependence, essentialism, and performativity. This dynamism allows an important
alternative to the two sides of the debate mentioned above, especially for contemporary
issues surrounding identity such as transsexuality and gender dystopia. The work of
Judith Halberstam explores questions of sex and gender as they relate specifically to
trans-identities. Her identity theory, which builds on Butler’s theory of gender
performativity, posits “[t]he postmodern lesbian body” as “remak[ing] gender as not
simply performance but also as fiction” (“F2M” 210). In her article, she explains that she
focuses on “sexualities and genders [...] as potentialities rather than as fixed identities”
(210-11). Halberstam expresses dismay at one film documentary that explicitly
“realign[s] sex and gender,” something that now seems out of place in an era of gender
construction and performativity (216). However, her argument is a contradictory, twofold
one: “it is perhaps preferable therefore to acknowledge that gender is defined by its
transitivity, that sexuality manifests as multiple sexualities, and that therefore we are all
transsexuals. There are no transsexuals” (226). These are provocative words for both
transsexuals and those who are not.
While 1 find Halberstam’s realignments and her addition to previous genderconstruction theories persuasive and significant, her theory has come under attack for
celebrating constructionism in the face of those whose lived experience makes this view
of identity unsatisfactory. In Female Masculinity, she addresses this specific criticism
leveled at her earlier article “F2M: The Making of Female Masculinity.” According to
Halberstam, Jay Prosser critiques her article for “advocating some simple celebratory
mode of border crossing,” that is performative constitutions of identity (147). However,
she accuses him of polarizing the debate so that queer theory stands opposed to
transgender theory, where the former is aligned with constructionism and the latter with
essentialism: “queer theory represents gender within some notion of postmodern fluidity
and fragmentation, but transgender theory eschews such theoretical free fall and focuses
instead on ‘subjective experience’. Queer theories of gender, in Prosser’s account,
emphasize the performative, and transgender theories are essentialist.” Indeed, Butler
implies that “the narrative of gender essentialism” is institutionally (in psychiatric
medicine) and culturally constructed (Undoing Gender 71) in that both instigate and

278

make necessary an essentialist (and coherent and stable) view of identity. However, she
forestalls challenges to the aims of queer theory by stating that its main aim is to prevent
“the unwanted legislation of identity” (7), and she even acknowledges that “a livable life
does require various degrees of stability” (8). Yet she maintains, “One does not always
stay intact” (19)—identity can come undone.
Similarly, Halberstam attempts to articulate a defence against Prosser and argues,
I wanted to question the belief in fluid selves and the belief, moreover,
that fluidity and flexibility are always and everywhere desirable. At the
same time, 1 was trying to show that many, if not most, sexual and gender
identities involve some degree of movement (not free-flowing but very
scripted) between bodies, desires, transgressions, and conformities; we do
not necessarily shuttle back and forth between sexual roles and practices at
will, but we do tend to adjust, accommodate, change, reverse, slide, and
move in general between moods and modes of desire. (Female
Masculinity 147)
Her defence doubles back on itself by saying fluidity marks the reality of gender and
sexuality, leaving a space for criticisms such as Prosser’s. He takes issue with the fact
that, despite her attempted revisioning above, the main thrust of her article and her book
is the flexibility of identities and boundaries: “All gender should be transgender, all
desire is transgendered, movement is all” (“F2M” 226). For Prosser, this kind of
argumentation implies a subordination or dismissal of those who seek to move beyond
transgendered labels and live a particular gender identity. Indeed, much performative
theory, including Butler’s, opens itself to similar criticisms. As Prosser explains,
transsexuals who undergo sex-change operations live and experience a very different
reality than the theory Halberstam espouses. Prosser valorizes the essentialist desire to
achieve “one’s true and authentic gender” (Halberstam, Female Masculinity 163) that
arises in many who experience gender dystopia. He contends, “[T]he hard facts of gender
and embodiment” (167) will always undermine theories of performative and fluid gender
identities. Like Butler, Halberstam provides a productive model of identity particularly in
queer and trans contexts. However, Prosser’s objections show that not everyone finds
these theories viable in practice. The notion of an essential self remains crucial for the
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lived experience of many individuals. Yet these same individuals often need to cross
boundaries in order to reach such a self. Identity-construction theories do not offer these
individuals something wholly satisfactory or even commensurate with their experience of
their selves and bodies.
1 argue that Blake’s conception of identity offers another voice in the current
debates about identity and perhaps even a way to address the resulting dissatisfaction
with the model of construction. Almost three decades ago, Stephen Greenblatt closed his
book Renaissance Self-fashioning, which focuses in part on the social and political
structures that shape human identity, by explaining the desire to believe in the “I” and
agency even against evidence to the contrary: “For the Renaissance figures we have
considered understand that in our culture to abandon self-fashioning is to abandon the
craving for freedom, and to let go of one’s stubborn hold upon selfhood, even selfhood
conceived as a fiction, is to die. As for myself, [...] 1 want to bear witness at the close to
my overwhelming need to sustain the illusion that 1 am the principal maker of my
identity” (257). Dismissing a core self and embracing performative identity, not only in
theory but also in practice, remains problematic and unsatisfactory for many. However,
Blake’s view of identity offers an alternative to the either/or position of the
constructionist and the essentialist.
At first, his placing of deed and doer in a dependent relation seems strikingly
constructionist in light of Butler’s deed-doer equivalence, where one constructs the other
and vice versa. For instance, when Blake explains, “There is not an Error but it has a Man
for its [Actor] Agent that is it is a Man” ( VLJ E 563), he seems to be asserting that one
cannot think of a deed apart from its doer. Also, for Blake, a poet’s writing and activity
rely on his identity as poet, yet his identity as poet relies on his poetic action. Kevin D.
Hutchings implicitly aligns Blake with Butler in his alignment of Blake with Foucault.
Hutchings argues that Blake’s “‘Self-Examination’” is “a critical process which analyzes
and questions the relationship between individual subjectivity and discursive authority”
(279). Hutchings continues, “For what Blake wishes to show in Milton is that sovereign
self-control is an illusion, indeed a fiction that paradoxically generates passivity on the
part of its adherents.” While his reading of Milton is insightful, he seems to gloss over or
avoid the role of permanent identity.
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The crucial difference remains in the understanding of agent or doer for Blake and
Butler. The latter denounces a unified, stable self and the “willful subject” (Bodies That
Matter 9); instead, she theorizes a performative identity that is necessarily constituted
through acts and language. No self exists outside of these spheres of “constitutive
constraint,” and no self can effect change outside of these limiting spheres (15). Blake,
however, does not turn away from an idea of permanent identity—though his
representation of it in Milton raises questions about the nature of such an identity. Blake
insists on an essential self outside language and action—an eternal identity—as well as
on intention. How can we know that the work we do is right, that it expresses our calling,
our eternal identity? Alternatively, how can we know when it is wrong? These questions
never concern Blake. He and his characters simply know what work pertains to their
identity. Paradoxically, actions reaffirm an eternal permanence and constitute one’s
identity. Strangely, he combines the essential and the performative. Perhaps this
combination—no matter how impossible for reason to fully comprehend—offers an
alternative to the sometimes unsatisfactory performative and constructionist identities
that post-structuralists such as Butler theorize. And perhaps these are questions better left
to faculties of mind and body other than reason, faculties like imagination and physical
perception and affect. By refusing to reject individual, separate identity completely,
Blake somehow retains the power for an individual to provoke change.

Self-Annihilation and Identity
The process of self-annihilation would seem to place Blake in the tradition of
Nietzsche and Butler, in the tradition of those who undermine or displace identity, the
self, or the willing subject. As an act, self-annihilation appears to contradict inspiration;
the first suggests the complete destruction of the self, while the latter suggests the
enhancement of the self by another being through the merging of identities. At the
beginning of the poem, the Bard’s Song of Satan’s fall, as well as his distinction among
the three classes of men—the Elect, the Redeemed, and the Reprobate—jolts Milton out
of his complacency and into action. After hearing the Bard’s song,
Milton rose up from the heavens of Albion ardorous!
The whole Assembly wept prophetic, seeing in Miltons face
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And in his lineaments divine the shades of Death & Ulro
He took off the robe of the promise, & ungirded himself from the oath of
God
And Milton said, 1 go to Eternal Death! The Nations still
Follow after the detestable Gods of Priam; in pomp
Of warlike selfhood, contradicting and blaspheming.
When will the Resurrection come; to deliver the sleeping body
From corruptibility: O when Lord Jesus wilt thou come?
Tarry no longer; for my soul lies at the gates of death.

1 will go down to self annihilation and eternal death,
Lest the Last Judgment come & find me unannihilate
And I be siez’d & giv’n into the hands of my own Selfhood

What do I here before the Judgment? without my Emanation?
With the daughters of memory, & not with the daughters of inspiration^]
1 in my Selfhood am that Satan: I am that Evil One!
He is my Spectre! in my obedience to loose him from my Hells
To claim the Hells, my Furnaces, 1 go to Eternal Death. (14.10-32, E 108)
Milton begins by disrobing himself “from the oath of God,” taking the first step away
from the patriarchal religion of the Old Testament tyrannical God and the first step
toward redemption. This line is the longest one in this passage, as if the form carries the
burden and weight of God’s oath in its length. Blake’s Milton rejects the religion that
Blake believed the historical Milton clung to in life, the religion of obedience, sin,
violence, human physical sacrifice, and oppression. This kind of religion promotes
‘contradictions’ and opposes true faith, creating a “warlike selfhood” destructive to the
individual. Milton, though expecting the final coming of Jesus in the Last Judgment, does
not passively wait for redemption; there is no mere serving and waiting here. He
acknowledges his error and resolves to find his Emanation, to annihilate himself, and to
spurn memory in favour of imagination (changing his own history by imagining a future
possibility)—all of which he suggests are necessary for his salvation. Already in Eternity,
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it would seem that Milton has nowhere to climb up the cosmic ladder; rather, because he
is dissatisfied, he risks complete destruction by going toward “Eternal Death”—he
“enters this world and reincarnates himself’ (Frye 316)—in order to redeem himself and
his six-fold female Emanation. His heroic apotheosis comes in a non-classical form—not
in an ascent but a descent, much like Christ’s. As in the invocation, which calls on the
Daughters of Beulah instead of the Greek Muses (the daughters of the goddess of
Memory), this passage reflects Blake’s displacement of memory in favour of inspiration.
Memory tends to reify and affirm identity and the individual, and it is more identityoriented than inspiration; inspiration, on the other hand, seems to violate the individual
identity by inviting other agencies to work within and through the individual. As a result,
it tends to the performative in the Butlerian sense of being the opposite of essence (i.e.,
something that cannot be changed).
In addition, Blake depicts selfhood as an oppressor or jailor: Milton fears being
“siez’d & giv’n into the hands of [his] own Selfhood” if he does not proceed with self
annihilation before the Judgment arrives. Moreover, Milton sees his Selfhood as the arch
enemy, thereby affirming his role in Satanic error: “1 in my Selfhood am that Satan: I am
that Evil One!” Here, Milton does not deny culpability; he affirms his agency in his
misdeeds while on earth, misdeeds that resonate in Eternity and continue to cause his
current turmoil. Rather than denying agency and accusing someone else (as Satan the
accuser would do), he establishes his agency when he wishes “To claim the Hells, [his]
Furnaces” in order “to loose [Satan] from [his] Hells.” Milton goes to eternal death in
order to cast off and destroy his “warlike selfhood” and to redeem himself and his
Emanation. Milton must act if he hopes to amend his erroneous path and achieve
salvation. At the same time as Milton asserts his agency, he also begins the process of
casting off and destroying “selfhood,” the process of self-annihilation. He appears poised
to revise his perception of his being by seeing it founded not on selfhood but on an
obliteration, an annihilation—literally a reduction to nothing—of his identity.
Not only does Blake seem to approach Nietzsche and Butler in his depiction of
selfhood as error and as something that must be obliterated, but he also approaches them
by prioritizing the deed over the doer in his configuration of self-annihilation. Part of
Milton’s self-annihilation process takes place through Blake’s body. After Milton
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descends to Blake’s cottage, and just before Milton completes his act of self-annihilation,
Blake seems to merge into another character. He says, “I also stood in Satans bosom &
beheld its desolations! / A ruind Man” (38.15-16, E 139). If Satan is, in fact, Milton’s
own evil selfhood, then Blake also stands in Milton’s bosom as he casts out the Accuser:
that portion namd the Elect: the Spectrous body of Milton:
Redounding from my left foot into Los’s Mundane space,
Brooded over his Body in Horeb against the Resurrection
Preparing it for the Great Consummation^] (20.20-23, E 114)
The erroneous and spectral component of Milton exits from Blake after Milton merges
with Blake, enacting one step of self-annihilation. The corrupt aspects of Milton are
expelled, and Blake retains the visionary and prophetic part. Self-annihilation here does
not have a solitary agent. It has at least two and perhaps more agents, if we recall the
presence of the Bard in Milton and Los in Blake. Like inspiration, the process involves
characters entering other characters. By confusing agency to such an extent, the action
itself becomes more important than any individual who happens to take part; in other
words, the process of self-annihilation, though essential for Milton individually, occupies
a greater role than the fact that Milton (whose exact responsibility remains unclear)
enacts the deed; indeed, Blake (perhaps by entering Satan) has a hand (and foot!) in this
act.
As Blake’s role in this feat demonstrates, self-annihilation does not belong solely
to Milton; besides Blake, there are other characters who partake in this event. For
example, Ololon conducts a parallel quest. She, or they (“they” because Ololon consists
of all of Milton’s Emanations), says, “Let us descend also, and let us give / Ourselves to
death in Ulro among the Transgressors. / Is Virtue a Punisher? O no!” (21.45-47, E 116).
Seeing the hopeful outcome of such a deed, Ololon goes to eternal death; her act suggests
that Milton’s cannot be accomplished without assistance. Self-annihilation helps others; it
is not an act that affects only one entity, nor can one entity rely merely on its own deeds
for redemption, though they are crucial. Thus, the deed when multiplied by others
becomes significant and removes the selfishness of the doer. Despite her fear, Ololon’s
self-annihilation completes Milton’s quest. After Milton has cast out Satan and after
Ololon corporealizes in Blake’s garden, both journeys find fulfillment:
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the Virgin divided Six-fold & with a shriek
Dolorous that ran thro all Creation a Double Six-fold Wonder!
Away from Ololon she divided & fled into the depths
Of Miltons Shadow as a Dove upon the stormy Sea.
Then as a Moony Ark Ololon descended to Felphams Vale
In clouds of blood, in streams of gore, with dreadful thunderings
Into the Fires of Intellect that rejoic'd in Felphams Vale
Around the Starry Eight: with one accord the Starry Eight became
One Man Jesus the Saviour, wonderful! round his limbs
The Clouds of Ololon folded as a Garment dipped in blood
Written within & without in woven letters: & the Writing
Is the Divine Revelation in the Litteral expression^] (42.3-14, E 143)
This apocalyptic vision heralds the Last Judgment—there is blood, but rejoicing,
implying that redemption is successful. The Virgin divides from Ololon just as Milton’s
Shadow—“the Covering Cherub & within him Satan” (37.8, E 137)—divides from him,
implying that they have each successfully undergone self-annihilation, rejecting the self
righteous and selfish parts of their individual self. Moreover, Ololon, along with being
partly responsible for Milton’s self-annihilation, belongs to Jesus’ deeds: she
accompanies Him as a bloody cloud so that humans may see and read the “Divine
Revelation.” In this way Jesus “enterfs] into / Albions Bosom” (42.20-21, E 143),
awakening England. The whole thing is described as loud and thunderous, full of
trumpets sounding (a positive climax in comparison to the silence at the beginning of the
poem prior to Milton’s journey). One man’s journey of self-annihilation has included
several different agents, and it has led finally to an apocalyptic redemption. We need not
be the Prophet of Eternity, we need not be Albion, and we need not be the prophet-bard
Milton to change the world; all we need to do is embrace action. The doer has less
relevance at the end of the poem (despite the title) than the doer’s act, an act that suggests
one can open one’s imagination and de-centre one’s self to merge with others, or at least
be moved by them.
Despite such an emphasis on acts, especially those of self-annihilation, and
despite Milton’s quest for the destruction of his selfhood, Blake refuses to do away with
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separate individualities or notions of the self altogether. Herein lies his incompatibility
with philosophers like Nietzsche and Butler. Mitchell lists a number of possible words
and phrases to describe Blake’s ambiguous concept of self-annihilation: “ego-death,”
“nirvana,” “Christian death and rebirth,” and an “existential concept of the self as an
entity which is continuously created and destroyed” (“Blake’s Radical Comedy” 304).
While Mollyanne Marks argues that “[t]he self or selfhood is, for Blake, the force
irreconcilably opposed to creativity, generosity, and the human give-and-take of psychic
warfare in Eternity” (28), others do not see Blake as rejecting the self entirely and, rather,
define self-annihilation in a way that reaffirms identity. For instance, Welch explains, “[it
does] not imply the loss or death of identity but instead its realization. (Blake typically
distinguished between one’s selfhood - a false and ghostly covering, one’s ‘spectre’ in its
various negative and impermanent manifestations - and one’s identity - one’s true self,
which is eternal.)” (104). Coming from a Buddhist context, Mark Lussier explains that
self-annihilation is “Blake’s antidote” to “Urizen’s illusory vision o f ‘solitary’ existence”
and desire for “a sovereign self’ (“Enlightenment East and West” para. 24). While the
process functions as a part of enlightenment, it “equally connects with [the] articulation
of an ethos of otherness,” which we find in his other works. Self-annihilation, then,
integrates the concerns of the self with the larger network of relations among other
beings. Hatsuko Nimii, quoting an earlier critic Soetsu Yanagi, writes, “Self-annihilation
does not mean the denial of self but the perfect expansion of self, infinite expression and
union with the universe” (172). For Welch, self-annihilation signifies the process by
which we uncover our essential identity, allowing us to remove things we believe to be,
but are not in fact, our true selves, things which are nothing more than errors of
perception. Nimii suggests that the result of self-annihilation is not the rejection of
notions of the self but an enhancement of the self. In fact, it is “a process which is in
effect a transition from nullity to fulfilment” (178), rather than being a process that
negates or obliterates.
Romantic concepts of poetic identity offer another way to understand the act of
self-annihilation and its relevance to inspiration in Milton. The term self-annihilation is
reminiscent of Keats’s “camelion Poet” (279), who turns away from the Wordsworthian
“Egotist” (263). Keats promotes a different kind of “poetical Character” (279), one that
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“is not itself - it has no self - it is every thing and nothing - It has no character.” In a
letter, Keats expands on what he means:
he [a poet] has no Identity - he is continually for - and filling some other
body - The Sun, the Moon, the Sea and Men and Women who are
creatures of impulse are poetical and have about them an unchangeable
attribute - the poet has none; no identity [...] When I am in a room with
People if I ever am free from speculating on creation of my own brain,
then not myself goes home to myself: but the identity of every one in the
room begins to [...] press upon me that, I am in a very little time
annihilated. (279-80)
The poet Keats describes has, in fact, no identity, no stable “I”; rather, he is constantly
annihilating himself as the identities of others “press upon” him, as if he becomes those
people and objects with which he comes into contact. Like a chameleon changing its
colours depending on its surroundings, the poet takes on the identity of others,
demonstrating adaptability, flexibility and openness. Keats says, “nothing startles me
beyond the Moment. [...] if a Sparrow come before my Window I take part in its
existince [sic] and pick about the Gravel” (259). Keats is moved by his environment and
circumstances. This Keatsian poet undergoes annihilation through the influence of others;
as he becomes inspired, as they inspire him, he loses himself. Blake configures
inspiration in a similar manner, though for him there is no loss of identity: Milton
undergoes self-annihilation, which is said to be crucial for his salvation; this self
annihilation includes a re-integration with his Emanations, as well as some kind of
understanding of his foe, Satan. Furthermore, Milton is both inspired and inspires,
thereby taking part in the existence of other identities. However, because Blake depicts
the same characters being inspired and inspiring others, he suggests that inspiration is a
two-way act. Characters both move and are moved (are influenced, or pressed upon, but
in a voluntary manner). Neither identity is lost; both, or all, are expanded.
Near the end of the poem, Blake’s Milton unites self-annihilation with inspiration,
offering an indication of what self-annihilation could possibly entail:
Obey thou the Words of the Inspired Man
All that can be annihilated must be annihilated
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That the Children of Jerusalem may be saved from slavery
There is a Negation, & there is a Contrary
The Negation must be destroyd to redeem the Contraries
The Negation is the Spectre; the Reasoning Power in Man
This is a false Body: an Incrustation over my Immortal
Spirit; a Selfhood, which must be put off & annihilated always
To cleanse the Face of my Spirit by Self-examination.
To bathe in the Waters of Life; to wash off the Not Human
I come in Self-annihilation & the grandeur of Inspiration
To cast off Rational Demonstration by Faith in the Saviour
To cast off the rotten rags of Memory by Inspiration^] (40.29-41.4, E
142)
By uniting self-annihilation and inspiration, Blake indicates a correlation between or
perhaps even an equation of the two. Milton finds “The Negation” anathema. Lorraine
Clark contends, “This negation or Spectre threatens to reconcile or mediate the contraries
of life [...], reducing them from absolutes to mere relativities within a system. But Blake
despises such mutual accommodation as a blurring of distinctions which reduces the
passion or energy of life” (4). By rejecting negation but not self-annihilation, Milton and
Blake suggest that self-annihilation does not equal a negation. Self-annihilation and the
expansion of self, then, do not throw the world into a blurry mess, where the merging or
expansion of agents is also “a blurring of distinctions.” Identities are maintained and
reaffirmed—as Clark indicates, life needs firm outlines to retain its energy. Moreover, by
equating reason with the Selfhood and naming reason as the negating force—that which
creates false bodies and petrifies the human spirit—Blake suggests that the Selfhood,
which must be annihilated, does not belong to him alone. Salvation and the new
Jerusalem depend upon each one of us submitting to “Self-examination,” judging and
choosing what is and what is not annihilate just as the Angels of the Divine Presence
instruct Milton to do earlier.
In order to self-examine, Milton turns to “Self-annihilation and the grandeur of
Inspiration.” In a gesture reminiscent of his first speech, where he turns to the Daughters
of Inspiration as he begins his quest for self-annihilation, Milton links these two acts.
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Milton also aligns “Faith” with this process (these processes) at the end of the above
speech. Elsewhere, Blake describes faith along similar lines as inspiration, where a single
individual does not possess sole responsibility for the act. In defending the possibility of
miracles, he says, “Jesus could not do miracles where unbelief hinderd hence we must
conclude that the man who holds miracles to be ceased puts it out of his own power to
ever witness one The manner of a miracle being performd is in modem times considerd
as an arbitrary command of the agent upon the patient but this is an impossibility not a
miracle neither did Jesus ever do such a miracle” (Annotations to Bishop Watson’s An
Apology’fo r the Bible E 616-17). In these annotations, Blake opposes Watson “who
considers [a miracle] as an arbitrary act of the agent upon an unbelieving patient.
Whereas the Gospel says that Christ could not do a miracle because of Unbelief’ (E 617).
I find Blake’s use of the words “agent” and “patient” particularly significant. His
understanding of a miracle reduces considerably the role of the miracle-worker, in this
case Jesus. Faith, the belief that something is possible, makes possible the act of miracle
making. Not even Jesus himself can perform such acts without the help of the so-called
patient. In Blake’s assessment of miracles, this “patient” becomes a co-actor and co
producer of the miracle by having faith, by opening him/herself up to the possibility in a
manner similar, if not equal, to the act of inspiration. Having faith means allowing
oneself to be moved by or inspired by, in this case, Jesus; it entails a certain displacement
of self, an annihilation of reason or skepticism or selfhood, to allow another inside
oneself. John H. Jones states, “[S]elf-annihilation is necessary for inspiration”; “Self
annihilation [...] involves a radical interchange between the two contraries of addresser
and addressee, and allows for the transcendence of the boundaries of finite Selfhood
through dialogue and for the possibility of inspired discourse” (“‘Self-Annihilation’ and
Dialogue in Blake’s Creative Process” 6). I agree, but I would go further. First, I would
add that Blake goes beyond dialogue to include interpenetrating bodies (as I will discuss
shortly). Second, while appearing to be oppositional acts (one expanding the self, one
destroying it), inspiration and self-annihilation are not only inextricably dependent acts,
both of which are crucial in Milton, but also—or in fact—the same act. To self-annihilate
is to inspire, and to inspire is to self-annihilate. As such the self, or identity, remains;
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rather than destruction, identity seeks reaffirmation and expansion through this singular
act.

Performativitv and Repeated Moments of Inspiration
Like self-annihilation, inspiration reinforces Blake’s paradoxical concept of
identity. In these inspirational moments, we find the disintegration of causality and an
apparent fusion between characters and among various identities, specifically through
shared or similar actions of inspiration. In this section, I will explore how these elements
affect individual identity particularly and the composition of the deed-doer relation in
light of Blake’s firm belief in permanent identity and the outline of identity. Most
significantly, I will apply Judith Butler’s theory of performativity, and her notion of
parody in particular, to Blake’s re-articulations of inspiration to show how such an
analysis reconfigures the significance of this action. I find Butler’s performative theory of
gender construction,18 as outlined in Gender Trouble, particularly useful in analyzing
Blake’s multiple reiterations of the scene of inspiration because of the theatrical, cultural,
and social nature of her concept of performativity.19 I am not suggesting a one-to-one
correlation between her theory and his poetics; rather, the heart of the connection rests in
the repeated moments of subversion that function to bring about change. Blake subverts
the traditional model of inspiration and also, as a result, identity in order to resignify and
reinvigorate both.
Milton certainly does not provide us with a representation of identity in which
characters respect the firm outline of one another’s identities. They transgress these
boundaries repeatedly. Various characters take on the roles of both inspirer and inspired
18 For Butler, gender is problematic because she sees it as a limiting concept. In the heterosexual
normative world, sex is inextricably linked to gender as a form o f regulation. A male body must enact
masculinity, while a female body must enact femininity with the presumption that this is the natural order
o f things. However, Butler argues that gender is constructed; it is not what it is by any natural claim, but
through reiterated acts that continuously reinscribe gender as this or that. There is no such natural order.
19 Butler says, “[M]y theory sometimes waffles between understanding performativity as linguistic
and casting it as theatrical. 1 have come to think that the two are invariably related, chiasmically so, and
that a reconsideration o f the speech act as an instance o f power invariably draws attention to both its
theatrical and linguistic dimensions” (xxv).
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at different times, and characters usually commit acts only after being inspired by another
character. Nevertheless, an inspired state does not indicate the possession of one
character by another; it indicates a fusion between or among characters so that an act has
multiple agents. This kind of inspiration results in activity on the part of both characters,
displacing passivity altogether; neither participant imposes on the other. In each moment
of inspiration, a character’s identity is not overwhelmed by the identity of the inspirer.
While the action itself propels change, the willingness or ability of the actor to displace
his or her self (thereby allowing someone to enter him or her) occupies an equally
important role in the process at the local level of the event. However, because acts do not
necessitate a single agent, what the characters do becomes more important than who they
are as individuals in the context of the poem as a whole; multiplicity outweighs
singularity. Thus, the act of inspiration has a greater value than any one character who
could potentially participate in it.
Blake continually returns to the moment of inspiration. Rather than prioritizing
and centralizing one moment of inspiration, he repeats a series of such moments. These
moments become stylized because Blake reiterates, revises, and restages them, using
several similar images to invoke inspiration, including fire or flames, lightning, a
whirlwind, a star, a comet, and a sun, as well as a combination of these images. He also
frequently depicts characters entering another’s body. One could say that this poem is
primarily about dramatizing various moments of inspiration. Each moment of inspiration
is clearly important in its own right, but, taken together, the repetitive quality gains a
deeper importance. The inspiration sequences include various characters (the Bard,
Milton, Los, Blake, Robert, Ololon, Albion, Christ, and the audience) and a variety of
types of inspiration in the text and designs: one character entering another’s bosom, a
shooting star (pi. 2; fig. 32), a shooting star entering someone’s foot, flames (pi. 1; fig.
21), lightning (pi. 30; fig. 33), a fiery sun (pi. 21 [Bentley]; fig. 34), and even a simple
encounter or visitation (pi. 36; fig. 35). Using Butler’s theory as a basis for my
interpretation, I argue that Blake’s performative figuration of inspiration destabilizes the
original biblical moment of inspiration, and it undermines not only the notion of the
inspired prophet-poet as a unique and divinely authorized authentic voice but also the
notion that such inspirational acts are singular. Paradoxically, Blake inauthenticates one
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Fig. 32. Milton a Poem, copy D, plate 2, object 2, 1818, Lessing J. Rosenwald Collection,
Library of Congress. © 2010 the William Blake Archive. Used with permission. This
project is supported in part by a William Blake Archive Reproduction Grant for Graduate
Students.
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Fig. 33. Milton a Poem, copy D, plate 30 [33], object 33, 1818, Lessing J. Rosenwald
Collection, Library of Congress. © 2010 the William Blake Archive. Used with
permission. This project is supported in part by a William Blake Archive Reproduction
Grant for Graduate Students.
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Fig. 34. Milton a Poem, copy D, plate 21 [Bentley], object 47, 1818, Lessing J.
Rosenwald Collection, Library of Congress. © 2010 the William Blake Archive. Used
with permission. This project is supported in part by a William Blake Archive
Reproduction Grant for Graduate Students.
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moment in order to authenticate multiple moments that may otherwise appear as impotent
copies or imitations of an original.
The scene when God first breathes life into Adam signifies the original moment
of inspiration in Judeo-Christian biblical terms: to inspire means to breathe or blow into.
The Romantics refigured inspiration from the image of the divine breath into the image of
natural breath. Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s metaphor of the Aeolian harp, a harp that
makes music once the breeze blows past its strings, represents the poet who is inspired by
some natural or supernatural force to create poetry. Blake, too, makes use of similar
natural images in his poem Milton when he attributes the lark's song to a divine force:
“His little throat labours with inspiration; every feather / On throat & breast & wings
vibrates with the effluence Divine” (31.34-35, E 130). Further, Blake directly links
human expression to God’s when he says, “As the breath of the Almighty, such are the
words of man to man / In the great Wars of Eternity, in fury of Poetic Inspiration, / To
build the Universe stupendous” (30.18-20, E 129). For Blake, the utterances of sentient
beings, when expressed in moments of inspiration, parallel the life-giving and creating
force of God’s breath.
Despite such parallels, the activity of inspiration in Milton does not function
primarily as a tribute to God or as a validation of His power. Rather, Blake’s various
depictions work to undermine such an origin for inspiration and to undermine the
implication that all other inspiration is but a copy of the original unique biblical moment.
Butler’s theory of gender performativity specifically attacks and disables notions of the
authentic, the real, and the original, showing them to have a “fundamentally phantasmatic
status” (187). In the context of gender performance, she says, “performativity is not a
singular act, but a repetition, which achieves its effects through its naturalization in the
context of a body” (xv). Butler’s primary example of the way gender can be subverted is
drag. For her, drag, “a stylized repetition o f acts" (179; original emphasis), demonstrates
the theatrical and performative nature of gender identity, undercutting any pretensions to
nature, essence, authenticity or originality bound up in notions of an original and a “a
failed copy” (186). Drag embodies a subversive act that challenges stable notions of
gender, showing that a male body can indeed enact femininity or that a female body can
enact masculinity. It functions as an example of a “parodic redeployment of power”
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(158): it mimics a gender, which is presumed not only to be expressive rather than
performative but also to be necessarily a product of biology rather than social
construction. While Butlerian drag and Blakean inspiration seem a disjunctive
comparison, both highlight the potentially disruptive effects of repetition and parody;
drag, as iterations of gender stereotypes, destabilizes gender categories, while Blakean
inspiration, as iterations of biblical inspiration, destabilizes the authority of such an
activity.
Viewing Blake’s multiple moments of inspiration in the context of repetition,
parody, and subversion provides us with a concept of inspiration that subverts
inspiration’s sacred and authentic origin. Repetition often has the effect of emphasizing,
but also of making the repeated item obviously un-singular or un-extraordinary. Through
the sheer number of reiterations and his continual refashioning of the moment of
inspiration, Blake disturbs the authority of the original biblical moment as well as of the
original poetic moment, which are conventionalized as invocations to God or the Muses.
In Milton, an inspired individual never completely loses the sense of self. The poem
begins with the conventional invocation to the Muses (a passage discussed near the
beginning of the chapter). However, when Blake calls on higher powers to tell the story
of Milton in Eternity, he does not request inspiration. Instead, he asks the Daughters of
Beulah to write about Milton’s quest through his body, imploring them to enter and take
over his “hand,” “the Nerves of [his] right arm” and his “Brain,” so that this vision of
Eternity may find its way to the page. In this case, Blake occupies a seemingly passive
role in order to be the conduit through which the Muses will “Record the journey of
immortal Milton.” It is as if Blake hyperbolizes this episode even to the point of parody,
“a subtle parody of Milton’s claim to have transcribed the whole of Paradise Lost by
dictation from God” according to Lucy Newlyn (269). Blake undermines the meaning of
conventional inspiration where “[t]he muse speaks, and the poet is only her mouthpiece
and servant; or in the medieval Christian tradition the human scriptor has authority only
as a scribe of divine truth. Both notions actually negate individual creativity. Inspiration
there concerns matters of authority, the right to speak and the claim to speak in the name
of truth” (T. Clark 2). Such an exaggeration of passive reception as a subversion or as a
parody of this kind of relation between the poet and the Muses is reinforced by Blake’s
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portrayal of himself as the speaker of the poem.
Butler’s discussion of “the original” offers some insights into Blake’s
manipulation of the origin. She argues, “The notion of gender parody defended here [i.e.,
Gender Trouble] does not assume that there is an original which such parodic identities
imitate. Indeed, the parody is o f the very notion of an original [...] so gender parody
reveals that the original identity after which gender fashions itself is an imitation without
an origin” (Creating States 175). After reading the poem and being inundated with one
inspiration scene after another, one begins to question why Blake felt it necessary to
repeat it so extensively. One answer that arises from Butler’s performativity is that Blake
imitates and potentially parodies the “original” scene of inspiration in order to show that
its power does not belong to some God who sits on high. Rather, humanity has the
capacity to wield this powerful tool. Also, by emphasizing the body in this process, Blake
returns to the site of original inspiration in which Adam’s body was literally animated by
God’s breath. Blake unsettles this moment by indicating that not only does God have the
power to penetrate another so radically and so physically, but humans have it as well.
Human inspiration, then, is not “a failed copy” of some original moment (186). It has its
own potency as, to borrow from Butler, “[An] imitation[] which effectively displace[s]
the meaning of the original [...]” (176). The tyrannical God of Milton’s Paradise Lost,
the God figured as a supreme being who demands obedience from his human subjects, is
not necessary in Blake’s world where humans are the ones with the power to create
change and to alter the world.
Of all his works, this one, arguably, depicts Blake as a character in text and design
more than any other. He may be a conduit in many cases throughout the epic, but he has
such a role thanks to his ability to participate in mental strife, his ability to imagine, and,
as a result, his ability to open himself to such visionary acts. As Esterhammer notes,
Mitchell “specifically relates the creative effect of Blake’s language to his rejection of a
Miltonic model of inspiration” (Creating States 175). Mitchell argues, “Without the
Miltonic assumption of an untouched, perfect divinity in the heavens, the prophet cannot
simply serve as the mouthpiece of God; if he is to be a seer, he must create what he sees”
(Blake’s Composite Art 169). Indeed, Blake’s depiction of inspiration in this example
(and in the subsequent examples) does not suggest a possession whereby the person
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under possession has his or her will suspended. Balfour, however, claims the contrary:
“Blake’s works—like Milton’s poems, like the prophet’s words—are his and not his, with
the emphasis on their author being more possessed than possessing. Once again, this
giving up or over of one’s voice is the paradigmatic poetic and prophetic act, a sacrifice
that is the condition of redemption” (172). My point about parody and disrupting the
origin works against such readings of inspiration and prophecy. In my reading, a fusion
between or among characters occurs so that more than one being takes responsibility for
an act, nullifying the seeming passivity of one of the characters and thereby making all
active. Through his exaggeration of passive reception, Blake subverts and parodies a
relation between the poet and the Muses or God based on the latter exerting control over
the former, and, in doing so, Blake opposes Milton’s understanding of inspiration.
Furthermore, despite calling on the Daughters of Beulah to enter his hand and
brain and to write this epic through his body, he does not relinquish his authority, as is
evidenced by the title page of Milton. Here, he does not list the Daughters of Beulah—or
eternal beings—as the originators of the work, nor does he efface his role in the creation
and production of the poem. Instead, “W Blake” is listed as “The Author & Printer” (E
95; fig. 21). Milton is one of the few works in which Blake identifies himself as the
author, and the only later work in which he does so—all works after the Songs list him
only as the printer. Thus, given the relationship between action and identity, it is
significant that in this poem, he assigns to himself complete possession of the work
before the audience without qualifying it in the design.20 This assignation does not
discount the inspiration that Blake seeks at the beginning of the poem; rather, it
complicates the notion of agency and origin in the epic.

20 Numerous times throughout his letters, Blake claims that he is a mere vessel for the eternal
vision implemented by those in Eternity (e.g., E 701, 705, 724, 728-29). For instance, in reference to one o f
his epics, he states, “1 dare not pretend to be any other than the Secretary the Authors are in Eternity”
(Letter to Butts, 6 Jul. 1803, E 730). Yet, elsewhere, he takes exception with the implication that poets are
somehow distanced from what they write: “Plato has made Socrates say that Poets & Prophets do not Know
or Understand what they write or Utter this is a most Pernicious Falshood. If they do not pray is an inferior
Kind to be calld Knowing Plato confutes him self’ (VLJ E 554).
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Similarly, Blake’s depiction of prophecy functions to question the idea of an
origin. Traditional prophetic moments follow from inspiration in that a prophet, in the
biblical sense, as God’s spokesperson, produces a prophecy under God’s direct guidance.
Thus, the tradition of prophets finds its lineage in the first biblical site of inspiration, the
creation of Adam. As Balfour explains, “the authority of prophetic rhetoric normally
derives in large measure from its representation as coming from a divine source outside
the human mind. The only authority required by Blake is a ‘firm perswasion’” (133).
Blake, then, needs the authority only of the individual, not of an external source. In the
poem, Milton’s act is foreseen in an ancient prophecy in Eternity. At first fearful of
Milton’s act of leaving Eternity, Los then
recollected an old Prophecy in Eden recorded,
And often sung to the loud harp at the immortal feasts
That Milton of the Land of Albion should up ascend
Forwards from Ulro from the Vale of Felpham; and set free
Ore from his Chain of Jealousy, he started at the thought (20.58-61, E
115)
Blake explains that characters know of such a prophecy, but he does not reveal the
authority or source of the prophecy. No God stands behind it, and no one character stands
out as the prophet or as God’s mouthpiece; the prophecy merely exists in this rather
mysterious manner. By destabilizing the authority of the prophecy about Milton’s act and
calling into question any kind of accountability, “is Blake not,” as Esterhammer points
out, “disrupting the very tradition on which he should be drawing for credibility as an
inspired speaker?” (217). It certainly seems so. Blake daringly relinquishes, and, indeed
threatens, the security and authority of the divinely inspired prophet. He abandons such a
tradition and fashions a new concept of inspiration: Blake “avoid[s] the reductive clarity
of a Miltonic overview, since there is no epic narrator to underline the significance of the
events as they unfold, and no character within the poem who is truly omniscient”
(Newlyn 266), not even Los, the figure of imagination. Los’s recollection of the prophecy
and the many performances of the prophecy by the Bard—who does not claim God’s
authority but states nevertheless, “1 am Inspired” (13.51, E 107)—serve to complicate
any notion of causality. Again, performance takes centre stage, but it also throws into
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question Milton’s decision to leave Eternity. We know the Bard’s song provokes
Milton’s journey, but would he have made the decision if he had not heard it? Was he
present at all these prior performances of the prophecy? If so, has Milton had an Eternity
of hearing it to convince him to act?
The act of inspiration and self-annihilation embodies multiplicity, thus
complicating causality or agency. Milton’s journey, which appears to be a solitary one, is
infused with various selves. For example, the Bard does not simply vanish from the text
once his song concludes; he merges with another identity: “Then there was great
murmuring in the Heavens of Albion [...] The loud voic’d Bard terrify'd took refuge in
Miltons bosom” (14.4-9, E 108). While we do not see the Bard again, his last known act
joins him to Milton by entering Milton and we never see him leave. The Bard, then,
accompanies, and perhaps inspires in the sense of provoking, Milton’s initial steps in his
journey but also in the sense of continuing to fortify him for the remainder of his quest.
At this point in the narrative, Milton speaks for the first time, announcing his decision to
leave Eternity and seek eternal death. Blake does not account for how much the Bard acts
as the agent behind Milton’s actions or how much Milton himself acts as the agent.
However, Milton’s autonomy is not jeopardized in the fusion—there is no sense that he
becomes a puppet obeying the will of his master. Instead, the lack of clarity suggests that
both Milton and the Bard participate in the deeds that Milton enacts. His willingness to be
inspired by the Bard and to allow him (literally) into his “bosom” (14.9, E 108) shows
that he has already started to cast off selfhood by opening his identity to be shared with
another. The two merge, and, as a result, both are expanded.
Similar to the Bard’s entrance into Milton is Milton’s entrance into Blake, the
latter maintaining his sense of self while being joined with Milton:
But Milton entering my Foot; 1 saw in the nether
Regions of the Imagination; also all men on Earth,
And all in Heaven, saw in the nether regions of the Imagination

And all this Vegetable World appeard on my left Foot,
As a bright sandal formd immortal of precious stones & gold:
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I stooped down & bound it on to walk forward thro’ Eternity. (21.4-14, E
115)
Milton’s entrance into Blake allows Blake, and indeed “all men on Earth, / And all in
Heaven” to see into “the nether regions of the Imagination.” Thus, Milton’s descent into
the world, his process of self-annihilation, opens the imagination of all, giving them
visionary (in)sight. What this means is that his one act not only redeems him, but it also
potentially allows all beings to seek redemption. Blake, now himself and Milton at once,
does not figure himself as a vessel passively taking in the inspiration and letting
something else happen to him. Instead, he actively pursues a course and proceeds to
“walk forward thro’ Eternity.” Yet, as with Milton and the Bard, we never see a clear
endpoint to the process of Milton inspiring Blake, suggesting that Blake now carries
Milton along with him just as Milton presumably carries the Bard with him on his
journey, making Milton’s inspiration of Blake a three-way act—and, in fact, Blake’s
encounter with Los makes it a four-way act (not to mention the Muses whom Blake
invokes at the beginning of the poem). If we consider Ololon and Robert, Blake’s dead
brother who is also entered by a star, and their roles in inspiration, the layers of identities
become even more complex.
After Milton inspires him, Blake’s journey through Eternity continues on to
further merging of identities. As with Milton, when Blake encounters Los, the process
does not leave Blake overwhelmed and passive:
While Los heard indistinct in fear, what time I bound my sandals
On; to walk forward thro’ Eternity, Los descended to me:
And Los behind me stood; a terrible flaming Sun: just close
Behind my back; I turned round in terror, and behold.
Los stood in that fierce glowing fire; & he also stoop'd down
And bound my sandals on in Udan-Adan; trembling I stood
Exceedingly with fear & terror, standing in the Vale
Of Lambeth: but he kissed me and wishd me health.
And I became One Man with him arising in my strength:
Twas too late now to recede. Los had enterd into my soul:

302

His terrors now posses’d me whole! I arose in fury & strength.
(22.4-14, E 116-17)
Los provides Blake with further fortification, as did the “preceding” encounter with
Milton. While Los does not re-enact Milton’s entrance into Blake’s foot (though Los
binds Blake’s sandals), Los does “enter[] into [Blake’s] soul,” which is perhaps not very
different from entering into someone’s bosom or foot in this poem. Despite Blake’s
comment that Los’s “terrors now posses’d [him] whole,” Blake still insists on using an
active sentence to describe his subsequent action: “1 arose in fury & strength.” Still
demarcated as an “I,” Blake arises without suggesting that his (or Los’s) will has been
compromised. Instead, combining with Los has given him new “strength.” Moreover, the
experience is cast as a union of identities: “And I became One Man with him arising in
my strength.” Not only does Blake arise in strength, but it also seems as though Los
arises thanks to Blake’s strength (and thanks to Blake’s ambiguous grammar), thereby
multiplying the act and confusing agency.
Again, who inspires whom to do what is not clear, but what is clear is that this
process of merging, or destabilizing one’s self-centredness or Selfhood, and potentially
annihilating it in these moments, leads to Blake’s “bec[oming] One Man,” an allusion to
Jesus as the One Just Man who will redeem the world. Characters becoming other
characters prefigures and parallels Jesus’ self-sacrifice to redeem us all. Hughes notes the
same kind of disruption in causal logic in the “Introduction” to the Songs o f Innocence
(1789), stating, “The poem’s scene of inspiration is certainly a complex one to
understand: is it the child who inspires the piper, or vice versa, or a combination?” (94).
Inspiration in Milton is no less ambiguous. One may ask, who can take responsibility for
the first act of inspiration? Does Milton’s inspiring act inspire this epic, or does the
Muses’? The convoluted twists and turns that Blake contrives in attributing an action to
an individual evinces that the point of origin is of little importance next to the fact that
this act occurs at all.
As the above examples show, Blake depicts inspiration not only as a process that
occurs through language and utterance but also as one that occurs at the level of the body
and through physical action. Blake represents the materiality of inspiration through
images of fire or flames, lightning, a whirlwind, a star, a comet, and a sun entering or
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enveloping a human body. In fact, the poem shows inspiration to be the actual, and not
simply metaphorical, interpenetration of bodies: Blake repeatedly refers to characters
entering the bodies of other characters, whether into the brain, the chest, the hand, or the
foot. Inspiration, then, does not appear only as an effect of breath or words but also as an
effect of bodily penetration and physical acts. If Blake’s bodies interpenetrate one
another—as the Muses enter Blake’s body, and Milton enters Blake’s body, and Milton
enters Robert’s body, and the Bard enters Milton’s body—then where do we draw the
line around identity? Where does Milton end and Blake begin? Such a confusion of
intermingling identities creates a multi-layered kind of inspiration, and it continues
throughout the poem, becoming more complicated at each turn.
Moreover, Blake sensualizes and eroticizes some of the moments of inspiration.
As discussed in the section on epic, Blake reconstructs a model of heroism. His model
also includes the troubling of strict sexual codes. While sex per se does not occur in the
poem, Blake includes several moments that gesture toward sensuality and eroticism, a
gesture that revisions traditional heterosexual notions of masculinity. I argue that Blake’s
central and continuously repeated image of physical penetration and amalgamation
between various identities of various sexes suggests a queering of identity. Besides the
(mostly) naked21 and muscular masculine images that he delineates, the mirror images22
of “William” and “Robert” being entered into by a star (pi. 29 and 33 [Bentley]; figs. 36
& 37) attach a homosocial-homoerotic element to inspiration. In the “William” design,
Blake depicts himself with head and body bent back and arms open wide as a flaming star
descends toward his left foot. Erdman reads the moment as a gesture of activity:
“Dynamically we may define the tarsus as the articulation of the foot that energizes
stepping forward” (“The Steps (of Dance and Stone)” 74). The flames from the star
illuminate his foot and cast their light upward alongside his body and past his name. The

21 As Christopher Hobson points out in Blake and Homosexuality, the images o f William and
Robert from copy C o f Milton depict the brothers with transparent shorts, while the corresponding images
from the earlier copy A depict the men fully naked.
22 According to the numbered ordering o f the plates, these two do not actually get bound as facing
pages, but the Blake image does come first in the numbering, making them look as if they are mirror
images when they are viewed together.
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Fig. 36. Milton a Poem, copy D, plate 29 [Bentley], object 32, 1818, Lessing J.
Rosenwald Collection, Library of Congress. © 2010 the William Blake Archive. Used
with permission. This project is supported in part by a William Blake Archive
Reproduction Grant for Graduate Students.
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Fig. 37. Milton a Poem, copy D, plate 33 [Bentley], object 37, 1818, Lessing J.
Rosenwald Collection, Library of Congress. © 2010 the William Blake Archive. Used
with permission. This project is supported in part by a William Blake Archive
Reproduction Grant for Graduate Students.
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text on plate 15, lines 47-50 (E 110) explicitly states that Milton is the star. If we read the
star as Milton in the design, then we have the one (male) poet entering and penetrating
the physical body of the other (male) poet. The image moves beyond the traditional
model of authorial influence; it depicts a physical (in addition to mental and spiritual)
union. Likewise, Robert participates in a physical-mental-spiritual experience, creating a
link between all three men. We see “a triple spiritual and sexual union among the two
brothers and Milton, manifested in the brothers’ simultaneous orgasmic body spasms”
(Hobson, Blake and Homosexuality 131).
Several critics note the parallel between this moment and Saul’s conversion into
St. Paul (for instance, see Riede 26Iff.). Riede states, “Milton descends into Blake’s
lowest member in one more sense than we have considered it, for yet another pun on
‘tarsus’ plays on the plural o f ‘tarse,’ an archaism for phallus (OED)” (271). However,
Riede states that such a pun is merely a “continuation of Milton’s phallocentrism.”
Nevertheless, both Mitchell (“Style and Iconography” 67) and Christopher Z. Hobson"
point to the homoerotic and homosexual connotations of Blake’s text and designs.
Hobson points out that these two images “give strongly homoerotic overtones to the
heroic qualities they depict” and reinforce “the poem’s emphasis on positive male
homoeroticism” {Blake and Homosexuality 131 ).2324 He adds, the images of Robert and
Blake “suggest both crucifixion and sexual ecstasy”; “[evidently, the moment of
Milton’s spiritual accession is also a moment of sexual exaltation.” Blake chooses to cast
heroism, revelation, and sacrifice in a homoerotic light. He constructs the designs so as to
depict explicit male-male eroticism, moving beyond the bonds of fraternity and
brotherhood (based on Christian love and humanism) present in many of his other

23 Elsewhere, Hobson provocatively argues, “in the middle and late works Blake’s idea o f liberty
expands to include both female and male homosexuality, and that homosexuality and its toleration become
emblems o f a larger mutualism within a free society” (‘“ What is Liberty without Universal Toleration’”
137).
24 Besides the William and Robert plates, Hobson also analyzes the plate depicting Los appearing
in a fiery sun to Blake as homoerotic, if not insinuating a specific sexual act (i.e., fellatio); in the design,
Blake is kneeling and looks behind him to see Los emerge from the sun, while Blake’s head covers Los’s
genital area (135-41; fig. 34).
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works.2' For example, as one being crosses the bounds of another being’s outline of
identity, a moment of sexual ecstasy occurs. Characters willingly allow themselves to be
inspired, to be entered, and the act is most certainly pleasurable and ecstatic.
In the poem, touching and interpenetrating bodies are crucial. Significantly, Blake
critiques the world of science and rational thought, “The Microscope” and “the
Telescope,” precisely because they contradict the point of these acts: “they [the scientific
instruments] alter / The ratio of the Spectators Organs but leave Objects untouched”
(29.17-19, E 127). On the surface, these instruments seem to open new worlds to us by
revealing things we cannot see with the naked eye. However, the problem lies with the
failure to effect material change, with the failure of the instruments to allow the
individual user to actually penetrate the objects that they magnify. This example
encapsulates one of the larger concerns of the poem: “healing the fissure between object
and subject” through “discrete acts of perception” (Lussier, “Blake and Science Studies”
200, 207)—and, I would add, material penetrations. Thus, as Lussier claims, in Milton we
find “Blake’s participatory model” (200) of the nature of existence, reality, and the
relationship among beings. More concretely, in the scenes of inspiration, bodies touching
and moving one another are essential in the process; it is not only a matter of spiritual and
psychic influence, though this is important as well. Sedgwick theorizes the agency aspect
of touching between two individuals: “Even more immediately than other perceptual
systems, it seems, the sense of touch makes nonsense out of any dualistic understanding
of agency and passivity; to touch is always already to reach out, to fondle, to heft, to tap,
or to enfold, and always also to understand other people or natural forces as having
effectually done so before oneself’ (14). The penetrability of Blake’s bodies highlights
Sedgwick’s claims about the destabilization of the binary view of agent and receiver.
However, touching is not the only sense affected in this process.
The representation of ecstasy and eroticism as part of the moment of inspiration in
the designs inevitably heightens the visual effects that mediate the experience for the
audience. John B. Pierce highlights the importance of orality and aurality in Blake’s
Milton, thus opening the performative potential of the poem. Yet his argument remains
25

For a reading o f the significance o f “universal brotherhood” (447) to social and political

relations in Blake’s works, see Michael Ferber’s “Blake’s Idea o f Brotherhood.”
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firmly rooted in the verbal, specifically the relationship between speech and writing.
Even when he addresses a visual image (in this case the title page), he mainly associates
it with linguistic problems: it poses “a challenge to the linearity of the book” (468).
Pierce’s claim that “[Blake’s] Milton becomes a dispersion of subject positions, ranging
from inspired positions within the orality of Eternity to the visible mark of the written
form” (470) does not address the visual in its own right with respect to inspiration and
subjectivity. The significance of Blake’s visual depictions of inspiration cannot be
underestimated. The visual scene of inspiration, particularly in the example of the
“William” and “Robert” plates, offers us more than the poetry allows:
Then first 1 saw [Milton] in the Zenith as a falling star,
Descending perpendicular, swift as the swallow or swift;
And on my left foot falling on the tarsus, enterd there,
But from my left foot a black cloud redounding spread over Europe.
(15.46-49, E 110)
The designs Blake provides for this moment come at separate points in the work, separate
from the poetic reference and separate from each other. By comparing the text to the two
images above, we see that they convey a great deal more than the poetry does (the star
Milton “enterd there”). The intense feeling of a body being infused with inspiration or
becoming, in part, someone else is absent in the lines of the poem. Milton does not
merely “enter,” as the words of the poem indicate; rather, the image shows us that he
overwhelms Blake and produces an ecstatic moment. In addition, the image of Robert
gives us a moment unsayable, or at least not said, in the language of the poem; the written
text never mentions him.
As an art form that integrates both the linguistic and visual dimensions, dramatic
performance offers a significant way of interpreting these visual moments of inspiration.
These moments parallel theatrical “pointing,” a convention dominant in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries. Freeman explains,
The dramatic technique o f ‘pointing’ refers to the practice of bracketing
off a set speech from the course of action and directing that speech, along
with a set of gestures, at the audience. Once plays were established in the
repertory, particular roles and speeches or ‘points’ achieved privileged
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status in the course of performance and were associated with the technique
of a particular actor or actress who either originated the role or attempted
innovations in that role. (31)
I argue that these kind of theatrical points find their equivalent in the inspiration
sequences and images, which occur more than a dozen times in Milton, with the shooting
star entering the foot arguably the most common. Repetition brackets them off from the
rest of the poem and highlights them, signaling the relevance of these moments. The
tableau-like designs resonate with theatrical points, wherein an actor often held a pose or
a gesture for a short time in order to impress the audience. Each time we encounter one
such moment from this sequence of repetitions, we inevitably recall previous ones,
comparing and contrasting them with respect to the way they are visualized or articulated
and with respect to the various characters who perform this particular point. Just as we
compare various incarnations of Hamlet, especially in the performance and staging of the
famous “To be or not to be” soliloquy, we can, and do, compare the way various
characters become inspired or inspire, making the moment even more pivotal. The
repetitions theatricalize the moment, making it performative. In addition, they set the
moment of inspiration off from all other actions and events, suggesting that these
moments are the defining acts of Milton.
Thanks to its numerous repetitions, this “point” does not belong solely to one
character or actor. It is a shared act, which perhaps encourages more repetitions beyond
the work—encouraging the audience to open themselves up in this way so that they to
may add their own version in this series of similar “points.” As Mitchell reminds us,
because of unions and the merging of identities, the problem of “see[ing] illustrations
accurately” arises; “This underlying oneness makes the task of identifying characters in
the designs particularly difficult. The problem is one of avoiding narrowly restrictive
identifications on the one hand, and of confusing everything into a blurry unity on the
other” (“Style and Iconography” 64). Either extreme should be avoided. Defining the
various moments of inspiration as a series of theatrical points avoids these extremes and
enables two possibilities at once: emphasizing the singularity of each moment and
providing each moment a larger, more interconnected framework. The frequency of
similar moments forces us to recognize each one as a remarkable event, while their
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sameness encourages us to group them together and compare them, thus taking each
“point” on its own terms but giving it fuller meaning and significance as a series.
Several characters enact inspiration and participate in this particular “point.” Not
only do male characters enter and physically penetrate other male characters, but female
characters also seem to participate in these kinds of moments (e.g., Blake requests female
Muses to enter his physical body at the beginning of the poem). Ololon, the
conglomeration of Milton’s female relations, undertakes a parallel journey to Milton’s,
and, in fact, her journey enables the completion of his. Here, the epic hero seemingly
begins his quest to save his Emanation, but it turns out that his own redemption depends
on her quest. The apocalyptic moment that Milton asks for at the beginning of the poem
is achieved in part thanks to Ololon. Mitchell argues “the descent of Ololon” is “[t]he
decisive action in the poem” (“Style and Iconography” 50). She appears to usher in
Christ, another component of the conglomerate hero of the poem. Blake writes, “So spake
the Family Divine as One Man even Jesus / Uniting in One with Ololon & the appearance
of One Man / Jesus the Saviour appeard coming in the Clouds of Ololon!” (21.58-59, E
116). Betsy Bolton interprets the image of Ololon as a garment over Christ at the end of
the poem as a “female-male version of hermaphroditism” (76).2(1 Moreover, Milton
himself willfully enters into some gender ambiguity:
Then on the verge of Beulah he beheld his own Shadow;
A mournful form double; hermaphroditic: male & female
In one wonderful body, and he enterd into it
In direful pain [...] (14.36-39, E 108)

26

Bolton differs from Mitchell’s positive view o f Ololon’s role; instead, she sees an explicit

difference between her act and Milton’s: with Ololon, we have “an experience o f violence, a loss o f
autonomy and agency,” while Milton’s act “seems far more gradual, peaceful and creative” (80). She also
reads Ololon and Christ’s union as one in which Ololon “vanishes, sublimated into symbols surrounding
the masculine figure o f Jesus” (81). While I take Bolton’s point and do find Blake’s work to draw a clear
division between men and women, even to the point o f appearing misogynistic at times, I think that
inspirational acts refuse such an absolute sublimation o f any identity.
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Milton’s journey to earth necessitates such a union. While Blake’s “hermaphrodite]”“7 is
“A mournful form” (suggesting a state to be avoided) and a symbol of “a condition of
mutual oppression between the sexes” according to Mitchell (63), the impact of the image
cannot be negated. Milton enters this form that is both “male & female / In one wonderful
body.” Of course, “wonderful” can mean literally full of wonder, indicating surprise at
the unfamiliar, but it also has the related positive connotation of delightful. The
ambiguity also arises in a later formulation where Blake describes the “Twofold form
Hermaphroditic” as standing before Milton in “their beauty, & in cruelties of holiness”
(19.32, 34, E 113). Despite the form’s cruelties, Blake acknowledges its beauty; he
avoids using phobic terms of repulsion or unnaturalness.
Again, the image of Milton somehow joining with other male characters (as with
William and Robert above) and with a “hermaphroditic” form destabilizes both Milton’s
sexual and gendered identity. While the text refuses to state explicitly what changes occur
when one enters another in this poem, it is clear that such moments of alteration are
crucial. In addition to the elements of theatricality and performativity, I argue that
Blake’s central and continuously repeated image of physical penetration and
amalgamation between various identities of various sexes queers identity, particularly as
bodies enact inspiration. Such an identity, though maintaining a claim on some eternal
form, expresses the capacity to unite with other identities (of both genders), thereby
refuting a notion of the isolated self and adding a level of multiplicity.
What is at stake for Blake in using interpenetrating bodies as a signifier for
inspiration? For one, it gives visionary acts a concrete presence. He shows that these
kinds of acts have a very real impact in the material world. But he also goes further.
Butler’s discussion of the body in Gender Trouble leads us in another direction. In
relation to the AIDS epidemic and fearful responses to diseased bodies, she points to
“permeable bodily boundaries” (168). She claims that such a permeability of the body
through penetration and the exchange of fluids during sex confound any attempt to use
the body—traditionally an external marker of a stable self—to ground the claim of “the
27

Interestingly, Blake does not use the noun “hermaphrodite” to define the “hermaphroditic” form

in the poem. This distinction may suggest that the figure o f the “hermaphrodite” is not one that is inherently
negative or one that must be rejected for a singular form o f one sex.
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internal fixity of the self’ (171). The permeability of bodies “disrupts the very boundaries
that determine what it is to be a body at all” (169). Blake’s bodies are more than
permeable; they are penetrable and move in and out of one another. If one’s body does
not signify a sealed enclosure, then we are necessarily open to change at a fundamental
level. To embrace and acknowledge the permeability of both the self and the body is to
be open to being other than what we have been before or other than what governing
institutions say we should be. In fact, Blake makes it clear that rejecting this penetrability
is akin to a failure or fall. Unlike Milton’s Paradise Lost in which Satan sins through his
disobedience and revolt against God, in Blake’s epic poem, Satan falls, 1would argue,
because of his refusal to be entered or to be inspired by another. He resists moments of
interpenetration such as inspiration and self-annihilation—at the end, in the face of
Milton’s self-annihilation, Satan “trembl[es] round his Body, [and] he incircle[s] it”
(39.16, E 140). He chooses to enclose and to encircle himself and his body, thereby
isolating himself from others. In contrast, the rest of the main characters in the poem
form a community of inspirers, and, as such, they transform the world through
inspiration.
Primarily through the performative depiction of inspirational acts, Blake moves
away from conventional notions of a solitary and special poet or prophet figure being
inspired by some divinity toward a theory of inspiration for all, a theory which addresses
social concerns as much as poetic ones. As a result, poetic inspiration no longer belongs
to a small minority. Blake does not construct a Wordsworthian vision of the poet
speaking for or to “men.” As Charles Guignon points out, a Romantic or explicitly
Wordsworthian vision of an authentic and true mode of existence is one in which “The
ultimate metaphysical reality is the human Self, independent of and untouched by
anything outside itself, in its own unbounded freedom creating realities for itself, and in
no way answerable to anything outside itself’ (64). Contrary to this solipsistic and inward
turn, Blake’s reconfiguration of inspiration necessitates and emphasizes the interpersonal
exchange between human beings, suggesting not the isolated mind turned in upon itself
but a vision of community where to be human, perhaps even authentically so, is to open
oneself up to others. In the end, Blake may be demonstrating a wish-fulfillment fantasy in
his conception of human relationships, resulting from a frustration with his own lack of
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community, particularly artistic. Nevertheless, his human community involves human
beings inspiring each other through social and material interventions. In exploring
Blake’s understanding of identity and community, Deen argues, “Identity is the
community of men acting through the individual man to create a human world” (183). In
light of my analysis of inspiration, I would add that inspiration unites individuals into a
community and gives them a unified power to effect change.
In The Theory o f Inspiration: Composition as a Crisis o f Subjectivity in Romantic
and Post-Romantic Writing, Timothy Clark argues, “The history of the concept of
inspiration in much Romantic and post-Romantic writing can be summed up as the
attempt to locate or employ some privileged ‘creative’ faculty with the property of a
performative that (impossibly) ensures its own value or which, in other words, projects
and incorporates its own audience” (11, original emphasis). Although Clark references
Blake only occasionally, the particular performative coding that Clark assigns for
inspiration is relevant to Blake. As 1 discussed earlier, Blake’s performative takes the
form of the Sedgwickian dare. The Preface to Milton concludes with a quotation from the
Bible: “Would to God that all the Lords people were Prophets” (E 96).2S The full
quotation, as Moses speaks it in Numbers, is “would God that all the Lord’s people were
prophets, and that the Lord would put his spirit upon them!” (11.29). The missing half of
the verse suggests divine inspiration, while the placement of Blake’s biblical quotation
just after the famous lyric “And did those feet in ancient time,” a poem that talks of
“Mental Fight” (E 95) and “buil[ding] Jerusalem” (E 96), intimates a coming apocalypse.
By withholding the second part of the verse, Blake implicitly prompts his audience to fill
in the missing part. This omission and our subsequent completion allow us to take an
active role in the creation of meaning and, by the same token, in the creation of the new
Jerusalem. By doing so, we take a small step toward becoming the visionaries that Blake
wishes us to be.
In a Preface that has already uttered a performative call to England’s people to
“Rouze up” (E 95), the biblical citation is conspicuous for pointing out two things at
:KCritics such as Frye (340), Wittreich (Angel o f Apocalypse 243) and Balfour (131) have pointed
out that Blake not only cites the Bible with the quotation, but he also echoes Milton’s Areopagilica, which
also quotes this phrase.
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once: one, that the poet wishes all people were divinely inspired prophets and, two, by
doing so, he indicates that we are not, in fact, prophets. Here, Blake forces the audience
away from the private space of the mind and into the realm of public action. In his
reading of Milton, Mitchell foregrounds the public space where the audience is forced to
interact with the work. Interestingly, he uses the term “radical comedy” as a “theatrical
metaphor” for the poem, where this metaphor functions as “a way of seeing Milton as a
kind of living theater, open-ended, inconclusive, and reaching out to involve its audience
in the action” (“Blake’s Radical Comedy” 282). While I go further than seeing the
relation between Blake and drama as merely metaphorical, I find Mitchell’s point about
the poem and its audience particularly relevant. The two-pronged biblical quotation with
which Blake ends his Preface exemplifies such a reaching out in the form of a dare (in
fact, the second one of the Preface). Blake dares his audience to become what he says
they are not, to access the visionary that inspired individuals can access; he dares them to
demonstrate the protean or transformative ability to alter themselves.
Performative repetition, I argue, also expands the moment of inspiration past the
narrative level to the level of the audience of Blake’s work, and it opens inspiration up as
a more inclusive process, one not confined solely to unique individuals such as prophets
and poets. The title page furthers these ideas, constructing a moment of inspiration that
also disturbs notions of singular personal identity (fig. 21). Milton, with flaming feet,
stands before a vortex, or a kind of whirlwind, which bears not only his name but that of
Blake as well. As Milton steps forward into the vortex, his left hand hangs down adjacent
to the name “W Blake,” while “[his] own [right] hand is shown reaching through and
‘breaching’ the name” (Vogler 142, original emphasis), thereby breaking his name in
half. Thomas A. Vogler explains that this “fractured name[] anticipates] a complex act
of un/re-naming.” Milton’s act of breaking his name is, indeed, important for the action
of the poem, but, rather than following Vogler’s psychoanalytic reading, I focus on the
importance of the act for Blake’s conception of identity and its relationship to self
annihilation and inspiration.
The vortex and flaming feet indicate that both Milton and Blake, connected
through Milton’s body, are in a moment of inspiration. Milton is inspired by Blake, as is
evident in the way Milton’s hand almost touches Blake’s name (an echo of the invocation
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scene); however, Milton is also inspiring Blake. Significantly, in order to enter such a
moment, Milton willfully unsettles and displaces himself: his hand separates and severs
his name. Such an act resembles a later depiction of Milton (pi. 16; fig. 38). Here, Milton
encounters an obstacle in the form of Urizen during his journey to self-annihilation. In
this encounter, Blake depicts Milton’s foot bifurcating the word “selfhood”—he literally
divides it. He unsettles who he is and who he has been in order to participate in such a
moment, and, thereby, confirms his penetrability.
In addition, the very status of the title page as the first page of the poem suggests
a particular kind of relationship between the audience of the poem and Milton: Blake
tropes the audience engaging with or entering his illuminated works as Milton entering
another world and as Milton beginning a visionary quest. Yet, as the discussion of
Blake’s view of the world of imagination in chapter two suggests, what appears as a trope
is really an encouragement for us to actually enter the illuminated work. Such an entrance
inevitably resonates with the various entrances into other bodies that many of the
characters enact. Blake points to the audience’s willing participation as yet another level
of these moments of inspiration. With Milton, Blake argues, in effect, that participation in
such inspirational moments necessitates disturbing one’s perception of the bounded self
in order to shift one’s perception of the way things are to the way things could be, or as
Butler says, to “rethink the possible” (xx).
What, then, does it mean to be inspired? In his rendering of inspiration, Nietzsche
says, “Everything happens involuntarily in the highest degree but as in a gale of a feeling
of freedom, of absoluteness, of power, of divinity” (“Thus Spoke Zarathustra” 300).
Timothy Clark, quoting the full passage from which this sentence is taken, assesses
Nietzsche’s understanding of inspiration as one that shifts between two extremes: “This
passage presents inspiration in terms of extremes of both self-affirmation and,
simultaneously, of a transgression of personhood” (174). Yet, not surprisingly given
Nietzsche’s dissolution of the doer in the “First Essay” in On the Genealogy o f Morals,
Clark states, “The overwhelming freedom and power undergone in inspiration is not in
any way a matter of the individual conscious will. The will itself is the product of the
very forces with which it feels so in accord” (175). Nietzsche, while embracing the
feeling inspiration brings, rejects any notion of complicity on the part of the person
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Fig. 38. Milton a Poem, copy D, plate 16 [18], object 18, 1818, Lessing J. Rosenwald
Collection, Library of Congress. © 2010 the William Blake Archive. Used with
permission. This project is supported in part by a William Blake Archive Reproduction
Grant for Graduate Students.
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inspired, just as he rejects the doer at all, much as Butler would do after him.
Blake’s configuration of inspiration differs. I argue that a Blakean sense of
inspiration suggests a process whereby the “I” enacts a kind of self-annihilation by
displacing itself—but only to some extent. Allowing someone to inspire us, breath into
us, means that we dissolve the illusory border that seems to demarcate and isolate
identity, the self, and the body—we undergo self-annihilation. However, while perhaps
appearing as opposite actions, self-annihilation and inspiration are, in fact, the same
process. Erdman, in his analysis of the image of William being inspired by the star,
describes William as “flinging his body back in self annihilation” (“The Steps (of Dance
and Stone)” 81). The streaking stars, flaming feet, fiery whirlwinds, burning suns, and
lightning-like images are renovating moments. G. J. Finch states,
For Blake life is a process of continuous creation. Poetry is not, as it is
with the other major Romantics, a matter of recollection. Blake is not
really interested in imaginatively recapturing the past but in creating the
future. He writes with a dynamic sense of human possibility; poetry is
enactment, it is not about something, it is something. He is surely the last
major poet to write with such a firm sense of poetry as the eternal ‘now’ of
existence. The true subject of Blake’s poetry is liberation - not in the
sense of some kind of observable content but because the poems
themselves are performative acts of liberation. (193)
I would add that, for Blake, poetry does something, as is implied in Finch’s performative
identification. The figure of inspiration embodies the kind of action that should occur not
only when we read and look at his work but also when we interact with others. The poem,
as a moment of inspiration, becomes what it is, enacts what it suggests as we encounter it,
all the while both affirming and destabilizing our sense of self.
Applying Butler’s performative theory to Blake’s poem Milton provides a way to
make sense of his numerous reiterations of inspirational acts as they apply to identity and
action. Her theory is a theory of subversion, as her subtitle to Gender Trouble states:
Feminism and the Subversion o f Identity. Although Blake’s poem does not explicitly
focus on gender identity, it does provide an example of identity subversion, namely
human identity and poetic identity as it is passed on through texts such as Paradise Lost.
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Repetition and reiterability are crucial components for both Butler and Blake: these
activities challenge the status quo and confound notions of originality and authenticity.
While drag subverts the preconceived notions of gender potential, inspirational acts
subvert preconceived notions of human potential. While Butler demonstrates the
performativity and inauthenticity of gender by using the example of drag, Blake
demonstrates the performativity and inauthenticity of the power of God and the prophet
poet by using the example of inspiration. Boldly revising the fundamental problems of
Paradise Lost, Blake undermines God’s authority as the one and true Creator by
destabilizing the primal scene of God’s inspiration of Adam. The deconstruction of the
authentic moment of inspiration, and also significantly of creation (poetic and otherwise),
allows for a re-conceptualization of human identity and capacity. For Blake, displacing
the so-called original and authentic moment of inspiration does not inauthenticate all such
moments; rather, doing so reaffirms the authenticity of each iteration, giving them, and
humans, authority and power.
Blake’s rendering of identity offers us a paradox that is also a compromise, one
that is apt for both the Romantic period and the present. Both time periods demonstrate
preoccupations with the tension between inner and outer in terms of identity, the former
period through its interest in sincerity and constancy and in theatrical performance, the
current period through its attention to questions of identity, gendered and otherwise.
Blake addresses this disjunction by advocating self-annihilation and change. The only
way to preserve your eternal identity is through constant moments of inspiration and a
displacement of the self. Today, where the affirmation of a fluid sense of identity
sometimes conflicts with lived experience, Blake’s paradoxical retention of identity and
perpetual displacement of the self, perpetual self-examination and alteration, offers a
more balanced, if somewhat contradictory, conception of identity. One does not have to
kill the agent, as happens in Nietzsche and Butler (though she tries to refute this claim).
The agent, while more complex than a single doer, still exists and has potency, though
perhaps to a lesser degree than (visionary) action itself. The key moment is undoubtedly a
cross between inspiration and self-annihilation or some amalgamation of the two. As 1
have positioned Blake both in relation and in contrast to Butler, he offers a space of
agency while subscribing (in part) to a performative view of identity. By refusing to
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reject individual, separate identity, Blake retains the power for an individual to provoke
change, and he reaffirms the self without sacrificing interdependence or prioritizing the
doer of an action over the deed. In a perfectly Blakean paradox, the figuration of identity
in Milton leaves us with a strange but productive combination of an essential self and a
self that must necessarily construct and reconstruct itself.
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Conclusion

My analysis of Blake’s illuminated works in a theatrical context has sought to revise our
critical understanding of his relation to his cultural and artistic milieu. Conceptualizing
his works as dramatic performances reveals that Blake, far from being dislocated from his
time, engages with the concerns and debates of his day regarding public and private,
mind and body, interiority and exteriority, and reflection and action, and it offers an
important perspective for understanding his notions of identity (individual and collective)
and spectatorship.
In his essay about melodrama in the early nineteenth century, Jeffrey Cox writes,
“We need to see the array of performances in London as part of an interlocking system,”
adding that we should “see the major theatres offering tragedies and comedies,
pantomimic stages, circus rings, street fairs, and even poetic plays in print as all
connected in a performance system that helps shape each part” (“The Death of Tragedy”
163). Cox points out not only the variety of performances—those bound to the stage and
those not—but also the interrelatedness of these forms. Staged drama did not stand in
isolation from less formalistic urban street shows, nor did printed dramas stand apart
from these embodied presentations. Blake’s illuminated works provide yet another kind
of performance among the numerous ones present in London during his lifetime. His art
is just one among a multitude of performances that provided audiences with many ways
to engage with the production before them. In addition to those mentioned above,
illustrated literary editions, painting galleries (e.g., the Boydell Shakespeare Gallery),
attitudes (e.g., Hamilton’s and Ducrow’s), urban spectacles, panoramas, salons and
family theatricals for intimate stagings and group readings, and the kind of spectatorship
found in the theatres themselves (where the audience was both spectator and spectacle1)
1

The lighting o f the theatre, the constant conversation during the show, and the see-and-be-seen

(or heard) environment o f the theatres made the experience o f taking in a show quite different from the
present-day ones o f more conventional theatres. The audience had a much greater role in the spectacle. The
Coburg Theatre pushed this role to the extreme by introducing “a spectacular mirror curtain” that reflected
the audience as if it were the stage spectacle (Moody 152). As Jane Moody explains, “[T]he mirror
brilliantly dissolved the boundary between the consumer and the object o f consumption, allowing
spectators to become the subject o f their own spectacle” (152 and 154).
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all functioned to create particular yet intersecting experiences for an audience; these
experiences depended on the way the audience was encouraged to navigate a space and
engage with the artifact or production in that space, the level of physical and sensory
activity demanded of the audience, the visual, verbal, and acoustic components, and their
relationship to each other.
Acknowledging Blake’s role in this labyrinth of interconnections yields a number
of hitherto unexplored aspects and potential meanings of his works. The theatrical
context offers a different perspective for further explorations of, for instance, Blake’s
compulsion to repeat and revise, both in verbal and visual registers, in relation to
questions of adaptation and (re)staging; the relationship between various copies of the
same work and repeated performances in a theatrical run of a drama; and thematic
concerns such as identity, perception, and action with respect to theatre theory and views
of acting throughout his oeuvre. Questions that arise within this theatrical frame are the
extent to which there is an evolution in Blake’s thinking, the ways in which it
corresponds with what was happening simultaneously in the world of performance, and
how the various aspects mentioned above affect and shape an interpretation of Blake's
multilayered presentation of identity.
The dual exploration of drama and identity-formation with respect to Blake’s
illuminated works in this study opens up alternative possibilities for understanding his
composite art as a medium and the audience experience it constructs. Consequently,
viewing these works as dramatic performances allows for a productive engagement with
his paradoxical figuration of identity, one that comprises the imagination, mental acts,
and individual and the body, physical action, and the collective. In the remaining pages, I
will draw together some of my central claims about Blake’s works by briefly considering
an aspect of the visual imagery in Milton that I have not yet discussed: the star imagery
that signifies inspiration.
Blake’s unusual choice of the shooting star as one of the most common
representations of inspiration furthers his vision of identity in the context of action. Why
does he choose the shooting star, particularly the image of one entering a person (as
opposed to simply seeing a star)? An astrological basis does not entirely fit because
though the aspect of influence is relevant, the idea that the stars control human affairs and
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determine our fates makes human agency negligible or non-existent. In contrast, Blake’s
depiction of inspiration, where both identities act, most certainly maintains and even
reaffirms human agency; Milton entering Blake as a star does not suggest his unequivocal
influence over Blake but rather a mutual influence.
S. Foster Damon’s explanation does not account for the star imagery in
inspiration either. According to him, “STARS symbolize Reason” and thus “are assigned
to Urizen” (386). Indeed, in some images, stars seem to have this symbolic function: in
Visions o f the Daughters o f Albion, Theotormon uses a whip with stars at the ends for
self-flagellation (pi. 6), and, in Jerusalem, Blake depicts Albion, with tattoo-like stars on
his body, being tortured (pi. 25). Visually, Blake most frequently uses stars simply to
signify the night sky, as he does for The Book o f Job and for various single plates in his
other works, including Milton (pi. 6). However, the shooting or flaming star that Blake
selects as the verbal and visual signifier of inspiration in Milton seems to mean something
other than the stars of reason or the simple stars of the night sky.
Here, characters entering the feet of other characters, falling or shooting stars,
characters depicted and seen as falling stars entering other characters’ feet, as well as
flaming feet create the core constellation of images that depict the moment(s) of
inspiration. Mary Lynn Johnson associates the shooting or falling star with an apocalyptic
sign, “a sign that history is coming to a close and ‘Eternity’ is at hand” (235). Joseph
Wittreich draws numerous comparisons: “Prometheus” (Angel o f Apocalypse 14),
“Lucifer,” “Milton’s Satan” (15), “man’s falling away from true religion,” “the
falsification of truth, the obscuring of light,” Milton as the “destroyer” of his former
errors (15-16), and, finally, the star from Revelation, which connects “Milton to the angel
who appears as a star”—an “angel of the Apocalypse” who will “cast [error] off’ (16).
All these potential interpretations are fascinating and fruitful in their own right.2
2

Geoffrey Hartman assesses the image o f the evening star in Romantic poetry as “a Westerning o f

the poetical spirit, and the fear o f a decline in poetical energy,” as well as a “fear o f discontinuity” (176). In
this context, the star is “symbolic o f a continuity that persists within apparent loss” (150). Blake’s star is
not freighted with this fear or sense o f loss but rather it has an optimistic and celebratory status. Hartman
goes on to say that “Blake thinks o f each great poet as a new and equal star” (152); 1 would modify this
statement: Blake thinks each o f us has the potential to be a new and equal star with the power to inspire and
be inspired.
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However, given my own focus on identity and action, my interpretation bends in a
different direction.
Nietzsche’s striking example of lightning as a figure for our understanding of
deed and doer offers one potential reading of Blake’s shooting star. Nietzsche writes,
For just as the popular mind separates the lightning from its flash and
takes the latter for an action, for the operation of a subject called lightning,
so popular morality also separates strength from expressions of strength,
as if there were a neutral substratum behind the strong man, which was
free to express strength or not to do so. But there is no such substratum;
there is no ‘being’ behind doing, effecting, becoming; ‘the doer’ is merely
a fiction added to the deed—the deed is everything. The popular mind in
fact doubles the deed; when it sees the lightning flash, it is the deed of a
deed: it posits the same event first as cause and then a second time as its
effect. (“First Essay” 45; original emphasis)
If lightning equals an act (the act of enlightening the sky) and is not the cause of the flash
but the flash itself, then the same could be said of all phenomena. For instance, the
shooting star is not a star that shoots itself across the sky; rather, it is what it does. This
erasure of the doer resembles Blake’s description of the relation between work and the
doer—the identity of the doer depends on the expression of his or her work or deeds.
Furthermore, Blake uses the image of lightning as a figure for inspirational
moments. He says of Ololon’s appearance in front of his cottage that it was “as the /
Flash of lightning but more quick” (36.29-20, E 137), and Satan sees Milton go by “swift
as lightning passing” while the “startled [...] shades / Of Hell beheld him in a trail of
light as of a comet / That travels into Chaos” (15.18-20, E 109). Also, the star image from
the first page of Book 1 turns into lightning on the title page of Book II (Erdman, “The
Steps (of Dance and Stone)” 80; figs. 32 & 33). Inspiration is a complex event—a deed
with more than one doer according to Blake or a deed with no doers at all according to
Nietzsche. The disruption in the cause and effect chain displaces the doer to the extent
that it makes the fact that lightning strikes, or the shooting star falls, more important than
any nominal agency that may stand behind it. Blake does not dismiss agency (or
responsibility) as Nietzsche does, but the inextricable relation between doer and deed
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presents one reason for why Blake conceives of inspiration as a shooting star. With so
many characters involved in inspiration and with Blake’s encouragement to have us
follow suit, the specific identity behind the inspirational moment is not the overarching
point (though it is crucial for individuals at a personal and local level)—the moments
themselves are.
Identifying why Blake chooses a falling star specifically requires a further
examination of the nature of shooting stars. While actual shooting stars are not stars at all
but intergalactic debris entering the atmosphere, the misnomer suggests a connection to
regular stars, which presumably fall from their stationary position in the night sky,
thereby setting themselves in motion. Similarly, Milton’s quest for self-annihilation
represents a rejection of his stasis in Eternity. Stars themselves also offer other important
qualities that enhance those of shooting stars. In the Bible, stars serve in analogies
regarding offspring several times. For example, in Genesis, God twice blesses Abraham
and then Isaac with numerous descendents: “I will bless thee, and in multiplying I will
multiply thy seed as the stars of the heaven [...] (22.17); “I will make thy seed to
multiply as the stars of heaven, and will give unto thy seed all these countries [...]”
(26.4).3 Here, the stars indicate the sheer number of descendents that God will ensure for
Abraham and Isaac.
However, in Psalms, stars have a different connotation: “The LORD doth build up
Jerusalem: he gathereth together the outcasts of Israel. [...] He telleth the number of the
stars; he calleth them by their names. / Great is our Lord, and of great power: his
understanding is infinite” (147.2-5). These verses emphasize not only the innumerability
of the stars but also the fact that God knows all “their names”—these stars are clearly not
indistinguishable from one another. They have their own specific identities. While we
may not be able to tell most stars apart from our earthly perspective, these verses indicate
that they have their own singularity. Elsewhere, Paul proclaims, “There is one glory of
the sun, and another glory of the moon, and another glory of the stars: for one star
differeth from another star in glory” (1 Corinthians 15.41). As with the previous example,
this one emphasizes the variation and difference between stars. Rather than classifying
3

For similar references to stars, see, for example, Exodus 32.13, Deuteronomy 1.10, 1 Chronicles

27.23, Nehemiah 9.23, and Jeremiah 33.22.
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them as a group, Paul classifies them as separate entities, each entitled to its own kind of
“glory.”
These biblical resonances of stars correlate to Blake’s star imagery in Milton. His
subversion of the original moment of inspiration allows for the participation of all, not
just the select few. Stars appear almost indistinguishable from our point of view, when in
fact they are individual and singular. The analogy between a star and a human being,
then, corresponds to both aspects of inspiration: through acts of inspiration, we become
indistinguishable from the act itself (like Nietzsche’s lightning), but we also retain our
individuality despite a level of obscurity. Moreover, by using the shooting star in
particular for inspirational moments, Blake also implicitly aligns them with the crucial
act of self-annihilation: what was once seemingly fixed and permanent becomes transient
as it bums up in an instant, thus making the shooting star an apt image for these two
necessarily interrelated events. And the fact that the shooting star physically penetrates an
individual in inspiration reaffirms the necessary role that the body has in this visionary
experience and that the senses have in being open to the possibility of this experience.
In Blake’s view of things, a star is never just a star; it is always something more.
This ‘more’ can be seen only with visionary perception. The Blakean shift from ordinary
sensory perception to a higher level of perception has been one of the running threads of
this dissertation. But what exactly does this shift look like? In a letter to Thomas Butts (2
Oct. 1800), Blake includes a poem about his “first Vision of Light” (2, E 712), a poem of
enlightenment or inspiration, where he explains how his “Eyes did Expand” (8),
describing the transition from ordinary perception to higher perception:
The Light of the Morning

In particles bright

Distinct shone & clear

I each particle gazed
Astonishd Amazed
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For each was a Man
Human formd[.] (13-22)
The light of the morning functions to enact a moment of inspiration, much as the star
does in Milton. But like the star (which is also Milton), the light is much more than it first
appears: each particle of the light beam is also a man. The paradoxical image of the light
with its numerous particles is a familiar one: a larger collective that seems to be a single
entity yet clearly consists of myriad individual components. For Blake, the transition
from seeing the general to seeing the particular seems to be effortless, but the movement
from one kind of perception to the other unmistakably leads to a radically altered view of
and engagement with the world. This view reveals the true nature of reality, one
interfused with the imagination where physical phenomena are more than what the
ordinary use of our senses shows, where the concrete and the visionary subsist within
each other.
Blake continues his poem of enlightenment by personifying the natural and the
cosmic:
Each grain of Sand
Every Stone on the Land
Each rock & each hill
Each fountain & rill
Each herb & each tree
Mountain hill Earth & Sea
Cloud Meteor & Star
Are Men Seen Afar. (25-32, E 712)
Two potential readings arise as a result of Blake’s ambiguous grammar: either things
appear in their typical form (i.e., a star is only a star) when seen from afar and in their
visionary form (i.e., human) when seen up close or vice versa. In either case, the tension
resides in the two kinds of experiences, distanced and immediate. The second reading
corresponds more precisely to my analysis in chapter two that includes the critical
awareness of Brechtian alienation and the presence of medieval spectacle: Much as the
world of the imagination (or the illuminated works) can be entered and its full presence
recognized only after a kind of alienation from it, the world around us can be penetrated
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and seen for what it really is only after a more critical stance. The reality that all things
are, in fact, men can be fully grasped only when seen from “Afar,” from a more aware
perspective.
Also, Blake highlights the role of the sense of sight in his transformative
experience:
My Eyes more & more
Like a Sea without shore
Continue Expanding
The Heavens commanding
Till the jewels of Light
Heavenly Men beaming bright
Appeard as One Man
Who Complacent began
My limbs to infold
In his beams of bright gold. (45-54; E 713)
Blake explains how his eyes, not his mind’s eye, grew. Enlightenment (or inspiration) is
explicitly figured as a physical rather than mental or spiritual awakening: Blake’s “limbs”
are “infoldfed]” in the “beams” of the “Heavenly Men” who “Appeard as One Man.” The
senses grow into infinity, the opposite process of the shrinking of the senses that occurs
with the fall from an integrated identity in Urizen. Blake says that he, too, begins
“complacent,” but this complacency or lack of awareness is erased in this epiphanic
moment of insight and growth when he makes a full-bodied entrance into the eternal
world of the imagination. Though the One Man “infold[s]” him, Blake suggests that he
also actively participates in this inspirational event by emerging from his complacency to
open himself up to this life-altering experience; after all, the poem begins with him
actively “gazing” at the light to see the numerous human particles. This immersive
experience comes only after an initial moment of alienation where the world is not seen
from a more intimate perspective but “Seen Afar.” Rather than obscuring a clear view,
distance offers a clarified vision of the nature of things. In his works, Blake underscores
these paradoxically combined processes of alienation and incorporation as necessary in
the alteration of perception. The same applies to the star that Blake mentions at line 32,
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showing its humanity when seen from afar. This star echoes the star in the moment of
inspiration in Milton; the distance of first seeing the star from afar is closed as the star
falls and enters another individual, also closing the gap between two identities and
creating an immersive event.
Everything has its own individuality and identity, yet, at the same time,
everything is “One Man,” one interdependent entity. The personification of inanimate
and vegetative objects makes the interdependence of the all things even more powerful.
By identifying them as human, Blake encourages an interaction with earthly phenomena
as if they were fellow beings in the human collective and emphasizes external
connections, thereby solidifying our relation to other beings and other things and turning
away from a solipsistic view of our place in the world. By humanizing the inanimate,
Blake includes each small atom of the world in the network of human relations so that
nothing stands outside of human interest, making all significant and vital.
But precisely how do we raise our senses in order to perceive the infinite as Blake
describes above? How can we learn to see so that entering the world of the imagination
and entering one another becomes a real possibility in lived experience? These are the
million-dollar questions that Blake leaves unanswered. What he offers as a substitute is
the illuminated works. Unable to replicate in others the visionary perception that he
achieved in his life, he, instead, created the means to achieve it: the illuminated works in
both content and form function to enable this transformative and visionary state. My aim
throughout this study has not been to find the definitive answers to the difficult questions
posed above; rather, it has been to try to understand a little better the concerns these
questions raise and what is at stake in them, an understanding enriched by examining
Blake’s art through the lens of drama and performance.
Constructing the illuminated works as dramatic performances is perhaps one key
way that Blake tries to shake his audience out the confines of the “mind-forg’d manacles”
(“London” E 27) that keep us bound to a mundane use of our senses and a stifling of the
imagination, as well as to restrictive political, social, and moral ideologies. The dramatic
elements prompt the audience to see beyond the typical view of poetry and pictorial art
and help make the illuminated works come alive, and, by doing so, encourage alternative
ways of thinking and of seeing and acting in the world. In its extreme or ideal form, this
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transformative experience provoked by his medium also includes our entrance into the
imagination. If seeing properly or imaginatively allows us to see that the physical world
and the imagination interpenetrate one another and if the senses allow us to participate in
the creation of identities and things, then perhaps Blake indicates that we wield an even
greater power: to co-create the world of the imagination and, thus, the Eternal.
Employing our imagination and performing imaginative acts leads to its continuation.
The creative force of the senses in combination with the imagination that Blake
emphasizes in the theatrical and performative elements of his illuminated works suggests
that humans have great power. Raising others to a higher level of perception, one that
encourages an imaginative and physical use of the body’s senses, is not just desired but
crucial if the world of vision, the imagination, and the Eternal is to be reaffirmed and its
vital spark kept burning. How this eternal world, which holds the property of
permanence, can be and must be co-created is yet another boggling Blakean paradox, but
one that celebrates the human. The theatrical dimension of his art form stresses the
potency of human action—as in inspiration—and Blake’s expanded view of mind and
body, of real and imagined worlds, and of singular and collective identity found in the
illuminated works.
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